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 ABSTRACT 
Helicopters play a vital role in the movement of people and cargo to and from the 
installations of the oil and gas industry at sea, often in challenging environments, such as 
nighttime, where accidents tend to have serious impacts. 
The ability to remain safe is largely reliant on the processes of hazard identification and risk 
analysis. However, the processes currently used do not provide the offshore helicopter 
industry with the desired levels of safety in nighttime operations. The reasons for this include 
serious methodological weaknesses in current processes, especially the lack of a holistic view 
of the safety-critical components of the industry; biased and over-simplistic analysis of 
accidents; overreliance on reported incidents of doubtful statistical utility; ad hoc survey 
methods to elicit opinions of pilots rather than facts about hazards; and the complete absence 
of predictive analysis using hazard data. This thesis addresses these weaknesses by 
developing and implementing a new and comprehensive methodology consisting of a number 
of processes used in an integrated manner, with novel contributions in taxonomy 
development, data quality and qualitative and quantitative data analytics to enhance hazard 
identification and risk analysis of nighttime offshore helicopter operations.  
The thesis demonstrates that this new methodology is effective in describing the safety-
critical components of the offshore helicopter industry, identifying systematic hazards 
patterns and trends from the statistical analysis of accident reports, establishing the 
appropriate use of incident reports for hazard identification and risk analysis and exploiting 
knowledge and facts elicited directly from surveys of pilots to discriminate accurately the 
riskiest phases of flight, identify an exhaustive and statistically representative range of 
hazards related to the riskiest of such phases and analyse the hazard data through quantitative 
predictive analysis. The methodology is easily transferable to other operations in the 
helicopter domain by institutions of international reach (e.g., the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, ICAO) and individual helicopter operators. 
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 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the context of the research in this thesis by examining the role of hazard 
identification and risk analysis in preventing accidents in nighttime offshore helicopter 
operations. It establishes the rationale for the need for a new methodology which integrates 
enhanced processes for hazard identification and risk analysis and formulates six objectives 
for its realisation. This is followed by a description of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
The offshore helicopter industry started its activities in the 1940s in North America, where 
frequent rough sea conditions prevented the transportation by boat of equipment and 
personnel to and from offshore oil platforms. The dangerous conditions, along with long 
journey times made helicopters an appealing mode of transportation compared with water 
borne transport (e.g., Swartz, 2014; U.S. JHSAT, 2007; Qian et al., 2012; Kaiser, 2007). This 
initiated an inextricable link between the continuity of energy exploitation and safety of 
offshore helicopters. 
Since its inception, the offshore helicopter industry has experienced continuous growth and 
expansion worldwide. In 2011, helicopter operations in support of oil and gas activities 
transported over 20 million passengers around the world on more than 6 million flights, 
equivalent to over 2.3 million flying hours (Stevens, 2013)1. A limited but important part of 
such flights, estimated at 3% of the total flying hours, are undertaken in the nighttime. 
The industry profile encompasses small local companies with a few helicopters to large 
enterprises with hundreds of helicopters operating in all continents. The typical offshore 
helicopter operator provides aircraft, personnel (e.g., pilots, technicians and support staff) and 
aircraft maintenance facilities to sustain helicopter operations (Farrell, 2013; U.S. JHSAT, 
2007). In contrast to the traditional commercial aviation, the customers are not the flying 
public per se but primarily the oil and gas companies which employ the workers at the 
installations at sea. 
1 Additionally, private communication with Mr. Mark Stevens, Managing Director of Shell Aircraft 
International, on 12 June, 2013. 
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 Oil and gas companies are renowned for low acceptance of risk and the historical sponsorship 
of important developments in safety. Such developments extend in turn to their sub-
contractors including offshore helicopter operators (Hudson, 2000; Lewis, 2011). Currently, 
the oil and gas industry sets safety requirements for helicopter operations worldwide (Fox, 
2002; U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011a) with novel safety infrastructure 
and advanced safety management programmes, including challenging safety targets, that 
subsequently benefit the wider helicopter community (e.g., CAA, 2004). The safety 
management programmes address the need to identify hazards and analyse risks, which are 
subsequently fed back into the management system for sound decision-making to avoid 
accidents. This is essential given the daunting characteristics of offshore helicopter flights. 
Offshore helicopter flights are often undertaken over water at distances in excess of 300 
nautical miles from the shore, in both visual and instrument meteorological conditions (VMC 
and IMC, respectively), in daytime and at night. This environment is associated with, inter 
alia, higher aircraft corrosion rates due to salinity, limited visibility due to the interactions 
between the sea and the atmosphere, strong winds and operations conducted at a high tempo 
on platforms and boats that are plagued with obstacles (Prior and Evans, 2005; U.S. JHSAT, 
2007; Morrison, 2001). 
The accident rates in the offshore helicopter industry are still at least one order of magnitude 
greater than those of commercial fixed-wing operations (Oil & Gas UK, 2011; OGP, 2010a). 
Furthermore, helicopters are the biggest contributor to the overall risk of fatal accidents in the 
offshore environment (Okstad et al., 2012; Olsen and Lindøe, 2009; Hokstad et al., 2001; 
OGP, 2000, 2012a; Vinnem, 2011, 2010; Flin et al., 1996). These problems are particularly 
acute at night, when the accident rates are considerably higher than in the daytime and the 
knowledge of the hazards and risks associated with such accidents is very limited (OGP, 
2013a; Ross and Gibb, 2008). This is aggravated by the expected increase in nighttime 
offshore helicopter activities associated with, for example, the beginning of the exploration of 
oil and gas in polar regions. 
Overall, the safety of offshore helicopter transportation is a cause of great concern to 
operators, regulators and the workforce (Mitchell and Braithwaite, 2008; Oil & Gas UK, 
2011; Tharaldsen et al., 2008; Rundmo and Sjöberg, 1996; Skjerve, 2008; Hope et al., 2010; 
Herrera et al., 2010a), leading to many safety reviews (e.g., HSE, 2003a, b; Oil & Gas UK, 
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 2007; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, 2010; CAA, 2013; 
Lindøe et al., 2011) and uncertainty over the sustainability of the offshore helicopter industry. 
Currently, this industry operates in an unstable environment where flights are instantly 
interrupted following an accident and the associated decrease in public acceptance of 
helicopter travel (Fox, 2002; Cwerner, 2006; Mitchell and Braithwaite, 2008). This has 
recently been the case in the North Sea (BBC News, 2013; Carrell, 2009) and many other 
places (e.g., Bailey, 2010; TSB Canada, 2011), with the potential for discontinuities in oil and 
gas production flows and severe economic, political and social impacts (Mitchell and 
Braithwaite, 2008; Clark et al., 2006). 
Despite the many safety reviews, considerable investment in safety (Stevens, 2013; Howson, 
2006, 2008; CAA, 2010c, b, a), advanced safety management programmes and the attentive 
watch of coordinated stakeholders (e.g., customers, workforce and regulatory bodies), the 
offshore helicopter industry still fails to meet its own safety target. Since 2005, the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) has determined that the risk per 
period of flying exposure for an individual flying on OGP contracted businesses should not 
be greater than that of the average global airline (Stevens, 2013). The accidents and incidents 
in the nighttime are key contributors to the failure to meet this commitment (OGP, 2010b, 
2009; GCAA, 2010; Barnett, 2009b; Doty, 2010; Herrera et al., 2010a), which leads to 
serious doubts over the industry’s ability to identify hazards, analyse risks and learn from its 
operational experience to manage safety accordingly (Pasztor and Connect, 2013; Pasztor and 
Michaels, 2013; Doty, 2010; Stevens, 2013; BBC News, 2012; Ross and Gibb, 2008). This is 
due to the following limitations. 
• There is a lack of a process to outline the safety-critical components of the industry 
and, consequently, no agreed view of the industry’s components which are relevant 
to safety. This prevents the achievement of a holistic view of the hazards faced and 
perpetuates the ongoing silo approach to hazard identification and risk analysis, 
whereby stakeholders focus on their areas of responsibility oblivious to the impacts 
of their actions in other components of the industry. 
• There is no robust accident analysis process. This prevents the capture of high 
quality accident data and impedes detailed statistical analysis to identify systematic 
hazard trends and patterns, not evident from the pure description of the hazard data 
captured. 
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 • There is no agreed process to assess empirically the statistical precursor relationship 
between reported incidents and accidents, as believed to exist in the aviation 
industry, i.e., that the characteristics reported to occur most frequently across 
incidents represent the characteristics of an impending accident. This prevents the 
identification of how to best use reported incidents to identify hazards and analyse 
risks. 
• There are no factual hazard identification and risk analysis survey processes. This 
compromises the believability and generalisability, both geographically and with 
respect to phases of flight, of the hazards and risks of the nighttime, which currently 
can only be identified and analysed from surveys of pilots. 
• There is a lack of statistical analysis of the hazard data captured during surveys. This 
impedes the establishment of probabilistic predictions of safety-critical outcomes 
based on the occurrence of hazards elicited from surveys. 
This thesis addresses these limitations and, for the first time, develops a methodology that 
integrates novel hazard identification and risk analysis processes which enhance hazard and 
risk knowledge and, therefore, improves the management of safety in nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
From the background above, the aim of this thesis is to develop a methodology that integrates 
enhanced hazard identification and risk analysis processes which improve safety management 
in nighttime offshore helicopter operations. Six research objectives have been formulated to 
achieve this aim. 
1. Provide a systematic review of the hazard identification and risk analysis literature 
applicable to nighttime offshore helicopter operations. 
This highlights the limitations of current hazard identification and risk analysis 
processes and enables the development of customised solutions which address the 
limitations identified. 
2. Develop and implement a process to generate a customised taxonomy which 
consolidates a comprehensive characterisation, from a safety standpoint, of the 
worldwide offshore helicopter transportation industry. 
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 This helps in understanding the context of offshore helicopter operations and 
subsequently identifies the parts of the industry whose interactions lead to increased 
vulnerability to hazards, risks and ultimately accidents in nighttime operations. 
3. Develop and implement a robust accident analysis process to enable the collection of 
accident and operational data worldwide, assess their quality, recommend 
improvements to data collection where needed and perform statistical analysis to 
identify systematic hazard trends and patterns across the dataset. 
This allows a broad understanding of the industry’s failure modes, placing nighttime 
hazards in the wider context of all offshore helicopter hazards identified from the 
analysis of accidents using the taxonomy developed during the previous research 
objective. The process improves on the current over-simplistic accident analyses 
solely based on describing the data captured. 
4. Develop and implement a process to assess the utility of reported incidents as 
statistical precursors to an impending accident, as believed to exist in the aviation 
industry. 
This further enables to understand nighttime incidents in the wider context of offshore 
helicopter incidents and to establish the empirical relationship between reported 
incidents and accidents. This, in turn, avoids misusing reported incident data and, 
therefore, prevents misguided prioritisation of safety interventions, including in the 
nighttime. 
5. Develop and implement survey processes to capture factual, exhaustive and 
statistically representative information about the risks experienced and hazards 
encountered by pilots during nighttime offshore helicopter operations, especially in 
the most critical flying conditions. 
This enables an integral picture of the existing risks and hazards to be built, alleviates 
the current over-reliance on ad hoc incident reports and prepares the survey data for 
the focused quantitative analysis of hazards in the most critical conditions. 
6. Develop and implement a quantitative analysis procedure that generates predictions of 
safety-critical outcomes from the hazard data captured from surveys. 
This enables an assessment, in probabilistic terms, of the impact of the occurrence of 
the hazards on the safety of the offshore helicopter industry during the most critical 
condition of nighttime operations. This includes the illustration of such impacts using 
the industry’s taxonomy developed in the second objective. 
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 1.3 Thesis outline 
The thesis is organised in nine chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the fundamentals 
of nighttime offshore helicopter transportation, safety, hazard identification and risk analysis. 
This includes the definitions of safety and the associated terms and an overview of the 
processes of safety management applicable to nighttime offshore helicopter operations, with 
an emphasis on hazard identification and risk analysis. Overall, this chapter highlights the 
critical weaknesses affecting the industry’s ability to learn from its operational experience. 
Chapter 3 develops and implements a novel process to outline the Offshore Helicopter 
Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. The process builds on a brief appraisal of three relevant 
techniques useful to outline an industry’s taxonomy to then select hierarchical task analysis 
complemented by the study of relevant models from the literature. Validity is ensured by the 
critique obtained from carefully-selected Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
Chapter 4 develops and implements the novel Accident Analysis Process. The process is 
developed to ensure that the limitations identified in Chapter 2 are addressed and statistical 
analysis is possible. The implementation of the process reveals the most hazardous aspects of 
worldwide offshore helicopter operations with respect to the taxonomy developed in Chapter 
3 and place nighttime accidents in the wider context of the overall accidents in offshore 
helicopter transportation. The validity of the results is assured by consultation with carefully 
selected SMEs knowledgeable in worldwide offshore helicopter operations and comparison 
with the pre-existing literature. 
Chapter 5 develops and implements a novel process for the assessment of the utility of 
reported incidents as statistical precursors to accidents, as believed to exist in the aviation 
industry. The process includes the assessment of data for completeness and a procedure 
designed to enable the comparison of incidents and accidents for their frequencies of 
occurrence. The process is implemented using incident data from the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority’s Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) Scheme’s database and the results 
obtained directly challenge the long-lasting belief in the aviation industry whereby the 
incidents occurring most frequently indicate the characteristics of an impending accident. 
Furthermore, the results lead to a heightened awareness of the persistent problem of 
underreporting of incidents in the offshore helicopter industry. Finally, the chapter provides 
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 recommendations on how incident reports should be used for maximum benefit in hazard 
identification and risk analysis. These are essential for the exploitation of reported incidents 
to improve safety in nighttime operations. Validation of the results is done through SME 
critique. 
Chapter 6 establishes the importance of analysing risks and identifying hazards on the basis 
of phases of flight and develops a survey methodology to uncover the riskiest phases of 
nighttime offshore helicopter flights. In order to achieve this, the chapter provides a critical 
review of existing taxonomies of phases of flight and analyses in greater detail the few 
reports concerning nighttime accidents and incidents available. Finally, the chapter develops 
a novel and bespoke taxonomy of the phases of nighttime offshore helicopter flights which 
underpins the development of a questionnaire survey. Critical sampling of respondents 
ensures data representativeness and the generalisability of the results of the multiple 
hypotheses tested. The results identify the phases flown using visual scan techniques at high 
kinetic states, especially the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches, as the 
riskiest phases of nighttime offshore helicopter flights. 
Chapter 7 develops the novel Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process and, based on 
the findings of Chapter 6, implements the process to identify the hazards of the visual 
segment of nighttime instrument approaches. The process comprises a preliminary hazard 
identification stage based on the available information, e.g., the literature, followed by factual 
data collection through the application of the Talk-Through task analysis technique to a 
representative sample of pilots. The hazard data collected are then subject to categorisation 
and analysis using Grounded Theory and Template Analysis. The outcome of this process is 
the creation of a hazard template which is exhaustive and statistically representative, ready 
for quantitative analysis in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 8 develops a novel Content Analysis-based quantitative analysis procedure and 
implements it to the template. This aims to explore the systematic statistical relationships 
across the hazard data and fit regression models to predict the occurrence of adverse 
outcomes based on the occurrence of explanatory hazards. Validation is undertaken through a 
limited concurrent validity exercise using an alternative dataset. Furthermore, this chapter 
generates multiple hypotheses that provide avenues for future research. 
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 Chapter 9 ends the thesis by reviewing its results, providing suggestions for future research 
and listing the high-impact achievements. 
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 CHAPTER 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF NIGHTTIME 
OFFSHORE HELICOPTER 
OPERATIONS, SAFETY, HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ANALYSIS 
This chapter contributes to the investigation on hazard identification and risk analysis of 
nighttime offshore helicopter operations in several ways. Section 2.1 establishes the basic 
terminological definitions that are necessary to ensure consistency throughout the thesis and 
define its scope. Section 2.2 discusses key interpretations of safety and the associated terms, 
which identify the prime role of hazard identification and risk analysis in the effective 
management of safety. In Section 2.3, hazard identification and risk analysis are discussed in 
greater depth, leading to identifying the gaps currently failing to protect offshore helicopter 
operations in the nighttime. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter by summarising the gaps and 
providing the workflow to address them in the remainder of the thesis. 
2.1 Helicopter, offshore operations and the nighttime 
A helicopter is a heavier-than-air aircraft which derives both lift and propulsion from 
controlling the reactions of the air on one or more power-driven rotors mounted on 
substantially vertical axes (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013; Taneja and Wiegmann, 2003; Conroy 
et al., 1992; ICAO, 2012a)2. Given their unique ability to land and takeoff from an in-flight 
stationary position, helicopters are ideal aircraft for performing diverse types of off-runway 
missions, including offshore transportation (Fox, 2002). 
A problem arises with the inconsistent definitions of what constitutes offshore operations 
(e.g., CAA, 2008; ICAO, 2010c, 2005a; Barroso, 2012). In this thesis, such operations refer 
only to the movement of people and/or cargo to or from installations operated by the oil and 
gas industry on the sea (Simons et al., 2011; CAA, 2008). These include fixed and moving 
installations (e.g., platforms and boats) for the exploration and/or exploitation of oil and gas 
reserves on the seabed. 
2 Powered-lift (e.g., tilt rotor) and gyroplane aircraft are not covered by this thesis since they are not considered 
to be helicopters (ICAO, 2012a)  
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 The nighttime comprises of the hours between the end of the evening civil twilight and the 
beginning of the morning civil twilight (ICAO, 2010c)3. In this period of time, the horizon 
and terrestrial objects cannot be distinguished clearly in the absence of light from sources 
other than the sun. The considerable safety implications of this are investigated in this thesis. 
Nighttime offshore helicopter operations correspond to only approximately 3% of the overall 
hours flown by offshore helicopter worldwide (Ross and Gibb, 2008). However, offshore 
helicopter activities at night are expected to increase considerably in the near future due to 
four important drivers: expansion towards the polar circles, redress of repressed demand, 
emergency attendance and technology developments. These drivers are briefly described 
below. 
Expansion towards the poles, where the availability of daylight hours is short during several 
months of the year, accompanies the search for new oil and gas deposits necessary to meet 
the growing demand for energy worldwide (Wheatcroft, 2010; Donnelly, 2005; Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources, 2009; Gautier, 2007; BarentsObserver, 2011b; 
Nikitinskaya, 2011; BarentsObserver, 2011a; OGP, 2013b; Oil & Gas UK, 2010; Schenk et 
al., 2009). Repressed demand refers to intense oil and gas activities which would require 
helicopter support beyond the available daylight hours but remain limited to such by local 
laws or practice which are currently under revision, for example, in Brazil and the Middle 
East (Sosa, 2010; Quintão, 2010; Barnett, 2009a). Emergency attendance increases with the 
growing offshore population, which may require nighttime evacuation by helicopter on an 
individual basis (e.g., for medical conditions, known as medical evacuation or ‘medvac’) or 
collectively. Examples of the latter are accidents involving platforms/ships (e.g., McGinnes 
and Sims, 2012) and natural catastrophes, such as extreme storms, monsoons, hurricanes and 
cyclones (Vinnem, 2011; HART Aviation, 2007). Finally, technological developments refer 
to new infrastructure devised to support sustained flights in degraded visual environments 
(DVE), especially the nighttime. These include the redesign of helideck lighting schemes, 
incorporation of Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance into Airborne Radar Approach 
3 The end of the evening civil twilight and the beginning of the morning civil twilight correspond to the 
moments when the geometric centre of the sun reaches 6o below the horizon after the sunset and before the 
sunrise, respectively ICAO (2010c). The Convention on International Civil Aviation - Annex 6 - Operation of 
Aircraft. 7th ed. Montréal: ICAO. 
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 (ARA) procedures4, development of satellite-based differential GPS signals for vertical 
guidance on approach manoeuvres and the widespread use of Automatic Voice Alerting 
Devices (AVAD) and Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS; see Howson, 2006 
for all technological developments). 
In order to understand its role in nighttime offshore helicopter operations, the definition of 
safety is explored in the next section. 
2.2 Safety 
Numerous definitions of safety can be found in the literature, each reflecting slightly different 
interpretations within specific domains (e.g., Lewis, 2011; ISO/IEC, 1999; JSSI - Occurrence 
Data Analysis Working Group, 2006; Hollnagel, 2013; Weick, 1987; Reason, 2008). 
However, a common understanding is that safety represents the absence of unexpected and 
undesirable events with damaging consequences, typically accidents (Hollnagel, 2004). The 
definitions of safety by the absence of such events are currently referred to as ‘Safety-I’ 
(Hollnagel, 2013), which encapsulates the definition adopted by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation5 (ICAO). According to the ICAO, safety is the ‘state in which harm to 
persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level 
through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management’ (ICAO, 2012, 
pp.12). 
An alternative view, called ‘Safety-II’, stipulates that safety should be understood primarily 
as the presence of expected and intended events, in addition to the absence of unexpected and 
unintended events (Hollnagel et al., 2011; Hollnagel, 2013). This corrects what Reason 
(2008) referred to as an ‘imbalance of understanding’ of safety (pp. 265) created by the 
apparent lack of empirical activity during its long-lasting presence. However, the definition 
outlined by the ICAO is adopted in this thesis to ensure consistency with ongoing practices in 
4 This is an instrument navigation procedure in which the airborne meteorological radar is used for horizontal 
navigation and the radar altimeter is used for vertical navigation. See Nascimento (2009). 
5 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the United Nations’ specialised agency for 
international civil aviation, with 191 member countries in 2013. ICAO (2013). 2013 Safety Report. Montréal: 
ICAO.6 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the aviation regulator across 29 European contracting 
States. 
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 aviation. The ICAO definition of safety requires that the concepts of hazard and risk are 
discussed in relation to safety. 
2.2.1 Risk 
Safety relates to risk, since a higher level of risk (as typically measured by the number of 
accidents) corresponds to a lower level of safety. Furthermore, risk is frequently described as 
the likelihood of a lack of safety, i.e., that an accident can happen (Hollnagel, 2008; ISO, 
2009; Cvetkovich and Earle, 1985; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). 
In aviation specifically, guidance documents from the ICAO, the European Aviation Safety 
Agency6 (EASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration7 (FAA) describe risk as a measure 
of the expected losses which can be caused by an undesirable event, factored with the 
probability of the event occurring (Stolzer et al., 2008; Lewis, 2011). This probability is, in 
turn, determined by an event’s underlying cause, usually referred to as a hazard (discussed in 
the next section). Table 2-1 outlines the definitions which are widely accepted in aviation. 
Table 2-1 – Definitions of risk in aviation 
Organisation Definition 
ICAO and 
EASA 
The likelihood of injury to personnel, damage to structures or equipment, loss 
of material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function, measured 
in terms of probability and severity (EASA, 2013d; ICAO, 2010e) 
FAA A composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a 
hazard in the worst credible system state (Stolzer et al., 2008) 
6 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the aviation regulator across 29 European contracting 
States. 
7 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the USA’s national aviation regulator. 
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 2.2.2 Hazard 
Across domains, a hazard generally represents a threat to humans and what they value (e.g., 
ISO, 2009; Cvetkovich and Earle, 1985; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). In aviation, the 
definitions of hazard follow this lead, with a tendency to be more prescriptive, as listed in 
Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2 – Definitions of hazard in aviation 
Organisation Definition 
ICAO and 
EASA 
A condition, object or activity with the potential of causing injuries to 
personnel, damage to structures or equipment, loss of material, or reduction 
of ability to perform a described function (ICAO, 2012c; EASA, 2013d) 
FAA 
 
Any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, or death to 
people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to 
the environment (FAA, 2006) 
NASA/ 
ASRS8 
Any issue, condition, action or set of circumstances that compromises the 
safety of an aircraft or a flight crew (cited in Stolzer et al., 2008) 
 
Common to all these definitions is the idea that hazards are prerequisites to undesirable 
events (e.g., accidents and incidents, described in the Section 2.2.3) and hence, the study of 
hazards forms a fundamental part of the strategies to mitigate undesirable events, i.e., the 
management of safety (Stolzer et al., 2008). In aviation, however, the concepts ‘hazard’ and 
‘operation’ are fundamentally related. 
The ICAO defines an operation as: 
‘an activity or group of activities which are subject to the same or similar hazards and 
which require a set of equipment to be specified, or the achievement and maintenance of a 
8 Guidelines provided by the USA’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the users of the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
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 set of pilot competencies, to eliminate or mitigate the risk of such hazards’ (ICAO, 2010c, 
pp. I-1-8). 
This definition has two main implications. Firstly, since hazards are operation-specific, there 
is no one-size-fits-all accident prevention strategy applicable across the gamut of operations 
undertaken by helicopters (U.S. JHSAT, 2007). Secondly, there is little justification for 
constraining the collection and analysis of hazard data based on arbitrary and artificial 
boundaries, such as company and the country of operation (Harris, 2006a; Lewis, 2011). This 
constraint currently exists (as further explained in Section 2.3.3) and may prevent important 
hazards from being identified, especially as accidents and incidents become progressively 
rare (Amalberti, 2001). The definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘incident’ and the possible 
relationship between them are discussed below. 
2.2.3 Accident and incident 
Although the definitions of an ‘accident’ and ‘incident’ are mostly domain-specific (Dupuy, 
2011; Hollnagel, 2004), they usually converge in that an accident represents a sudden, 
unwanted and unforeseen event involving an observable, well defined and damaging loss. An 
incident, however, is usually loosely defined and represents an occurrence of sufficient 
(actual or potential) severity to warrant reporting, but one which still represents an affordable 
loss (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008; Kjellén, 2000). In aviation, a subset of the incidents, 
called ‘serious incidents’, is considered important. Table 2-3 outlines the various definitions 
used in aviation. 
The importance of identifying and reporting the occurrence of incidents (and serious 
incidents) stems from the fact that such events are generally believed to share the aetiology of 
accidents, i.e., the hazards leading to accidents and incidents/serious incidents are largely the 
same. Therefore, the occurrence of an incident/serious incident is viewed as important (even 
necessary) to enable lessons to be learned for the purposes of preventing accidents 
(Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008; Kjellén, 2000). 
However, the definitions presented in Table 2-3 show that assigning the status of ‘incident’ or 
‘serious incident’ to an occurrence depends on a value judgement made by the observer. 
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 Given the subjectivity involved, there is no guarantee that reported incidents will reflect the 
conditions likely to lead to an accident. As a consequence, there is usually no agreement as to 
how incident reports can be usefully exploited for the purpose of hazard identification, risk 
analysis and ultimately accident prevention (Reason, 2008; Hollnagel, 2004). This is very 
important for offshore helicopter operations in the nighttime and, therefore, is further 
discussed in Section 2.3.3.1. 
Table 2-3 – Definitions of accident, serious incident and incident in aviation (ICAO, 2010e) 
Event Definition 
Accident An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which [...] takes 
place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of 
flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked [...], in which 
[...] a person is fatally or seriously injured [...,] the aircraft sustains 
substantial damage or structural failure [..., or] the aircraft is missing or is 
completely inaccessible 
Serious incident An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high 
probability of an accident [...] 
Incident An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation 
 
From the definitions hitherto discussed, it is clear that achieving a state of safety relies on the 
ability to either prevent unwanted events from happening or ensuring that the consequences 
of such events are kept within acceptable limits (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008). This 
requires that processes are in place to learn from the experience accumulated in the field, i.e., 
processes of experience feedback, which enable hazard identification, risk analysis and 
thence safety management (Sklet, 2004; Hale, 1997; Kjellén, 2000; Reason, 2008; Weick, 
1987; Yantiss, 2011; Buzek and Chastel, 2010; Hollnagel, 2012; 2009; 2008b; 2004; ICAO, 
2012c). In aviation, the processes to feedback the hazards experienced in the field and 
associated risks into the management system abound and form the core of the overall 
processes of safety management, reviewed in the next section. 
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 2.2.4 Safety management 
Safety management in aviation is best understood from the umbrella regulations established 
by the ICAO. The ICAO, in its pursuit of the safe, orderly and economic development of air 
transport, requires that various processes of safety management are implemented according to 
a three-layered hierarchy of control structures formed by the ICAO itself, Member States and 
individual aviation product and service providers (ICAO, 2012c). The requirements of the 
ICAO are established in the 19 annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation9 
(ICAO, 2006a), which contain international standards and recommended practices (SARPs). 
Some SARPs mostly regulate safety (Stolzer et al., 2008; ICAO, 2013) irrespective of the 
aircraft type and, therefore, the majority of the annexes apply to offshore helicopter 
operations. A summary of the safety aspects of the annexes, with their applications and 
limitations in offshore helicopter transportation, is provided in Appendix 1. 
According to the SARPs, ICAO’s main function which directly impacts safety management 
through hazard identification and risk analysis is the gathering and aggregate analysis of 
accident and serious incident reports at the worldwide level (ICAO, 2010e). However, this 
has serious shortcomings in offshore helicopter operations, explained in Section 2.3.3.1. 
ICAO’s SARPs related to a State’s safety management support the discharge of two functions 
which are key for hazard identification and risk analysis at the State level: the investigation of 
accidents and serious incidents (explained in Section 2.3.3.1) and the establishment and 
maintenance of a State Safety Programme (SSP), explained in Section 2.2.4.1. 
At the organisational level, the SARPs establish the high-level requirements for hazard 
identification and risk analysis on the basis of the Safety Management System (SMS) and the 
analysis of various types of datasets. This is explained in Section 2.2.4.2. 
9 Adherence to the mandate of the Convention on International Civil Aviation is obligatory unless a Notification 
of Differences is filed by the State where national regulations and practices differ from the standards established 
by the ICAO. ICAO (2006a). The Convention on International Civil Aviation. 9th ed. Montréal: ICAO. 
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 2.2.4.1 State Safety Programme 
A State Safety Programme (SSP) is a management system for the regulation and 
administration of safety by the State, which aims to achieve an acceptable level of safety 
(ALoS) in the State, as measured by the aggregate safety performance of the State’s aviation 
industry. This is pursued through the application of safety-focused business and quality 
management processes at the State level, aimed at supporting data-driven decisions by the 
State (Stolzer et al., 2008, 2011; Yantiss, 2011; CAA, 2010e). The underlying assumption is 
that safety is an emergent property of robust processes (Yantiss, 2011; Transport Canada, 
2008; Hsu et al., 2010; Maurino, 2007; SMICG, 2010a). 
Combining performance-based and prescriptive requirements (ICAO, 2012c), the SSP is 
formed of four components, also referred to as the pillars of: State safety policies and 
objectives, State safety promotion, State safety risk management and State safety assurance. 
State safety policies and objectives involve the enactment of the legislative framework to 
ensure aviation safety in the State. State safety promotion trains State safety professionals to 
the level required for the competent discharge of their functions and creates an environment 
in which information flows openly between the stakeholders involved in safety management 
within the State. State safety risk management and State safety assurance are the SSP’s 
components directly related to hazard identification and risk analysis. 
The State safety risk management component establishes the requirements and oversees the 
development of the SMS which should enable product and service providers to continuously 
and effectively identify hazards and analyse/mitigate risks in their organisations, as well as 
demonstrate their safety management capability to the State (Hernandez, 2005; Yantiss, 
2011). This includes the agreement with the Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) proposed 
by the provider, including the associated alert and target levels of performance (ICAO, 
2012c). SPIs are metrics on the basis of which the safety status of the product and service 
provider is inferred with reference to (i) unwanted outcomes which could not be prevented 
(i.e., lagging indicators, e.g., number of accidents) and (ii) the performance on key safety 
processes believed to control unwanted outcomes, i.e., leading indicators, e.g., level of 
regulatory compliance (Okstad et al., 2012; Grabowski et al., 2007; Vinnem, 2010). SPIs are 
important for hazard identification and risk analysis since, in essence, a lagging SPI refers to 
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 a hazard which could not be mitigated and a leading SPI represents a hazard which may still 
be mitigate before any adverse outcome occurs. 
The State safety assurance component cyclically gathers and analyses data on hazards and 
risks at the State level basically through oversight and surveillance activities of the product 
and service providers’ SMS (e.g., through the actual performance achieved on the SPIs). 
Together with the State safety assurance component, State safety risk management should 
enable the experience feedback to take place at a State level largely based upon the hazards 
identified and risks analysed by various product and service providers through the Safety 
Management System (SMS). 
2.2.4.2 Safety Management System 
In compliance with the ICAO requirements ratified by the State, product and service 
providers must develop and implement a Safety Management System (SMS) within their 
organisations. An SMS is defined as ‘a systematic approach to managing safety, including 
the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures’ (ICAO, 
2012c, pp. 10), which are developed by operators under the supervision of - and subject to 
approval by - the State (Yantiss, 2011). 
Like with the SSP, the SMS is built upon the premise that safety is an emergent property of 
robust business- and quality-oriented processes (Transport Canada, 2008; ICAO, 2012c; 
Yantiss, 2011; Stolzer et al., 2011, 2008; Hsu et al., 2010; Maurino, 2007; CAA, 2010e) 
realised according to the four components of safety policies and objectives, safety risk 
management, safety assurance and safety promotion (Yantiss, 2011; ICAO, 2012c). 
Safety policy and objectives create the frame of reference for the operation of the SMS within 
the organisation. Safety promotion ensures the right qualification of safety personnel and 
publicity of the SMS (ICAO, 2012c; Yantiss, 2011). Safety risk management and safety 
assurance perform hazard identification and risk analysis/mitigation in complementary 
circumstances. Safety risk management addresses the need of ad hoc hazard identification 
and risk analysis/mitigation related to, for example, an increase in safety-related events. 
Safety assurance, in turn, is a closed-loop control function in which the organisation 
formulates goals (typically by means of target and alert levels of SPIs), identifies the actual 
state of affairs with reference to these goals and gears the state of affairs towards the goals by 
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 subjecting any deviations detected to hazard identification and risk analysis/mitigation 
(Yantiss, 2011; ICAO, 2012c; Harper et al., 2011). Analysing multiple datasets (e.g., accident 
and incident reports, surveys of aircrew) independently is essential since it is at the 
organisational level that various hazards and risks are directly experienced. 
This and the previous sections have highlighted that hazard identification and risk analysis 
are essentially conducted through the investigation of data collected from multiple sources 
primarily at the organisational level, followed by escalated analyses at the State and 
international levels (SMICG, 2010b; ICAO, 2012c). The actual realisation of hazard 
identification and risk analysis, in terms of processes and requirements, are discussed in the 
following section. 
2.3 Hazard identification and risk analysis 
Hazard identification and risk analysis, as currently realised in offshore helicopter operations, 
including in the nighttime, are best understood in the context of the processes used across 
various safety-critical industries. This is important because the scientific literature on hazard 
identification and risk analysis processes in offshore helicopter operations is poor to say the 
least. A consolidated view of the processes in use across various safety-critical industries is 
provided in the next section. 
2.3.1 Consolidated view from the safety-critical industries 
Safety-critical industries, such as nuclear energy generation, chemical processing, civil 
aviation and oil and gas exploitation, have employed various processes to identify hazards 
and analyse risks in their operations. Appendix 2 presents an extensive list of 147 such 
processes drawn from the safety literature, along with examples of the processes’ areas of 
application and further bibliographic references. The list includes well-know processes, such 
as the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
studies, as well as processes which focus on specific types of hazards and risks, e.g., the 
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). Whereas some processes only deal with 
hazard identification, other processes are focused on risk analysis (e.g., safety audits and risk 
matrix, respectively). Furthermore, there are processes which are complete frameworks fit for 
both hazard identification and risk analysis (e.g., the Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) 
process). Since the references in Appendix 2 explain the processes listed extensively (and 
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 provide yet further references), the processes are only discussed in this thesis if and where 
used. 
Most hazard identification and risk analysis processes are customised to a specific industry, 
application (e.g., only technical systems), situation or type of hazard (e.g., human error). 
Therefore, the choice of processes to address a given problem must be done accordingly. For 
example, hazard identification and risk analysis through accident and incident statistical 
analysis are suitable with high frequency accidents. Alternatively, in-depth investigations of 
single events are typically used to identify the hazards associated with infrequent accidents. 
Finally, the identification of the hazards likely to lead to very rare large scale accidents is 
usually undertaken through systemic analytical processes which scrutinise normal operations 
(Sklet, 2004; Rasmussen, 1997; Shryane et al., 2000; Hollnagel, 2008). In the face of 
different types of hazards for a single operation, different processes should be selected 
(Reason, 2008; Hollnagel, 2004). 
The selection of hazard identification and risk analysis processes should also reflect the 
complexity of the activity under investigation. For example, simple, directly linked activities, 
such as the operation of non-complex mechanical devices, may be covered by processes 
which enable the identification of hazards and the analysis of risks irrespective of the 
surrounding context, e.g., checklists. Complex activities with considerable human 
involvement, on the other hand, require processes which characterise the operational context 
in detail. This is essential because the context largely shapes human performance (Hollnagel, 
2012; 2009; 2004), as is the case in nighttime offshore helicopter flying. A consolidated 
review of the human factors literature on the requirements for human orientation in flights in 
degraded visual environments (DVE) endorses this view. 
2.3.2 Consolidated view from flights in degraded visual environments 
Safe flights from pilots in DVE require both sustained spatial orientation and the ability to 
avoid collisions. These in turn depend on accurate visual perception and decision-making, 
both of which are highly context-dependent and prone to impairment in DVE, as discussed 
below. 
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 2.3.2.1 Visual perception and spatial orientation 
The human ability to move in space depends significantly on information captured by vision, 
which accounts for approximately 80% of the sensual inputs needed for Earth-based two-
dimensional (2-D) locomotion. Visual reliance is greater in aviation, where 3-D acceleration 
often misleads the proprioceptive and vestibular systems which would otherwise contribute to 
20% of the orientation inputs (Newman, 2007). The human ability to move in space also 
depends on the central nervous system integrating these inputs and interpreting them against 
internal models of locomotion (Cheung, 2004). Therefore, perception and orientation depend 
both on ‘bottom-up’ neural sensing mechanisms as well as ‘top-down’ interpretative 
processes (Cheung et al., 1995). Consequently, misperceptions (and spatial disorientation) 
may result from the following:  
• Absence or insufficiency of external visual stimuli; 
• Breakdown in the capture of external stimuli; 
• Breakdown in the stimuli integration mechanism; 
• Breakdown in the retrieval of internal models of orientation from the long-term 
memory; 
• Breakdown in the matching process between external cues and internal models; 
• Inadequacy of the internal models. 
Given the mechanisms of misperception listed above, avoiding misperceptions in nighttime 
flying depends not only on the sufficiency and capture of external stimuli but on the 
integration of visual external stimuli, memory retrieval and interpretation against internal 
models, all of which are dependent on the availability of cognitive resources, thus workload 
and task complexity (Cheung et al., 1995). These in turn are affected by pilots’ chosen use of 
automation and familiarity with the task (e.g., by training). Familiarity is also important for 
the development of adequate internal models. This is a key consideration in the context of 
nighttime offshore helicopter operations because the internal models of locomotion of human 
beings are naturally inefficient for orientation in DVE, with a direct impact in decision-
making. This discussed in the following two sections. 
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 2.3.2.2 The treacherous nature of human decision-making 
Since humans usually spend their lives in daylight, their internal models for orientation are 
built upon redundant visual cues, with many of the human perception mechanisms, e.g., 
convergence, relative size and linear perspective, working efficiently and effortlessly to de-
bias and interpret such cues. However, in DVE the fewer cues available compromise the 
performance of human visual perception mechanisms (Gibb et al., 2010; Padfield et al., 2001; 
CAA, 2007), whilst the over-estimation of visual capabilities remains (Andrade, 2011). 
Consequently, unless attention is focused on actively seeking reliable visual cues, models of 
which have to be internalised a priori, wrong decisions may result. Wrong decisions in DVE, 
especially the nighttime, have led to high accident rates in aviation also beyond the offshore 
helicopter domain (see Gibb et al., 2010; CAA, 2007; Helmreich and Khatwa, 1998; Khatwa 
and Roelen, 1996; EHEST, 2010; U.S.JHSAT, 2010; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2011). One 
of the main strategies to counter-act flawed decision-making in aviation is the inclusion of 
another pilot in the cockpit for pondered decision-making. However, this also has key 
limitations, discussed below. 
2.3.2.3 Decision-making in multi-crew cockpits 
While it may be possible to solve the decision-making problem, to some extent, by 
introducing a discussion forum for situation assessment in multi-crew cockpits (Greenberg et 
al., 2005), social influences and communication problems are also inherited. This requires 
clear communication standards and unambiguous intervention policies, without which the 
intended shared decision-making can be expected to breakdown (Helmreich and Khatwa, 
1998; Gibb and Olson, 2008). Moreover, in highly stressful or unfamiliar circumstances, such 
a pondered decision-making process should give way to naturalistic strategies in which 
immediately available heuristics and recognised patterns of familiar situations are chosen 
instead (Carvalho et al., 2009; Wickens and Carswell, 2006; Reason, 2008). However, with 
poorly developed internal models, this process suffers and can potentially cause visual 
misperception and disorientation to both pilots individually, more so if crew communication 
and procedural interventions are not in place. These in turn are directly affected by 
organisational shortcomings (Majumdar et al., 2009b; Inglis et al., 2010). 
The literature presented in the previous two and this section endorses that human perception, 
orientation and decision-making are correlated to the internal and external factors present as 
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 tasks are executed (e.g., available automation, training levels, quality of visual environment, 
organisational practices). The cognitive strategies (i.e., mental models and heuristics) that 
enable the perception needed for spatial orientation, situation awareness and decision-making 
are a by-product of the operator’s experience with the work environment (Endsley, 1995; 
Gibb et al., 2010). Therefore, there is a need to understand how experience within the 
industry actually frames operators’ performance. The context of the operation needs to be 
understood (Carvalho et al., 2009) for accurate hazard identification and risk analysis. 
2.3.2.4 Context, hazard identification and risk analysis 
Characterising the context of operation in support of hazard identification and risk analysis 
usually involves the elicitation of subject matter expertise, which might require some form of 
survey or task analysis methodology to be applied (Hollnagel, 2012; 2009; 2004; Marti, 
2000; Militello and Hutton, 2000; Ainsworth and Marshall, 2000). This use of task analysis is 
widely recommended in the technical literature of aviation (e.g., Stolzer et al., 2008; FAA Air 
Traffic Organization, 2008; FAA, 2006; Arendt and Adamski, 2011; ICAO, 2012c) and has 
recently been applied in support of safe airport operations (Wilke et al., 2014). Applying task 
analysis enables a frame of reference to be created with regard to an industry’s safety-critical 
components (e.g., stakeholders), underpinning the identification of what might otherwise 
appear to be disconnected and unfamiliar hazards (Hollnagel, 2012, 2009, 2004; Harris, 
2006a; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2011; SMICG, 2013b; EASA, 2011; Borys, 2000; FAA, 
2006; ICAO, 2012c; Arendt and Adamski, 2011; Roland and Moriarty, 1990; Shepherd, 
2000; Stolzer et al., 2008; Deming, 2000; FAA Air Traffic Organization, 2008). 
However, the task analysis techniques suitable for this purpose are poorly specified in the 
technical and scientific literatures (Stolzer et al., 2008; FAA Air Traffic Organization, 2008; 
FAA, 2006; Arendt and Adamski, 2011; ICAO, 2012c), with the consequences that the 
uptake of such techniques is still very limited in offshore helicopter operations and the 
characterisation of the industry’s activities, which could support hazard identification and risk 
analysis, is currently absent. The development and implementation of a process to 
characterise offshore helicopter operations by means of a customised taxonomy of its safety-
critical components is addressed in Chapter 3. 
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 In spite of this absence, a number of hazard identification and risk analysis processes are 
currently in use in offshore helicopter operations, including the nighttime, all with serious 
flaws as discussed in the following section. 
2.3.3 Consolidated view from offshore helicopter operations 
Understanding the limitations of the processes of hazard identification and risk analysis 
which support safe nighttime offshore helicopter operations requires a review of technical 
literature. This is necessary because the scientific literature is, as mentioned in Section 2.3, 
extremely incomplete. Hazard identification in particular requires special attention since any 
hazards which are not identified will be excluded from risk analysis and mitigation altogether 
(Paltrinieri et al., 2012; Aven, 2008; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). 
The hazard datasets and associated hazard identification processes applied in offshore 
helicopter operations are part of those used in aviation and shown in Appendix 3, classified 
by various attributes. The classification most frequently used, labels hazard datasets and 
associated hazard identification processes as reactive, proactive and predictive (Stolte et al., 
2010; ICAO, 2012c). This classification is used to discuss the processes employed in the 
offshore helicopter industry in Sections 2.3.3.1 to 2.3.3.3. 
2.3.3.1 Hazard identification through reactive processes 
Reactive hazard identification processes are those which rely on the analysis of past safety 
occurrences (e.g., accidents and serious incidents) to identify the hazards which contributed 
to the occurrence (Reason, 2008; ICAO, 2012c). These correspond to what the safety 
literature presented in Appendix 2 labels as ‘accident and incident investigation’ and 
‘accident and incident statistics’. 
Whereas the identification of hazards through the investigation of individual accidents and 
serious incidents is highly regulated and usually thorough in aviation (ICAO, 2010e), the 
identification of hazards through the statistical analysis of multiple accident and serious 
incident reports is still deficient. This is associated with various shortcomings discussed in 
Section 2.3.3.1.1, with a focus on the analyses of nighttime accidents/serious incidents. 
Furthermore, hazard identification through the statistical analysis of incident reports is 
particularly deficient given that the assumption of shared aetiology with accidents mentioned 
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 in Section 2.2.3 is usually accepted unverified. This is further discussed in Section 2.3.3.1.2, 
with special attention to the nighttime incidents. 
2.3.3.1.1 Statistical analysis of accident reports 
Under the provisions of Annex 13, an ICAO Contracting State must identify hazards to safe 
air operations from the investigation of the accidents of aircraft that occur in its territory 
(ICAO, 2010e). However, given the relatively low frequency of accidents in offshore 
helicopter transportation (OGP, 2012b, 2010a), the number of accidents in individual States 
is usually insufficient to identify statistically significant trends or give early indications of 
systematic as opposed to random hazards patterns across a number of accidents (Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission, 2005). This prevent the allocation of 
resources for in-depth follow-up analyses and mitigation in areas of likely maximum benefit 
(Aven, 1992; Kjellén, 2000). 
In order to ameliorate this, the sharing of information between States is recommended by 
ICAO; however, this sharing is non-obligatory and tends to be inconsistent (Harper et al., 
2011; ICAO, 2010e). This leads to a silo, country-based contrived approach to the analysis of 
accidents, which hampers the identification of the hazards that are common across multiple 
accidents. 
These hazards can potentially be identified if accident sampling and analysis are based on the 
common operational hazards, i.e., an international, operation-based (also called mission-
based) analysis approach (ICAO, 2010c; European Commission, 2011). This is currently 
undertaken by the ICAO, EASA, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(OGP10), similar oil- and gas-related associations (e.g., the Helicopter Advisory Safety 
Conference, HSAC11) and the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST12). However, each 
such attempt has serious limitations, each of which is described in turn below. 
10 Formed in 1974, the OGP brings together many of the world’s leading oil and gas companies with the aim to 
promote responsible and profitable operations. In 2013, the OGP included 71 companies, with over 46% of the 
estimated air movements of the worldwide oil and gas activity Stevens, M. (2013). Aviation safety in the oil & 
gas business. Vancouver, Canada: CHC Safety and Quality Summit. 
11 The HSAC oversees the operations of helicopters contracted by the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico 
(USA) and routinely exchanges information with the OGP. 
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 2.3.3.1.1.1 Analysis by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
The ICAO requires the States to report the accidents which involve aircraft with a certified 
maximum take-off weight of over 2250 kg13. The reports submitted to the ICAO are stored in 
the Accident and Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) database and analysed collectively for 
frequency of occurrence and number of fatalities involved (ICAO, 2012c). Based on these, 
high risk accident categories are identified globally, e.g., controlled flight into terrain – CFIT, 
on an annual basis (ICAO, 2013). Furthermore, three-way cross-tabulations (e.g., descriptive 
summaries of accidents per types of safety event, phases of operations and aircraft categories) 
are provided upon the request of a State (ICAO, 1987, 2003). 
The restriction imposed on data entry by aircraft weight makes it impossible for 
approximately 30% of the worldwide offshore helicopter fleet to have their accidents reported 
to the ICAO (Farrell, 2013). This seriously limits the utility of the ADREP as a data 
collection platform to enable hazard identification on the basis of the statistical analysis of 
offshore helicopter accident reports at the worldwide level. This is aggravated by the 
constraint of the analysis to annual periods and the associated low numbers of accidents 
registered. Additionally, the best possible analysis provided, i.e., three-way cross-tabulations, 
does not involve statistical testing and, therefore, it cannot identify the hazards which occur 
systematically across accidents.  
2.3.3.1.1.2 Analysis by the European Aviation Safety Agency 
The EASA overseas safety of offshore helicopter operations in Europe, which are routinely 
undertaken in two main areas: the North Sea, which refers to the sea areas of the UK, 
Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Ireland; and the 
12 The IHST is a joint industry-regulator effort which was officially formed during the first International 
Helicopter Safety Symposium (IHSS) hosted in 2005 in Montréal. The goal of the IHST is to reduce helicopter 
accident rates by 80% in the ten years between 2006 and 2016. This goal is to be pursued through a data-driven 
approach based on the collective analysis of helicopter accident reports IHST (2011). The developing history of 
an accident-free future [Online]. Available: http://www.ihst.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1780&language=en-US 
[Accessed 04/11 2013]. 
13 These are the aircraft deemed to primarily represent the aggregate safety in the global air transport industry 
because they account for the majority of commercial flights ICAO (2013). 2013 Safety Report. Montréal: 
ICAO. 
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 Mediterranean Sea, which refers to the waters of Spain, Portugal and Italy (EASA, 2013c; Oil 
& Gas UK, 2010). 
Since the North Sea is internationally renowned as one of the world’s safest areas for 
offshore helicopter operations (HART Aviation, 2007; Vinnem, 2011) and the Mediterranean 
Sea is an area of very low offshore helicopter traffic (EASA, 2013b), the accidents in Europe 
have insufficient numbers to enable any statistical testing to be undertaken for the 
identification of systematic hazard trends and patterns. 
A number of other shortcomings also affect hazard identification based on the study of 
accident reports in Europe: the low quality and incompleteness of the data collected, 
complexity of the hazard taxonomies used (Selvi, 2011; European Commission, 2011; 
Moussas, 2010; Ferrante et al., 2004; JSSI - Occurrence Data Analysis Working Group, 
2006), lack of data on the level of aviation activity at the States (European Commission, 
2011), analysis constrained to annual periods (EASA, 2013a) and simplistic statistical 
analysis techniques (Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, 2005; JSSI - 
Occurrence Data Analysis Working Group, 2006; EASA, 2013b). Ultimately, hazard 
identification based on accident information in Europe is only achievable on the basis of 
individual accident reports. 
2.3.3.1.1.3 Analysis by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers and 
similar associations 
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) operates an Aviation Sub-
Committee (ASC) which requires the contracted helicopter service providers to report any 
accidents in which they are involved. The occurrences reported are input into a worldwide 
database which the OGP uses proprietarily for the collective analysis of accident data. 
Between 1998 and 2007, the results of the analysis were published as high-level descriptive 
summaries of the accidents’ main characteristics, presented with reference to annual periods 
(OGP, 2012b; HSAC, 2000; OGP, 1999). These reports formed the principal basis for safety 
interventions in the offshore helicopter domain. 
However, the accident data collected by the OGP are incomplete since adherence to the 
OGP’s ASC is not obligatory and, in 2010, only 12% of the worldwide oil and gas companies 
actively participated in the ASC (Doty, 2010; OGP, 2010a; Vinnem, 2011). This directly 
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 affects the scope of the analyses undertaken by the OGP and compromises the reliability of 
many other studies which are primarily based on the OGP’s accident dataset (e.g., Clark et 
al., 2006; Williams, 2000; Zoers, 2005; Vinnem, 2011, 2008). 
In addition, terminological disagreements have biased the studies of offshore helicopter 
accidents, undertaken by the OGP. For example, the HSAC has identified that the accident 
statistics in the Gulf of Mexico are frequently understated because the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)14 classifies as ‘incidents’ occurrences which would 
elsewhere be labelled ‘accidents’, e.g., some types of survivable forced-landings at sea, also 
known as ‘ditchings’ (Williams, 2012). 
Another key shortcoming in the analysis of accidents by the OGP is the absence of an 
analysis process which employs statistical testing for the identification of systematic hazard 
trends and patterns. Given the purely qualitative nature of the OGP’s analyses, the results 
cannot be generalised. 
However, one such qualitative study is worth mentioning because it specifically focused on 
risk management of nighttime offshore helicopter operations worldwide. Ross and Gibb 
(2008) reviewed accidents of helicopters involved in maritime operations between 1990 and 
2007 to identify an accident rate five times higher than the overall rate in this period. This 
was primarily caused by the lack of pilot standardisation and the application of improper 
flying techniques, which resulted in a number of recommendations, especially related to dual 
crew pairing, pilot training, procedure standardisation and enhanced technologies. However, 
this study can be criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, the accidents were sampled on 
the basis of data availability as opposed to any theoretical consideration, e.g., data timeliness. 
Secondly, accidents from operations other than offshore (e.g., marine pilot transfer and 
maintenance flights) were pooled together with data from offshore operations and analysed. 
This might have led to the identification of hazards which do not necessarily exist in the 
offshore domain. Finally, only the nighttime accidents were analysed, which prevented the 
identification of any specific hazard trends associated with the nighttime by comparison with 
the hazards present in all lighting conditions. 
14 NTSB is the USA’s national accident investigation authority. 
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 Qualitative analysis, with the associated inability to generalise any results, has also been the 
focus of many other studies of helicopter accidents undertaken at regional and national levels 
by organisations which, like the OGP, request the reporting of accident data contractually in 
their spheres of influence. These include Oil & Gas UK, Norwegian Oil and Gas Association 
and the HSAC in the Gulf of Mexico (Herrera et al., 2010a; Hokstad et al., 1999; HSE, 
2003b; Vinnem, 2011, 2008; Barnett, 2009a; Morrison, 2001; Oil & Gas UK, 2011; 2007). 
Overall, the studies of accidents undertaken by the offshore oil and gas industry are of limited 
utility for hazard identification, risk analysis and ultimately for any safety improvements in 
helicopter operations. 
2.3.3.1.1.4 Analysis by the International Helicopter Safety Team 
The International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) identifies hazards from the analysis of 
official accident reports using a framework adapted from that produced by the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in the context of fixed-wing aircraft operations in the USA in 
the 1990s. The CAST’s framework required the regional analysis of accident reports on an 
annual basis using bespoke taxonomies. This led the IHST to adopt a per-region (e.g., Persian 
Gulf) or per-country, per-calendar-year, per-operation-type helicopter accident data collection 
and analysis strategy (IHST, 2011). 
Even though the IHST’s analyses cover offshore helicopter operations, the data collection 
strategy is constrained by annual periods and sometimes for single countries. This has 
perpetuated the problem of a low number of accidents recorded and, therefore, poor statistical 
utility. Furthermore, the IHST’s analysis framework is also qualitative in nature, i.e., the 
analysis yields solely accident frequency counts, with no hypothesis testing which could 
identify systematic hazard trends and patterns (U.S. JHSAT, 2007; 2009, 2010; EHEST, 
2010; Canadian Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011). 
Another fundamental problem associated with the IHST’s framework is the inappropriateness 
of the taxonomies inherited from the fixed-wing domain when applied to the analysis of 
helicopter accidents. For example, the unique phases of flight of helicopters are poorly 
covered, the breakdown into helicopter operations is too generic (e.g., onshore and offshore 
activities being grouped together as commercial air transport) and the classification of human 
factors-related hazards is unsound. There is usually a significant bias to assign ‘pilot 
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 judgement and actions’ as the cause of accidents (Howson, 2012). Consequently, the analysis 
outputs achieved are too simplistic to realise the safety improvement pursued (Huber, 2013). 
Given the various limitations in the sampling and analysis of accident reports mentioned in 
Sections 2.3.3.1.1.1 to 2.3.3.1.1.3 and this section, the hazards to offshore helicopter 
operations are still identified primarily from the investigation of individual accidents and the 
safety interventions are devised accordingly (European Commission, 2011; Rowe et al., 
2006; Howson, 2006; CAA, 2010d; Hart, 2005). However, addressing the hazards identified 
from individual investigations is likely to have only incremental effects on the overall safety 
level achieved by the whole industry. As explained before, this stems from the fact that the 
precipitating circumstances (i.e., the hazards) prevailing in the population of accidents cannot 
be identified from single events (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). Furthermore, the ability to 
predict critical accident characteristics on the basis of statistical analysis of hazard data is 
desirable in aviation (further explained in Section 2.3.3.3) but currently inexistent. 
In order to enable the systematic hazard trends and patterns to be identified across the 
accident data, especially in the nighttime, a novel accident analysis process is required. This 
process should enable the analysis of the hazards of accidents in all lighting conditions so that 
the hazards of the nighttime may be assessed with respect to the overall hazards of accidents 
in the offshore helicopter environment. A novel accident analysis process is developed and 
implemented in Chapter 4. 
Given the low numbers of accidents typically recorded, the analysis of reported incidents is 
given considerable importance in offshore helicopter operations, discussed below. 
2.3.3.1.2 Statistical analysis of incident reports 
Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3.1 introduced the use of incident (and serious incident) reports for 
hazard identification in lieu of the infrequent accident reports, on the basis of the acceptance 
of a shared aetiology principle. Under this assumption, monitoring and acting appropriately 
on the hazards identified from the analysis of incidents and serious incidents enable accidents 
to be prevented (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008; Kjellén, 2000). 
This view largely stems from the pioneering work of Heinrich, first published in 1931 and 
revised a number of times since (e.g., Heinrich, 1980). Based on the review of a large number 
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 of industrial accident reports sampled from factories and insurance claims, Heinrich 
concluded that accidents of varying severities were related to each other by their frequencies 
of occurrence in an iceberg- or pyramid-like fashion. According to the iceberg/pyramid, in a 
unit group of 330 accidents sharing the same set of characteristics (e.g., underlying hazards 
expressed by the causes of the occurrence), 300 resulted in no injury, 29 in minor injuries and 
1 in a major injury or lost-time case. From this observation, it was concluded that ‘in the 
largest injury group – the minor injuries – lie the most valuable clues to accident causes’ 
(cited in Manuele, 2011, pp.57). 
This observation has since impacted hazard identification and risk analysis/mitigation in 
various industries. The main impact was the establishment of a statistical precursor 
relationship whereby safety events of lower severity precede high severity and relate to them 
by their shared characteristics according to threshold levels, i.e., those of the 1:29:300 ratios 
(Smith and Borgonovo, 2007; Nielsen et al., 2006). In aviation specifically, this has resulted 
in the widespread belief that the incident/serious incident reported to occur most frequently 
directly indicate the characteristics of an impending accident15 (CAA, 2000). 
However, the pyramid/iceberg, as well as its specific application in aviation, has been 
disputed on a number of grounds. These include empirical evidence contradicting the 
frequencies theoretically postulated (e.g., Manuele, 2011; SMICG, 2013b), lack of empirical 
evidence of the causal relationship between incidents and accidents (Nielsen et al., 2006), 
difficulties in harmonising definitions and thus comparing the subjectively-determined 
incidents to accidents (Reason, 2008; Hollnagel, 2004), the existence of incidents that do not 
share the aetiology of accidents (SMICG, 2010a; Westrum, 2006; Shanon and Manning, 
1980; Salminen et al., 1992; Kjellén, 2000; Nielsen et al., 2006) and poor incident data 
quality in general (Hollnagel, 2004; Harper et al., 2011). 
Unless the statistical precursor relationship between incidents and accidents, as applied in the 
aviation industry, is tested and validated, the use of the hazards most frequently reported 
across incidents as indicators of an impending accident might be an ineffective way to 
15Private communications with Captains Jon Hopkinson, Manager of Flight Operations at CHC Helicopters, the 
world’s largest offshore helicopter operator; Fernando Moraes from Petrobras; Valter Pinto from Aeróleo and 
Paulo Víctor from BHS. 
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 identify key hazards in need of priority intervention. This is very important in offshore 
helicopter operations since reported incidents are widely trusted as reliable sources of hazard 
information on the basis of their frequencies (ICAO, 2012c; Vinnem, 2010; CHC, 2010; 
Lewis, 2011; Prince, 1999; McCarroll, 2011). This includes the use of incident reports in 
probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs, e.g., CAA, 2010c) and as safety performance indicators 
(Herrera et al., 2010a; ICAO, 2012c). Chapter 5 develops and implements a process to assess 
the utility of reported incidents as statistical precursors of impending accidents, as believed to 
occur in the aviation industry. This enables the identification of the best use of reported 
incidents as tools for hazard identification and risk analysis/mitigation, guiding their 
utilisation in support of safe operations in the nighttime. 
2.3.3.2 Hazard identification through proactive processes 
Proactive processes of hazard identification actively seek hazards in the operation as 
undertaken, exploiting process measures instead of negative outcomes. As such, proactive 
processes attempt to isolate latent failures and areas where organisational defences are weak 
in anticipation of an adverse event (Reason, 1997; 2008; ICAO, 2012c). 
In offshore helicopter transportation, it is generally agreed16 that there are two main types of 
proactive hazard identification processes: those which only address regulatory compliance 
(i.e., a bureaucratic task) and those expected to provide vital information about hazards that 
need to be addressed. Forming the first group are, for example, audits and internal process 
evaluations. The latter are basically comprised of surveys (ICAO, 2012c; Vinnem, 2010; 
CHC, 2010), described in the next section. 
2.3.3.2.1 Surveys 
A survey is the process of collecting information from a sample of people who have been 
selected to represent a defined population (Burns and Burns, 2008). In aviation, surveys are 
used to identify hazards directly from the front-line personnel exposed, usually by means of 
16 Private communication with Captains Rafael Ramos, Gilvan Barros and Luiz Fleury Curado, Aviation Safety 
Officers for three major offshore helicopter operators, i.e., Líder Aviação, Senior Taxi Aéreo and Omni Brasil, 
respectively, in August, 2013. Meeting held in April, 2013 in Aberdeen with the senior safety managers of 
CHC, the world’s largest helicopter operator. Private communication in December, 2012 with the UK CAA 
Helicopter Safety Research Manager. 
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 questionnaires and interviews. These produce invaluable information where accidents are 
relatively infrequent and occurrence data is unreliable, as in offshore helicopter operations, 
especially in the nighttime (see Section 2.3.3.1; also Huber, 2013; Stevens, 2013; ICAO, 
2012c; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2011; Dery et al., 2007; Boschert et al., 2007; 
EUROCONTROL, 2000). The hazards of nighttime offshore helicopter operations were 
identified, to varying extent, in three surveys: CAA (1997), Nascimento (2009) and Herrera 
et al. (2010a). 
In CAA (1997), the impacts of in-flight paperwork in North Sea operations were assessed 
through a questionnaire survey of pilots. The questionnaire comprised mostly of rating scales 
in which pilots evaluated the workload and accident potential of hazards related to various 
scenarios. Poor helideck lighting was identified as a major hazard during the nighttime 
approach manoeuvre and, subsequently, ongoing research into an optimal helideck lighting 
scheme has gained impetus (CAA, 2014, 2010b, 2009, 1997; Howson, 2009, 2006). 
However, because the focus of the study was not nighttime operations, there were no further 
contributions to hazard identification and risk analysis. 
Nascimento (2009) investigated the hazards during the visual segment of nighttime 
instrument approaches from 22 semi-structured interviews with individual pilots based at 
Aberdeen’s Dyce airport. Using task analysis and Grounded Theory (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 
1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), an extensive, factual and bespoke list of hazards (i.e., a 
hazard template) was produced and subjected to multiple reliability and validity checks. 
Three major areas of concern were identified: 
• Decision-making conflicts - for example, pilots staying on instrument flight rules 
(IFR) after the missed approach point (MAP), in anticipation of reaching visual 
meteorological conditions (VMC). 
• Unexpected events caused by factors encountered at the offshore installation - for 
example, near collisions with the platform metalwork resulting from unknowingly 
misplaced obstacles close to the aircraft’s flight path. 
• The potential for visual spatial disorientation - resulting from factors such as a lack of 
visual cues for depth and surface texture perception during the deceleration 
manoeuvre prior to landing. This scenario was perceived by crews to be related to the 
interplay of the following seven factors: perceptual problems, attentional problems, 
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 human-aircraft interface problems, Crew Resource Management (CRM) issues, 
training problems and oversight tolerance. 
These areas reflected some known hazards of offshore helicopter operations in general. For 
example, decision-making conflicts were previously identified amongst pilots who felt 
inclined to fly under adverse conditions due to their salaries being based on wage-by-the-
flight-hour (Mata et al., 2006). Unexpected events in offshore installations are well-
documented with respect to turbulence and obstructions created by topside structures, loose 
items, thermal effects, wrongly positioned cranes and poor aeronautical charts (Morrison, 
2001; Hart, 2006; CAA, 2010b; ICAO, 2009b; Quintão, 2010; Mata et al., 2006; Gomes et 
al., 2009). The potential for visual spatial disorientation in DVE is well established in the 
aviation literature discussed in Section 2.3.2 and Nascimento (2009), and is especially acute 
in the transitions between scan types, i.e., from instrument scanning to visual scanning and 
vice versa (e.g., Braithwaite et al., 1998; Cheung, 2004; Cheung et al., 1995; Dunford et al., 
1995; Gibb and Olson, 2008; Gibb et al., 2010, 2008; Kern, 2002; Schmidt, 1999; Tormes 
and Guedry, 1975; Young, 2003; e.g., Berbaum et al., 1991; CAA, 2002a, b; Masson et al., 
2009; Smith and Foster, 1995; U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011b, a). 
Finally, such hazards were mostly associated with speed and height control problems, which 
could lead to an accident. 
Although generally consistent with the literature, the investigation of Nascimento (2009) has 
fundamental limitations. Firstly, it only covered British Northern North Sea operations. 
Secondly, this was a qualitative study and, therefore, the generalised nature of the results in 
regions away from the North Sea is questionable. Finally, because the study was 
commissioned to support the investigation of a specific accident that occurred in the visual 
approach phase (AAIB, 2011), it did not attempt to assess the hazards of any other phase of 
flight. However, it is possible that other phases of flight present higher levels of risk than the 
visual approach phase when worldwide operations are analysed. Assessing the hazards and 
risk levels on a phase-of-flight basis also in areas away from the North Sea is addressed in 
Chapters 4, 5 and especially in Chapter 6. 
Herrera et al. (2010a) followed up on the risk model developed by Hokstad et al., (1999; 
2001) to assess the frequencies and consequences of a range of hazards of helicopter 
operations in the Norwegian continental shelf between 1999 and 2009 and forecast the risks 
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 for the following 10-year period. Employing a mixture of methods, especially expert 
judgement elicited from interviews, the main hazards identified in nighttime flights were the 
approach manoeuvre, poor weather conditions and operations to boats. Given that these 
hazards were already listed in the template of Nascimento (2009), the results of Herrera et al. 
(2010a) conferred some validity to the former’s findings but added little to them. This 
stemmed from a shallower approach to the human factors aspects of nighttime flying in 
Herrera et al. (2010a) and the focus on expert judgement instead of elicited knowledge and 
facts related to hazards and risks. Furthermore, this was a qualitative study which only 
covered the operations in Norway. These limitations compromised generalisability. 
From the above it can be said that the surveys which previously addressed nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations have two main weaknesses: (i) lack of generalisability, as the surveys 
covered only operations in the North Sea and did not sample participants on the basis of 
statistical considerations; (ii) circumstantial deployments, as the surveys were commissioned 
either in response to a specific event causing safety concern or to cover a decade-long period 
of operations. These are common problems to other surveys in the offshore helicopter domain 
and widely to aviation in general (Transport Canada, 2008; European Commission, 2011; 
SMICG, 2013a; Mitchell and Braithwaite, 2008; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board, 2010; Mata et al., 2006; Gomes et al., 2009; NASA, 2009; 
National Research Council of the National Academies, 2009b, a). 
In order to achieve generalisability, rigorous design and application of the survey is 
necessary, especially with respect to statistical representativeness (Burns and Burns, 2008). It 
is also important to ensure that the hazard data generated is grounded in facts (e.g., task-
based) and unbiased. Furthermore, sound data analysis techniques must be employed to 
ensure that key information is retained when the hazard data from different participants are 
pooled together for analysis. Finally, for sustained safety benefit the survey process could be 
designed for routine application as part of the safety assurance component of SMS (Section 
2.2.4.2), instead of reactively only. 
To date, there is no standard process for conducting hazard identification and risk analysis 
surveys in offshore helicopter transportation, which meets these requirements. In order to 
address this issue, this thesis develops robust survey methodologies in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
use of survey data in statistical hazard analysis is addressed in Chapter 8. 
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 2.3.3.3 Hazard identification through predictive processes 
Predictive hazard identification processes rely on the ‘analysis of system processes and 
environment to identify potential future hazards’ (ICAO, 2012c, pp. 35). This definition 
resonates with task analysis and departs from the engineering view of prediction, which 
invariably refers to probabilities and statistical analysis. In engineering, predictions can be 
made from virtually any dataset (e.g., the accident dataset mentioned in see Section 2.3.3.1.1) 
discriminated as matched explanatory and outcome variables, provided that there are 
sufficient observations of the events of such variables and that statistical procedures which fit 
the data characteristics are applied (e.g., logistic regression applied to categorical data).  
As currently applied in the offshore helicopter industry, ‘predictive processes’, such as the 
analysis of data recorded by Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) devices and direct 
observations, might lead an operator into wrongly believing that his/her organisation is safely 
‘predicting’ hazards when it is not. For example, whereas the HFDM routinely registers the 
events of useful outcome variables in nighttime offshore helicopter operations (e.g., the 
stability of flight profiles), the explanatory variables (i.e., factors likely to have an impact on 
pilots’ ability to maintain a stable flight profile at night) are only collected when an 
investigation is commissioned to find explanations to a safety occurrence deemed sufficiently 
severe (Pilgrim, 2010)17. This approach prevents the establishment of statistical predictions 
due to the absence of information on the events of the explanatory variables when the 
outcome variable is not considered a severe safety occurrence. Since predictive hazard 
identification is the ultimate goal pursued in aviation (ICAO, 2012c), establishing statistical 
predictions on the basis of hazard data is addressed in Chapter 4 and especially in Chapter 8. 
Following hazard identification, any associated risk must then be analysed. This is explained 
in the next section. 
2.3.3.4 Risk analysis 
Risk analysis evaluates the potential loss associated with a hazard, as compared with the cost 
of controlling the hazard (Yantiss, 2011). Even though many risk analysis processes exist 
17 Private communication on 21 September, 2010 with Captain Mike Pilgrim, the Co-Chair of the Global 
HFDM Community and the HFDM Advisor for CHC, the world’s largest helicopter operator. 
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 (refer to Section 2.3.1 and Appendix 2), two processes are currently in use in offshore 
helicopter operations: risk matrix and bow tie. 
2.3.3.4.1 Risk matrix 
Risk analysis using the risk matrix is based on the worst credible severity that can be 
expected from a hazard and the likelihood that an event of such severity may occur (CAA, 
2010c; ICAO, 2012c). The underlying assumption is that if protection is devised against the 
worst credible severity, then protection against any severity is assured (Aven and Zio, 2011). 
The matrix is formed by colour-coded risk indexes which translate the tolerability of the risk 
on the basis of its expected severity and likelihood (or alternatively frequency or probability) 
of the hazard realising. If the risk is intolerable, a response action (i.e., a mitigation measure) 
is required. Once action is taken, the hazard is re-assessed in the matrix and acted upon 
recursively until a sufficiently low level of risk, i.e., as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP), is obtained. ALARP is obtained when any attempt to further reduce risk results in 
incremental benefits that do not justify the investment made for such reduction (ICAO, 
2012c; Hollnagel, 2008). An example of risk matrix and associated guidelines is provided in 
Figure 2-1. 
Although widely used, the risk matrix has a number of problems. Firstly, it is often found 
difficult to calibrated and use18. This is associated with subjectivities in the assessment of 
likelihood and interpreted severity, which stem from the flexibility to tailor the matrix in 
accordance with a service provider’s business risk appetite (Yantiss, 2011; Arendt and 
Adamski, 2011). Secondly, the risk index matrix is actually a shortcut tool which uses a 
single point estimate (i.e., the worst case scenario) in lieu of a more accurate analysis 
approach using probability distributions of possible outcome severity levels (Stolzer et al., 
2008; Vinnem, 2010; NASA, 2013). This might overburden product and service providers 
who devise stringent mitigations for unrealistically pessimist risks. Therefore, a more 
accurate approach with multiple possible outcomes is needed. This provided by the bow tie 
method explained below. 
18 Private communication in August, 2013, with Captains Gilvan Barros and Luiz Fleury Curado, Aviation 
Safety Officers for two major offshore helicopter operators, i.e., Senior Taxi Aéreo and Omni Brasil. 
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Figure 2-1 – The risk matrix risk analysis process (ICAO, 2012c, pp. 38-41)
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 2.3.3.4.2 Bow tie 
The bow tie produces a qualitative analysis of the risks associated with multiple possible 
outcomes. Starting from an outcome (called a ‘top event’ or ‘hazard’) less severe than the 
worst case scenario, the bow tie method takes into consideration the effectiveness or 
otherwise of different mitigation measures (called ‘barriers’) to assess the possible 
consequences leading to more severe outcomes downstream (ICAO, 2012c; Hudson, 2000). 
The method also enables analysis upstream from the top event, identifying the so called 
‘causes’ or ‘threat conditions’ which might precede the top event and the barriers that can be 
put in place to avoid the occurrence of the top event in the first place. Figure 2-2 illustrates an 
analysis undertaken in the oil and gas drilling domain based on the bow tie method. For 
further details, see DNV (2013). 
 
 
Figure 2-2 – Bow tie analysis (DNV, 2013) 
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 However, the bow tie also has serious limitations. Firstly, it is an impoverished qualitative-
only version of the Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) technique, with the disadvantage 
that probabilistic risk quantification is not possible in the bow tie. This stems from hazards 
which are usually not discriminated into independent events and minimal cut-sets, preventing 
the use of Boolean algebra (Nielsen, 1974; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). Secondly, the 
bow tie only holds true if both the causes and consequences of top events are linearly 
arranged. This is rarely the case in complex operations, such as nighttime offshore helicopter 
transportation, where multiple interactions take place in a network fashion (Hollnagel, 2004, 
2009; Herrera et al., 2010a). Given these limitations, a more accurate approach founded on 
probability analysis is certainly desirable. 
Probability analysis-based risk analysis processes exist in the safety literature, e.g., Monte 
Carlo simulations of hazard outcome distributions (Stolzer et al., 2008; Goodheart, 2013), 
classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis, FTA) 
and regression analysis based on data on outcome and explanatory variables stored in a 
database (Stolzer et al., 2008; Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; see also Section 2.3.1). 
Currently, there is no standard, universally-accepted risk analysis methodology in use across 
the aviation domain. Hence, an approach which enables comparable priority setting to 
address the greatest risks does not exist. Risk analysis in aviation is an area still under 
development with significant effort required on research (SMICG, 2013c; European 
Commission, 2011; Aven and Zio, 2011). Chapter 8 develops a process for predictive 
analysis of risky conditions based on expert knowledge elicitation, which can be viewed as an 
alternative risk analysis process on its own right. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has defined basic terms and investigated hazard identification and risk analysis 
in offshore helicopter operations, with an emphasis on the nighttime. Five key weaknesses 
were identified. 
Firstly, there is no process prescribed to outline the safety-critical components of the industry 
and no agreed view of such components, e.g., by means of a customised taxonomy. These 
favour low awareness of the industry-embedded hazard generating mechanisms and 
encourage a silo approach to hazard identification and risk analysis whereby stakeholders 
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 tend to focus on their areas of responsibility with little awareness of the overall impact of 
their actions on other related activities. 
Secondly, the statistical analysis of accidents is fraught with unreliable data collection and 
over-simplistic interpretations of the data collected. This prevents understanding systematic 
industry-wide hazard trends and patterns that should be addressed as matters of priority 
intervention unconstrained by artificial political boundaries. 
Thirdly, the statistical precursor relationship between accidents and incidents, as believed to 
exist in the aviation industry, has not been empirically verified even though this belief 
reinforces the ongoing over-reliance on reported incidents and their potentially wrong use for 
hazard identification and risk analysis based on the frequency of reporting. 
Fourthly, the generalisability of the hazards identified and risks analysed through surveys is 
poor, both geographically and with respect to phases of flight. Furthermore, the majority of 
the surveys are focused on judgements about hazards and risks instead of task-related facts. 
As a consequence, the validity of the hazards identified and risks analysed is questionable. 
Finally, even though the word ‘predictive hazard identification’ (or, alternatively, ‘predictive 
safety’) is routinely used across the industry, at present no statistical analysis is undertaken, 
which predicts safety-critical outcomes on the basis of the occurrence of hazards. In reality, 
there is no hazard-related predictive capability in the industry. 
Overall, hazard identification and risk analysis in nighttime offshore helicopter operations is 
ineffective from the highest international levels down to the practices of individual offshore 
helicopter operators. Therefore, a methodology which integrates enhanced processes of 
hazard identification and risk analysis, applicable to nighttime offshore helicopter operations, 
is required. This methodology formed of integrated processes is proposed and implemented 
in this thesis. 
Initially, a process to generate a customised taxonomy of the safety-critical components of 
the offshore helicopter transportation industry is developed and implemented. This captures 
the main parts of offshore helicopter operations with the potential to create hazards. This is 
followed by the development and implementation of a process for the analysis of accidents 
worldwide, which identifies systematic hazard trends and patterns, including high-level 
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 statistical predictions, in the nighttime, in comparison to the overall hazards of offshore 
helicopter operations. Then, a process to assess the statistical utility of reported incidents, as 
believed to exist in the aviation industry, is developed and implemented. This identifies how 
incident reports can be exploited to correctly identify hazards in nighttime operations and 
beyond. On the basis of the accident analyses and the conclusions from the statistical utility 
of reported incidents, two survey processes are developed and implemented to, initially, 
screen the riskiest phases of nighttime flights and, then, elicit the factual, task-based 
knowledge of pilots with respect to the hazards of the riskiest phase. The results of the latter 
are initially analysed qualitatively to form an exhaustive and statistically representative 
hazard template, which is subsequently analysed statistically. The statistical analysis 
procedure developed predicts critical outcomes probabilistically based on a set of explanatory 
hazards. The overall task-based survey process, with both the qualitative and quantitative 
hazard analysis capabilities, is designed to be transferable to other tasks and be applied 
routinely. Furthermore, in order to ensure that hazard knowledge is maintained and updated, 
any interaction between the hazards identified from the implementation of the process 
mentioned above is used to instantiate the industry’s taxonomy dynamically. Finally, each 
such process is validated to ensure scientific rigour. 
The new methodology explained in this previous paragraph is outlined in Figure 2-3, together 
with the chapters in which each process is developed and implemented. The next chapter 
starts the underpinning work of developing and implementing the process to create the 
taxonomy of the industry’s safety-critical components.  
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 CHAPTER 3 THE OFFSHORE HELICOPTER 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY’S TAXONOMY 
The previous chapter established the need for an overarching description of the offshore 
helicopter industry in order to effectively identify hazards and analyse risks. This is addressed 
in this chapter by outlining the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. In 
Section 3.1, the theoretical justifications for outlining an industry’s taxonomy are briefly 
recapitulated. In Section 3.2, relevant techniques applicable to the problem of developing a 
taxonomy of an existing industry are introduced, along with a discussion of their suitability to 
describe the operations of the offshore helicopter transportation industry. This leads, in 
Section 3.3, to the establishment of the process used in this thesis to outline the taxonomy of 
the offshore helicopter transportation industry and its subsequent implementation in Section 
3.4. In order to ensure the completeness of the seminal taxonomy developed, in Section 3.5 
the results are compared to relevant model structures in the safety literature. This is followed 
in Section 3.6 by a validation exercise using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from academia 
and industry, knowledgeable in worldwide offshore helicopter operations. As concluded in 
Section 3.7, this ensures the utility of the taxonomy as the foundation of future hazard 
identification and risk analysis in the offshore helicopter domain. 
3.1 Brief theoretical background 
As discussed in the previous chapter (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), the context of operation 
determines human performance in flight. Therefore, describing the operational context of the 
industry, e.g., by means of a customised taxonomy of its safety-critical components, is an 
important step which should precede and underpin hazard identification and risk analysis in 
offshore helicopter operations (see Section 2.3.2.4). However, except for the recommendation 
to employ task analysis methods, there is currently an absence of prescribed process to 
generate this taxonomy. The techniques which are potentially useful to develop this 
taxonomy are investigated in the next section. 
3.2 Taxonomy development options 
There are over 100 task analysis techniques, each developed to address specific problems in 
system design and assessment. This section discusses a limited number of techniques which 
73 
 
 are capable of addressing the frequently overlooked problem of describing the safety-critical 
components of an industry through a customised taxonomy. The techniques are the 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) and 
the SHELL model19. The other techniques are extensively reviewed by Annett and Stanton 
(2000b), Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992), Drury (1983), Stanton and Annett (2000) and 
Chipman et al. (2000) and, therefore, are not discussed in this thesis. 
3.2.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is the most common, flexible and fundamental approach 
to task analysis. HTA was developed by Annett and Duncan (1967) as a way to explore the 
tasks that should be carried out to meet a system’s goals in virtually any domain (Kirwan and 
Ainsworth, 1992; Annett, 2003; Annett and Stanton, 2000a). The tasks are described by a 
hierarchy of sub-goals that indicate what a person or collaborative team is expected to do and 
by plans that indicate the conditions under which the sub-goals should be carried out 
(Shepherd, 2000; Shryane et al., 2000; Salmon et al., 2011). Because HTA provides an 
accurate description of the steps required in order to complete a task (Preece et al., 1994; 
Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992), it can also identify the safety-critical components of an 
industry and enable their arrangement in a taxonomy. HTA has recently been successfully 
applied to outline the safety-critical components of airport operations (Wilke et al., 2014). 
3.2.2 Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) was specifically designed to model 
complex socio-technical systems, with a view to discovering mechanisms of aggregate 
performance variability that might affect safety and productivity. FRAM achieves this by 
describing the functions performed, where a function is defined as an activity or a set of 
activities that are required to achieve specified system goals. An activity in turn, is defined as 
a task-as-done, as opposed to task-as-imagined or -planned-for, which might be more 
frequently used in task analysis methods (Hollnagel, 2012). 
19 NB: neither FRAM nor the SHELL model is usually considered a task analysis method. However, FRAM 
shares a number of common characteristics with task analysis, especially when FRAM is applied at a generic 
level. The SHELL model in turn is widely used in support of task analysis. FRAM and the SHELL model are 
further explained in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, respectively. 
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 Starting from any given function, FRAM explores six possible aspects that might couple a 
given function to other functions. The aspects explored are inputs, outputs, resources, 
preconditions, time constraints and controls. Having mapped the couplings between 
functions, the performance variability of the functions is assessed for their overall impact on 
the system’s stability (i.e., ability to remain safe). When the combined variability surpasses 
the system’s coping ability, functional resonance takes place (Hollnagel, 2012). 
The application of FRAM and HTA is virtually the same when analysis is undertaken at a 
high level, e.g., to describe, by means of a taxonomy, the safety-critical components an 
industry. Both techniques exploit empirical evidence related to the dependencies between 
tasks. 
However, since FRAM aims to develop a model based on various aspects of functional 
coupling, its application requires extensive access to data sources, personnel working in the 
field, subject matter expertise, human factors expertise and potentially human performance 
databases (Hollnagel, 2012). Therefore, FRAM might be more appropriately employed in 
support of thorough analyses, for example in support of accident investigations (e.g., Nouvel 
et al., 2007). For a high-level of analysis, FRAM might be an overly detailed response and 
the application of HTA is preferred as it fulfils the purpose of high-level description of the 
safety-critical components of an industry in a simpler manner. 
3.2.3 SHELL model 
The SHELL (i.e., Software-Hardware-Environment-Liveware-Liveware) model has been 
extensively mentioned in the literature as the provider of the attitude expected from the 
analysts engaged in systems modelling and safety analysis. In the SHELL model, the  
components of the model’s acronym mentioned above, together with their interfaces, are the 
safety-critical components which require attention for assured safety (Edwards, 1972; cited in 
Stolzer et al., 2008). 
The concepts encapsulated by the SHELL model have been reproduced in virtually every 
existing system modelling guidance material (e.g., DoD, 2012; ICAO, 2012c; NASA, 2013) 
and many accident analysis manuals (e.g., ICAO, 2011f; JSSI - Occurrence Data Analysis 
Working Group, 2006). However, the SHELL model is loosely defined. Therefore, it is best 
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 used as a support tool to help establish the correct mindset for safety analysts involved in 
more structured task analysis exercises (DoD, 2012; ICAO, 2012c; NASA, 2013). 
3.2.4 Other techniques  
Techniques which are developed from a negative outcome perspective (e.g., Fault Tree 
Analysis, FTA) have not been considered fit for the purpose of outlining the Offshore 
Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. Negative stance (as opposed to neutral 
stance) techniques allow awareness of only a subset of an industry’s operation to be 
developed, i.e., the parts and environmental conditions involved in the failure case studied. 
However, techniques of a negative stance can be used to ensure the completeness of a 
developing taxonomy, as explained in Section 3.5. 
3.3 Process to establish the industry’s taxonomy 
Given the features of the techniques discussed in Section 3.2, HTA was selected as the 
technique to describe the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. The next 
stage in the taxonomy development exercise is to establish the purposes and stopping rules of 
the HTA (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Hollnagel, 2012, 2009). Stopping rules are essential 
in order to ensure that the taxonomy is as wide as the purposes of its definition dictate, while 
still compact enough to be manageable (Harris, 2008). This is essential since HTA can, in 
principle, continue indefinitely and become an unmanageably laborious process (Kirwan and 
Ainsworth, 1992; Annett and Stanton, 2000a). 
3.3.1 Purpose 
The purpose of developing the taxonomy in this chapter is the following: 
To consolidate a comprehensive characterisation, from a safety standpoint, of the 
worldwide offshore helicopter transportation industry, with respect to the component 
parts and operating environment. 
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 3.3.2 Stopping rules 
In order to ensure that the taxonomy is developed at a comprehensive and generic level with 
worldwide applicability, analysis stops when further analysis would require describing tasks 
specific to helicopter types, helicopter operators (e.g., company procedures) or countries. 
3.3.3 Steps 
In order to create the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy, a series of 
steps were envisaged. They begin with a high-level mission analysis (Jarvis and Harris, 2008; 
Arendt and Adamski, 2011) for the identification of typical flight profiles in offshore 
helicopter operations. For each profile, the typical phases of flight are identified. HTA is then 
used to highlight the tasks that ideally need to be undertaken for the successful completion of 
each of the phases. For each of these tasks, the actors (defined in Section 3.4.4) who should 
perform or participate in them are identified. Then, by grouping the actors meaningfully, the 
taxonomy is provisionally outlined. Subsequently, this provisional taxonomy is compared to 
relevant structures of aviation models, risk models, accident models and performance shaping 
factors. This is aimed at ensuring the taxonomy’s completeness. Finally, the taxonomy is 
validated. 
The couplings between the actors described in the taxonomy (i.e., the processes actually 
undertaken during the operation of the offshore helicopter industry) are embedded into the 
HTA exercise and are described in the tables produced. However, such couplings are 
deliberately generic and may vary considerably in response to specific conditions (e.g., 
during nighttime operations). Therefore, in this thesis the coupling between actors is explored 
on a circumstantial basis, e.g., from overlaying the results of the statistical analysis of 
accidents onto the taxonomy to update it dynamically (further explained in Section 2.4). This 
is accordance with the need to instantiate (i.e., exemplify) FRAM-derived models, or define 
accident/conflict scenario prior to conducting detailed risk assessments (Hollnagel, 2012; 
NASA, 2013; CAA, 2010c; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). This is dealt with in Chapters 4 
and 8. Figure 3-1 summarises the steps of the process to outline the industry’s taxonomy. 
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 3.3.4 Validation 
In order to ensure that the process outlined could fulfil its purpose, experts in the field were 
invited to peer-review and comment on the overall validity of the process and constituent 
steps. These were a consultant in airport safety and a lecturer in aviation and transport, both 
with a PhD degree from a world-leading UK university, and two senior offshore helicopter 
pilots involved in safety management in Brazil. All experts were confident that the process 
could deliver the result intended. 
3.3.5 Knowledge sources 
HTA is usually undertaken based on the expertise accrued by the analyst during the course of 
the investigation and may be reviewed by collaborating operational personnel (Kirwan and 
Ainsworth, 1992). The implementation of the steps mentioned above was initially based on 
the researcher’s experience as a professional maritime helicopter pilot and, as advised by 
Bertoloni (2007), analysis of procedures, observations and unstructured interviews (i.e., 
informal conversations) with experts in the field (i.e., pilots, maintenance engineers, air 
traffic controllers, flight dispatchers, helideck landing officers, safety officers and safety 
research managers), especially during on-site visits (to both airfields and an oil platform). 
During the course of the research, the researcher observed and interviewed over 100 such 
professionals at their companies in the following scenarios: 
• British Northern North Sea (Aberdeen); 
• British Southern North Sea (Blackpool); 
• Brazil’s Campos basin (Macaé, Rio de Janeiro and Cabo Frio); 
• Norway (Stavanger and Bergen); 
• Spain (Reus, Amposta and Bilbao); 
• Netherlands (Den Helder); 
• USA (Santa Maria). 
Additionally, interviews were conducted over the phone and Skype with SMEs (senior pilots 
in safety positions) based in the following places: 
• Argentina (Magallanes Straight); 
• USA (Gulf of Mexico); 
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 • United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi); 
• Australia (Canberra); 
• Thailand (Nakhon Si Thammarat); 
• Denmark (Esbjerg); 
• Nigeria (Port Harcourt). 
Moreover, observations of pilots from the UK, Netherlands and Brazil were undertaken on 
four different occasions in high fidelity flight simulators in France. The simulators 
corresponded to three types of helicopter widely used in the offshore environment (i.e., 
EC225, EC155 and AS365N2). The simulator sessions were held in support of bi-annual 
flight training required by regulation (typically 8-hour long sessions for each pilot) and 
included scenario-based training in offshore installations. Considering the number of pilots 
observed in all four sessions (N=16), the simulator observation exercise exceeded 50 
simulator flight hours. 
Finally, general information on offshore helicopter operations was obtained from private 
communications with the regulators of the UK, Brazil, Norway and Australia. 
3.4 Process implementation 
3.4.1 High level mission analysis 
The definition of offshore transportation presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1) was used to 
analyse the mission at a high-level and derive the associated flight profiles. According to the 
definition, offshore helicopter transportation occurs to or from installations at sea (i.e., fixed 
platforms and moving boats) and the following eight flight profiles encompass this: 
• From onshore airport to offshore fixed platform – also known as long-haul; 
• From onshore airport to offshore moving boat – also known as long-haul; 
• Between offshore fixed platforms – also known as shuttling; 
• Between offshore moving boats – also known as shuttling; 
• From offshore fixed platform to offshore moving boat – also known as shuttling; 
• From offshore moving boat to offshore fixed platform – also known as shuttling; 
• From offshore fixed platform to onshore airport – also known as long-haul; 
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 • From offshore moving boat to onshore airport – also known as long-haul. 
3.4.2 Identification of typical phases of flight 
The phases of offshore helicopter flights were described in Teixeira (2006) as part of the 
development of a Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) analysis software. Because these phases are 
a considerable improvement over previous taxonomies derived from the fixed wing-domain 
(e.g., CAST/ICAO, 2011, see Section 2.3.3.1.1.4), Teixeira’s phases are used in this step and 
shown in Figure 3-2. The initiating and end events of each phase are listed in Appendix 4. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 – Typical offshore helicopter flight profile and phases (Teixeira, 2006, pp.52)  
 
3.4.3 Identification of tasks to be performed 
For each phase of flight, HTA was applied to respect both the purpose and stopping rules 
established in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. The results are shown in a tabular format 
(Tables 3-1 to 3-8), together with the identified actors, detailed in the next section. The goals 
and the typically sequential plans of the HTA are embedded in the texts of each table. 
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 3.4.4 Identification of actors 
From the tasks outlined, both online and offline actors were identified (Sklet, 2004; Svedung 
and Rasmussen, 2002; Rasmussen, 1997; Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). Online actors 
represent the parts (e.g., people, procedures, machinery) and environment present at the time 
at which the operation is undertaken and whose actions, inactions or states might immediately 
affect safety (i.e., actual hazards). Offline actors are those whose actions, inactions, or states 
lie dormant in the system during task execution, frequently remaining uncalled until some 
triggering conditions occur (i.e., potential hazards). This classification refers to the safety-
critical components of the industry and is in line with the concepts of active and latent 
failures (Reason, 1997) and sharp end versus blunt end relations in the working context 
(Hollnagel, 2004; Annett and Stanton, 2000a). The tasks and actors identified for each phase 
of flight of each of the eight flight profile are also listed in Tables 3-1 to 3-8. 
Table 3-1 (across three pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight between an onshore airport and an offshore fixed platform 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight Check aircraft maintenance records. Accept aircraft as 
airworthy. Execute walk-around inspection. Execute pre 
engine start checks. Communicate with Air Traffic 
Controller (ATC) for clearance to start engines (only if in 
controlled airspace; otherwise decide and transmit in 
blind). 
Flight crew, Maintenance 
engineers, Aircraft, Airport, 
Environment, Procedures, 
ATC 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, Original 
Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) 
Engine 
start 
Check if the area is clear of obstacles. Execute engine 
start checks. Execute post engine start checks. Monitor 
passengers boarding the aircraft. 
Flight crew, Cabin crew (if 
available), Aircraft, 
Environment, Procedures, 
Airport 
Maintenance engineers, 
Helicopter company support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM, ATC 
Taxi out Communicate with ATC for clearance to taxi and 
assignment of next stopping point (only if in controlled 
airspace; otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check if 
the aircraft is ready for ground move. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Airport, Environment 
Maintenance engineers, 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Hover out Communicate with ATC for clearance to hover (only if in 
controlled airspace; otherwise decide and transmit in 
blind). Check if the aircraft is ready for hover. Check if 
the area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command 
aircraft to hover. Monitor and maintain within power 
margins. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles 
and other traffic. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Airport, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
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 Air taxi out Communicate with ATC for clearance to air taxi and 
assignment of next stopping point (only if in controlled 
airspace; otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check if 
the aircraft is ready for air taxiing. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Airport, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Takeoff Communicate with ATC for clearance to takeoff (only if 
in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute takeoff checks. Check if the 
area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command 
takeoff. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Monitor speed increase. Adjust flight profile 
accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Airport, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Climb Communicate with ATC for climbing instructions (only if 
in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute post-takeoff checks. Adjust 
speed as required. Decide when to turn on the autopilot’s 
upper modes (see NB 5 in the end of the table). Monitor 
and maintain within power margins. Monitor and maintain 
clearance from other traffic. Monitor if flight profile is 
being executed as instructed/planned for. Adjust flight 
profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Airport, Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Cruise Communicate with ATC for instructions to level off at 
cruise altitude/height (only if in controlled airspace; 
otherwise follow flight plan and transmit in blind). 
Execute cruise checks. Adjust altitude and speed as 
required. Monitor and maintain clearance from other 
traffic. Monitor altitude maintenance as instructed or 
planned. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Descent Communicate with ATC for clearance to initiate descent 
(only if in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight 
plan and transmit in blind). Identify the destination 
installation (see NB 1 in the end of the table). 
Communicate with meteorological observer based on the 
installation for updated meteorological conditions, or 
received automated weather briefing from the installation 
(if available). Decide on approach procedure and 
approach direction to be executed. Execute the descent 
checks. Check if the approach direction chosen is clear of 
obstacles (e.g., boats and platforms). Re-plan approach as 
required. Execute chosen approach procedure in chosen 
approach direction. Adjust altitude and speed as required 
for finals. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles 
and other traffic. Assess visual acquisition of the landing 
site. Decide whether or not to proceed to landing. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Procedures, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Final 
approach 
Decide when to switch off the autopilot’s upper modes 5. 
Steer the aircraft towards the landing site. Monitor the 
continuous availability of visual cues in support of a 
visually-guided flight manoeuvre. Decide whether to 
continue or abort the manoeuvre. Assume manual control 
of the aircraft. Approach destination. Monitor and 
maintain clearance from obstacles and other traffic. 
Monitor and maintain approach stability. Decide 
technique for taxiing towards helideck area. Commit to 
landing on the helideck. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Go around Command aircraft climb and turn away manoeuvre. 
Retract landing gear if lowered and appropriate. Monitor 
and maintain clearance from obstacles and other traffic. 
Communicate with destination to inform the go around 
decision (if installation1 operates a manned radio station; 
otherwise, transmit in blind). Decide whether to attempt 
another approach or divert to alternate. Decide if and 
when to re-engage the autopilot upper modes5 (if they had 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment, ATC 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
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 been disengaged). Manage the flight path accordingly. 
Air taxi in Execute entrance technique decided during the final 
approach. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles. 
Monitor and maintain within power margins. Follow 
marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer (HLO) if 
available. NB: this phase of flight is unlikely to occur in 
an offshore installation1. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1 
(includes HLO), Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Hover in Monitor and maintain within power margins. Monitor and 
maintain clearance from obstacles. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Landing Command landing (i.e., lower collective lever whilst 
maintaining the helicopter in a stable attitude). Execute 
post-landing checks. Reduce engine power. Reduce blade 
rotation. Execute pre engine cut checks. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Touch and 
go 
Command aircraft climb and turn away manoeuvre. 
Retract landing gear if lowered and appropriate. 
Communicate with destination to inform the touch-and-go 
decision (if installation1 operates a manned radio station; 
otherwise, transmit in blind). Decide whether to attempt 
another approach or divert to alternate. Decide if and 
when to re-engage the autopilot upper modes5 (if they had 
been disengaged). Manage flight path accordingly. NB: 
this phase of flight is unlikely to occur in an offshore 
installation1. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment, ATC 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Taxi in Check if the aircraft is ready for ground move. Check if 
the area is clear of obstacles. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles. Follow 
marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer (HLO) if 
available. NB: this phase of flight is unlikely to occur in 
an offshore installation1. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Engine 
stop 
Check if the area is clear of obstacles. Check the wind 
speed limitations for stopping the rotors. Cut the engines 
off. Execute post engine cut checks. Alight passengers. 
Execute aircraft walk-around. Report any aircraft 
malfunction to maintenance team. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation1, 
Environment, Maintenance 
engineers 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
NB: 
1. Installation is generically used to refer to both platforms and boats. 
2. Any Search and Rescue (SAR) infrastructure has been excluded as it is not part of normal but emergency operations. It is therefore part of 
another industry which interfaces the present industry in ad hoc circumstances. This is in line with common standards accepted in the 
offshore oil and gas industry (HSE, 2003a; OGP, 2008). 
3. Even though the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry ferries cargo and people, its clients are not the individual passengers or 
owners of the cargo. The clients are the oil and gas companies which operate the oil and gas platforms and boats on the sea (see Section 1.1). 
4. Despite the fact that the passengers of offshore helicopter flights are usually literate in operations and safety (e.g., through obligatory 
aircraft underwater escape training and use of immersion suits during flight; see International Chamber of Shipping, 1989), they have not 
been considered as an active component of the industry. This is because passengers do not perform any function in normal flights apart from 
being transported. Any disturbances caused by passengers are abnormal events (e.g. a person feeling sick in flight leading to an unplanned 
landing) or acts of sabotage. 
5. Auto-pilot upper modes are selectable functions of the auto-pilot which allow to hold heading, a navigational course, altitude and 
indicated airspeed (McAdams, 2009). The auto-pilot upper modes of commercial helicopters cannot remain engaged below a minimum 
indicated airspeed (usually around 30-60 knots) due to increased inaccuracies introduced into the data system by turbulent airflow associated 
with rotors turning at slow translational speeds of the helicopter. As a consequence, takeoff and initial climb, as well as final approach and 
landing, usually must be flown manually by the pilots (Hart, 2005). 
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 Table 3-2 (across two pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight between an onshore airport and an offshore moving boat 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight 
As in Table 3-1 
Engine 
start 
Taxi out 
Hover out 
Air taxi out 
Takeoff 
Climb 
Cruise 
Descent Communicate with ATC for clearance to initiate descent 
(only if in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight 
plan and transmit in blind). Identify the destination boat. 
Communicate with meteorological observer based on the 
boat for updated meteorological and boat movement 
conditions, or received automated briefing from the boat 
(if available). Decide on approach procedure and 
approach direction to be executed. Execute the descent 
checks. Check if the approach direction chosen is clear of 
obstacles (e.g., boats and platforms). Re-plan approach as 
required. Execute chosen approach procedure in chosen 
approach direction. Adjust altitude and speed as required 
for finals. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles 
and other traffic. Assess visual acquisition and stability of 
the landing site. Decide whether or not to proceed to 
landing. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Procedure, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Final 
approach 
Decide when to switch off the autopilot’s upper modes. 
Steer the aircraft towards the landing site. Monitor the 
continuous availability and stability of the visual cues in 
support of a visually-guided flight manoeuvre. Decide 
whether to continue or abort the manoeuvre. Assume 
manual control of the aircraft. Approach the boat 
manually. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles 
and other traffic. Monitor and maintain approach stability. 
Decide technique for taxiing towards helideck area. 
Commit to landing on the helideck. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Go around As in Table 3-1 
Air taxi in Execute entrance technique decided during the final 
approach. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles. 
Monitor and maintain within power margins. Monitor 
boat movement pattern. Follow marshalling of Helideck 
Landing Officer (HLO) if available. NB: this phase of 
flight is unlikely to occur in an offshore installation. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Hover in Monitor and maintain within power margins. Monitor and 
maintain clearance from obstacles. Monitor boat 
movement pattern. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
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 Landing Assess appropriate moment for landing according to 
boat’s movement pattern. Command landing (i.e., lower 
collective lever whilst maintaining the helicopter in a 
stable attitude). Execute post-landing checks. Reduce 
engine power. Reduce blade rotation. Execute pre engine 
cut checks. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Touch and 
go 
As in Table 3-1 Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
 
Table 3-3 (across two pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight between two offshore fixed platforms 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight Execute walk-around inspection. Execute pre engine start 
checks. Communicate with installation (if the radio station 
is manned) for weather information, platform condition 
information and clearance to start engines. If radio station 
is unmanned, gather the information from own 
observation and decide on engine start-up. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment, Procedures 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Engine 
start 
Check if the area is clear of obstacles and platform 
conditions are adequate (e.g., that there is no hot gas 
blowing over the helideck). Execute engine start checks. 
Execute post engine start checks. Monitor passengers 
boarding the aircraft. 
Flight crew, Cabin crew (if 
available), Aircraft, 
Environment, Procedures, 
Offshore installation 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM, ATC 
Taxi out Communicate with installation for clearance to taxi and 
assignments of next position (if radio station is manned; 
otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check if the 
aircraft is ready for ground move. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Follow marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer 
(HLO) if available. NB: this phase of flight is unlikely to 
occur in an offshore installation. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Hover out Communicate with installation for clearance to hover (if 
radio station is manned; otherwise decide and transmit in 
blind). Check if the aircraft is ready for hover. Check if 
the area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command 
aircraft to hover. Monitor and maintain within power 
margins. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Air taxi out Communicate with installation for clearance to air taxi 
and assignment of the next stopping point (if radio station 
is manned; otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check 
if the aircraft is ready for air taxiing. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Follow marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer 
(HLO) if available. NB: this phase of flight is unlikely to 
occur in an offshore installation. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
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 Takeoff Communicate with installation for clearance to takeoff (if 
radio station is manned; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute takeoff checks. Check if the 
area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command 
takeoff. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Monitor speed increase. Adjust flight profile 
accordingly. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
ATC, Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Climb 
As in Table 3-1 
Cruise 
Descent 
Final 
approach 
Go around 
Air taxi in 
Hover in 
Landing 
Touch and 
go 
Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
 
 
Table 3-4 (across two pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight between two offshore moving boats 
 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight Execute walk-around inspection. Execute pre engine start 
checks. Communicate with installation (if the radio station 
is manned) for weather information, boat condition 
information (especially movement pattern) and clearance 
to start engines. If radio station is unmanned, gather the 
information from own observation and decide on engine 
start-up. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Offshore installation, 
Environment, Procedures 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Engine 
start 
Check if the area is clear of obstacles and boat conditions 
are adequate (e.g., that there is no hot gas blowing over 
the helideck). Execute engine start checks. Execute post 
engine start checks. Monitor passengers boarding the 
aircraft. 
Flight crew, Cabin crew (if 
available), Aircraft, 
Environment, Procedures, 
Offshore installation 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM, ATC 
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 Taxi out Communicate with installation for clearance to taxi and 
assignments of next position (if radio station is manned; 
otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check if the 
aircraft is ready for ground move. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Follow marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer 
(HLO), if available. Monitor boat movement pattern. NB: 
this phase of flight is unlikely to occur in an offshore 
installation. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Hover out Communicate with installation for clearance to hover (if 
radio station is manned; otherwise decide and transmit in 
blind). Check if the aircraft is ready for hover. Check if 
the area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command 
aircraft to hover. Monitor and maintain within power 
margins. Monitor boat movement pattern. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Air taxi out Communicate with installation for clearance to air taxi 
and assignment of the next stopping point (if radio station 
is manned; otherwise decide and transmit in blind). Check 
if the aircraft is ready for air taxiing. Check if the area is 
clear of obstacles and other traffic. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles and other 
traffic. Follow marshalling of Helideck Landing Officer 
(HLO) if available. Monitor boat movement pattern. NB: 
this phase of flight is unlikely to occur in an offshore 
installation. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Takeoff Communicate with installation for clearance to takeoff (if 
radio station is manned; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute takeoff checks. Check if the 
area is clear of obstacles and other traffic. Check boat 
movement pattern. Command takeoff. Monitor and 
maintain within power margins. Monitor and maintain 
clearance from obstacles and other traffic. Monitor speed 
increase. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, Offshore 
installation, Aircraft, 
Environment 
ATC, Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Climb 
As in Table 3-1 
Cruise 
Descent 
As in Table 3-2 
Final 
approach 
Go around As in Table 3-1 
Air taxi in 
As in Table 3-2 Hover in 
Landing 
Touch and 
go 
As in Table 3-1 Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
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 Table 3-5 – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a flight between an 
offshore fixed platform to an offshore moving boat 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight 
As in Table 3-3 
Engine 
start 
Taxi out 
Hover out 
Air taxi out 
Takeoff 
Climb Communicate with ATC for climbing instructions (only if 
in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute post-takeoff checks. Adjust 
speed as required. Decide if the autopilot’s upper modes 
will be turned on and when. Monitor and maintain within 
power margins. Monitor and maintain clearance from 
other traffic. Monitor if flight profile is being executed as 
instructed/planned for. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Airport, Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Cruise Communicate with ATC for instructions to level off at 
cruise altitude/height (only if in controlled airspace; 
otherwise follow flight plan or convenient altitude/height 
and transmit in blind). Execute cruise checks. Adjust 
altitude and speed as required. Monitor and maintain 
clearance from other traffic. Monitor altitude maintenance 
as instructed or planned. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Descent 
As in Table 3-2 
Final 
approach 
Go around As in Table 3-1 
Air taxi in 
As in Table 3-2 Hover in 
Landing 
Touch and 
go 
As in Table 3-1 Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
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 Table 3-6 – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a flight between an 
offshore moving boat to an offshore fixed platform  
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight 
As in Table 3-4 
Engine 
start 
Taxi out 
Hover out 
Air taxi out 
Takeoff 
Climb Communicate with ATC for climbing instructions (only if 
in controlled airspace; otherwise follow flight plan and 
transmit in blind). Execute after takeoff checks. Adjust 
speed as required. Decide if the autopilot’s upper modes 
will be turned on and when. Monitor and maintain within 
power margins. Monitor and maintain clearance from 
other traffic. Monitor if flight profile is being executed as 
instructed/planned for. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Airport, Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Cruise Communicate with ATC for instructions to level off at 
cruise altitude/height (only if in controlled airspace; 
otherwise follow flight plan or convenient altitude/height 
and transmit in blind). Execute cruise checks. Adjust 
altitude and speed as required. Monitor and maintain 
clearance from other traffic. Monitor altitude maintenance 
as instructed or planned. Adjust flight profile accordingly. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedures, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Descent 
As in Table 3-1 
 
Final 
approach 
Go around 
Air taxi in 
Hover in 
Landing 
Touch and 
go 
Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
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Table 3-7 (across two pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight from an offshore fixed platform to an onshore airport 
 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight 
As in Table 3-3 
Engine 
start 
Taxi out 
Hover out 
Air taxi out 
Takeoff 
Climb 
As in Table 3-1 
Cruise 
Descent Communicate with ATC for clearance to initiate descent, 
weather briefing, ongoing traffic information and 
expected approach procedure (only if in controlled 
airspace; otherwise follow flight plan and transmit 
movement intentions in blind). Execute the descent 
checks. Execute approach procedure assigned by the ATC 
or chosen if in uncontrolled airspace. Adjust altitude and 
speed as required for finals. Monitor and maintain 
clearance from obstacles and other traffic. Assess visual 
acquisition of the landing site. Decide whether or not to 
proceed to landing. 
Flight crew, ATC, Aircraft, 
Procedure, Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Final 
approach 
Decide when to switch off the autopilot’s upper modes. 
Steer the aircraft towards the landing site (runway or 
otherwise, e.g., helipad). Monitor the continuous 
availability of the visual cues in support of a visually-
guided flight manoeuvre. Decide whether to continue or 
abort the manoeuvre. Assume manual control of the 
aircraft. Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles 
and other traffic. Monitor and maintain approach stability. 
Approach the landing area 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Go around Command aircraft climb and turn-away manoeuvre. 
Retract landing gear if lowered and appropriate. Monitor 
and maintain clearance from obstacles and other traffic. 
Communicate with ATC to inform of the go around 
decision (if in controlled airspace; otherwise, transmit in 
blind). Decide whether to attempt another approach or 
divert to alternate. Decide if and when to re-engage the 
autopilot upper modes (if they had been disengaged). 
Manage the flight path accordingly. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment, ATC 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Air taxi in Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles. Monitor 
and maintain within power margins. Follow marshalling 
of ground support personnel if available. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
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 Hover in Monitor and maintain within power margins. Monitor and 
maintain clearance from obstacles. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Landing Command landing (i.e., lower collective lever whilst 
maintaining the helicopter in a stable attitude). Execute 
post-landing checks. Reduce engine power. Reduce blade 
rotation. Execute pre engine cut checks. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Touch and 
go 
Command aircraft climb and turn-away manoeuvre. 
Retract landing gear if lowered and appropriate. 
Communicate with ATC to inform of the go-around 
decision (if in controlled airspace; otherwise, transmit in 
blind). Decide whether to attempt another approach or 
divert to alternate. Decide if and when to re-engage the 
autopilot upper modes (if they had been disengaged). 
Manage flight path accordingly. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment, ATC 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Taxi in Check if the aircraft is ready for ground move. Check if 
the area is clear of obstacles. Command aircraft 
movement. Monitor and maintain within power margins. 
Monitor and maintain clearance from obstacles. Follow 
marshalling of ground support personnel if available. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
Engine 
stop 
Check if the area is clear of obstacles. Check the wind 
speed limitations for stopping the rotors. Cut the engines 
off. Execute post engine cut checks. Alight passengers. 
Execute aircraft walk-around. Report any aircraft 
malfunctions to the maintenance team. 
Flight crew, Aircraft, 
Environment, Maintenance 
engineers 
Helicopter company 
administrative support 
personnel, Helicopter 
company policies, Regulatory 
framework, Customer 
requirements, OEM 
 
 
 
Table 3-8 (across two pages) – Tasks performed and the actors involved in the phases of a 
flight from an offshore moving boat to an onshore airport 
 
 
Flight 
phases 
Tasks performed 
Actors 
Online Offline 
Pre-flight 
As in Table 3-3 
Engine 
start 
Taxi out 
Hover out 
Air taxi out 
Takeoff 
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 Climb 
As in Table 3-1 
Cruise 
Descent 
As in Table 3-7 
Final 
approach 
Go around 
Air taxi in 
Hover in 
Landing 
Touch and 
go 
Taxi in 
Engine 
stop 
 
The tables above identify the following actors (which include human and non-human safety-
critical components of the industry, see first paragraph of Section 3.4.4) involved in the tasks 
performed during the phases of offshore helicopter flights. 
• Flight crew 
• Cabin crew 
• Maintenance engineers 
• Aircraft 
• Airport 
• Offshore installations 
• Procedures 
• Environment 
• Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
• Helicopter company administrative support personnel 
• Helicopter company policies 
• Customer requirements 
• Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
• Regulatory framework 
3.4.5 Grouping of actors  
By re-arranging the interacting actors above, the following parts of the taxonomy are 
developed: 
• Helicopter operators, which host: 
• Flight crew, cabin crew and procedures, under their ‘flight operations’ part; 
• Maintenance engineers, under their ‘aircraft & systems maintenance’ part; 
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 • Helicopter company administrative support personnel (e.g., flight dispatcher), 
under their ‘ground operations’ part; 
• Helicopter company policies, under their ‘corporate’ part. 
• Aircraft/Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). 
• Airport. 
• ATC. 
• Customers, which host: 
• Customer requirements (relabelled ‘contractual requirements’); 
• Offshore installations. 
• Environment. 
• Regulatory framework. 
Figure 3-3 outlines the initial version of the taxonomy, which encapsulates the parts above 
(NB: the figure presents no interactions between actors. These are developed circumstantially 
based on relevant instantiations of the industry’s activities in Chapters 4 and 8; see Section 
3.3.3). 
3.5 Ensuring completeness 
This step reviews the industry structures outlined for other activities in aviation, in order to 
complement the developing Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy and 
ensure that it is as exhaustive as possible. This review is important as it minimises any bias 
stemming from the intra-cockpit task analysis-based approach of the previous steps. 
Because system structures are seldom outlined with the aim of framing the operation of 
aircraft by means of a taxonomy, this section also reviews relevant risk and accident models. 
These models represent a pre-defined understanding (i.e., a set of assumptions) of how risks 
exist or accidents occur in an industrial setting (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Salmon et 
al., 2011; Hollnagel, 2012; Lundberg et al., 2009; Hokstad et al., 2001). As such, risk and 
accident models usually refer to some sort of pre-conceived industry structure, even though 
this is not always made explicit (Hollnagel, 2012). 
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Figure 3-3 – Initial version of the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy
Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry 
Helicopter 
operators 
Corporate Flight operations 
Flight crew 
Cabin crew 
Procedures 
Aircraft & 
systems 
maintenance 
Maintenance 
engineers 
Ground 
operations 
Flight 
dispatchers 
Aircraft/OEM Airports ATC Customers 
Contractual 
requirements 
Offshore 
installations 
Environment Regulatory framework 
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 By reviewing only the accident models which incorporate an explicit underlying structure 
(i.e., morphological accident models; Sklet, 2004), this section does not intend to be an 
exhaustive review of all possible accident models since such reviews already exist in the 
literature (e.g., Hollnagel, 2004, 2009, 2012; Rollenhagen et al., 2010; Lundberg et al., 2009; 
Salmon et al., 2011; Reason, 2008; Sklet, 2004; Kjellén, 2000; Borys, 2000; Saleh et al., 
2010). Finally, the literature on performance shaping factors is also discussed because it also 
refers to industry elements which affect human performance. 
3.5.1 Aviation system and risk models 
3.5.1.1 Subotic et al. (2005) 
Subotic et al. (2005) described the Air Transport System from an Air Traffic Management’s 
(ATM) perspective, in order to derive target levels of safety (TLS) for equipment failure. 
This model is depicted in Figure 3-4, together with the parts already incorporated into the 
offshore helicopter transportation industry’s developing taxonomy, those parts used to 
complement it and those found not to be directly relevant (i.e., the elements related to the 
ATM perspective of safety) given the level of detail pursued. 
3.5.1.2 Greenberg et al. (2005) 
Greenberg et al. (2005, pp. 562) proposed a model for the safety assessment of fixed-wing 
civil aviation operations using a Bayesian belief network. The model is based on each crew 
member’s readiness to fly (e.g., level of fatigue, age and medical situation); level of 
airworthiness of aircraft (e.g., severity of any existing malfunction); company roster policy, 
economic situation and safety culture; society type (i.e., hierarchical or not) and authority 
gradient; atmospheric weather and visibility and finally mission characteristics (e.g., flight 
length and altitude). 
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Figure 3-4 – The Air Transport System described by Subotic et al. (2005, pp. 278) 
NB: coding scheme: elements already incorporated into the developing Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s taxonomy: ✓; elements 
further used to complement the developing model: +; and elements found less relevant: X.
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓
 
✓
 
+ 
+ 
+ + + 
+ + 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X 
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 Whereas the crew, aircraft and company aspects were deemed covered by the developing 
taxonomy’s ‘flight crew’, ‘aircraft/OEM’ and ‘corporate’ parts, respectively, society type and 
authority gradient might be largely determined by national traits (Helmreich and Merritt, 
1998; Li et al., 2007). Therefore, the ‘country’ part of the taxonomy was created. This also 
reflects any differences in national approaches to safety management, local environmental 
conditions, aircraft locally used, national infrastructure (e.g., quality of ATM and airport), 
customer practices and the regulatory framework. 
The atmospheric weather and visibility were incorporated as a breakdown of the 
‘environment’ part of the developing taxonomy. Finally, the mission characteristics were 
incorporated into the regulatory framework since, in offshore helicopter transportation, 
regulations primarily dictate the limits of the operational envelope (e.g., whether nighttime 
flights are acceptable for the routine ferrying of passengers; see Section 2.1). 
3.5.1.3 Hokstad et al. (2001) and Herrera et al. (2010) 
The risk model originally developed by Hokstad et al. (2001), which was improved by 
Herrera et al. (2010a) and referred to in Section 2.3.3.2.1, confers a structure for the 
assessment of offshore helicopter risk on the Norwegian continental shelf. The model is 
formed by two sub-models, which enable the assessment of the frequencies and consequences 
of a range of hazards. The consequence sub-model was excessively detailed for the purposes 
of this study. The frequency sub-model is outlined in Figure 3-5 and led to the incorporation 
of new parts into the proposed Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. The 
coding pattern of Figure 3-4 was repeated. The accident categories at the top of the model are 
irrelevant for the purposes of outlining an industry’s taxonomy from a neutral safety stance. 
Helicopter design, continued airworthiness and design organisations were incorporated under 
the ‘aircraft/OEM’ part of the developing taxonomy. 
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Figure 3-5 – Risk frequency influencing factors (Herrera et al., 2010a), coded as in Figure 3-4 
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 Helideck was incorporated as a breakdown of the ‘offshore installations’ sub-part of the 
customer part. Additionally, ‘procedures’ and ‘platform metalwork’ were incorporated to this 
sub-part in order to account for the marshalling and obstacle avoidance activities listed in 
Tables 3-1 to 3-8. Moreover, ‘airworthiness’, ‘licensing’, ‘mission requirement’ and ‘flight 
safety’ were incorporated into the ‘contractual requirements’ sub-part to reflect the safety 
management role of the oil and gas industry discussed in Section 2.3.3.1.1.3. 
International aviation authorities and organisations were incorporated as an overarching part 
of the developing taxonomy. Passengers, in turn, were not considered an active part of the 
offshore developing taxonomy (see NB 4 on Table 3-1), nor were other activities/other 
organisations because they referred to other industries (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles). 
3.5.1.4 Gibb et al. (2010) 
Gibb et al. (2010) proposed an aviation system model without specifying the origins of the 
elements considered, which were apparently derived from experience and common sense. 
The system model is shown in Figure 3-6. The three main parts considered (i.e., environment, 
pilot and aircraft) are already covered by the developing taxonomy. The breakdown of these 
parts into sub-parts led to the addition of ‘lighting’ and ‘maritime’ under the ‘environment’ 
part, accounting for Day/Night and Discernible horizon in Gibb et al.’s model. All other parts 
and subparts were either covered in the previous sections, too detailed to be incorporated 
(especially the breakdown of the pilot part) or aircraft-specific. Incorporation of such parts 
and sub-parts would contradict the stopping rules adopted. 
3.5.1.5 Harris and Smith (1997) 
The 5M system model (Harris and Smith, 1997; cited in Harris, 2006a and Stolzer, 2008) 
incorporates the following six aspects that must be considered in order to assess operations in 
engineered transportation systems: man, machine, mission, management, physical medium 
and societal medium (e.g., regulatory requirements). These aspects are already covered in the 
developing taxonomy. 
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Figure 3-6 – The aviation system model, adapted from Gibb et al. (2010), codified as in 
Figure 3-4 
 
3.5.2 Morphological accident models 
Three main and four subsidiary accident models which are formed by industry structures 
were identified. The main models were the Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 2008), Risk 
Management Framework and Migration of Work Practice model (Rasmussen, 1997) and 
Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP; Leveson, 2004). The 
subsidiary models identified were the Tripod model and the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), both derived from the Swiss Cheese model; and the 
AcciMap and ActorMap, which were derived from Rasmussen’s model. The following 
sections discuss each model and their associated subsidiary models sequentially. 
3.5.2.1 Swiss Cheese and subsidiary models 
The Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1990, 2008), introduces the idea that production systems 
are typically protected by defences-in-depth. These refer to multiple layers of controls (e.g., 
regulations, management practices and operating procedures) which aim to prevent active 
failures from leading to an accident. The model also outlines that all such defences are 
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 fallible and thus create the latent conditions for accidents. When latent conditions combine 
with local triggering factors in the workplace (e.g., suboptimal working conditions, errors 
from operators, or malfunctioning equipment), accidents may occur. The model is shown in 
Figure 3-7, together with the assessment of the applicability of the model’s components to the 
Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. 
 
Figure 3-7 – The Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 2008; cited in Salmon et al., 2011, pp. 3), 
codified as in Figure 3-4 
Whilst board decision and policy are covered by the ‘corporate’ part of the developing model, 
line management was incorporated as ‘maintenance supervision’, which is important for the 
safety of aircraft (Herrera et al., 2009). The other elements of the Swiss Cheese model were 
found to be too accident specific and, therefore, not transferable to a neutral stance taxonomy. 
From the slightly different version of the model outlined in ICAO (2012c), ‘training’ was 
identified as a transferable element, which was placed under the ‘flight operations’ sub-part 
of the developing taxonomy. 
The Tripod Diagnostic Evaluation Tool for Accident Prevention (i.e., Tripod DELTA; 
Hudson et al., 1994) is formed by a set of checklists designed to perform health checks in 
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 organisations according to the elements of the Swiss Cheese model. Therefore, the Tripod 
DELTA has already been covered. 
HFACS was developed from the Swiss Cheese model to construct taxonomies of latent 
failures and unsafe acts using military aviation accident reports (Wiegmann and Shappell, 
2003). HFACS has since been adapted to several domains, including rail, shipping and 
mining operations. The most complete version of HFACS was developed for rail operations 
and incorporates failures outside the organisation under analysis. This version was introduced 
in Salmon et al. (2011) and is presented in Figure 3-8, together with the assessment of its 
element’s transferability to the proposed taxonomy. The physical environment category of 
HFACS was incorporated as a further detail of the operational environment of offshore 
helicopter operations, especially the ‘maritime’ aspect. The technological environment led to 
the incorporation of ‘HFDM’ under the ‘flight operations’ part of the developing taxonomy. 
The relevance of HFDM was mentioned in Section 2.3.3.3 
3.5.2.2 Risk Management Framework and Migration of Work Practice model, 
AcciMap and ActorMap 
Rasmussen’s model (Rasmussen, 1997; cited in Salmon et al., 2011, pp. 3) deals with 
accidents as failures in control loops. The model outlines a hierarchy of actors (e.g., 
individuals and organisations), from which interaction safety emerges. The model has been 
applied in many safety-critical domains, such as public health (Woo and Vicente, 2003). 
Figure 3-9 shows Rasmussen’s model together with an assessment of the applicability of the 
model’s components to complement the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s 
Taxonomy. The element ‘associations’ of Rasmussen’s model was incorporated into the 
developing Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy to account for the 
influence that class associations (e.g., workers’ unions) have in rule-making and on work 
conditions, with an associated impact on safety. 
The AcciMap and ActorMap (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000) are derived of Rasmussen’s 
model and enable safety events to be analysed by mapping them onto a system’s model 
structure (Hollnagel, 2012). Both the AcciMap and the ActorMap impose a structure onto the 
socio-technical system associated with an accident, with indications of preconditions and the 
functions of the different system levels involved (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000). 
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Figure 3-8 – Rail version of HFACS codified as in Figure 3-4 
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 However, since their underlying model has already been covered, these two models cannot 
offer any further insights to the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. 
3.5.2.3 Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes 
Alternatively called STAMP, this is another control-theory-founded model that encapsulates 
assumptions about system control and structure. It prescribes two hierarchical control 
structures (i.e., one for system development and the other one for system operation) and the 
interactions between them. Like with the previous model, safety (and conversely accidents) 
are deemed to emerge from the control functions outlined (Hollnagel, 2012; Salmon et al., 
2011). 
 
Figure 3-9 – Rasmussen’s model, codified as in Figure 3-4 
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 STAMP considers that accidents occur when the control of safety-related constraints fails. 
The system proposed is generic and believed to be transferable to any domain. Figure 3-10 
shows STAMP and the assessment of the utility of its elements for the Offshore Helicopter 
Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. 
 
 
Figure 3-10 – STAMP, codified as in Figure 3-4 
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 evolution based upon the feedback of the helicopter operators. Implementation and assurance 
were incorporated into the ‘aircraft & systems maintenance’ sub-part and labelled ‘quality 
assurance’.  
3.5.3 Performance shaping factors 
Performance shaping factors (PSFs) were developed in recognition that the performance of 
humans, as individuals and in group, to a significant extent is determined by a limited set of 
factors present in the context in which human actions take place (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, 
especially Hollnagel, 2004). 
A review of the PSF literature allows for a list the factors that may affect human performance 
in offshore helicopter operations. Conversely, it is possible to identify which parts of the 
industry could contribute to this shaping of performance and thus, safety. 
Subotic et al. (2007) reviewed 13 taxonomies of performance shaping factors and 
summarised the factors into 14 groups. Similar factors were proposed by Hollnagel (2004) 
and Annett and Stanton (2000a). Typical factors include training, support of the organisation 
and conditions of work, e.g., ambient lighting and glare. All factors are either already 
incorporated into the developing Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy or 
irrelevant given the level of detail pursued.  
The final version of the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy is shown in 
Figure 3-11. Each of the parts and subparts of the taxonomy can be further decomposed if 
necessary to understand the dynamics of the whole industry or specific parts of interest. 
However, in order to launch an initial taxonomy with which to start identifying hazards and 
analysing risks, the proposed granularity is sufficient. 
3.6 Validation of results 
Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) establish that using different experts whilst developing and 
rechecking a task analysis is a useful approach to ensure that it is reliable and valid. 
Additionally, it is usually better to ask SMEs to review part of the analysis than leaving them 
to review it in its entirety. These guidelines were taken into account during the validation 
exercise proposed. 
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 Validation was achieved by observation and recording of the tasks undertaken by the pilots 
during flight simulation training (see Section 3.3.4), followed by a replay of a sample of the 
recordings to five senior offshore helicopter instructors and an open group discussion on the 
correctness of the tasks captured by the researcher. 159 videos were recorded, corresponding 
to various parts of the training of 16 pilots from three different companies and three 
nationalities (i.e., British, Dutch and Brazilian), undertaken in three different helicopter types. 
Each of the five senior helicopter instructors who assessed the tasks captured and reviewed 
the sample of videos recorded had over 5,000 flying hours accrued in their careers and held 
positions of leadership within their companies (e.g., chief pilot). 
The flight instructors were asked to review the tasks captured during the task analysis 
exercise for each phase proposed and use the video samples if needed to assure that there was 
a common understanding about the phases of flight to be reviewed. A sample of 14 video 
recordings was used, corresponding to the phases of flight of Figure 3-2, except for pre-flight, 
taxi out and taxi in. The tasks of the pre-flight phase are only executable in the actual aircraft 
and the other two phases are of lesser importance to offshore operations (see Tables 3-1 to 3-
8). The senior pilots agreed that the tasks captured in the task analysis reflected both real 
flight experience and the dynamics of the simulator training exercises. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The previous chapter established the need of a holistic view of the safety-critical components 
of the offshore helicopter industry to underpin hazard identification and risk analysis. This 
gap was addressed in this chapter by the development and implementation of a process which 
generated a customised taxonomy. 
In order to ensure the necessary scientific rigour, the process and the taxonomy were subject 
to peer-reviewing and a final validation exercise. With the assured validity, the Offshore 
Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy developed in this chapter provides the basis 
for hazard identification and risk analysis in this thesis. 
However, it is important to use the taxonomy flexibly and remain open to the need to update 
it as more knowledge in the field is accrued, more data are collected and analysed, operations 
change, or specific problems require that parts of the taxonomy are further developed and 
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 understood. In all such cases, the taxonomy supports hazard identification and risk analysis 
by anchoring the main concepts related to the operation of offshore helicopters. 
Having defined the Offshore Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy at a generic 
level, the next step to support hazard identification and risk analysis in the nighttime is to 
explore the industry’s failure modes through the analysis of accidents and update the 
taxonomy on the basis of any relevant results. This is important since the previous chapter 
has shown that the analyses of accidents in this domain are fraught with unreliable data and 
executed too simplistically to be trustworthy. 
In the next chapter, a process with which the lessons from accidents can be exploited in a 
global scale is developed and implemented. This process enables further updates to the 
industry’s taxonomy to be carried out and to improve the ability to identify hazards and 
analyse risks in nighttime operations. 
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 CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS 
Chapter 3 redressed the lack of a frame of reference by developing a new taxonomy 
encapsulating the safety-critical components of the offshore helicopter transportation 
industry. This chapter builds on this to address yet another important weakness affecting 
hazard identification and risk analysis of nighttime offshore helicopter operations: the lack of 
an accident analysis process which supports the identification of systematic hazard trends and 
patterns in the nighttime amongst the overall hazards of offshore helicopter operations. This 
shortcoming is addressed in five sections. Section 4.1 reviews the accident analysis processes 
used across the helicopter industry for their lessons and limitations. Section 4.2 builds on the 
review to specify the architecture of the new process and its implementation is described in 
Section 4.3. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4.4 and conclusions are drawn 
in Section 4.5. The latter include recommendations for the continuous improvement of 
accident data collection and analysis, which enhance hazard identification and risk analysis in 
the industry, especially with respect to nighttime operations. 
4.1 Status of helicopter accident analysis 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3.1) has shown that whereas the investigation of individual accidents 
continues to be a cornerstone of hazard identification and risk analysis in the offshore 
helicopter industry, statistical analysis of accident reports remains fundamentally flawed. 
However, there are other processes in use in the helicopter industry in general which need to 
be reviewed. In the helicopter industry in general, the methods for the statistical analysis of 
accidents can be summarised in four groups: (i) operation-specific, (ii) adapted from fixed-
wing operations, (iii) based on non operation-related hazards and (iv) epidemiological 
studies. Each of these suffers from significant weaknesses, which are recapitulated and 
described in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.4, followed by a comment on data quality in Section 4.1.5. 
4.1.1 Operation-specific methods 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3.1.1.3, the existing mission-tailored process of the oil and gas 
industry analyse incomplete datasets, focus on simple frequency counts and do not 
adequately explore the statistical interactions between hazards. Additionally, such analyses 
can be criticised for a lack of theoretical underpinning with respect to accident data sampling, 
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 e.g., by using data of opportunity with low validity at present, which compromises data 
timeliness (OGP, 2012b; HSAC, 2000; OGP, 1999; Doty, 2010; Herrera et al., 2010a; Ross 
and Gibb, 2008). 
4.1.2 Methods adapted from fixed-wing operations 
As discussed in Sections 2.3.3.1.1.1, 2.3.3.1.1.2 and 2.3.3.1.1.4, these methods have the 
weakness of constraining analysis per annual periods, with the associated reduction in the 
number of accidents available for analysis and the production of only qualitative descriptions. 
Furthermore, these methods introduce significant biases in the results due to the inadequacy 
of the taxonomies employed, which require the application of complimentary human factors 
taxonomies (EHEST, 2010; Howson, 2012; Canadian Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 
2011). 
4.1.3 Methods based on non operation-related risk factors 
These methods ignore the operation-specific nature of hazards described in Section 2.2.2 and 
focus on features across many operation types (e.g., analysis per helicopter category). 
Therefore, these methods are only able to provide conclusions with respect to hazards at a 
high level. Furthermore, information on the level of the activity is usually missing, preventing 
the understanding of accidents with respect to the size of operations through the calculation 
of accident rates (Minter and Irving, 1996; Majumdar et al., 2009b; Morley and MacDonald, 
2005; Fox, 2002; Harris, 2006b; Harris et al., 2000; EASA, 2013b). 
4.1.4 Epidemiological studies 
Even though such studies are usually rigorous and typically employ some sort of statistical 
analysis to identify systematic hazard trends, patterns and high risk scenarios, they focus on 
the risk of fatality or injury to helicopter occupants instead of the risk of an accident per se. 
Additionally, they typically analyse data of opportunity instead of data collected through 
designed processes aimed at assuring statistical utility and addressing theoretical 
considerations such as data timeliness (e.g., Mapes, 2010; Chalmers et al., 2000; O'Hare et 
al., 2003; Li and Baker, 1993, 1999; Krebs et al., 1995; Conroy et al., 1992).  
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 4.1.5 Data quality 
A common drawback of all these methods is the low quality of accident data used, which 
further limits statistical analysis. Only recently has the importance of data quality been 
formally acknowledged in safety for aviation (ICAO, 2012c). This directly contrasts with the 
high importance given to data quality in other critical industries (e.g., banking and consumer 
goods manufacturing, see Lee et al., 2002; Pipino et al., 2002), which have for decades 
viewed quality data as fundamental enablers of sound decisions. 
Generating quality data is, therefore, essential to hazard identification and risk analysis. This 
involves the identification of relevant data quality dimensions, such as believability (i.e., the 
extent to which the data is regarded as true and credible, Pipino et al., 2002), completeness, 
timeliness and value-added, and the development of metrics with which to evaluate such 
dimensions (e.g., simple ratio, minimum and maximum operators, weighted averages). 
Exhaustive lists of quality dimensions and metrics can be found in Lee et al. (2006, 2002), 
Pipino et al. (2002), Wand and Wang (1996), Lee and Strong (2003), Wang and Strong 
(1996), Levitin and Redman (1995) and are not further discussed in this thesis. However, the 
data quality dimensions most critically affected in previous helicopter accident analyses are 
discussed below. These dimensions are timeliness, scope, completeness and appropriate 
amount. 
Timeliness has been affected by excessively large analysis timeframes which identified risk 
factors of low relevance to current operations (Harris, 2006b; Harris et al., 2000). Data scope 
has been affected by the use of inconsistent terminological definitions which led to the 
incomplete sampling of accidents (see Section 2.3.3.1.1.3, especially Williams, 2012). 
Completeness has been compromised by a lack of accident data from helicopters which were 
not recovered from the bottom of the ocean and partial investigations resulting from a lack of 
sufficient resources to the original investigators (Conroy et al., 1992; Krebs et al., 1995; 
O'Hare et al., 2003; U.S.JHSAT, 2010; Taneja and Wiegmann, 2003). Finally, the collection 
of an appropriate amount of data has been affected by sampling strategies constrained by 
political jurisdictions (U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011b, a; Camargo, 2009; 
Majumdar et al., 2009a; Herrera et al., 2010a; Hokstad et al., 1999; Oil & Gas UK, 2007, 
2011; HSE, 2003b; CAA, 2007, 2010c; Vinnem, 2011, 2008; Brooks et al., 2008; Barnett, 
2009a; Morrison, 2001; EHEST, 2010). 
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 Despite these limitations, current methods have been useful in identifying a number of critical 
hazards and risks in offshore helicopter operations, which help understanding the issues of 
the nighttime in the broader context. The main hazards and risk in offshore helicopter 
operations are currently reckoned as the nighttime itself, instrument meteorological 
conditions (IMC), arrival segments, operations in developing countries and the use of single 
engine aircraft (Doty, 2010; Ross and Gibb, 2008; HSAC, 2000; OGP, 1999, 2012b; Harris, 
2006b; Harris et al., 2000; Williams, 2012). However, as mentioned before, this initial set of 
potentially critical areas needs validation. 
In order to identify systematic hazard trends and patterns in nighttime offshore helicopter 
operations, a robust analysis process is required. The next section proposes this new process 
that accounts for the weaknesses identified above and, by analysing the complete set of 
hazards in all lighting conditions, enables the identification of the issues which are specific to 
the nighttime. The results obtained from the implementation of the process are compared to 
the known risks and discussed with experts to ensure validity. 
4.2 Process development 
Figure 4-1 captures the architecture of the new process. Initially, the selection of an 
appropriate timeframe for the analysis is required, addressing the issues of poor data 
timeliness. This is followed by the precise definition of terms which ensures the appropriate 
data scope, the identification of relevant countries and the collection of operational and 
accident data independently, both of which address the requirement of an appropriate amount 
of data. The collection of accident data involves the identification of accident data sources, 
identification of appropriate variables for accident analysis (e.g., lighting conditions which 
enable any systematic hazard trends and patterns of the nighttime to be identified), 
development of an accident cause classification scheme, extraction of information regarding 
the statuses of the appropriate variables and the assessment of data completeness. The 
collection of operational data involves the identification of sources of variables useful for the 
calculation of accident rates (i.e., the denominator which represents the size of operations), 
choice of appropriate variables for the calculation of accident rates, extraction of information 
regarding the statuses of such variables and a check for operational data completeness. With 
both the information on the size of the operation and the accidents, accident rates are 
calculated (this is further explained in Section 4.2.6). Finally, a three-fold statistical analysis 
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 strategy is executed. This comprises the calculation and analysis of accident rates together 
with bivariate and multivariate analyses across the relevant variables. The realisation of the 
main steps of the process outlined in Figure 4-1 (i.e., select analysis timeframe, define terms, 
identify relevant countries, operational data collection, accident data collection and statistical 
analysis) are described in detail in the following six sections. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 – Analysis process 
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 4.2.1 Timeframe selection 
In order to ensure relevance to current operations (i.e., data timeliness), the timeframe 
selected should be representative of both the technologies and operating conditions (e.g., 
helicopter types used and platform designs). Selection should be underpinned by consultation 
of summaries of helicopter activity issued by institutions of international reach, e.g., OGP 
(2012b), national aviation authorities of countries that perform offshore helicopter operations 
and helicopter accident studies (e.g., EHEST, 2010). 
4.2.2 Definition of terms 
This assures the comparability of data issued by different sources (i.e., adequate data scope) 
and includes definitions at a high level where needed, for example, for the terms ‘offshore’ 
and ‘accident’ (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3.3.1.1.3). 
4.2.3 Identification of relevant countries 
Chapter 2 has shown that Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
requires national authorities to be responsible for accident investigations (ICAO, 2010e). 
Therefore, it is at a country level that accident reports are issued and the analysis of offshore 
helicopter accidents requires the identification of the countries where this operation is known 
or expected to have occurred. This ensures that data will be collected to an appropriate 
amount. The sources mentioned in Section 4.2.1 and the literature (e.g., Section 4.1) should 
be used for country identification. 
4.2.4 Operational data collection 
As explained in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.4, operational data refers to data useful for the 
calculation of accident rates. This is an important step since the calculation of accident rates 
is often impaired in the offshore helicopter industry due to low quality data (Vinnem et al., 
2006). Therefore, the sources of such data should be identified (see Sections 4.2 and 4.2.4) 
and the variables to be used for the calculation of accident rates selected. For example, 
although flying hours typically estimate time at risk, other metrics reflect alternative risk 
perspectives, e.g., cycles of take-off and landing (Oil & Gas UK, 2011), number of 
passengers and occupants carried (OGP, 2012b), distance travelled, helicopter fleet size 
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 (Harris, 2006b) and combinations of these variables (Oil & Gas UK, 2011). Data 
completeness checks are required to assess the quality of such data and to make 
recommendations for improved data collection and dissemination where needed. Simple ratio 
completeness check might be executed by calculating the ratio between the cases in which the 
events of a variable are known over the overall number of cases. This ensures that only data 
which are complete to an arbitrary acceptable amount are analysed. 
4.2.5 Accident data collection 
The reports issued by national accident investigation authorities might be complemented by 
those published by unofficial sources (e.g., those mentioned in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.3), 
especially where national accident investigation authorities are not transparent. From such 
sources and the literature, variables of potential relevance to accidents (i.e., hazards, e.g., 
phases of flight) are identified and a bespoke cause classification scheme developed. This 
might start from existing mature classification schemes (e.g., that of the OGP, see Section 
2.3.3.1.1.3), which can be adapted as necessary to capture the finest possible level of detail 
with respect to the hazards associated with the occurrences. However, given the potentially 
different accident models and investigation stopping rules employed by the original accident 
investigators, varying levels of detail might be reported, which may prevent causal analysis at 
the desired level of detail (for extensive discussions on the subjective nature of accident cause 
attribution, accident investigation, and the impacts of accident models on the findings of 
accident investigations, see Appendix 1 and Hollnagel, 2012, 2009; 2008, 2004; Lundberg et 
al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2010). Following data extraction, completeness checks are applied as 
mentioned in the previous section. 
4.2.6 Statistical analysis 
In order to identify systematic hazard trends and patterns, understand complex relationships 
and make inferences and predictions related to accidents, rigorous statistical analysis is 
required. A three-fold analysis plan is desirable as this enables the examination of accident 
characteristics from different and complementary viewpoints. The analysis plan comprises of 
the calculation and analysis of accident rates, bivariate and multivariate analyses. 
The calculation of accident rates is undertaken by simple ratio, where the numerator is the 
number of accidents with specific characteristics (e.g., cause and lighting condition) in a 
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 given year and region and the denominator is the value of the associated operational variable 
selected for the calculation of accident rates (e.g., flying hours in the year, region and lighting 
condition considered; see Section 4.2.4). A bivariate analysis follows the analysis of accident 
rates to validate the results, to investigate the variables for which accident rates are 
unavailable or inapplicable and to cover any gaps caused by suboptimal data quality. 
Subsequently, a multivariate analysis identifies the multi-way interactions among variables 
and generates predictions based on past accident data in line with the pursuit of predictive 
safety (see Section 2.3.3.3). The tests to be applied depend on the characteristics and 
distributions of the data, as well as on assumptions about data representativeness. These are 
presented during the implementation of the process in the next section. 
4.3 Process implementation 
The implementation of the process developed in Section 4.2 is described in Sections 4.3.1 to 
4.3.8. 
4.3.1 Timeframe selection 
The UK CAA understands that the 20 years prior to 2013 are representative of current 
operations in the North Sea (Howson, 2013). In the context of occupational safety, Kjellén 
(2000) recommends that a five-year period is used. Considering primarily the types of 
helicopter used and platform/boat technologies, worldwide offshore helicopter operations 
between 1997 and 2011 were considered to fulfil the conditions outlined in Section 4.2.1 (Oil 
& Gas UK, 2011; OGP, 2012b). 
4.3.2 Definition of terms 
Section 2.3.3.1.1.3 identified that the accident statistics of offshore helicopter operations are 
frequently understated because certain catastrophic types of occurrences, such as survivable 
ditchings, as not classified as ‘accidents’ in the USA (Williams, 2012). This is possible 
because the ICAO definition of accident (presented in Section 2.2.3) requires that at least one 
person is in the aircraft with the intention of flight when (i) a fatality or serious injury occurs, 
(ii) the aircraft sustains substantial damage or structural failure, or (iii) the aircraft is missed 
or made inaccessible. Therefore, the case of a survivable ditching followed by successful 
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 occupant evacuation and destruction of the helicopter by wave impact, inversion, immersion, 
or sinking can still be classified as an incident. 
The ICAO definition of accident fails to consider that an aircraft destroyed by the hostile 
environment (e.g., the rough sea), when the contact with the hostile environment is associated 
with the operation of the aircraft, is a serious occurrence which requires causal investigation 
commensurate with the title of accident (for further discussion, see Appendix 1). The need to 
account for the impact of hostile environments in the safety of helicopter operations has been 
consistently mentioned in the literature (e.g., O’Collard, 2010; Couch and Lindell, 2010; 
EHEST, 2010; O'Hare et al., 2006; 2003) and has led to on-going revisions of regulations 
(e.g., EASA, 2012; TSB Canada, 2011). Most countries acknowledge this and consider any 
ditching as an accident. For example, two controlled precautionary landings recently 
occurred, in which there were no victims, were classified as accidents in the UK (AAIB, 
2012a, b). 
To overcome this issue, the ICAO definition of accident is refined as follows: 
‘An accident is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes 
place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such 
time as all such persons have disembarked, (a) in which a person is fatally or seriously 
injured as a result of: being in the aircraft; or direct contact with any part of the aircraft; 
or direct exposure to jet blast; or (b) as a consequence of which, at any time until 
recovery, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: adversely affects the 
structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would 
normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component; or (c) in which 
the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.’ 
4.3.3 Identification of relevant countries 
A total of 50 countries were identified from summaries of petroleum activity (e.g., BP, 2010; 
Kaiser, 2007; Williams, 2000) and the helicopter safety analyses mentioned in Section 4.1. 
Appendix 5 presents the complete list of countries identified. 
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 4.3.4 Operational data collection 
Public domain data to support the calculation of accident rates were complete only for flight 
hours between 1997 and 2009 (HSAC, 2000; OGP, 1999, 2012b; Doty, 2010). These hours 
were discriminated by the OGP regions of operation, which are introduced and further 
detailed in Sections 4.3.4.1 and 4.3.6.1, respectively. In order to enable the analysis of 
accident rates per lighting condition (i.e., daytime and nighttime), a procedure was 
established to calculate the available nighttime (and, conversely, daylight) hours throughout 
the year in regions of different latitudes. This is described in the next section. 
4.3.4.1 Procedure to estimate flight hours per lighting condition 
At present, nighttime offshore helicopter flights occur in two basic conditions: (i) the regular 
ferrying of passengers at high latitude locations; and (ii) anywhere in the world in attendance 
to emergencies, especially medical evacuations (i.e., ‘medvac’) from offshore installations.  
Amongst the high latitude locations where offshore helicopter flights take place, the North 
Sea concentrates the greatest volume of operations. In this area, operations are of such 
intensity that the daily flight schedule usually cannot be accommodated into the short 
daylight hours available in the winter. In the other high latitude locations, e.g., southern 
Argentina, the passenger ferrying flights are considerably fewer compared to the North Sea. 
This is because any flight tends to be fitted into the available daylight hours in these regions, 
even in winter time20. Therefore, this section assumes that nighttime operations for regular 
passenger ferrying purposes only occur in the North Sea.  
This section uses as basis the 3% worldwide nighttime flight hour proportion mentioned in 
Section 2.1 and adjusts the value regionally on the basis of astronomical calculations of the 
length of the day throughout the year and assumptions about medvac missions in the North 
Sea. This enables to derive the proportion of flight hours for the following three generic 
regions: North Sea, Gulf of Mexico and ‘other regions’. These are the main areas of offshore 
helicopter operations according to the OGP (discussed in Section 4.3.6.1). Sections 4.3.4.1.1 
20 Private communication on the 10 January, 2011, with Captain Guillermo Bolibar, Flight Safety Officer for 
Helicópteros Marinos (Argentina). 
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 to 4.3.4.1.4 describe how the nighttime flying hours of the North Sea were estimated and 
validated. Section 4.3.4.1.5 describes the estimation of the nighttime flying hours for the Gulf 
of Mexico and ‘other regions’. 
4.3.4.1.1 Nighttime flying hours in North Sea regular passenger ferrying missions 
Nascimento (2009) found that the flight schedule of British offshore helicopter operations is 
typically contained within the hours between 06:00 and 18:00 throughout the year. Assuming 
this is generally true, the periods of nighttime flying were determined by calculating the civil 
twilights for all days of the year using the astronomical almanac (USNO, 2012) and 
subtracting from the beginning and end hours of the flight schedule when there was an 
overlap. Figure 4-2 illustrates the daylight cycles for key days of the year at the latitude of 
Aberdeen in 2010. This city was chosen as representative of the North Sea because it is its 
main base for operations (CAA, 2014), concentrating over 60% of the total hours flown 
offshore in the UK sector of the North Sea (Oil & Gas UK, 2011). In Figure 4-2, the shaded 
and blue areas represent the hours of darkness and the typical flying schedule, respectively. 
The calculations revealed that, approximately 8% of the passenger ferrying flights out of 
Aberdeen are typically undertaken during the nighttime. This was assumed as a fair 
representation of the passenger ferrying nighttime flying hours in the whole North Sea. 
4.3.4.1.2 Nighttime flying hours in North Sea medvac missions 
The British and Norwegian North Sea scenarios are fairly similar, for example with respect to 
the regulatory framework and platform structures (HSE, 2003a). Therefore, since data on 
medvac missions in the UK were not publicly available, data related to operations in Norway 
were used for the estimation of nighttime medvac flying hours. 
Although medvac flights are stochastic in nature, the average number of such missions, 
observed for the 5-year period between 2003 and 2007 (Vinnem, 2011) was used as 
representative of the North Sea. The percentage of medvac flight hours was calculated in 
relation to the overall flight hours of the Norwegian sector (available from Herrera et al., 
2010a) during the same period. The assumption behind this calculation is that passenger 
ferrying and medvac flight hours are intrinsically correlated. This is because they are both, to 
some extent, determined by the size of the offshore population. 
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 4.3.4.1.4 Confirmatory interviews with experts in the North Sea 
The assumptions aforementioned were discussed with four safety experts: a safety research 
manager of the UK CAA, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of a Norwegian offshore 
helicopter operator, the flight safety officer of a UK offshore helicopter operator and a former 
flight operations inspector of the UK CAA. The safety experts agreed that the assumptions 
were realistic. 
Additionally, the nighttime flying hours and volume of nighttime medvac missions estimated 
were checked against the flying hours and missions logged by four experienced pilots based 
in the UK and Norway (two pilots from each place). It was concluded that the proportion of 
nighttime flying hours calculated and the volume of nighttime medvac missions actually 
undertaken generally reflected the overall experience of the experienced pilots. 
4.3.4.1.5 Worldwide nighttime flying hours 
Having calculated the nighttime flying hours in the North Sea, the remainder of the 
worldwide nighttime flying hours were split between the remaining flying regions (i.e., Gulf 
of Mexico and ‘other regions’) in proportion to the total flying hours in each region 
(described in Section 4.3.6.1). 
The end product of the whole Section 4.3.4.1 was the estimation of the hours flown by 
offshore helicopters in each year of the 1997-2009 period, further discriminated by four 
regions of operations (i.e., Gulf of Mexico, North Sea, ‘other regions’ and worldwide, which 
is the sum of all regions), each of which subsequently broken down by three possible lighting 
conditions (i.e., daytime, nighttime and whole day, which is the sum of both lighting 
conditions). 
4.3.5 Accident data collection – sources and sampling strategy 
Accident information was sought from the reports issued by the official accident investigation 
authorities of the 50 relevant countries listed in Appendix 5. Of these, 46 target databases 
were available online. The accident information gathered was cross-checked against the 
analyses outlined in Section 4.1, to ensure information consistency. This was especially 
relevant for developing countries, where accident information was found to be shared 
inconsistently (Oil & Gas UK, 2011).  
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 Given the adopted definition of an accident and its potential confusion with incidents/serious 
incidents amongst the various countries of interest, additional revision of the reported 
incidents/serious incidents was required. All the incidents/serious incidents available from the 
46 databases were checked, as well as those reported to the USA’s Accident/Incident Data 
System (AIDS, FAA, 2012a), Canadian Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System 
(CADORS; Transport Canada, 2012), British Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) 
scheme and Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB). The search words of Baker et 
al. (2011) were used, complemented by ‘ditching’, ‘water landing’, ‘oil’, ‘gas’ and ‘ship’. 
This led to the incorporation of 16 catastrophic ditching ‘incidents’ into the ‘accident’ 
dataset, all in the USA. The destruction of such helicopters was confirmed by checking the 
FAA aircraft registry (FAA, 2012b). 
Further searches were conducted using websites specialised in the sharing of aircraft-related 
information (i.e., Flight Safety Foundation, 2012; Helihub, 2012; FlightSafe Consultants 
Limited, 2012; Spender, 2012; Lippl, 2012; Dutch Aviation Society, 2009). To minimise 
uncertainties, only accidents that matched the definition adopted and reported by at least two 
independent sources were included. Finally, the non-specialised press was checked for non-
technical information, e.g., if the accident occurred at night. 
4.3.6 Identification of variables relevant to accidents and data completeness 
A total of 142 variables of potential relevance to accidents were identified. Of these, 63 
variables covered the demographic characteristics of each pilot and 16 described the 
operating environment. In order to minimise errors in the statistical analysis, the simple ratio 
threshold for data completeness (see Section 4.2.4) was established at 90% (worldwide and 
across each of the three OGP regions described in the next section). Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show 
the demographic and operating scenario variables, respectively, with the results of the 
completeness tests. 
Given this threshold, the six variables included in the analyses, out of the 142 presented in 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2, are outlined below. 
 
 
124 
 
 Table 4-1 – Pilot demographic variables initially considered for the analysis, with the results 
of the completeness checks (failures shaded in red) 
   Handling pilot Non-handling pilot 
      World GOM1 NS2 Other 
regions3 
Analyse 
it? 
World GOM1 NS2 Other 
regions3 
Analyse 
it? 
Age     60% 91% 67% 10% No 6% 1% 53% 4% No 
Gender     65% 90% 67% 25% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Licences Type of 
aircraft 
Helicopter 68% 100% 73% 18% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Aeroplane 56% 96% 0% 4% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Glider, Lighter Than Air or 
Gyroplane 
56% 96% 0% 4% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Instrument 
rating 
Helicopter 66% 96% 73% 16% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Airplane 56% 96% 0% 4% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Instructor 
rating 
  
Helicopter 58% 98% 0% 7% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Airplane 56% 96% 0% 4% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Total time All aircraft 66% 97% 73% 16% No 7% 2% 60% 4% No 
  This make and model 62% 93% 67% 12% No 7% 1% 53% 6% No 
  Aircraft single engine 21% 35% 0% 3% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Aircraft multi engine 12% 19% 0% 3% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Night 28% 48% 0% 3% No 1% 1% 7% 0% No 
 Instrument Actual 26% 44% 0% 4% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Simulated 22% 38% 0% 3% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Rotorcraft 39% 64% 0% 7% No 2% 0% 13% 3% No 
  Glider 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
    Lighter Than Air 1% 2% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Time as pilot-in-
command 
All aircraft 42% 72% 7% 3% No 1% 0% 13% 0% No 
This make and model 34% 60% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Aircraft single engine 7% 12% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Aircraft multi engine 6% 9% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Night 11% 19% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Instrument Actual 8% 13% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Simulated 8% 13% 0% 1% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Rotorcraft 22% 38% 0% 3% No 1% 1% 0% 1% No 
  Glider 1% 2% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
    Lighter Than Air 1% 2% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Time last 90 days All aircraft 54% 85% 67% 4% No 5% 1% 53% 1% No 
  This make and model 39% 64% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Aircraft single engine 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Aircraft multi engine 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Night 6% 9% 0% 1% No 1% 0% 7% 0% No 
 Instrument Actual 2% 4% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Simulated 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Rotorcraft 32% 52% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Glider 1% 1% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
    Lighter Than Air 1% 1% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Time last 30 days All aircraft 46% 68% 67% 6% No 6% 1% 53% 3% No 
  This make and model 37% 60% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Aircraft single engine 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Aircraft multi engine 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Night 4% 6% 0% 1% No 1% 1% 0% 0% No 
 Instrument Actual 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Simulated 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Rotorcraft 32% 53% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Glider 1% 1% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
    Lighter Than Air 1% 1% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Time last 24 hours All aircraft 40% 62% 40% 6% No 4% 0% 33% 3% No 
  This make and model 32% 52% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Aircraft single engine 2% 4% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Aircraft multi engine 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Night 3% 5% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Instrument Actual 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Simulated 2% 3% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Rotorcraft 29% 47% 13% 4% No 2% 0% 13% 1% No 
  Glider 1% 2% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
    Lighter Than Air 1% 1% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Seniority Involved 
with 
  
Management 1% 2% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 Operations 0% 0% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
  Safety 0% 0% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
Years as an offshore helicopter pilot 0% 0% 0% 0% No 0% 0% 0% 0% No 
 1. Gulf of Mexico – refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
 2. North Sea – refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
 3. Refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
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 Table 4-2 – Variables describing the operating scenario initially considered for the analysis, 
with the results of the completeness checks (failures shaded in red) 
    World GOM1 NS2 Other regions3 Analyse it? 
Regions of occurrence 100% NA NA NA Yes 
Aircraft category 100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
Phases of flight 96% 99% 100% 90% Yes 
Lighting conditions (i.e., daytime or nighttime) 100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
Outcomes (i.e., fatal or not) 100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
Causes 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
Meteorological conditions (i.e., IMC or VMC) 95% 99% 80% 91% No 
Cockpit instrumentation (i.e., glass or dial/mixed design) 52% 51% 57% 54% No 
Auto-pilot fit (i.e., number of control axes) 52% 50% 57% 54% No 
Accident initiation point (i.e., over water or land) 94% 100% 100% 84% No 
Landing surface condition (e.g., wet runway, choppy seas) 18% 25% 13% 9% No 
Flight profile (i.e., long-haul or shuttling) 76% 92% 93% 46% No 
Mission sub-type (i.e., passenger ferrying, positioning, 
medvac, cargo ferrying, abandonment or training) 
85% 98% 100% 60% No 
Installation of operation (i.e., to/from platform or boat) 80% 95% 87% 54% No 
Aircraft manning (i.e., single pilot or multi crew) 87% 100% 100% 65% No 
Type of airspace 32% 55% 7% 1% No 
  1. Gulf of Mexico – refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
  2. North Sea – refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
  3. Refer to Section 4.3.6.1 
  NA – Not Applicable 
4.3.6.1 Regions of occurrence 
The OGP classification of offshore helicopter areas is better than the usual country-based 
classification scheme because the former is based upon the similarity of operational 
characteristics and, therefore, similarity of hazards (see Section 2.2.2). The OGP classifies 
helicopter operating regions as follows (OGP, 2012b): 
• Gulf of Mexico (GOM), corresponding to approximately 42% of worldwide annual 
flying hours offshore; 
• North Sea (NS). Approximately 12% of worldwide offshore helicopter hours are 
flown here; 
• ‘Other regions’, where the remainder 46% of the hours are flown. 
Since ‘other regions’ encompassed areas of dissimilar characteristics (e.g., typical weather 
conditions in Canada versus Africa), re-clustering was required. This was based on aspects of 
anticipated relevance to safety and generally agreed with the grouping of regions undertaken 
by Khatwa and Roelen (1996). These aspects were validated by carefully selected 
professionals in the offshore helicopter industry who are familiar with operations in multiple 
places. These professionals included the safety vice-president of the world’s largest 
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 helicopter operator (which operates helicopters in all continents), the flight crew manager of a 
helicopter company based in the UK and with operations in Africa and the aviation safety 
officer of a helicopter company which operates in Belgium, Africa and France. The 
unstructured interviews mentioned in Section 3.3.5 were also used to validate the clustering 
of regions (for additional background of offshore helicopter operations, see Mata et al., 2006; 
Gomes et al., 2009; Menezes et al., 2010; Hokstad et al., 1999; Vinnem, 2008, 2011; Herrera 
et al., 2010b; Lande, 1998; Forssell, 1982; HART Aviation, 2007; Hart, 2005; Howson, 2006; 
Prior and Evans, 2005; Brown, 1981; Valner and Leighton, 2009). The clustering strategy is 
shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 – Clustering of ‘other regions’ 
 
Americas except GOM (Am) Middle 
East1 
(ME) 
Australasia (Au) 
CIS3 
Africa4 
(Af) California Alaska Canada Mexico Brazil India 
Far 
East2 Australia 
 
Number of 
accidents 1 2 1 6 6 11 4 15 1 7 14 
Regulatory 
framework 
Tight 
           Loose ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Safety 
management 
Integrated 
           Local ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Intensity of 
operations 
Frantic 
    
✓ ✓ 
   
✓ ✓ 
Spaced ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ 
  Maturity of 
operations 
Long lasting ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Initiating 
 
✓ ✓ 
        
Infrastructure 
Developed 
           Incipient ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Weather 
conditions 
Benign  ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ 
Adverse 
 
✓ ✓ 
      
✓ 
 
Type of 
aircraft5 
typically 
used 
HT 
  
✓ 
      
✓ 
 MT ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ 
LT 
           ST/SP 
 
✓ 
         
 
1 Accidents happened in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran and Qatar  
 
2 Accidents happened in China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Myanmar 
 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States. Accidents happened in Azerbaijan, Russia and Ukraine 
 
4 Accidents happened in Angola, Nigeria, Congo and Cameroon 
 
5 Refer to Table 4-4 for categories of aircraft 
 
4.3.6.2 Aircraft categories 
Given differences in engine reliability (Harris, 2006b), the OGP’s classification scheme for 
helicopter categories (OGP, 2012b) was slightly modified (i.e., single engine helicopters were 
split into piston or turbine powered). As Table 4-4 shows, the scheme mostly concerns the 
number of passengers transported. 
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 Table 4-4 – Helicopter category classification scheme 
Category Criterion Examples (ordered by ascending empty weights) 
Single piston (SP) Single piston-engine 
helicopter 
R44 
Single turbine (ST) Single turbine-engine 
helicopter 
Bell206, AS316, AS350, EC130, Bell407 
Light twin turbine (LT) Maximum 9 passengers BO105, AS355, AW109, Bell222, Bell230, 
Bell430 
Medium twin turbine (MT) Maximum 13 passengers BK117, AS365, Bell212, Bell412, S76, AW139 
Heavy twin turbine (HT) More than 13 passengers Bell214, AS332, EC225, S61, S92, MI8, MI172, 
MI14  
 
4.3.6.3 Phases of flight 
Chapter 3 introduced the phases of flight which were specifically designed to cover offshore 
helicopter operations (Section 3.4.2). However, the lack of detail in a considerable part of the 
dataset led to the clustering of phases as in Table 4-5. Despite the reduced ability to 
discriminate between phases of flight, such clustered phases closely matched those of the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA, 2005), indicating a degree of external validity. 
4.3.6.4 Lighting conditions 
These enabled to overcome the inaccuracy of previous helicopter accident studies which used 
time blocks to infer the luminescence at the moment of the accident, e.g., with nighttime 
assumed between 19:00 and 07:00 (Taber and McCabe, 2006; Krebs et al., 1995). Like with 
the calculation of nighttime hours which preceded the calculation of accident rates (see 
Section 4.3.4) the astronomical almanac was used to calculate the civil twilights at the 
locations and dates of the accidents. Subsequently, the accidents were classified as having 
occurred in daylight or at night. 
4.3.6.5 Outcomes 
These were used to establish accident severity (i.e., fatal or not). 
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 Table 4-5 – Flight phases classification scheme 
Teixeira’s phases Clustered phases of flight 
Pre-flight, engine start Parked 
Taxi out, hover out, air taxi out Taxiing 
Takeoff, climb Takeoff 
Cruise Cruise 
Descent, final approach, go around, touch and go Approach 
Air taxi in, hover in, taxi in Taxiing 
Landing Landing 
Engine stop Parked 
 
4.3.6.6 Causes 
These referred to the causes attributed by the original accident investigators, which were 
categorised according to the classification scheme and procedure described in the next 
section.  
4.3.7 Development of accident cause classification scheme 
Given the need to account for varying levels of detail reported by the different sources, the 
cause classification scheme reflects the finest level of detail found across all sources and 
hence, took a high-level form. Causes were attributed to the ‘end states’ that best 
characterised the accidents (Apostolakis, 2004) and the ‘precipitating factor’ (also called ‘the 
first event’) that initiated the accident (Oil and Gas UK, 2011; Harris, 2006, respectively). It 
is important to note that limited accident datasets do not allow for complex multi-layered 
causal analysis (Majumdar et al., 2009b).  
In order to achieve consistency with previous studies in the oil and gas industry and enable 
comparisons with other analyses in the rotary domain, the cause classification scheme was 
primarily based on the categories developed by the OGP (1999, 2009, 2010b, 2000, 2012b; 
HSAC, 2000) and refined with elements from Harris (2006b), Harris et al. (2000), IHST (e.g., 
U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011b, a; EHEST, 2010), Morley and 
MacDonald (2005), Majumdar et al. (2009b), Fox (2002) and Minter and Irving (1996). The 
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 scheme’s initial version was further expanded by Template Analysis (King, 1998) as 
prompted by the accident data. This technique starts from a pre-defined list of codes (e.g., the 
set of accident causes drawn from the literature), which is then modified, refined and 
amended as prompted by new data. Table 4-6 outlines the scheme’s final version. 
 
Table 4-6 – Cause classification scheme 
Top level Intermediate level Bottom level 
(precipitating factors) (end states) 
Operational     
 
Pilot-related   
 
Non pilot-related   
    Air traffic management (ATM) Loose cargo 
    Bird strike/foreign object damage 
 
Miscellaneous pilot procedure 
    CFITWa Obstacle strike 
    Configuration management Passenger control 
    Dangerous goods Pilot incapacitation 
    External load procedure Platform/ship design/size issues 
    Fuel management Platform/ship procedure 
    Hostile fire Tie down procedure 
    Lightning Weather 
Technical     
 
Airworthiness   
 
Maintenance 
     Airframe Hydraulics 
  
Automation Indicator(s) 
    Avionics fire/smoke Landing gear 
    Communications Main rotor, transmission, drive shafts 
    Controls Navigation 
    Electrical system Tail rotor 
    Engine(s) Under-slung load 
    Flotation system Ventilation 
    Fuel system (includes fuel quality) Windscreen 
Unknown/unavailable   
a CFITW – Controlled Flight into Terrain or Water 
 
The main findings of the original accident investigations were categorised using this scheme. 
For accidents without official investigation reports, the findings reported by the OGP were 
accepted on the basis of privileged information, e.g. from insurance claims. The remaining 
accidents were categorised conservatively by frequently assigning ‘unknown or unavailable’ 
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 as the accident cause. Most such accidents corresponded to the catastrophic ditchings that 
were originally classified as incidents and hence, not subject to complete investigations. The 
accidents stemming from operational causes were further classified as pilot-related whenever 
the reports indicated that they could have been avoided by appropriate piloting. However, 
such accidents are not labelled as caused by pilot errors, as such labelling was previously 
found to be premature and inconsistent across official accident reports (see Section 4.2.5 and 
Hollnagel, 2009; Conroy et al., 1992). Classifying an accident as ‘pilot-related’ in this 
chapter should be viewed as an opportunity for developing pilot-supportive tools (e.g., better 
automation modes). 
In order to ensure inter-rater reliability, the findings of a random sample of 50 accident 
reports (over 25% of the total, see Jarvis, 2009) was categorised by two independent experts 
educated to doctoral-level in accident and incident analysis in aviation. Since the 
classification scheme was fairly simple, percentage agreement was deemed appropriate to 
assess the degree of convergence between the experts (Baker and Krokos, 2007). The 
agreement was greater than 90% at all three levels of the cause classification scheme, which 
was deemed excellent (Stanton and Stevenage, 2000; Warner and Sandin, 2010; Nascimento, 
2009; Cook, 1988; Militello and Hutton, 2000). Table 4-7 outlines examples of findings from 
accident investigations and how they were classified using the scheme. 
4.3.8 Statistical analysis 
This aims to identify systematic hazard trends and patterns, enable to understand complex 
relationships across the data (i.e., interactions) and make statistical inferences in line with the 
pursuit of ‘predictive safety’ (see Section 2.3.3.3). 
Whereas bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses are useful to separate random from 
systemic variation and to identify interactions between variables in virtually any sample of 
accidents, the application of inferential statistical techniques (e.g., hypothesis testing) must 
consider whether the sample obtained can be regarded as representative of the underlying 
population. This is typically achieved by some form of randomised sampling from a defined 
sampling frame (Burns and Burns, 2008; Field, 2009). 
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 Table 4-7 – Examples of accident cause classification 
Accident 
date 
Accident 
country 
Investigation 
‘authority’ 
Main findings of accident investigation 
undertaken 
Causes (attributed in 3 
levels when appropriate) 
25-May-97 India DGCA The accident occurred due to pilot getting 
disoriented in the prevailing night 
conditions. The disorientation took place 
as the pilot continued to fly on an 
unstabilised approach till close proximity 
of the rig at low height [SIC ...]. Factor: 
pilot - disregard of standard operating 
procedures 
Operational 
    Pilot-related 
     CFITWa 
08-Mar-00 Indonesia OGP Technical failure - unconfirmed Unknown or unavailable 
10-Nov-01 UK AAIB In high winds there was the ship's loss of 
steering. The lack of procedures on the 
ship to transmit the change in the alert 
status to the crew of the helicopter [...] 
denied the pilot an appropriate course of 
action to ensure the safety of the 
helicopter, which tumbled over on the 
helideck 
Operational 
   Non pilot-related 
    Platform or ship 
procedure 
18-Feb-05 USA NTSB Fuel starvation due to a blocked and 
collapsed fuel nozzle screen, resulting 
from a contaminated fuel source/facility. 
Factors were the inadequate maintenance / 
inspection of fuel sources 
Technical 
   Maintenance 
    Fuel system 
12-Mar-09 Canada TSB A main gearbox pressure light 
illuminated. Soon after, the loss of 
lubricant caused a catastrophic failure of 
the gearbox 
Technical 
   Airworthiness 
        Main rotor, 
transmission, 
drive shafts 
 
 DGCA     -  Directorate General of Civil Aviation    
 
 AAIB      -  Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch    
 
 TSB         - Transport Safety Board of Canada    
 
 a               -        Controlled Flight into Terrain or Water; see Table 4-6 
 
Due to the lack of a sampling frame (i.e., the exact number of accidents in the period 
considered was actually unknown), randomised sampling could not be undertaken. However, 
the exhaustive accident search strategy and the convergence of accident information from 
multiple sources generated confidence that the sampling approximated a census (i.e., a 
complete enumeration of the entire defined population) at least asymptotically (Spanos, 2006; 
Burns and Burns, 2008). Therefore, the accident sample was considered to be representative 
of the population of accidents and the application of inferential statistical techniques was 
deemed appropriate to learn about the underlying accident generation mechanism (Mayo and 
Cox, 2006), i.e., the hazard trends and patterns. This is in accordance with the mainstream 
accident analysis literature (e.g., Couch and Lindell, 2010; Stevens, 2013; Mapes, 2010). 
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 Based on the assumption that the accident sample is representative of the underlying 
population, various hypotheses were tested, as described in the Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. For 
all the statistical tests, the hypotheses were two-tailed and the significance was established at 
p≤0.05. Given the relatively small accident and accident rate sample sizes involved, any 
significant effect can be assumed to stem from large effect sizes. Therefore, effect sizes were 
not calculated (Burns and Burns, 2008). 
4.3.8.1 Calculation and analysis of accident rates 
With the flying hours calculated in Section 4.3.4.1, the accident outcomes identified in  
Section 4.3.6.5 and the categorisation of accident causes outlined in Sections 4.3.6.6 and 
4.3.7, the accident rates were calculated by simple ratio (see Section 4.2.6) for each year 
between 1997 and 2009, discriminated by outcomes, causes, regions of occurrence and 
lighting conditions. 
Given the sample sizes involved, Shapiro-Wilk and Levene’s tests were used to check the 
normality of the distributions and the homogeneity of variance, respectively. Because in all 
cases at least one of such assumptions of parametric data was violated, non-parametric 
techniques were required. See Field (2009) and Agresti (2002) for details of the statistical 
tests mentioned above and outlined below. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (KS-Z) procedure tested the null hypothesis whereby the 
distributions of accident rates across two conditions (i.e., daytime and nighttime) were the 
same. The test is useful with small sample sizes, i.e., N<25 per group. 
The Moses Test of Extreme Reaction (MTER) was used to investigate the null hypothesis 
that the extreme values observed for accident rates were equally likely to occur in both 
daytime and nighttime conditions. (Sheskin, 2004; Sprent and Smeeton, 2001; IBM 
Corporation, 2011). 
The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) procedure tested the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
accident rates across k experimental conditions (i.e., the regions of occurrence) were the 
same. In case statistically significant results were found, post-hoc tests were used to identify 
where the differences lied, as described in the next test. 
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 The Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction (MW/B) was applied to each pair-wise 
combination of conditions drawn from the previous step to test the null hypothesis whereby 
the two samples were from populations with the same distribution functions. The Bonferroni 
correction avoided falsely rejecting the null hypothesis by using a more stringent rejection 
criterion given by the initial significance level divided by the number of pairs under analysis. 
Because it was anticipated that the North Sea would present the lowest and more spaced-in-
time accident rates (see Section 2.3.3.1.1.2), the North Sea was chosen as the control group 
for these tests. 
4.3.8.2  Bivariate accident analyses 
Two types of bivariate analyses were undertaken: cross-tabulations of categorical variables 
and analysis of the distributions of accident-fatalities (i.e., the number of occupants fatally 
injured in each accident) per the events of the variables of relevance to accidents (described 
in Section 4.3.6). 
4.3.8.2.1 Cross-tabulations of categorical variables 
The Pearson’s chi-square test was applied to investigate the null hypothesis whereby the 
categorical variables were independent when analysed in pairs. This test requires that not less 
than 80% of the cells in such tables have expected frequencies greater than five and that no 
single expected frequency is lower than unity. When this was violated, Fisher’s exact test was 
used. In both cases, clustering of categories was needed to avoid null cell frequencies 
(Agresti, 2002; Majumdar et al., 2009b; Field, 2009). 
Clustering was undertaken as follows: the Single Engine (SE) category was formed from the 
fusion of SP and ST. The LT/MT was formed from the fusion between LT and MT (see 
Section 4.3.6.2). Furthermore, the ‘ground manoeuvres’ category was created from the fusion 
between the parked and taxiing flight phases and the ‘arrival segment’ was formed from the 
fusion between approach and landing (see Section 4.3.6.3). At the intermediate level of the 
cause classification scheme, causes were clustered in two different ways: pilot-related versus 
all other causes and airworthiness versus all other causes. The causes were then analysed 
independently against the other variables. At the bottom of the cause classification scheme, 
causes were clustered as follows: CFITW, obstacles strike (OS), pilot procedure (PP), engine-
related (ER), tail rotor (TR) and all other causes (else). These causes were the most frequent 
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 causes of accidents, each occurring to over 10% of the accidents worldwide. Refer to Section 
4.3.7 for the cause classification scheme. 
4.3.8.2.2 Distributions of accident-fatalities per variable of relevance to accidents 
The normality of the distributions was tested according to the sample sizes involved in each 
tests condition, i.e., the Shapiro-Wilk test was used when there were fewer than 50 cases per 
category and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used otherwise. The homogeneity of 
variance was checked by Levene’s tests (Field, 2009). Because in all cases at least one such 
assumption of parametric tests was violated, the use of non-parametric techniques was 
required. 
The tests mentioned in Section 4.3.8.1 were used as applicable, except for the Moses Test of 
Extreme Reaction (MTER). During the post hoc analyses employing the Mann-Whitney tests 
with Bonferroni correction (MW/B), the category whose mean value was closest to the 
average value across all categories’ means was chosen as a control group. This intended to 
compare all categories to the central tendency of each variable under test. 
4.3.8.3 Multivariate accident analysis 
Given the characteristics of the data, log linear analysis could not be undertaken to assess the 
multi-way interactions between categorical variables. This is due to an excessively large 
number of cells which did not meet the requirements for chi-square analysis in the cross-
tabulation tables produced. Therefore the exploration of possible interactions between more 
than two variables was embedded in the logistic regression analysis (Field, 2009; Agresti, 
2002). 
Logistic regression was used to predict the events of dependent variables (i.e., causes and 
outcomes of accidents) by analysing the linear relationship between the natural logarithm of 
the odds (defined below) of such variables and the explanatory variables. 
Causes of accidents were predicted based on regions of operation, aircraft categories, phases 
of flight, lighting conditions and all possible interactions between such variables. Outcomes 
of accidents were predicted based on the same variables, accident causes and all possible 
interactions between these variables. The choice of number of explanatory variables were 
adequate, according to the recommendations of Burns and Burns (2008) and Garson (2011), 
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 both cited in Dupuy (2011). These recommendations concern the sample sizes involved. 
Logistic regression is frequently used in transport research (e.g., Inglis et al., 2010; Dupuy, 
2011). 
In order to ensure that the standard errors of the b coefficients were not excessively large, 
unobserved combinations of predictors needed to be avoided. This required further clustering 
of categories, which was undertaken as follows. The three OGP regions of operations were 
used (see Section 4.3.6.1). LT, MT and HT helicopters were clustered into the Multi-Engine 
(ME) category (see Sections 4.3.8.2.1 and 4.3.6.2). Phases of flight were re-clustered as 
arrival segment (refer to Section 4.3.8.2.1), departure segment (i.e., takeoff) and all other 
phases (refer to Table 4-5). At the intermediate level of the cause classification scheme, 
causes were grouped as pilot-related, airworthiness and other causes. At the bottom level of 
the cause classification scheme, causes were grouped as CFITW, obstacle strike, engine-
related and other causes (see Sections 4.3.8.2.1 and 4.3.7). 
Problems with multicollinearity (i.e., predictors which are too highly correlated) and 
overdispersion (i.e., observed variance which is larger than the variance predicted by the 
model) were assessed primarily by observation of the standard error of the b coefficients 
obtained. Any standard error greater than 2 was deemed indicative of multicollinearity or 
overdispersion (Field, 2009). Additional overdispersion checks were undertaken by 
calculating the dispersion parameter (i.e., Ø) for each multinomial logistic regression model. 
Ø is given by the quotient between the model’s goodness of fit statistic over its degrees of 
freedom. This quotient should be between 1 and 2 to ensure that there is no overdispersion 
(Field, 2009). 
Finally, the forward stepwise model fitting strategy based on the log-likelihood statistic was 
used to account for the exploratory nature of this study (Field, 2009). 
4.4 Results and discussion 
The sampling strategy returned 189 accidents. This corresponds to approximately 80% 
statistical power for the detection of an effect size of 0.20 on the two-tailed hypothesis tested. 
This is the threshold typically accepted for assured statistical utility (Burns and Burns, 2008).  
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 Sixty-five per cent of the accident reports were covered by official investigations. The OGP 
summaries accounted for a further 25%, leaving 10% to the judgement of the researcher. The 
accidents with ‘unknown/unavailable’ information were excluded from the analysis. Accident 
information was normalised by the flying hours data available (i.e., 1997-2009) and 
discriminated by four regions of operations (i.e., worldwide, GOM, NS and ‘other regions’), 
three lighting conditions (i.e., whole day, daytime and nighttime), seven causes (i.e., all, 
operational, operational pilot-related, operational non pilot-related, technical, technical 
airworthiness and technical maintenance) and two outcomes (i.e., overall and fatal). The 
bivariate and multivariate analyses of accident data covered the whole (1997-2011) period. 
The analyses are presented and interpreted in the following sections. 
4.4.1 Calculation and analysis of accident rates 
Figures 4-3 to 4-5 illustrate the worldwide overall and fatal accident rates (solid blue and 
dotted red lines, respectively), calculated as described in Section 4.3.8.1. The accident rates 
include all, operational and technical causes, grouped according to lighting conditions 
(daytime to the left, nighttime to the right). The much higher accident rates in the nighttime 
are noticeable (6-fold overall and 15-fold for fatal accidents, as compared to the daylight 
rates over the same period), as well as the prevalence of operational accidents over technical 
accidents. However, the sparse distribution of technical failures at night suggests that these 
were caused by random effects. 
The results of the statistical tests applied are summarised in Table 4-8, which also outlines the 
hypotheses tested. The fact that worldwide nighttime accident rates were either significantly 
greater (test of hypothesis H01, KS-Z tests) or tended towards the extreme of the distributions 
(test of H02, MTER), for all combinations of causes and outcomes, confirmed the trends in 
Figures 4-3 to 4-5. The GOM and other regions follow a similar pattern. However, for the NS 
the distributions per lighting condition were not significantly different (KS-Z tests), 
indicating comparable risk levels in this region. Nonetheless, since all the ranges were 
significantly different (MTER), any helicopter accident at night inflated the accident rates, 
and should therefore be addressed. 
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Figure 4-3 – Worldwide overall and fatal accident rates (solid blue and dotted red lines, 
respectively) for all causes, per lighting conditions (left: daytime; right: nighttime) 
 
Figure 4-4 – Worldwide overall and fatal accident rates (solid blue and dotted red lines, 
respectively) for operational causes, per lighting conditions (left: daytime; right: nighttime) 
 
Figure 4-5 – Worldwide overall and fatal accident rates (solid blue and dotted red lines, 
respectively) for technical causes, per lighting conditions (left: daytime; right: nighttime) 
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 Table 4-8 – Results of the statistical tests applied to accident rates 
Hypotheses H01/2 = 'the distribution / range of accident rates is the same across lighting conditions' 
(KS-Z and MTER, respectively) 
H03 = 'the distribution of accident rates is the same across regions of occurrence' 
Causes Outcomes 
Worldwide GOM NS Other Whole day Day Night 
KS-Z MTER KS-Z MTER KS-Z MTER KS-Z MTER KW 
MW/B KW MW/B KW MW/B 
NSxGOM NSxOther NSxGOM NSxOther NSxGOM NSxOther 
All 
All ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X ✓ 
Fatal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ X ✓ 
  
Operational 
All ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X X 
  Fatal ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
  
 Operational, pilot-
related 
All ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X 
  
 
Fatal ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
  
 Operational, non 
pilot-related 
All ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X X NA NA 
  
 
Fatal X ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ X ✓ X NA NA X NA NA X NA NA 
  
Technical 
All ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ ✓ X X NA NA 
  Fatal ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X X X NA NA 
  
 Technical, 
airworthiness 
All ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ ✓ X X NA NA X NA NA X NA NA 
  
 
Fatal ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ X X X NA NA X NA NA X NA NA 
  
 Technical, 
maintenance 
All ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X X NA NA 
    Fatal X ✓ X ✓ X ✓ X ✓ X NA NA X NA NA X NA NA 
     
KS-Z Kolgomorov-Smirnov Z test 
   
✓ Significant result: reject H0 
   
     
MTER Moses Test of Extreme Reaction 
   
X Non-significant: accept H0 
   
     
KW Kruskal-Wallis test 
   
NA Not Applicable 
   
     
MW/B Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction 
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 Regarding the analysis per region, the tests of the hypotheses H03 in Table 4-8 show that the 
distributions of accident rates (overall and fatal) for all causes were significantly different for 
the ‘whole day’ condition with diverging post hoc analysis’ results. Whereas GOM’s overall 
accident rates were significantly greater, the highest fatal accident rates occurred in the ‘other 
regions’. Further analysis per lighting condition indicated that the accident rates of the GOM 
were related to daytime operations. Conversely, the ‘other regions’ sustained the highest 
nighttime accident rates. This emphasises the nighttime as a recognised condition for fatal 
helicopter accidents, as mentioned before (Taber and McCabe, 2006; Simons et al., 2011; 
Baker et al., 2011; Flight Safety Foundation, 2010; Ross and Gibb, 2008). 
In relation to the operational failures alone, the whole day and daytime accident rates of the 
GOM were significantly higher than in all other regions. Concerning the fatal accident rates, 
both GOM and ‘other regions’ performed significantly worse than the NS for the whole day 
and in daylight. However, during the nighttime the ‘other regions’ had the highest fatal 
accident rates. This clarifies that the increased risk of nighttime operations in ‘other regions’ 
stemmed from fatal operational failures, especially pilot-related. Regarding technical failures, 
the daytime accident rates of the GOM were the highest and caused by poor maintenance. 
The considerably higher nighttime accident rates indicate a persistent problem of pilot 
performance in the nighttime throughout the analysis timeframe. With significantly higher 
fatal accident rates, this problem was worst in regions other than the NS and GOM. In 
contrast, the GOM faced the highest accident and fatal accident rates in the daytime in 
relation to maintenance and pilot performance issues. A plausible explanation is that, by 
assigning ‘pilot/maintainer error’ as a cause of accidents more frequently than investigative 
authorities of other regions do, the NTSB’s premature accident investigation ‘stopping rules’ 
mentioned before (Hollnagel, 2009) may have biased the results. This may, for example, be 
the result of a lack of appropriate data to the accident investigators. Many SE helicopters are 
not equipped with flight data recorders and thus, accident investigation may have to rely on 
assumptions to a greater extent than for those equipped with flight data recorders. 
4.4.2 Bivariate accident analysis 
4.4.2.1 Cross-tabulations of categorical variables 
The results for this analysis are presented in Table 4-9. 
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 Table 4-9 – Results of the statistical tests applied to pairs of categorical variables 
 
Regions Aircraft categories 
Lighting 
conditions Phases of flight 
Severity 
(i.e., fatal or not) 
Aircraft categories ✓         
Lighting 
conditions 
✓ ✓       
Phases of flight X X X     
Severity 
(i.e., fatal or not) 
✓ ✓ ✓ X   
Causes (top level) X X ✓ ✓ X 
Causes 
(intermediate 
level) 
X X ✓ ✓ X 
Causes (bottom 
level) 
X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
        ✓     Significant association X     Non-significant association 
 
The association between regions of occurrence and aircraft category stemmed from the 
significantly larger number of accidents to HT aircraft in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), than expected from independent variables. This was unsurprising since 
operations in this region are dominated by HT helicopters. Regarding lighting conditions, 
nighttime accidents occurred in higher frequencies in Africa, NS and Middle East and in 
daylight in the GOM. Despite confirming that developing countries were less prepared to 
undertake nighttime operations (Barnett, 2009a), the association with the NS suggests that 
more exposure to the nighttime (see Section 4.3.4.1) might be related to the occurrence of 
accidents. Again this highlights the need for a careful consideration of using helicopters over 
the sea at night. 
Fatal accidents were more frequent in Africa, the Americas except GOM, Australasia and 
CIS and less frequent in the GOM. This confirms the results in Section 4.4.1 and explains 
why regulations and safety practices are more lenient in the GOM, with SE helicopters flying 
offshore and catastrophic ditchings still being classified as incidents. 
The significant association between aircraft category and lighting condition occurred as MT 
helicopters crashed at night more often than expected. MT aircraft were also significantly 
associated with fatal accident outcomes, controlled flights into terrain or water (CFITWs) and 
tail rotor failures. Additionally, engine failure accidents were significantly associated with SE 
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 aircraft. These associations indicate that MT helicopters were used in conditions that were 
excessively challenging to pilots, necessitating an examination of the helicopter’s operational 
envelope. This is particularly important, as MT aircraft are the preferred choice for nighttime 
missions, especially medvac, in many parts of the world. 
Lighting conditions were associated with accident severity - with more fatal accidents at 
night - and causes at all three levels of the cause classification scheme (Table 4-6), showing 
that nighttime operational, pilot-related and CFITW accidents did not occur at random. 
Furthermore, there were fewer airworthiness failures at night than expected, which was 
unsurprising given that such failures tend to occur according to time exposure. This confirms 
that the technical failures which occurred at night (Section 4.4.1) were caused by random 
effects. 
Phases of flight were associated with causes at all levels of the cause classification scheme. 
The association between flight phases and accident causes stemmed from (i) a concentration 
of operational failures on the ground and arrival manoeuvres and (ii) pilot-related accidents, 
CFITW and obstacle strikes during the arrival. Also contributing to this association was the 
concentration of technical failures, especially airworthiness and tail rotor failures in the cruise 
phase. These results confirm the need to normalise technical failures by the flight hour and 
operational failures by the flight segment. Additionally, the results confirm the urgent need to 
address pilot performance shortcomings during arrival manoeuvres of offshore operations. 
Finally, accident severity was associated with causes of accidents at the bottom level of the 
cause classification scheme, confirming that CFITWs were mostly fatal. 
4.4.2.2 Distributions of accident-fatalities per variable of relevance to accidents 
This bivariate study showed that the distributions of accident-fatalities were significantly 
different across regions of occurrence, aircraft category, lighting conditions and accident 
causes (at the bottom level of the cause classification scheme). Table 4-10 summarises the 
hypotheses tested and the results obtained. 
142 
 
 Table 4-10 – Summary of the results of the statistical tests applied to the distributions of accident-fatalities 
 
Hypotheses Statistical tests applied1 and results obtained 
H04 The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across regions of 
occurrence2 KW 
MW/B 
GOM x Au Af x Au ME x Au NS x Au Am x Au CIS x Au 
✓ ✓ X X X X X 
H05 The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across aircraft categories
3 
KW 
MW/B    
HT x MT LT x MT SE x MT    
✓ X ✓ ✓    
H06 The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across phases of flight KW MW/B      
X NA      
H07 The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across lighting conditions KS-Z       
✓       
H08a The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across accident causes at 
the top level of the cause classification scheme4 
MW       
X       
H08b The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across accident causes at 
the intermediate level of the cause classification scheme4 
KW MW/B      
X NA      
H08c The distribution of fatalities per accident is the same across accident causes at 
the bottom level of the cause classification scheme4, 5 KW 
MW/B  
ER x OS PP x OS TR x OS Else x OS CFITW x OS  
✓ X X X X X  
  
✓    Significant result: reject H0 X    Non-significant: accept H0 NA    Not Applicable 
       
1 Refer to Section 4.3.8.1 and Table 4-8 for coding of statistical tests applied 
       
2 Refer to Section 4.3.6.1 and Table 4-3 for coding of regions 
       
3 Refer to Section 4.3.6.2 and Table 4-4 for coding of aircraft categories 
       
4 Refer to Section 4.3.7 and Table 4-6 for cause classification scheme 
       
5 Refer to Section 4.3.8.2.1 for coding of accident causes 
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 Regarding regions of occurrence, the fatalities per accident were fewer in the GOM and 
similar across all remaining regions. Given that the GOM concentrates small, single-engine 
helicopter operations this result was expected. However, the failure to achieve significance 
across all remaining regions shows that the fatalities per accident were comparable in areas 
where the typical categories of aircraft used are different (e.g., MT in the Middle East, 
Americas except GOM and Africa versus HT in Australasia, CIS and NS). This might 
highlight problems with poor Search and Rescue (SAR) infrastructure, more adverse 
operating conditions or over-stretched flight envelopes in the regions using MT, or that MT 
helicopters were less crashworthy and seaworthy than the other helicopter categories. These 
are important considerations since the use of MT aircraft are a natural cost-effective choice in 
lieu of HT helicopters. 
The analysis across aircraft categories further endorsed the hypotheses above. The 
distributions of fatalities per accident were only significantly different between SE and MT 
aircraft, with fewer deaths per accident in the former category. This confirms that the 
numbers of fatally-injured occupants per accident of MT and HT aircraft were comparable 
throughout the study timeframe, even though the latter is meant to carry considerably more 
occupants per flight than the former. 
The distributions of fatalities were also significantly different across lighting condition, with 
nighttime accidents consistently claiming more lives per accident than daytime accidents. 
Regarding accident causes, although the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that the distributions of 
fatalities per accident were different across the causes considered at the bottom level of the 
cause classification scheme, post-hoc tests failed to identify where the differences stemmed 
from. This might have been the result of an excessively stringent rejection criterion caused by 
the application of the Bonferroni correction. Nevertheless, the extreme mean fatalities were 
caused by engine-related issues and CFITWs (which were lowest and highest, respectively). 
This clarifies that CFITWs were the biggest cause of death per accident in offshore helicopter 
transportation. Given such findings, regression models for accident outcomes and their causes 
were fitted to support the establishment of sound ‘predictive’ safety interventions (see 
Section 2.3.3.3). 
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 4.4.3 Multivariate accident analyses 
This was used to identify multi-way interactions across the variables of relevance to accidents 
and predict accident cause and outcomes given that an accident has happened (i.e., 
probability of an accident = 1). Causes were predicted using multinomial logistic regression 
whereas the prediction of outcomes was based on the binomial logistic regression. The 
prediction of causes was attempted at all three levels of the cause classification scheme 
separately. Similarly, three predictions of accident outcomes were undertaken, corresponding 
to each level of the cause classification scheme. However, the results presented focus on as 
low a level as possible, to extract the maximum hazard information available. 
4.4.3.1 Multinomial logistic regression 
Despite further clustering, it was not possible to predict accident causes at the most detailed 
level of the cause classification scheme due to an excessively large number of unobserved 
combinations of predictors (50%). Using the intermediate and top levels of the scheme, the 
analysis showed that multicollinearity or overdispersion were absent in the data. At the 
intermediate level of the scheme, a test of the full model against a constant only model 
indicated that the predictors, as a set, reliably distinguished between accidents causes 
(χ2(14)=34.692, p=0.002). The overall prediction success was 61.1% (pilot-related: 82.0%; 
airworthiness: 53.2%; other: 3.8%). 
No multi-way interactions between the variables were found. When comparing the odds of 
having technical, airworthiness failures to those of operational, pilot-related failures, the 
Wald criterion showed that aircraft category, phase of flight and the interaction between 
lighting condition and aircraft category made significant contributions to prediction. The use 
of multi-engine aircraft produced an odds ratio that represented a 2.4% likelihood of 
airworthiness-related accidents over that of single-engine aircraft. Regarding phases of flight, 
the odds ratios of airworthiness failures during the arrival and departure segments indicated 
likelihoods of 37.8% and 20.9% respectively, in comparison to accidents in the remaining 
phases of flight (largely dominated by the cruise). Considering the interaction between 
aircraft category and lighting condition, the change in the odds indicated that multi-engine 
aircraft operated in daylight were 48 times more likely to be involved in airworthiness 
failures than single-engine aircraft operated at night. However, given the large 95% 
confidence interval obtained, this should be interpreted with care. 
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 The predictions of failures other than airworthiness-related were only successful in 3.8% of 
the cases and thus also need to be interpreted with care. Table 4-11 summarises the results. 
 
Table 4-11 – Results of multinomial logistic regression 
    
95% CI for odds ratio 
  b(SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Airworthiness versus Pilot-related failures 
    
 
Aircraft category (ME/SE) -3.743* (1.892) 0.001 0.024 0.965 
 
Phases of flight (Arrival/Else) -0.972* (0.423) 0.165 0.378 0.866 
  
(Departure/Else) -1.564* (0.638) 0.060 0.209 0.731 
 
Aircraft category X lighting condition 3.872* (1.927) 1.099 48.038 2099.373 
Any other versus. Pilot-related failures 
    
 
Aircraft category (ME/SE) -20.997** (0.728) 1.827 X 10-10 7.608 X 10-10 3.168 X 10-9 
  Phases of flight (Arrival/Else) -1.406* (0.575) 0.079 0.245 0.757 
 
R2Mc Fadden= 0.109; R2Cox & Snell= 0.193; R2Nagelkerke= 0.224 * p<0.05 
 
** p<0.001 
     
The results of the multinomial logistic regression were in general agreement with those of the 
bivariate analysis, barring the dissociation between lighting conditions and accident causes in 
the regression model fitted. This could be an outcome of the clustering procedure that 
combined heterogeneous categories, thereby affecting prediction accuracy. Nevertheless, 
given the prediction successes achieved, the model fitted is a good predictor of pilot-related 
events. 
Predictions at the upper level of the cause classification scheme (i.e., technical versus 
operational failures) were fairly similar to those at the first part of Table 4-11 above (i.e., 
airworthiness versus pilot-related failures), except that the results of the departure segment 
were not statistically significant. 
4.4.3.2 Binomial logistic regression 
Multicollinearity and overdispersion were not present in any of the three models fitted (i.e., at 
each level of the cause classification scheme of Section 4.3.7). When predicting accident 
outcomes using the most-detailed (i.e., bottom) level of the cause classification scheme, a test 
of the full model against a constant-only model indicated that the predictors, as a set, reliably 
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 distinguished between fatal and non-fatal accidents (χ2(3)=20.363, p=0.000). Overall, the 
prediction success was 72.9% (non-fatal: 94.9%; fatal: 24.5%). 
Again, no multi-way interactions between the variables were found. The Wald criterion 
indicates that only lighting conditions and regions of operation made significant contributions 
to prediction (p=0.021 and p=0.006, respectively). When operating out of the GOM area, the 
odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of fatal accidents was 2.8 times that of the GOM. 
Similarly, when operating out of the NS area, fatal accidents were 2.6 times more likely to 
happen. However, the confidence interval of the latter’s odds ratio indicates the possibility of 
fewer fatal accidents occurring when moving out of the NS, e.g., into the GOM, where there 
were proportionately fewer fatal accidents. A change in lighting condition from daytime to 
nighttime produced an odds ratio corresponding to a fatal accident likelihood of 4.9. Table 4-
12 summarises these results. 
 
Table 4-12 – Results of binomial logistic regression 
   
95% CI for odds ratio 
  b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Region Away from GOM 1.018** (0.379) 1.318 2.767 5.811 
 
Away from NS 0.938 (0.667) 0.691 2.554 9.444 
Lighting 
 
1.58** (0.572) 1.584 4.857 14.89 
Constant   -1.221* (0.560) 
 
0.295   
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.713; R2Cox & Snell=0 .113; R2Nagelkerke= 0.159 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
 
The model predicted non-fatal outcomes more accurately than fatal outcomes and this may 
highlight a limitation in the use of regression analysis with accident data in the offshore 
helicopter domain. The small sample size of fatal accidents may not support such analysis. 
This asks for novel ways of predicting potential accidents, which are addressed in Chapter 8. 
Nevertheless, the fitted model confirms the results of the previous analysis steps (see Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2). 
The model fitted using the intermediate level of the cause classification scheme had lighting 
condition as the only significant predictor variable. Using the upper level of the cause 
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 classification scheme, the results were fairly similar to those of the bottom level. A plausible 
reason for such differences might be the reduced modelling accuracy associated with the use 
of more generic predictor categories. This confirms that the choice of focus on the results at 
the bottom level of the cause classification scheme (described in Section 4.4.3) was adequate. 
4.4.4 Validation 
Validity with respect to specific criteria was assessed as follows. External validity (i.e., the 
extent to which the results of the sample can be generalised to the population; see Burns and 
Burns, 2008) was deemed achieved because the sampling procedure was considered to 
approach a census (see Section 4.3.8). 
The internal validity, which refers to the extent to which the results are valid within the 
confines of the study (Burns and Burns, 2008), was assessed with respect to concurrent and 
predictive validity. These refer to the extent to which the results truly reflect the current and 
future status of safety performance in the industry, respectively. They may be assessed by 
direct observation of the phenomenon under study or by evaluating data from other sources. 
Since accidents are rare events, observations were not practical. Therefore, data was sought 
from the experiences of subject matter experts (SMEs), who were invited to review the 
results. 
The choice of SMEs had to be done carefully since very few SMEs can comment on offshore 
helicopter operations at a global level. Specific legal frameworks ensure that pilots are 
licensed nationally and only fly in the regions where their national licenses are valid 
(typically the country of issue). This rule limits the build-up of international experience by 
most of the pilots and, therefore, their ability to assess the validity of the results obtained. 
However, because some companies operate integrated safety and operations departments with 
jurisdiction in many countries, SMEs who were knowledgeable on global issues could be 
consulted. They were a flight crew manager of the largest offshore helicopter operator in the 
world, which operates on all continents; a senior training captain and flight safety officer of a 
major European offshore helicopter operator; and a flight operations manager of a major 
offshore helicopter operator with headquarters in the North Sea and bases worldwide. All 
such professionals agreed that the results obtained were representative of the current issues 
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 faced by the industry and would remain so in the future unless decisive corrective actions are 
put in place. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 established the importance of having a robust accident analysis process which 
enables the systematic hazard trends and patterns of the nighttime to be identified amidst the 
gamut of hazards present in the operation. In this chapter, an accident analysis process with 
the required capability was, for the first time, developed and implemented. 
The implementation of the process has resulted in the identification of a number of critical 
areas for priority intervention both in the nighttime and beyond. These areas were validated 
by carefully selected SMEs and include the need for the following: 
• Improvement in the quality and sharing of accident data; 
• New metrics for the normalisation of accidents (i.e., technical accidents should be 
normalised by the flying hours, whereas operational accidents should be normalised 
by the cycles of takeoff and landing); 
• Careful analysis of pilot performance at night; 
• Careful analysis of pilot performance in the arrival flight segment of flight; 
• Consideration of the use of MT helicopters in more benign conditions (e.g., by 
reducing the frequency of nighttime operations); 
• Assessment of the seaworthiness and crashworthiness of MT helicopters; 
• Careful analysis of pilot- and maintenance-related events in daylight in the Gulf of 
Mexico, including from the perspective of biased attribution of accident causes; 
• Consideration of terminating the use of SE helicopters in the Gulf of Mexico; 
• An alternative safety paradigm that accounts for hazard prediction in the face of rare 
catastrophic (i.e., fatal) accidents. 
With regard to nighttime operations specifically, it was concluded that the nighttime accident 
rates (fatal accident rates in particular) were significantly greater than those of the daytime 
and mostly stemmed from operational issues, especially poor pilot performance. These 
accident rates were highest in areas away from the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico. However, 
it was concluded from the analysis of accidents by frequencies (i.e., the bivariate analysis) 
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 that nighttime accidents were associated also with the North Sea. Higher nighttime accident 
frequencies were additionally associated mid-twin turbine helicopters and fatal controlled 
flights into terrain or water (CFITWs). Finally, the nighttime was a reliable statistical 
predictor to operational as well as fatal accidents in the logistic regression models fitted to the 
accident data. 
These conclusions can be usefully mapped to the industry’s taxonomy of Chapter 3. Given 
the higher completeness of the data and fewer clustering of categories involved, this is best 
done by using the results of the bivariate analysis (Section 4.4.2.1), as shown in Figure 4-6. 
During the nighttime, accidents were found to be associated with pilot performance (i.e., 
flight crew), MT aircraft (i.e., attributable to design) and region (i.e., country of operation). 
The representation of these associations overlaid onto the industry’s taxonomy generates an 
initial idea of where the main problems leading to nighttime accidents lie and, therefore, 
where safety interventions and in-depth hazard identification efforts could concentrate for 
maximum benefit. However, given the low quality of the accident data analysed and the 
associated need of various compromises (e.g., clustering of categories and use of generic 
causes), the results and interactions in the taxonomy can only be presented at a high level 
which still requires further in-depth analysis for accurate hazard identification, risk analysis 
and thence targeted mitigation actions. 
Given the need of further hazard identification mentioned above, coupled with the other gaps 
in reactive hazard identification processes identified in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3.1.2), Chapter 
5 investigates the statistical utility of reported incidents as precursors of accidents (as 
believed to exist in aviation) in the offshore helicopter industry. This further enables to 
undertake hazard identification and risk analysis in support of nighttime offshore helicopter 
operations, grounded on empirically verified data. 
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CHAPTER 5 ASSESSMENT OF THE STATISTICAL 
UTILITY OF REPORTED INCIDENTS 
Chapter 4 developed a new accident analysis process to improve the offshore helicopter 
transportation industry’s awareness of its systematic hazard trends and patterns, especially in 
the nighttime. An important conclusion from that chapter is that an alternative safety paradigm 
is needed to ensure continuous hazard identification and risk analysis on the face of rare 
catastrophic accidents. As discussed in Chapter 2, at present, continuous hazard identification 
and risk analysis largely relies on the incidents reported by front-line personnel (e.g., pilots and 
maintenance engineers). However, several factors may affect the validity of incident reports, 
leading to the incorrect identification of hazards and thence wrong risk analysis and ineffective 
prioritisation of safety interventions. In order to avoid this, it is important to empirically assess 
the statistical utility of reported incidents as indicators (also referred to as ‘precursors’) of 
impending accidents, as generally believed to occur in the aviation industry. This is achieved 
by means of a process developed and implemented in this chapter. The first section briefly 
recapitulates and expands the theoretical background underpinning incident/serious incident 
data analysis. This is followed in Section 5.2 by a description of the drivers to incident data 
quality, with focus on helicopter operations. In Section 5.3 the architecture of the process is 
outlined and implemented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the results, which are discussed 
in Section 5.6. Sections 5.7 and 5.8 discuss the validation and limitations of the process, 
respectively. Section 5.9 outlines important conclusions, which enable to improve the utility of 
incident reports for hazard identification, risk analysis and thereby risk mitigation in the 
offshore helicopter industry, especially in the nighttime. 
5.1 Theoretical background 
As discussed in Sections 2.3.3.1 and 2.3.3.1.2, the importance given to reporting incidents and 
serious incidents is associated with the belief that incidents, serious incidents and accidents 
share the same aetiology. This belief originated from Heinrich’s factory investigation 
(Heinrich, 1980) which established a statistical precursor relationship between events of 
various severity levels. The belief in this relationship has endured and been accepted with an 
unverified status of truism in many industries (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2008) such as rail 
operations (Kyriakidis et al., 2012), occupational safety (Kjellén, 2000; Bird Jr. and Germain, 
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1992) and civil aviation. Different pyramidal representations of the alleged statistical 
relationship between accidents and (serious) incidents have been extensively used in safety and 
training materials, with all pyramids expressing the idea that an accident is preceded by many 
incidents of similar characteristics (ICAO, 2005b, 2006c, 2012c; Hernandez, 2005; FAA Air 
Traffic Organization, 2008, 2009c; FAA, 2000; Pilgrim, 2010). 
It results from the statistical precursor relationship that the optimal use of serious incident and 
incident data for hazard identification and risk analysis is as numerical indicators of impeding 
accidents. In the aviation industry, this has resulted in the belief that the incidents/serious 
incidents reported to occur most frequently directly indicate the characteristic of an impending 
accident. However, the pyramid itself and its specific application in the aviation industry have 
been disputed on various grounds explained in Section 2.3.3.1.2. When the precursor 
relationship cannot be validated, incident reports should be assessed and used individually 
(Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; Harper et al., 2011), provided that specified data quality criteria 
are met, as discussed in the following section. 
5.2 Data quality considerations 
Chapter 4 has discussed the importance of data quality for accident analysis, with the 
conclusion that the generation of accident data should satisfy specified data quality criteria with 
respect to defined dimensions and metrics. 
Data quality is equally important to reliably identify hazards and analyse risks from reported 
incidents. Given that incident data are usually stored in large databases, the factors for assured 
data quality include the characteristics of the database in terms of data input, storage and 
retrieval capabilities (Holt, 2009). Additionally, the stakeholders involved in all such activities 
are instrumental in determining the quality of the reported incident data. 
5.2.1 Stakeholders involved 
Assuring quality incident data requires the identification of the stakeholders involved and the 
development of appropriate data quality control mechanisms. Stakeholders can be categorised 
as collectors, custodians or consumers of data (Lee and Strong, 2003). All have important roles 
to play in data quality management. 
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For instance, whilst pilots and maintenance engineers (i.e., data collectors) could bias the data 
collected by underreporting nighttime human factors incidents (thus compromising the ‘value-
added’ dimension of data quality), this could well be the result of insufficient guidance 
provided by data custodians (e.g., the incident database designers and operators from 
regulatory bodies) in relation to the types of incidents to be reported. Value-added refers to the 
extent to which the incidents captured in the database are beneficial, useful and correspond to 
their true real world values (Lee et al., 2002). Low value added is a recurring problem of 
reported incidents in aviation in general (e.g., CAA, 2010c; Corrie, 1997; Holt, 2009). 
Low quality data might also be produced by data collectors who are not sufficiently aware of 
the relevance of reporting specific incidents to data consumers (e.g., the regulator’s safety 
analysts). Indeed, previous research has identified that informing data collectors about the 
needs of downstream data consumers, facilitates the generation of higher quality data (Lee and 
Strong, 2003). This corroborates the need to educate professionals on the use of the 
occurrences reported under incident reporting schemes, as well as the critical factors associated 
with underreporting and biased reporting of incidents. 
5.2.2 Critical factors for effective incident reporting 
Many factors can influence the willingness to report incidents and serious incidents in safety-
critical industries. In the UK military for example, the time investment and effort associated 
with reporting incidents, as well as fear of punishment, were found to be the main factors for 
underreporting. Moreover, faulty information feedback mechanisms, which leave the reporting 
individual oblivious to the associated safety actions taken, were identified. Nevertheless, when 
reporting occurred, it was most often biased towards technical issues (e.g., faulty equipment). 
This was attributed to greater guidance on what technical incidents consisted of and greater 
event traceability (e.g., by recorded engine exceedances) than with the less tenable human 
factors occurrences. From the over 4800 incident entries in 2007, only 65 were related to 
human factors events (Holt, 2009). 
In the USA, the reporting of incidents and serious incidents in civil operations under the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) increased considerably after the operation of such 
database was transferred from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, a regulatory body 
with power to levy fines and revoke licences) to the National Aeronautics and Space 
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Administration (NASA, an independent body without such powers). Besides the suspicion on 
the dual role of the regulatory agency, fear of litigation and breaches of the scheme’s 
confidentiality by magistrates were also speculated as factors for underreporting (Corrie, 1997). 
Van der Schaaf and Kanse (2004a, b) explored why workers still hesitated to disclose self-
errors at a chemical processing plant renowned for its good safety culture. Besides some of the 
reasons mentioned above, they added that perceived uselessness (e.g., feeling that reports 
would not be acted upon by management anyway), accepted risk (i.e., understanding that some 
types of risk - e.g., own errors - are inherent to the job), sense of personal immunity and a 
‘macho’ attitude could be factors affecting the will to report. These factors were also 
mentioned by Stewart (2008) under various forms of ‘locus of control’. 
‘Perceived dread’ (Bohm and Harris, 2010; Slovic, 2000) might also influence the reporting of 
incidents. This is an effect whereby reporters tend to overestimate the frequencies of the factors 
that appeal to their fears, thereby reporting such occurrences more often than the frequency 
with which they actually occur. Differently, Steckel and Patankar (2012) identified that the vast 
majority of errors of aircrews in the cockpit are simply not noticed, particularly if they happen 
during the execution of routine procedures and when corrective actions are successful. This 
endorses the need not to solely rely on reported incidents (Herrera et al., 2010a). 
According to the first edition of ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM; ICAO, 2006c) 
some other factors for incident underreporting included embarrassment in front of peers, self-
incrimination and true sanctions, such as enforcement action by regulatory authorities. On the 
other hand, the principles of good reporting systems were listed as follows: 
• Trust; i.e. that the information disclosed will not be used against the reporting 
individual. 
• Non-punitive nature; often achieved by the regulatory authority and top management 
assuring the confidentiality of the reporting individual. 
• Inclusive reporting base; e.g., not only focused on capturing the flight crew’s view but 
also that from ground handlers. 
• Independence; e.g., the operator of the database does not possess regulatory powers; or, 
in State-run databases, clear assurance is given that the information reported will be 
used only for safety purposes. 
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• Ease of reporting; e.g., as many tick off questions as possible. 
• Acknowledgement; i.e. some call-back capability so that reporting individuals know 
what resulted from their reports. 
• Promotion; e.g., disseminating the reporting scheme’s existence with maximum 
exposure, using a variety of communication media. 
• Timely sharing the information reported with the aviation community. 
In its second edition, the SMM (ICAO, 2009c) places greater responsibility on senior managers 
for fostering a safety culture in which front-line personnel (e.g., pilots and maintenance 
engineers) feel compelled and protected to report their genuine mistakes. Based on Reason’s 
theories (GAIN Working Group E, 2004; Reason, 1997), such safety culture (and thus effective 
reporting systems) stem from five organisational traits: 
• Effective sharing of information. 
• Flexibility to reach the persons able to correct systemic faults directly. 
• Positive learning environment. 
• Clear accountabilities. 
• Operators’ willingness to report. 
Acknowledging the importance of such traits, Westrum (1988, 1991) defined progressive levels 
of safety culture to be pursued by organisations, the most robust of which is seeing safety as an 
integral part of the business. Such a safety culture (referred to as ‘generative’) would facilitate 
wide reporting and proactively seek creative ways of avoiding accidents. 
Given that the critical factors for effective reporting presented in this section were primarily 
identified in the aviation domain, it is reasonable to expect that they may be applicable to 
helicopter operations. This is discussed in the next section.  
5.2.3 Reporting culture and data quality in helicopter operations 
Chapter 4 has shown that the reporting of helicopter accidents is still problematic, both in 
offshore operations and across the wider rotary community (Section 4.1). Problems related to 
underreporting, inconsistent use of definitions and low data quality in general are still to be 
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addressed, despite the fact that accident investigations tend to be closely monitored by national 
authorities and the general public.  
Given that these problems largely reflect the degree of maturity of the industry with respect to 
safety, aggravated by the subjective nature of reported incidents (Section 2.2.3), it is reasonable 
to expect that the problems of accident reports can also exist across reported incidents. In fact, 
there are very few studies related to reported incidents in helicopter operations, with all 
confirming that the quality of reports remains a serious concern preventing effective hazard 
identification and risk analysis. 
For example, in an analysis of 3481 helicopter incidents and serious incidents reported to the 
UK regulator between 1995 and 2004, Mitchell (2010) identified that only 10% of the reports 
filed corresponded to private flights. However, such operations sustained 47% of all helicopter 
accidents in the same period. It was also noted that human factors issues only caused 17% of 
the reported occurrences, whereas they were attributed to 76% of the accidents. The opposite 
applied to airworthiness failures, which corresponded to 68% of the UK regulator’s dataset but 
to only 16% of the accidents. Given that technical failures are reported more frequently, the 
cruise phase usually receives the majority of reports due to the greatest time exposure to wear 
and tear (Harris, 2006b; Harris et al., 2000). However, as shown in Chapter 4, this could be 
misleading on the impact of the phase of flight on risk (e.g., the typically larger risks associated 
with the arrival and departure segments are ignored). 
The reasons for the discrepancies included a lack of understanding of safety requirements and 
ad hoc relationships between the smaller helicopter companies and their customers (Mitchell, 
2010), both of which carry the potential to favour underreporting (CAA, 2010c) or biased 
reporting of occurrences. 
In the USA, a public enquiry launched after a series of accidents involving helicopters used in 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) also concluded that the scarcity of useful data severely 
impaired the analysts’ full understanding of the issues involved (GAO, 2007). 
Although it is generally expected that the offshore helicopter industry should be considerably 
less affected by the above influences than the general aviation (see Sections 1.1 and 2.3.3.1.1.3 
for the proactive role of the oil and gas industry in promoting safety in offshore helicopter 
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operations), little is known in this domain about the data stored in incident databases. 
Therefore, the next section proposes a new process to explore the statistical utility of incident 
information stored, as believed to exist in the aviation industry, whilst accounting for the data 
quality weaknesses identified above. 
5.3 Process development 
The process was developed to enable the assessment of the utility of reported incidents as 
statistical precursors to accidents, as applied in aviation. This is a test of the truth of Heinrich’s 
pyramid, as applied in the aviation industry, which considers that the incidents reported most 
frequently indicate the characteristics of the impending accident (see Sections 5.1 and 
2.3.3.1.2). This is similar to a construct validity assessment exercise, i.e., a test of the extent to 
which a measuring device (i.e., reported incidents) relates to the theoretical concepts 
underpinning its creation (Burns and Burns, 2008), as applied in the aviation industry. 
However, this chapter is written from a more flexible stance whereby the underpinning theory, 
as specifically applied in the aviation industry, is also in question. 
Because the problems of low data quality identified in the previous chapter can be expected to 
also affect reported incidents (see Section 5.2.3), the accident analysis process developed in 
Chapter 4 was adapted and complemented to realise the process involving the following tasks. 
1) Define the type of reported incident to be used in the assessment (e.g., mandatory 
and/or voluntary incident reports). 
2) Establish criteria for the selection of a model incident databases, with a focus on data 
quality. 
3) Select a model incident database. 
4) Define a timeframe which enables learning lessons with relevance to current operations. 
5) Sample incidents from the database. 
6) Extract variables of relevance to accidents/incidents (i.e., the hazards). 
7) Check variables for completeness and make recommendations on improved data 
collection where needed. 
8) Sample accidents in the area covered by the incident database during the timeframe 
selected.  
9) Assess the fit of the incident data to Heinrich’s theory, as applied in the aviation 
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on closed-claim-file insurance records (Manuele, 2011). This entails the obligation or 
compelling incentive to report. Therefore, in order to enable as accurate an assessment as 
possible of the application of Heinrich’s pyramid in the aviation industry, the type of incident 
data to be used in the reported incident statistical utility assessment should reflect some form of 
obligation or compelling incentive to report.  
5.3.2 Criteria for the selection of model incident databases 
The model incident databases selected should be trustworthy in terms of the expected external 
validity of the reports, i.e., the incidents stored should be a fair representation of the population 
of actual incidents in the field (Burns and Burns, 2008). Section 5.2.2 outlined several factors 
which promote the environment where open reporting is expected to flourish and, hence, 
should satisfy the representativeness criteria. The principles of good reporting systems outlined 
in ICAO (2006c) should be taken into account when selecting databases for the statistical  
utility assessment. 
Another indirect indicator of the trustworthiness of the database might be its assumed or 
expected utility. Although reported incidents should not be used on the basis of their 
frequencies unless the statistical precursor relationship is validated and representativeness is 
assured, such use reveals a degree of trust on the reports. This is typically associated with an 
observed positive reporting culture.  
Other relevant factors include database publicity (e.g., the degree to which the associated 
reporting scheme is known to the population of potential reporting individuals) and the 
availability of its incident data for use in the statistical utility analysis. 
5.3.3 Database selection 
The selection of databases depends on the purpose of the analysis, e.g., country-based or 
multiple areas. In the latter case, it may be necessary to assess specific data quality dimensions 
in order to ensure that the data from different databases can be merged without loss of vital 
information. In the former case, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (Zionts, 1979; Fischhoff et 
al., 1984) could be used to select the highest quality databases. 
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5.3.4 Timeframe selection 
As outlined in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1), in order to ensure relevance to current operations, the 
timeframe selected should be representative of the current technologies and operating 
conditions. However, since incident databases are typically run on a country or regional basis, 
this assessment should be made with respect to the area covered by the candidate databases. 
The timeframe with the characteristics above may be identified from the summaries of 
helicopter activity published by national or regional institutions, e.g., the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA, 2005) and teams of the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST, e.g., 
EHEST, 2010).  
5.3.5 Sampling incidents from the database 
Many incident databases are not designed to be operation-specific (e.g., ASRS, 2013). 
Therefore, it may be necessary to sample the incidents of interest. Since the characteristics and 
capabilities of incident databases may vary considerably (e.g., in some databases the 
visualisation of data may depend on search words and, in others, on selecting options from 
drop-down menus), it is necessary to ensure that the data sampled from a single database or 
different databases are comparable. 
5.3.6 Extraction of relevant variables 
Since a comparison between accident and incident reports is to be undertaken, the extraction of 
relevant variables should follow the strategy outlined in Section 4.2.5 and implemented in 
Section 4.3.6. 
5.3.7 Completeness checks 
As in Sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.6, completeness checks should be employed to avoid biased 
analysis results. Although the same completeness check (i.e., simple ratio) and criterion (i.e., 
90%) could be used, less stringent criteria may be employed if essential to enable analysis, with 
an acknowledgement of any associated limitations. 
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5.3.8 Sampling accident data 
Accident data must be sampled over the same period and region as the incident data. The 
sources and strategies outlined and implemented in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.5) should 
be used. Additionally, the variables extracted should match the variables covered by the 
incident data. 
5.3.9 Procedure to assess the fit of the data to Heinrich’s theory, as applied in the 
aviation industry 
A three-fold analysis plan is desirable since it enables to assess the application of Heinrich’s 
pyramid from complementary viewpoints. This plan differs from the statistical analysis 
proposed in Chapter 4. The analysis of incident rates proposed in Chapter 4 is irrelevant to 
challenging the specific application of Heinrich’s pyramid in the aviation industry, which is 
solely based on the frequencies of reported incidents preceding an accident. 
The three-fold analysis plan includes the analysis of the frequencies of incidents against 
accidents (i.e., the test of Heinrich’s theory as applied in the aviation industry), pair-wise 
associations (i.e., bivariate analysis) and multi-way interactions (e.g., through multivariate 
analysis). The last two enable to assess whether the combination of events of variables 
matching the characteristics of accidents significantly stand out from all possible combinations 
of events, with respect to their frequencies of occurrence. This implies that the Heinrich’s 
pyramid, as applied in the aviation industry, holds true with respect to combinations of 
incident/accident characteristics, not only to individual characteristics. The tests to be applied 
depend on the characteristics and distributions of the data (outlined in Section 5.4.7). 
5.4 Process implementation 
5.4.1 Type of reported incidents chosen 
The reporting of serious incidents is mandatory (ICAO, 2010e) and, therefore, serious incidents 
comply with the requirement established in Section 5.3.1. Voluntary reports were discarded 
since, by virtue of their dependence on willingness to report, the drive to report is largely 
subjective. 
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The choice of serious incidents limits the assessment of the precursor relationship, as applied in 
the aviation industry, to the upper two levels of the pyramid (i.e., accidents versus serious 
incidents, see Section 5.1).  
5.4.2 Model database 
Since in aviation serious incidents must be reported to the national accident investigation 
authority (or the national civil aviation regulator; see ICAO, 2010e), in principle the databases 
of national accident investigation authorities (or national civil aviation regulators) could be 
used to support the assessment proposed in this chapter. However, there are usually problems 
associated with data availability due to internal data handling procedures, as discussed in the 
next section. 
5.4.2.1 National accident investigation authorities 
Upon receipt of a serious incident report, an assessment is usually made on the extent to which 
the situation reported could have turned into an accident. This assessment drives the 
commissioning of an investigation or the filing of the report virtually without further 
consideration (The National Archives, 1996). Only the serious incidents, subjected to an 
investigation, are usually published. As a consequence, the serious incident data in the public 
domain fail the availability criterion established in Section 5.3.2 and most likely also fail in 
terms of representativeness. 
Table 5-1 illustrates the point mentioned above by comparing the numbers of accidents and 
serious incidents available from the databases of the 50 national accident investigation 
authorities investigated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 (NB: the countries which did not display 
any serious incidents publicly have been omitted). 
5.4.2.2 Civil aviation regulators 
The extent to which the national civil aviation regulators of the 50 countries investigated in 
Chapter 4 maintain representative databases of serious incidents is not fully known. However, 
since in virtually all countries the availability of serious incident data from the national 
accident investigation authorities was poor (see Table 5-1) and the accident data was 
incomplete in many respects (see Section 4.3.6), it is reasonable to expect that the criteria 
outlined in Section 5.3.2 are not fulfilled by more than a few of the national civil aviation 
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regulators’ databases. One potential exception is the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) 
Scheme run by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
 
Table 5-1 – Accident and serious incident reports available from the national accident 
investigation authorities investigated in Chapter 4 (1997-2011 period) 
  Accident reports Serious incident reports 
Brazil 6 1 
Ireland 0 1 
Netherlands 2 4 
Norway 2 7 
UK 11 9 
USA (Gulf of Mexico) 106 9 
 
5.4.2.2.1 The UK’s Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme 
The UK CAA’s MOR Scheme is a programme of major importance to offshore helicopter 
operations in the North Sea. Established with the sole objective of preventing accidents and 
incidents, the scheme does not attribute blame or liability and has legal provisions which 
ensure the confidentiality of the reporting individuals (CAA, 2005). This is in agreement with 
the principles of good reporting systems described in Section 5.2.2. 
The MOR Scheme has an inclusive reporting base. Since its inception in 1976, the scheme is 
generally considered to successfully address the requirements set out by the European 
Parliament and the ICAO whereby Contracting States are required to establish a mandatory 
occurrence reporting system which facilitates the reporting, collection, storage, protection, 
analysis and dissemination of information on actual and potential serious safety deficiencies 
(i.e., hazards) across the aviation industry (Cox and Papandreu, 2003; CAA, 2005; ICAO, 
2010e). Annually, over 14,000 mandatory occurrence reports are filed with a current total of 
over 200,000 entries, making it the world’s most established scheme (Roberts, 2009). The 
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scheme applies to any aircraft operating under an air operator’s certificate or with a certificate 
of airworthiness granted by the UK CAA. 
The fact that the scheme is operated in the North Sea is an additional strength. As explained in 
Chapters 2 (Section 2.3.3.1.1.2) and 4 (Section 4.3.6.1), this is an area of the world’s second 
largest volume of offshore helicopter flights (OGP, 2012b), undertaken under the attentive 
watch of various coordinated stakeholders. Such stakeholders have strived to ensure that the 
North Sea remains a test bed for the development of novel safety infrastructure and 
programmes, which subsequently benefit the wider helicopter community (Fox, 2002; Howson, 
2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the local safety culture might favour the 
fulfilment of the data representativeness requirement of the MOR Scheme (see Section 5.3.2). 
There is also an assumed or expected utility of the scheme, which is evidenced by its recent use 
in Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) that have informed the establishment of safety 
interventions in the offshore helicopter industry (e.g., CAA, 2010c). Although the use of 
incident data in PRAs might be inappropriate and challenging this use is at the core of this 
chapter, using reported incidents in PRAs is usually associated with the assumption that a 
positive reporting culture exists (see Section 5.3.2). 
Finally, the data of the MOR Scheme was available to this thesis. Therefore, the MOR Scheme 
was chosen for the incident statistical utility assessment. 
5.4.3 Analysis timeframe 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the UK CAA considers that the 20 years between 1994 and 
2013 are representative of current UK operations. However, data was only available in the 
years between 1997 and 2010. This was an appropriate period because of the incorporation of 
virtually all current aircraft models during this period (Oil & Gas UK, 2011). Therefore, the 
period between 1997 and 2010 was used for the assessment. 
5.4.4 Sampling of incidents 
Occurrence data stored in the MOR Scheme’s database are formed by objective information 
(e.g., date, time, location, route, speed, altitude, phase of flight), a title and narrative sections 
for the reporter’s description of the event in their own words. Figure 5-2 shows an example of 
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an occurrence stored in the MOR Scheme’s database. 
Key phrases of the narratives are identified using a key phrase lexicon developed by the UK 
CAA, which is an extended version of the Air Transport Association’s specification 100 (ATA 
Spec 100), incorporating human factors. Subsequent searches on the database are done by 
means of such key phrases (CAA, 2005). In order to ensure that as broad a spectrum of 
occurrences as possible could be sampled, data were requested from the CAA by e-mail based 
on the search words ‘offshore’ and ‘helicopter’ discriminated by lighting condition. The data 
requested was received by e-mail for the ‘day’, ‘night’ and ‘twilight’ conditions. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 – Example of a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) 
 
Because of the applicability of the MOR Scheme to all UK registered aircraft, the sampling 
strategy also retrieved accidents of UK registered aircraft overseas (e.g., used in offshore 
operations in China). Such occurrences were excluded from the analysis. 
Additionally, the occurrences were separated into either accidents or serious incidents. This is 
fundamental to enabling the investigation of the assumption that the incidents are statistical 
precursors to accidents, as applied in the aviation industry. 
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Finally, the database covers both civil and military offshore operations. The title and narrative 
of each occurrence were read, enabling to only select the civilian serious incidents for analysis 
(see Section 2-1 for the scope of the thesis). 
5.4.5 Variables extracted and completeness checks 
Phases of flight and incident causes were extracted from the reports by applying the 
classification schemes developed in Sections 4.3.6.3 and 4.3.7. Lighting conditions were 
extracted based on the sampling strategy presented in the Section 5.4.4 and were categorised 
according to Section 4.3.6.4 (i.e., daytime versus nighttime). The sixteen incidents 
characterised as ‘twilight’ were incorporated into the ‘nighttime’ dataset for consistency. 
The data quality issues discussed in Chapter 4 were also present across the reported incidents. 
For example, the typically very brief narratives of the MOR Scheme’s occurrences did not 
allow for a deep causal analysis including multiple factors. Therefore, the use of high level 
precipitating factors and end states was necessary (see Section 4.3.7). Additionally, the phases 
of flight needed clustering so that the minimum cell frequencies required by the statistical tests 
could be achieved (Field, 2009; Majumdar et al., 2009b). As in Section 4.3.8.2.1, the phases of 
flight were clustered as ground manoeuvres, departure segment, cruise and arrival segment. 
Completeness was 100% for all variables, except for phases of flight, which achieved 77% 
completeness over the whole study timeframe. Data on phases of flight were missing for the 
three initial years covered by the study (i.e., 1997, 1998 and 1999). In order to avoid biasing 
the results, any incidents with missing information were excluded from the relevant statistical 
analyses. 
5.4.6 Sampling of accident data 
All accident reports published by the UK’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) in 
the period of concern were gathered from AAIB (2012c). The accidents characteristics are 
presented in Section 5.5. 
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5.4.7 Assessment of the fit of the data to Heinrich’s theory, as applied in the aviation 
industry 
Accidents and incidents were independently analysed for the three variables mentioned (i.e., 
phases of flight, lighting conditions and causes). The subsequent analyses of frequencies 
verified whether the most frequent characteristics across the accidents happened for the whole 
1997-2010 period were matched by the characteristics of the incidents most frequently 
reported. This highlights any possible long-term trends. Additionally, it was also verified 
whether the characteristics of each individual accident corresponded to those most frequently 
reported across the incidents of the two years preceding each accident. For these verifications, 
analysing frequencies or proportions of reported incidents achieve the same results, the latter 
having the benefit of showing the representativeness of reported incidents of specific 
characteristics in relation the totality of reported incidents in the period considered. 
Two years prior to each accident were chosen to reflect the period in which safety management 
practices were expected to have remained constant. This is because safety programmes (e.g., 
HFDM) typically take 2 to 3 years to mature (EASA, 2013c). Additionally, 2 years enabled 
reasonable samples of incidents to be gathered for the statistical analysis.  
The bivariate analysis was based on the non-parametric statistical tests for categorical variables 
mentioned in Section 4.3.8.2.1 (i.e., the Person’s chi square and Fisher’s exact tests). 
Frequency associations between pairs of variables (i.e., phases of flight and causes, phases of 
flight and lighting conditions, causes and lighting conditions) across the incidents reported 
under the MOR Scheme were also explored over the whole period and in the two years 
preceding each accident. This was to assess if combinations of variables (instead of each 
variable alone) could have indicated the characteristics of the accidents that occurred on the 
basis of their frequencies (see Section 5.3.9). Significance was established at p≤0.05 (two-
tailed). 
In addition to the clustering of the phases of flight explained in Section 5.4.5, the incident 
causes were split into mutually exclusive categories corresponding to those of accidents (using 
the bottom level of the cause classification scheme, or the next upper level if the frequency at 
the bottom level is zero – see Table 4-6) or all other causes (Section 4.3.8.2.1). For the 1997-
2010 period, the most frequent causes across all accidents at all 3 levels of the causal analysis 
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scheme (i.e., operational, pilot-related and main rotor/transmission/driveshaft) were used. This 
was used to highlight any general long-term trends with respect to frequency associations. 
Section 5.5.2 shows one contingency table in order to illustrate how these associations were 
investigated. Multivariate analysis (i.e., log linear analysis; binomial and multinomial logistic 
regression) were not supported by the data because there were too many unrepresented cases of 
combined variable events (over 50% in all cases). It is recommended that this is explored as 
future work, based on larger sample sizes. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Frequency analysis 
According to the AAIB, between 1997 and 2010 there were 10 offshore helicopter accidents 
and 789 incidents reported under the MOR Scheme. A sample size of 800 confers an 80% 
statistical power for the detection of an effect size of 0.10 for two-tailed hypothesis tests, which 
is highly acceptable for assured statistical utility (Burns and Burns, 2008). 
Table 5-2 shows the percentage distributions (i.e., frequency over totality of events in the 1997-
2010 period considered; see Section 5.4.7) of accidents and incidents with respect to clustered 
phases of flight, lighting conditions and accident causes (at the top, intermediate and bottom 
levels of the cause classification scheme, respectively; see Table 4-6). The table shows that, 
except for the lighting conditions, the accident characteristics happening most frequently were 
not matched by the most frequent characteristics of the reported incidents. Additionally, the 
right hand-side part of Table 5-2 shows that, except for the lighting conditions, the 
characteristics which were most frequent across the accidents occurred considerably less 
frequently across the reported incidents. 
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Table 5-2 – Most frequent causes, phases of flight and lighting conditions across accidents and 
distributions of such variables across incidents in the 1997-2010 period 
 
Accidents (N=10) Reported incidents (N=789) 
  
Most frequent* 
characteristics 
Most frequent* 
characteristics   
Proportion of reported incidents with the 
characteristics of most frequent* accidents 
Phases of flight Arrival 40% Cruise 38% 
 
Arrival 15% 
Lighting conditions Daytime 70% Daytime 90% 
 
Daytime 90% 
Causes (top)** Operational 70% Technical 78% 
 
Operational 22% 
Causes (intermediate)** Pilot-related 40% Airworthiness 73% 
 
Pilot-related 6% 
Causes (bottom)** Main rotor, transmissions, drive shafts 30% Engine (s) 25%   Main rotor, transmissions, drive shafts 12% 
 
* Percentages correspond to frequency over totality of events. See Section 5.4.7 
 
** Refer to Section 4.3.7 
 
The results of the analysis of each of the ten accidents and the incident reports that preceded 
them by 2 years is shown in Table 5-3 (NB: all percentages are in relation to the totality of 
reports issued during the 2 year periods considered). Again, the table shows that, most often 
than not, the accident characteristics were not matched by the most frequent characteristics 
across the reported incidents. 
5.5.2 Bivariate analysis 
5.5.2.1 Clustered phases of flight and causes 
Considering the whole 1997-2010 period, significant associations are found between clustered 
flight phases and incident causes. These show that pilot-related and operational factors were 
reported in the arrival segment significantly more frequently than the frequencies that could be 
expected from dissociated variables (χ2(3)=8.556, p=0.036 and χ2(3)=28.741, p=0.000, 
respectively). Table 5-4 illustrates how the contingency table was formed using the top level of 
the cause classification scheme. 
Considering the incidents reported for the 2 years prior to each accident, there is no significant 
association between clustered flight phases and incident causes that could have indicated the 
type of accident that occurred. 
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Table 5-3 (across two pages) – Causes, phases of flight and lighting conditions of accidents and distributions of such variables across incidents 
 
Accidents Incidents reported for the preceding 2 years 
 
Date Registration Causes 
Phase of 
flight 
Lighting 
condition 
Number 
of 
reports Causes*                          % from total incidents 
Phases of flight 
Lighting 
conditions* 
 Data quality 
assessment Distributions*   
1 12-Jul-01 G-BMAL Operational Taxiing Daytime 75 Technical 75% N=55, 66.7% 
completeness 
Cruise 39% Daytime 91% 
  Pilot-related    Airworthiness 71% Taxiing 1%   
   Pilot procedure     Engines 21%      
     Operational 25%      
      Pilot-related 4%      
       Pilot procedure 3%      
2 10-Nov-01 G-BKZE Operational Parked Daytime 71 Technical 77% N=66, 91.5% 
completeness 
Cruise 47% Daytime 90% 
  Non pilot-related    Airworthiness 73% Parked 10%   
   Platform or ship 
procedure 
    Engines 24%      
     Operational 23%      
      Non pilot-related 20%      
       Platform or ship procedure 16%      
3 16-Jul-02 G-BJVX Technical Approach Daytime 87 Technical 83% N=87, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 48% Daytime 87% 
  Airworthiness    Airworthiness 78% Approach 13%   
   MR, XMSN, 
DS** 
    Engines 22%      
       MR, XMSN, DS** 13%      
4 03-Mar-06 G-CHCG Operational Cruise Daytime 101 Technical 83% N=101, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 51% Daytime 83% 
  Non pilot-related    Airworthiness 75%     
   Lightning strike     Engines 34%      
     Operational 17%      
      Non pilot-related 11%      
       Lightning strike 0%      
5 13-Oct-06 G-PUMI Technical Takeoff Daytime 104 Technical 83% N=104, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 49% Daytime 87% 
  Airworthiness    Airworthiness 76% Takeoff 5%   
   MR, XMSN, 
DS** 
    Engines 25%      
       MR, XMSN, DS** 12%      
6 27-Dec-06 G-BLUN Operational Approach Nighttime 110 Technical 79% N=110, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 50% Daytime 86% 
  Pilot-related    Airworthiness 71% Approach 11% Nighttime 14% 
   CFITW***     Engines 23%      
     Operational 21%      
      Pilot-related 12%      
       CFITW*** 0%      
              
172 
 
 
 
 
7 22-Feb-08 G-REDM Operational Cruise Daytime 117 Technical 77% N=117, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 50% Daytime 86% 
  Non pilot-related    Airworthiness 71%     
   Lightning strike     Engines 18%      
     Operational 23%      
      Non pilot-related 15%      
       Lightning strike 1%      
8 09-Mar-08 G-BKXD Operational Approach Nighttime 120 Technical 77% N=120, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 49% Daytime 85% 
  Pilot-related    Airworthiness 70% Approach 11% Nighttime 15% 
   Obstacle strike     Engines 18%      
     Operational 23%      
      Pilot-related 8%      
       Obstacle strike 0%      
9 18-Feb-09 G-REDU Operational Approach Nighttime 116 Technical 81% N=116, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 43% Daytime 85% 
  Pilot-related    Airworthiness 76% Approach 12% Nighttime 16% 
   CFITW***     Engines 22%      
     Operational 19%      
      Pilot-related 15%      
       CFITW*** 0%      
10 01-Apr-09 G-REDL Technical Cruise Daytime 114 Technical 81% N=114, 100% 
completeness 
Cruise 46% Daytime 85% 
  Airworthiness    Airworthiness 75%     
   MR, XMSN, 
DS** 
    Engines 23%      
            MR, XMSN, DS** 11%       
         * Most frequently reported causes, flight phases and lighting conditions shown, along with those 
identified in the accident that occurred at the end of the 2-year period (the latter in boldface)  
         ** MR, XMSN, DS: main rotor, transmission(s), drive shaft(s) 
         *** CFITW: controlled flight into terrain or water  
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Table 5-4 – Contingency table for the analysis of association between clustered phases of 
flight and causes (at the top level) 
 
Causeaccid = operational *Causeaccid
C  = all other causes 
Ground manoeuvring  31 60 
Departure  16 80 
Cruise  35 267 
Arrival (= phase of flightaccid)  30 85 
χ2(3)=28.741, p=0.000  (significant) 
 
*   Causeaccid
C  - the complement of the cause in the previous column (i.e., all causes except operational causes) 
 
5.5.2.2 Clustered phases of flight and lighting conditions 
Considering the whole period, the test fails to show significance (i.e., χ2(3)=1.795, p=0.616), 
suggesting that the incident reports concerning issues during the nighttime arrival segment 
(i.e., the most frequent characteristics across accidents in the time frame considered) were not 
significantly more frequent than in any other combination of clustered flight phase and 
lighting condition. 
Considering the 2-year periods prior to each accident, there is a significant association 
between clustered flight phases and lighting conditions only prior to the G-BLUN accident 
(Fisher’s exact test = 7.950, p=0.034). This means that the number of reports of incidents 
during the arrival segments were significantly higher at night before this accident. 
5.5.2.3 Causes and lighting conditions 
Considering both the whole period and the 2 year periods prior to each accident, the incidents 
reported do not show any statistically significant association between causes and lighting 
conditions that could have given an indication of the types of accidents that eventually 
occurred (e.g., χ2(1)=0.930, p=0.221 for main rotor/transmission/driveshaft incidents against 
lighting conditions during the 1997-2010 period). 
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5.6 Discussion 
Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 showed that the most frequent characteristics of the incidents 
reported under the MOR Scheme between 1997 and 2010 and for 2 years preceding the 
accidents could not have indicated the types of accident that happened. The exceptions could 
have been the more consistent reporting of issues related to ‘platform and ship procedures’ 
prior to the accident of the G-BKZE (Table 5-3) and the statistical association between 
clustered flight phases and lighting condition before the G-BLUN accident (section 5.5.2.2). 
However, the specific circumstance of the former (i.e., loss of steering ability by the ship on 
which the helicopter touched down) did not figure in any such incident reports and was 
hardly predictable before the onset of the accident. Likewise, none of the incidents related to 
issues in the arrival segment at night, reported prior to the G-BLUN accident, concerned 
operational or pilot-related factors (i.e., all such reports were related to technical issues). This 
would have frustrated any attempts to use the reported incidents to predict the characteristics 
of an impending accident on the basis of the most frequent incident characteristics, as 
generally believed to be the correct use of incident reports in aviation. 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 additionally show that, surprisingly similar to the findings across the 
wider, general aviation-dominated British helicopter community (Mitchell, 2010), the 
reported incidents are biased towards technical failures, with the issues related to limited 
engine performance still dominating (see Table 5-2). This shows that the decision of the 
regulators and operators in the North Sea to only employ twin engine aircraft in the offshore 
environment is necessary and may be a factor in the lower accident rates compared, for 
example, to operations in the USA (see Sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.5), where single engine 
offshore helicopter operations are still dominant. The bias towards technical failures explains 
why the cruise phase of flight consistently received the greatest number of incident reports, as 
predicted in Section 5.2.3. 
Failure to show any credible statistical precursor relationship between reported serious 
incidents and accidents, as believe to occur in the aviation industry, raises two fundamental 
arguments. Firstly, that accidents might be sudden and secondly, that there is an ongoing 
underreporting of the relevant safety occurrences in the North Sea offshore helicopter 
transportation industry. 
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5.6.1 Sudden failures 
The results indicate that Heinrich’s pyramid, as applied in the aviation industry, does not hold 
true in offshore helicopter operations, especially with respect to operational and human 
factors (e.g., pilot-related) occurrences. This raises awareness for potential sudden failures, 
which require an alternative theoretical framework to that of Heinrich’s, as applied in 
aviation. Therefore, this chapter endorses the previous recommendation (e.g., Manuele, 2011; 
Manuele, 2005) that such a framework should be based on the complete numerical 
dissociation between accidents and reported incidents. This is to say that neither the pyramid 
nor any geometrical figure should be used to express the statistical relationships between 
accidents and reported incidents and thus influence the expectancy of an accident on the basis 
of the incidents being reported most frequently (i.e., the specific application of Heinrich’s 
theory in aviation). As discussed in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2.4 and 3.5.2, accidents in complex 
socio-technical systems, such as offshore helicopter transportation, are characterised by 
multiple, rare and non-linear combinations of factors which are often not evidenced in routine 
reported incidents. Because the reported incidents of low severity cannot numerically indicate 
the higher severity accidents to come, acceptance is required that addressing the type of 
incident reported to occur most frequently does not assure avoidance of an accident. 
Given that accidents may strike in unexpected ways (i.e., with virtually no precursors being 
reported; see Table 5-3, especially the incident reports preceding the accidents of the G-
CHCG, G-BLUN, G-BKXD and G-REDU), safety regulators and managers ought to embrace 
a safety paradigm which stimulates inventive ways of anticipating possible failures. More 
than a good reporting culture, a generative safety culture (see Section 5.2.3) is necessary to 
avoid accidents. This is particularly relevant in high risk, low frequency operations, such as 
nighttime flying, where available experience and hazard reports are very limited (see Sections 
2.1 and Tables 5-2 and 5-3). Therefore, novel processes which enable to elicit the experience 
of practitioners in the field and overcome the problems associated with reported incidents, are 
currently needed and developed in Chapters 6 to 8.  
The virtual absence of precursors to accidents may also be a by-product of evolved safety 
culture in highly mature systems. Because in such systems unsafe conditions are continuously 
and swiftly identified and corrected, accidents should reflect unforeseen, uncontrollable and 
rare events which seldom resemble reported incidents (see Section 2.2.2 and 4.5). Ultimately, 
176 
 
 
 
 
in such systems, accidents and incidents might be events that are fundamentally different, 
with the former requiring deep knowledge of systemic interactions and creativity for their 
avoidance. This endorses that the application of Heinrich’s theory in aviation (i.e., that the 
most frequent characteristics across reported incidents indicate the characteristics of an 
impending accident) is actually counter-intuitive and, therefore, should be abandoned. 
However, it is acknowledged that incident reporting remains important for hazard 
identification, risk analysis and, therefore, accident prevention, as discussed in Section 5.6.3. 
5.6.2 Underreporting of safety occurrences 
An alternative argument to that in Section 5.6.1 is that Heinrich’s premises, as applied in the 
aviation industry, could still stand but were not met because there is a worrying 
underreporting of the relevant occurrences in the offshore helicopter domain. This would 
require a review of the MOR Scheme from the standpoint of consumers, custodians and 
collectors of data. 
Regarding the analysis in this chapter of the MOR Scheme’s fundamental publication (i.e., a 
data consumers’ perspective), it appears that sufficient information is given to data collectors 
on what should be reported, including in relation to human factors-related incidents (CAA, 
2005). However, a few points for improvement are advised, especially with respect to 
operations in degraded visual environments (e.g., the nighttime). For example, because pilots 
are likely to suffer from decision-making impairment in such conditions (see Sections 2.3.2.2 
and 2.3.2.3), any doubt as to the sufficiency of the external visual cues for visually referenced 
flying should prompt the reporting of an incident. At present, only those cases which result in 
the minimum descent height (MDH) or other prescribed altitude being violated are 
reportable. Nonetheless, the generally adequate guidance provided by data consumers (i.e., 
the UK CAA) does not mean that promotion of the MOR Scheme is assured and the need for 
increased publicity should be addressed. 
From a data custodian perspective, the data collection method has still room for 
improvement. For example, all the objective information regarding the flight (e.g., route, 
time, flight number) could be automatically input if the MOR form operated on computer 
systems integrated with companies’ flight plans. Although such objective information was 
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found to be of a generally good quality across the reports studied (e.g., good completeness of 
flight phase data after the year 1999, see Table 5-3), integrating such systems would relieve 
the data collectors (e.g., pilots) from the burden of seeking and writing down this 
information. This would leave data collectors free to invest their time and effort on producing 
a quality narrative of the facts experienced, which is especially welcome in the late nighttime 
when pilots may be more tired following a complete day of work. 
In relation to data collectors, there still seems to be considerable scope for improvement in 
the reporting culture, especially in relation to operational and human factors-related 
occurrences (see validation in Section 5.7). In light of the potential for sudden failures of 
these types, developing a good reporting culture should be a priority. This chapter proposes 
that this should be achieved through education (and re-education) of aviation professionals. 
Good airmanship should be taught as inextricably related to an open reporting attitude, which 
in turn has to be supported and facilitated by the regulators and management. This is 
particularly important in the exclusively multi-crew environment of the North Sea, where 
continuous crew pairing should create a positive camaraderie, which in turn might lead to 
peer embarrassment and favour a sense of mutual protection when errors ought to be 
disclosed. 
It is important to accept that many safety issues will simply not be noticed by the aircrew 
(Steckel and Patankar, 2012). Therefore, it is paramount not to solely rely on reported 
incidents to detect hazards (Herrera et al., 2010a). In this respect, there are several systems at 
present with excellent data collection capability, e.g., HFDM, which can be used in creative 
ways. For example, with minor hardware modifications, HFDM could be coupled with 
routine video recordings of flights, in and out of the cockpit, for a complete picture of the 
hazards waiting to combine in various harmful ways (Steckel and Patankar, 2012). This 
would also produce matched outcome and explanatory variables which could be efficiently 
used for predictive hazard identification and risk analysis in the nighttime (see Section 
2.3.3.3). 
5.6.3 The continued importance of reporting incidents 
In spite of the results of the analysis in this chapter, it is important to acknowledge that 
incident data collection remains extremely important for risk mitigation. Whereas the 
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incidents were found to be of limited use as frequency indicators of accidents (see Tables 5-2 
and 5-3), incidents are very useful for the prediction severity, which is a composing term of 
risk (i.e., risk = frequency * severity; see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1). For example, even though 
engine issues were frequently reported during the analysis timeframe (see Table 5-2), engine 
failures can be expected to be of lesser severity because dual-engine operations are 
mandatory over the North Sea. On the other hand, although main rotor components were 
reported considerably less frequently than engine failures (see Table 5-2), the severity of such 
events can be easily predicted as catastrophic. 
In all cases, the results are encouraging as they show that the industry is eager to prepare the 
next steps towards a generative safety culture. Some such indications are the significant 
association found between clustered phases of flight and causes throughout the study 
timeframe (section 5.5.2.1) which replicate the relationship across past accidents worldwide 
(see Chapter 4, Sections 4.4). Additionally, the number of reported occurrences has been 
generally rising since 2007 (see Table 5-3), which should also encourage their use as safety 
(or reporting culture) performance indicators (see Section 2.2.4.1). Finally, there is a 
tendency to report more frequently nighttime occurrences, when the nighttime is a known 
factor for increased risk. Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.4.1) estimated that 8.46% of the flying hours 
of the North Sea occur at night and 10.4% of the 789 incidents reported under the MOR 
Scheme referred to nighttime operations. 
5.7 Validation 
Internal validity, especially concurrent and predictive validity, was assessed based on subject 
matter expertise, i.e., by inviting carefully selected experts to comment on the results, based 
on their experience with incident reporting out in the field. The SMEs described in Section 
4.4.4 were consulted and all agreed that underreporting is a serious issue in offshore 
helicopter operations, especially with respect to human factors occurrences (see Sections 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3). In addition, the SMEs also commented on ways to resolve the problem, 
which confirmed those discussed in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
Another form of internal and external validation exercise was the recursive presentation of 
the results in academic and industrial fora, including three dedicated meetings with the board 
and pilots of the world’s largest offshore helicopter operator, both in Aberdeen (UK) and 
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Vancouver (Canada; see Section 9.3.4). During these meetings, the results reported in this 
chapter were presented and discussions held to unveil the likely explanations. There was 
consensus that underreporting is a serious problem in the offshore helicopter industry due to 
the underlying factors covered in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Additionally, there was confidence 
that the problem is not limited to the British North Sea scenario and, therefore, population 
and ecological validity were likely achieved (see Burns and Burns, 2008). 
These presentations and meetings (see Section 9.3.4) also enabled to receive feedback on the 
validity of the process itself, which was discussed in detail with personnel from the safety 
research groups of EASA and the UK CAA. It was accepted that the process is fit for the 
intended test of the statistical precursor relationship, as currently believed to exist in aviation. 
5.8 Limitations 
It is acknowledged that, given the low accident sample sizes, the higher incidence of any 
causes, clustered flight phases, or lighting conditions across the accidents (i.e., the 
percentages listed in Table 5-2) could be a result of random effects. However, the 
associations between clustered flight phases and causes and clustered flight phases and 
lighting conditions of reported incidents (sections 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2, respectively) could be 
systematic instead of random. These associations were determined to be statistically 
significant across helicopter accidents in worldwide offshore operations (see Section 4.4.2.1). 
Nonetheless, the application in aviation of the incident-accident statistical precursor 
relationship of Heinrich (1980) is claimed to remain valid for each individual accident (i.e., 
an impending accident’s characteristics are predictable from the most frequent characteristics 
across reported incidents). Therefore, checking the utility of reported incidents as statistical 
precursors of accidents, as applied in aviation (and conversely the truth of the application of 
the theory itself), is possible from accident sample sizes as low as unity. 
5.9 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 established the need to assess the utility of reported incidents as statistical 
precursors to accidents, especially the belief in the aviation industry whereby the hazards 
most frequently reported as incidents indicate the characteristics of an impending accident. 
This is an important topic at present since the offshore helicopter industry is overly reliant on 
reported incidents for hazard identification and risk analysis, especially in nighttime 
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operations where other sources of hazard information are virtually absent. However, Chapter 
2 also established the lack of a process to assess the truth of the incident/accident statistical 
precursor relationship as believed to occur in aviation. This chapter has developed the process 
and implemented it for the UK sector of the North Sea. The frequency relationships and 
statistical associations between accidents and reported incidents between 1997 and 2010 were 
explored using the accident investigation reports published by the UK AAIB and the 
incidents filed under the British MOR Scheme. From the results of the analysis, the chapter 
has raised the following safety concerns in relation to the assumptions underpinning incident 
data collection in offshore helicopter transportation, as well as the process used to generate 
incident data. 
• The potential for sudden failures is a clear contradiction to the classic incident-
accident pyramidal relationship believed to occur in aviation. This is especially the 
case in relation to operational and human performance issues, which are recurrent in 
nighttime operations (see Section 4.5). Addressing sudden failures requires 
acceptance of the numerical dissociation between accidents and reported incidents and 
creative interventions from regulators, operators and aircraft manufacturers. 
• Potential flaws in the reporting culture of the offshore helicopter industry, which 
unexpectedly reflect the problems identified within the wider (general aviation-
dominated) British helicopter community, i.e., a strong bias towards reporting 
technical failures and underreport operational failures. 
• The need to educate operators on enhanced recognition of subtle human factor-related 
occurrences and improved understanding of the relevance of reporting apparently 
negligible events. 
• The need to strengthen operators’ trust in the reporting scheme to lead to a generative 
safety culture. 
• The need to re-evaluate the occurrence reporting scheme in relation to guidance to 
reporters, ease of reporting and promotion, with a view to producing quality data for 
future use. 
• The need to develop other means of collecting data from routine operations, not 
relying only on the ad hoc reporting of occurrences. 
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This chapter has shown that the best use of reported incidents is not as statistical precursors to 
accidents. Reported incidents are best used individually as indicators of early interventions 
needed to ensure safety (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; Harper et al., 2011), as raw data to 
enable the assessment of possible consequences of incidents and, finally, to validate safety 
issues identified through other methods (e.g., HFDM and surveys). This has a direct impact 
on hazard identification and risk analysis of nighttime operations since any of the usually few 
reported incident should be dealt with promptly and carefully. 
Given the limitations of reported incidents identified in this chapter, the following chapters 
develop novel survey methods to identify hazards and analyse risks in nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations, which address the shortcomings identified in Chapter 2. This starts 
from an analysis of risk experienced per phase of nighttime flights, which enables to 
overcome the limitations of using clustered phases in Chapters 4 and this chapter. This in turn 
enables the most critical phases of flight to be identified and selected for the development of 
the Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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CHAPTER 6 IDENTIFICATION OF THE RISKIEST 
PHASES OF NIGHTTIME FLIGHTS 
The previous chapter developed and implemented a process to assess the statistical utility of 
reported incidents, as believed to exist in the aviation industry. It was concluded that reported 
incidents are poor statistical indicators of impending accidents, especially with respect to 
pilot-related accidents. As shown in Chapter 4, these are extremely high-risk events when 
associated with the nighttime. Therefore, there is an urgent need to establish which factors 
cause the greatest difficulties to pilots during nighttime operations, beginning with a 
consideration of any effect associated with the phases of flight. Given the low quality of the 
taxonomies of phases of flight and safety data currently available, the assessment of pilot 
difficulties per phase of flight required a novel bespoke taxonomy and a questionnaire survey 
to be developed in this chapter. The survey identifies the phases posing the greatest 
difficulties to pilots (hence, the riskiest phases) and assesses the impacts of pilot 
demographics on the difficulties experienced. This is an important assessment in the context 
of pilot-related events, which was unachievable in Chapters 4 and 5 due to the 
incompleteness of the accident and reported incident data. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 6.1 establishes the rationale supporting the assessment of pilot difficulties on 
the basis of phases of flight. Section 6.2 reviews available taxonomies of phases of flight and 
their limitations to support the identification of pilot difficulties in helicopter operations. 
Section 6.3 provides a descriptive analysis of the nighttime accident and serious incident 
reports, with the aim of extracting risk information on the basis of phases of flight at a more 
detailed level than the high-level analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. The limitations of ongoing 
phase-of-flight-specific safety interventions are introduced in Section 6.4. In order to address 
the weaknesses identified in the previous three sections, Section 6.5 establishes the 
questionnaire survey methodology. The implementation of the survey and the results 
achieved are discussed in Section 6.6, which is followed by considerations over the 
limitations of the survey in Section 6-7. The conclusions are outlined in Section 6-8 and form 
the basis for the development of the Chapter 7. 
6.1 Safety analysis on the basis of phases of flight 
In aviation, well-discriminated phases of flight reflect analogous pilot activities, task 
complexities, environmental factors and aerodynamic loads. Therefore, phases of flight are 
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tacitly accepted as meaningful task entities for analytical purposes. This is reflected in 
virtually all accident investigation manuals, accident analyses and incident database 
structures, which use phase of flight as a primary hazard variable (see, for example, Menzel, 
2011; JSSI - Occurrence Data Analysis Working Group, 2006; Pang, 2011; Khatwa and 
Roelen, 1996; Taber and McCabe, 2006; Harris et al., 2000; U.S. JHSAT, 2007; Jarvis and 
Harris, 2008; Barroso, 2012; Helmreich and Khatwa, 1998; Ebbatson, 2009). Pilot training 
syllabi also address the activities on a per-phase-of-flight basis (e.g., OGP, 2008; JAA, 2007). 
Moreover, Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) software programmes seek to 
discriminate the phases of flight precisely to monitor phase-specific exceedances which 
trigger safety concerns (Pilgrim, 2010). 
Being phases of flight tacit task entities, hazard identification and risk analysis on the basis of 
phases of flight have the potential to address the need of factual, task-based hazard 
identification and risk analysis described in Sections 2.2.3.3.2.1 and 2.4. Furthermore, 
analysis based on the phases of flight enables the fit between human capabilities and task 
demands to be assessed, provided that the taxonomies of phases of flight used support this 
intent.  
6.2 Taxonomies of phases of flight 
For a taxonomy of phases of flight to be useful in identifying the fit between human 
capabilities and task demands (hence, the potential for pilot performance impairment, see 
Section 2.3.2), it is essential that the phases outlined are (Jarvis and Harris, 2008): 
i. Well discriminated; 
ii. Meaningful in the context of the operation covered; 
iii. Developed from a human factors logic; and 
iv. Unbiased.  
However, well-known taxonomies have lacked adequate discrimination and meaningfulness, 
in association with an unclear logic to their development. For example, the multi-layered 
categories of the taxonomy jointly developed by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
(CAST) and ICAO seem to describe the spatial position of the aircraft, i.e., an air traffic 
controller’s point of view (CAST/ICAO, 2011). Conversely, the categories of the taxonomies 
developed by the ICAO/EU and by the NTSB (European Commission - Joint Research 
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Centre, 2012; and Harris et al., 2000, respectively) apparently focus on the tasks performed 
by the (fixed-wing) aircrew. Therefore, neither taxonomy describes the particular phases of 
helicopter flights (see Section 3.4.2) meaningfully. Moreover, comparing the analyses based 
on such taxonomies is often misleading, since the sub-phases within phases with similar 
names (e.g., ‘en-route’ versus ‘cruise’) are not exactly the same. 
Many other taxonomies have prescribed excessively broad phases of flight and hence, can 
still be criticised for a lack of good discrimination, such as IATA’s taxonomy (mentioned in 
Skybrary, 2010) and the taxonomy outlined in CAA (2005). The same criticism applies to 
numerous studies which have used clustered phases to circumvent the lack of detail in their 
datasets (e.g., Herrera et al., 2010a; Couch and Lindell, 2010; Ross and Gibb, 2008) or 
address specific research questions that do not require a detailed discrimination of the phases 
of flight (e.g., Morrison, 2001; Brooks et al., 2008). 
A lack of discriminatory power and bias have also resulted from the poor adaptation of 
existing fixed-wing taxonomies for use in helicopter operations (see Section 2.3.3.1.1 and 
EASA, 2009; European Commission - Joint Research Centre, 2012; CAA, 2005; Majumdar 
et al., 2009b; U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team, 2011a). Since current taxonomies 
cover the phases uniquely performed by helicopters in a far from optimal manner (Taber and 
McCabe, 2006; Hoh et al., 1991), the use of clustered or loose phases leads to the collection 
of poor quality data, which prevents the identification of specific problem areas (e.g., Khatwa 
and Roelen, 1996). For example, a phase in which accidents occur frequently may not be 
identified consistently if another phase with barely any accidents composes its cluster. 
Jarvis and Harris (2008) overcame the issues mentioned above by having a clear human 
factors focus and applying process charting methods and high-level mission analysis (Kirwan 
and Ainsworth, 1992; Stolzer et al., 2008) in order to discriminate the phases of glider flights. 
This led to the categorisation of glider operations into meaningful, unbiased and independent 
phases, which however are not meaningful in the context of nighttime offshore helicopter 
operations. 
The taxonomy in Teixeira (2006, see Section 3.4.2) is meaningful in the context of offshore 
helicopter operations and was used in Chapter 3 to guide the development of the Offshore 
Helicopter Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy. However, the level of detail in this 
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taxonomy also needs to be improved to enable the accurate discrimination of the human 
factors task-related aspects of the phases of flight in the nighttime. Since Teixeira’s phases 
were designed to reflect only those tasks detectable by helicopter flight data monitoring 
(HFDM) devices, HFDM-undetectable events such as changes in pilot control strategy (e.g., 
between visual and instrument scans during decelerating approaches, see Nascimento, 2009), 
were ignored. This might introduce bias in any subsequent hazard identification due to the 
tacit encapsulation of tasks of different types in a single phase of flight. Improving Teixeira’s 
phases might be attempted by looking specifically at the nighttime accident and incident 
reports qualitatively with the aim of extracting information on phases of flight at a deeper 
level of detail compared to the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5. This is also important in light of 
the conclusion from Chapter 5, whereby reported incidents should be reviewed on an 
individual basis for hazard identification and risk analysis. 
6.3 Nighttime accidents and serious incidents re-visited 
The numbers of pilot-related nighttime accidents and reported incidents (analysed in Chapters 
4 and 5, respectively), together with the level of detail in such reports, were inadequate to 
support the unequivocal identification of riskiest phases of nighttime flights on the basis of 
statistical testing. Therefore, the following two sections assess the descriptive statistics of 
nighttime accident and incident reports, with the view to improve Teixeira’s taxonomy and 
support the identification of the riskiest phases of flight. In addition, the general 
characteristics of the accidents and serious incidents analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 are 
provided for a contextualised overview of nighttime occurrences. 
6.3.1 Accidents 
Between 1997 and 2011 there were 23 nighttime offshore helicopter accidents worldwide, 17 
of which were caused by operational, pilot-related factors. The remainder of the accidents 
were caused by unknown and technical factors (three in each case). 
Amongst the pilot-related accidents, only eight were subject to an official accident 
investigation with a report available in the public domain. Hence, the common level of detail 
available from all 17 accidents is fairly generic. Similar to the analysis in Chapter 4 (see 
Section 4.3.6), only regions of occurrence, aircraft categories, high-level causes, outcomes 
186 
 
 
 
 
and clustered phases of flight were found complete enough in terms of the level of detail for 
any discussion. 
In considering the regions of occurrence, nighttime pilot-related accidents occurred in the 
Gulf of Mexico (N=2), the North Sea (N=4) and ‘other regions’ (N=11). The breakdown of 
the other regions into specific areas follows the clusters outlined in Table 4-3, as shown in 
Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1 – Nighttime accidents happened in ‘other regions’ between 1997 and 2011 
 
Americas except GOM* 
Middle 
East 
Australasia 
CIS* Africa California Alaska Canada Mexico Brazil India 
Far 
East Australia 
Number of 
accidents 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 2 0 1 3 
  
* GOM – Gulf of Mexico; CIS -  Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
With respect to helicopter categories (see Table 4-4), accidents occurred primarily to mid 
twin-turbine helicopters (N=12), heavy twin-turbine helicopters (N=3) and to light twin-
turbine and single turbine helicopters (N=1 for both). 
The outcomes of nighttime pilot-related accidents were more often fatal (N=13 out of the 17 
accidents) and the causes (attributed to the ‘end states’ at the bottom level of the cause 
classification scheme, see Table 4-6) were either controlled flights into terrain or water 
(CFITWs; N=13) or obstacle strikes (N=4). 
In terms of phases of flight, the level of detail available only enabled the description of 
clustered phases (see Table 4-5 and Sections 4.3.8.2.1 and 4.3.8.3). The nighttime pilot-
related accidents primarily occurred in the arrival segment (N=10, with 9 accidents in the 
approach and one during landing), followed by the departure segment (N=5, all on takeoff), 
cruise (N=1) and an unknown phase of flight (N=1). Whereas these results indicate a problem 
of pilot performance in the nighttime arrival segment, especially during the clustered 
approach phase, Table 4-5 shows that this clustered phase comprises a number of phases of 
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flight, i.e., descent, final approach, go around and touch and go, which need to be 
disentangled in order to enable the identification of pilot difficulties based on the tasks 
associated with each phase of flight. Disentangling the phases was not possible due to the 
lack of an official investigation in the majority of the nighttime accidents. Furthermore, the 
level of description of phases of flight does not enable Teixeira’s (2006) taxonomy to be 
improved. 
6.3.2 Serious incidents 
Chapter 5 has shown that pilot-related incidents are severely underreported in the offshore 
helicopter domain thus rendering any frequency-based analysis using reported incidents as 
inappropriate. Therefore, in this section frequencies are outlined for the sole purpose of 
familiarisation with the type of serious incident data available in the offshore helicopter 
industry for hazard identification and risk analysis. 
There were no nighttime pilot-related serious incident reports available from the accident 
investigation authorities of the 50 countries investigated in Chapter 4 for the period 1997-
2011. There were six serious incidents reported for the period 1997-2010 in the UK MOR 
database. 
The helicopter categories involved in the six serious incidents included both mid twin-turbine 
helicopters (N=4) and heavy twin-turbine helicopters (N=2). With respect to causes (at the 
bottom level of the cause classification scheme, see Table 4-6) two reports referred to 
situations which could have turned into CFITWs (i.e., pilot disorientation), two were related 
to issues of miscellaneous pilot procedure, one referred to an Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
incident and the final incident referred to inadequate platform/ship procedure. Again, with 
respect to the phases of flight, the phases were clustered due to the poor level of detail 
available. Apart from one incident for which information on the phase of flight was 
unavailable, there were two incidents during the arrival segment (i.e., approach and landing), 
two incidents during departure and one incident during ground manoeuvres (i.e., parked). 
As with the analysis of accidents, the level of detail reported with respect to phases of flight 
does not allow for the analysis of the phases at a level that improves on the taxonomy of 
Teixeira (2006) neither to unequivocally identify the riskiest phases. 
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Despite the limited utility of the accident and incident reports to, as a set, highlight the 
riskiest phases of nighttime flights, Sections 2.1 and 2.3.3.2.1 highlighted that the arrival 
segment has received numerous safety interventions. These interventions address operations 
in the degraded visual environment, especially the nighttime. The limitations of these safety 
interventions need to be acknowledged. 
6.4 Limitations of ongoing phase-of-flight-specific safety interventions  
The current focus of safety interventions in the arrival segment of flight (e.g., the 
development of accurate instrument descent procedures and improved helideck lighting 
systems; see Section 2.1) stems from safety concerns raised from individual accident reports 
and pilot opinion surveys in the North Sea during the 1980s and 1990s, which were 
confirmed in the USA scenario (Howson, 2006; Downey, 2010; Barbini and Davenport, 
2010; CAA, 2010c, b, a). 
However, safety interventions derived from individual accident reports can only improve 
safety incrementally (see Section 2.3.3.1.1). Furthermore, attention has not been paid since 
the 1990s to reassessing the risks levels across all the phases of flight and never before in the 
areas away from the North Sea. Finally, the lack of previous research into the potential 
associations between pilot demographics and the difficulties experienced per phase of flight 
has prevented a holistic view to the hazards and risks associated with pilot performance in the 
nighttime. 
These limitations can be overcome by adopting an international pilot sampling strategy for 
assessing the risk levels per phase of flight with respect to particular pilot demographic 
characteristics. This enables to identify the phases causing the greatest concern and specific 
pilot group facing greater difficulties. The analysis of risk levels per phase of flight and any 
impacts of pilot demographic on such risk levels are addressed by the methodology described 
in the next section. 
6.5 Methodology 
The methodology developed in this section was designed to achieve the following goals: 
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i. Redress the limitations of the current taxonomies of phases of flight, i.e., poor 
discrimination of the phases of helicopter flights; lack of meaningfulness in the 
context of nighttime offshore helicopter operations; lack of a human factors 
development logic; and biases from uncritical transfer from other domains, see 
Section 6.2); 
ii. Redress the low quality of the accident and incident data currently available, i.e., 
inappropriate amount of data and data incompleteness, Sections 6.3); and 
iii. Address the need to assess the risk levels across phases of flight also in the areas 
away from the North Sea (Section 6.4); 
In order to achieve the goals above, a taxonomy of phases of flight applicable to nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations is generated and used as the basis for a questionnaire survey on 
the risk levels experienced by pilots. 
The questionnaire survey is designed as a balanced cross-sectional study in which pilots are 
sampled from specific groups of interest in numbers which support the statistical analysis of 
the risk levels that they attribute to each phase of flight captured in the taxonomy (Simons et 
al., 2011; Burns and Burns, 2008). Additionally, a set of demographic questions are asked to 
enable to assess the effects of pilot demographics into the risk levels experienced in the 
riskiest phases of flight identified. A direct question is also included in the questionnaire to 
validate the results of Chapter 8, and therefore is not dealt with in this chapter. Finally, an 
open-ended question is included to capture any missing themes and essentially build rapport. 
Versions of the survey were made available in three languages, which support the specific 
strategies used to sample regions, companies and pilots. Careful piloting of the questions, 
their translation and the sampling strategies preceded data collection. The piloting also 
ensured the validity of the taxonomy of the phases of nighttime flights developed. The 
methodology described above is explained in detail through its constituent steps presented in 
Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.6 below. 
6.5.1 Development of the taxonomy of phases of nighttime flights 
The phases proposed by Teixeira (2006) were improved and expanded with the successive 
application of two task analysis techniques: high-level mission analysis and the process 
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charting technique (Jarvis and Harris, 2008). The high-level mission analysis described in 
Section 3.4.1 was repeated in the context of nighttime operations, with the eight typical flight 
profiles of offshore helicopter transportation remaining valid, i.e., all eight possible profiles 
connecting offshore platforms, boats and land-based airfields might also be flown at night. 
The process charting exercise was undertaken by assessing if the phases described by 
Teixeira (2006, see Section 3.4.2) would cover all pilot-related tasks outlined in the literature. 
The hierarchical tasks analysis developed by Nascimento (2009) for the airborne radar 
approach (ARA) procedure of offshore helicopters highlighted the need to breakdown the 
approach phase into two different segments: the visual and instrument segments. By analogy, 
the takeoff and go around manoeuvres were also broken down into visual and instrument 
segments (see Section 3.4.4, Table 3-1, NB 5). 
The resulting phases of flight (called ‘level 1’ phases) were clustered into two higher-order 
levels (labelled levels 2 and 3) according to the clustering strategies established in Sections 
4.3.8.2.1 and 4.3.8.3. Additionally, categories that reflected the helicopter’s kinetic states and 
pilot’s visual sampling strategies (i.e., visual versus instrument scans) were introduced to 
account for the specific characteristics of nighttime operations. 
The kinetic state categories build upon previous investigations that considered the impacts of 
speed profiles on power and lift regimes and thereby safety. Low airspeed regimes were 
associated with high engine power demands and low translational lift. Therefore, low 
airspeed regimes were deemed less safe than the high speed regimes, which are characterised 
by low engine power demands and high translational lift (Harris et al., 2000; and Couch and 
Lindell, 2010). However, given the human factors interest of this study, the categories 
included account for the impacts of speed profiles on the stability of visual cues 
(environmental and within the cockpit, e.g., flight parameters) and, consequently, the crews’ 
ability to control the aircraft with reference to such cues. Low speeds were associated with 
slow variation of cues and, therefore, improved aircraft controllability. On the other hand, 
high speeds were associated with faster variation of visual cues and, therefore, more difficult 
control of the aircraft with reference to the visual cues (Ebbatson, 2009). Finally, categories 
which reflected the possible combination between kinetic states and the pilot’s visual 
sampling strategy were introduced in the taxonomy. 
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The resulting taxonomy is shown in Table 6-2. It should be noted that since passenger 
ferrying helicopters are not equipped with auto-hover devices, there is always a need to 
decouple the autopilot’s upper modes at low airspeed regimes (see Section 3.4.4, Table 3-1, 
NB 5; and Nascimento, 2009). Therefore, instrument scan (associated with coupled-up 
autopilot modes) - low kinetic state phases (i.e., IL) were not included in the taxonomy. This 
is based on the premise that humans are not capable of flying helicopters manually based 
only on the instrument readings at low airspeed regimes. This premise is confirmed by the 
obligatory fitting of auto-hover auto-pilot modes into Search and Rescue (SAR) and anti-
submarine sonar dip search helicopters for nighttime operations (see CIAIAC, 2010; RAF, 
2014; CASA, 2013; Flight, 1961). 
 
Table 6-2 – Taxonomy of phases of nighttime flights 
Phases of flight Scan 
techniques 
(St) 
Kinetic 
states 
(Ks) 
Combined 
St - Ks Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Parked, rotors/engines not running Parked Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Parked, rotors/engines running Parked Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Hovering before positioning/taxiing for takeoff Taxiing Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Positioning/taxiing before takeoff Taxiing Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Visual segment of takeoff/initial climb Takeoff Departure Visual (V) High (H) VH 
Instrument climb Takeoff Departure Instrument (I) High (H) IH 
Instrument cruise Cruise Cruise Instrument (I) High (H) IH 
Instrument descent Approach Arrival Instrument (I) High (H) IH 
Instrument approach Approach Arrival Instrument (I) High (H) IH 
Visual segment of the approach Approach Arrival Visual (V) High (H) VH 
Positioning/taxiing after the approach Taxiing Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Hovering after positioning/taxiing after approach Taxiing Ground manoeuvres Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Landing Landing Arrival Visual (V) Low (L) VL 
Go around in the instrument segment of the approach Approach Arrival Instrument (I) High (H) IH 
Go around in the visual segment of the approach Approach Arrival Visual (V) High (H) VH 
 
6.5.2 Questionnaire design 
As mentioned in Section 6.5 (and further detailed in Sections 6.5.2.1 to 6.5.2.3 below), 
demographic, direct and open-ended questions, as well as risk rating scales were designed 
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and piloted. The questionnaire was distributed to respondents according to the sampling 
strategies described in Section 6.5.4, which aimed to achieve the sample sizes described in 
Section 6.5.5. Distribution was accompanied by an invitation letter which stated the not-for-
profit, safety-only purpose of the research. The invitation letter also provided general 
guidance and an estimated time for survey completion. These aimed to ensure face validity 
and usefulness from a respondent’s perspective, with the view to capturing honest and careful 
responses (Smith and Kendall, 1963; Burns and Burns, 2008). The questionnaire instructed 
the pilots to consider, based on their operational experience, typical nighttime offshore 
helicopter flights prior to answering the questions and rating scales posed. In order to focus 
on the risk related to suboptimal pilot performance, the pilots were also instructed to consider 
perfectly serviceable aircraft. The invitation letter and questionnaire form Appendix 6. 
6.5.2.1 Demographic variables 
Such variables were collected in order to enable the analysis of risk ratings per demographic 
groups and control for potential biases stemming from the invariably subjective nature of 
surveys. The demographics were: 
• Region of operation; 
• Experience, as based on: 
• Rank; 
• Years as offshore helicopter pilot; 
• Flying hours in helicopters: total, IFR and at night; and 
• Number of night deck landings; 
• Level of training received (i.e., category of licence held); 
• Age; 
• Gender; and 
• Helicopter type flown. 
These variables were a subset of the variables mentioned in Chapter 4 (see Sections 4.2.5 and 
4.3.6 and Tables 4-1 and 4-2) and were selected for their expected relevance, based on 
discussions with subject matter experts (SMEs) in the field (see Section 4.4.4). This was 
important in order to keep the questions to manageable numbers and avoid non-responses. 
Additionally, collecting data on the helicopter type flown enabled the widespread belief that 
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glass cockpits are inherently safer than analogic and mixed cockpit designs to be tested 
(Harris, 2004; EASA, 2013c; Harris et al., 2005). This was unachievable in Chapters 4 and 5 
due to data incompleteness. 
6.5.2.2 Rating scales 
The widespread use of rating scales in aviation is well documented (e.g., CAA, 1997; ATSB, 
2006; Hunter et al., 2011). Semantically-anchored (Rollenhagen et al., 2010; Smith and 
Kendall, 1963) 11-point rating scales (CAA, 1997) were employed to assess the risk levels of 
each level 1 phase of flight, where 0 meant ‘no risk at all’, 5 was the mid-point (i.e., 
‘somewhat risky’) and 10 meant ‘extremely risky’. In line with the definitions of Section 
2.2.1, risk was defined as ‘the likelihood that an adverse event of damaging consequences 
will happen’. The level 1 phases were presented to participants in the chronological order of 
uneventful flights, with the go around phases introduced at the end, as shown in Table 6-2 
(also in Appendix 6). The rating scales of all the phases were presented together so that the 
pilots could rank the phases relatively to each other as much as in absolute terms. This 
overcomes the limitation of Likert scales (Likert, 1932), where equal intervals do not 
translate into scores which can be proportionately related to each other (Burns and Burns, 
2008). The level 1 phases proposed were validated by asking participants to pinpoint and rate 
any phases of flight which could have been missed. Finally, since the results of the studies 
reported in CAA (1997) and Herrera (2010) indicated satisfactory levels of construct, 
predictive and concurrent validity of the rating scales applied to offshore helicopter pilots, 
these studies were useful frames of reference to validate the scales of the present study and no 
further validation was attempted (Burns and Burns, 2008; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). 
6.5.3 Piloting 
The phases of flight, scales of risk experienced, demographic, direct and open-ended 
questions were subject to peer-review, piloting and refinement by six SMEs based in three 
continents. These SMEs were five senior offshore helicopter pilots involved in training and 
safety within their organisations and a safety analyst who held a master’s level degree in 
aviation human factors and worked for a major offshore helicopter operator. This process led 
to changes in ordering, wording and the content of the questions for completeness, brevity 
and ease of response. The process increased content, construct and face validity of the 
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questionnaire’s questions (Burns and Burns, 2008). Developed and piloted in English, the 
questionnaire was then translated into Spanish and Portuguese. The translations were verified 
by native speakers who had doctoral-level education in aviation safety and human factors, as 
well as practical experience in such fields. 
6.5.4 Region, company and pilot sampling strategies 
Chapter 4 indicated that the nighttime was a high risk factor for worldwide offshore 
helicopter operations; hence, the sampling of regions aimed to cover all offshore helicopter 
areas, starting from those outlined in Section 4.3.6.1. Since these areas were derived from 
accident reports, they had to be complemented by any areas where an accident did not occur. 
This led to the incorporation of the ‘Europe except the North Sea’ area (i.e., Italy and Spain; 
see Section 2.3.3.1.1.2), which is characterised by loose regulations, local safety 
management, spaced-in-time and long-lasting operations, incipient infrastructure, benign 
weather conditions and predominantly mid twin-turbine helicopters (see Table 4-3 and 
Notícias Jurídicas, 2002). The areas which formed the basis for the regional sampling 
strategy are outlined in Table 6-3.  
 
Table 6-3 – Areas covered by the regional sampling strategy 
Gulf of 
Mexico 
(GOM) 
North 
Sea 
(NS) 
‘Other regions’ 
Americas except GOM Middle 
East 
Australasia CIS* Africa Europe 
except 
the 
North 
Sea 
California Alaska Canada Mexico Brazil India Far 
East 
Australia 
  
*  CIS -  Commonwealth of Independent States. See Table 4-3 for this and other area codes 
 
These areas were re-grouped according to shared aspects of relevance to safety (see Section 
4.3.6.1 and Table 4-3) for nighttime operations. For example, Table 4-3 shows that Brazil, 
California, Mexico, Middle East, India, Far East, Australia, Africa and Europe except the 
North Sea only differed in one aspect, i.e., the intensity of operations. This is irrelevant 
during nighttime operations because low latitude regions usually only undertake night 
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operations in response to emergencies (see Section 4.3.4.1). Therefore, night flight traffic is 
usually not intense in these areas. All these areas formed Group 1. 
Group 2 was formed by Alaska and Canada, which only differed in the type of aircraft 
typically used. This is also irrelevant since it is likely that, in both Alaska and Canada, the 
helicopters used in nighttime medical evacuation (i.e., ‘medvac’; see Sections 2.1 and 4.3.4. 
1.2) are multi-engine equipped. Groups 3, 4 and 5 represent areas of unique operational 
characteristics: Group 3 was formed by the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which differ from the previous group because, in the CIS, the aircraft 
predominantly used are manufactured by companies from the countries of the Former Soviet 
Union, with potentially different airworthiness requirements (Khatwa and Roelen 1996). 
Group 4 was formed by the Gulf of Mexico, which is an area dominated by single engine 
operations. Finally, Group 5 was formed by the North Sea, representing an area of highly-
regulated operations (see Section 2.3.3.1.1.2). 
The major companies operating helicopters in support of offshore oil- and gas-related 
missions in each area listed above were identified and targeted. This strategy has already 
been successfully applied in the offshore oil and gas industry, where very few large 
companies usually dominate representative market shares (e.g., Vinnem, 2010). In order to 
maximise the chances of reaching the relevant companies (and thereby respondents), aviation 
regulators, accident investigation boards, oil and gas companies and regional teams of the 
IHST (see Section 2.3.3.1.1.4) were also contacted (i.e., in the Middle East, India, Australia, 
USA, Canada, Mexico and CIS) by the most convenient means (typically e-mail). The list of 
parties contacted can be seen in Appendix 7. 
The selection of representative companies was followed by a quota sampling strategy at the 
company level which attempted to capture the experience of the following two groups: senior 
and flight line-only pilots. The former were pilots who dealt with other pilots in a wide range 
of flying conditions and had to display declarative knowledge (Corbet and Anderson, 1995) 
as a part of the job. Flight instructors, aviation safety officer, operations and management 
post-holders, e.g., chief pilots and chief operating officers (COO), were considered senior 
pilots. The experience of senior pilots was anticipated to most likely synthesize that of many 
pilots (Chipman et al., 2000) and be particularly useful if sample sizes were small (i.e., if the 
questionnaire response rate was low). The flight line-only pilot group was formed by line 
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pilots without an administrative job and was used to control for potential professional bias of 
the previous group. All pilots participating in the survey were volunteers (Dery et al., 2007). 
The questionnaire, together with the invitation letter, was distributed by electronic mail 
addressed to the persons in charge of the training, safety, operations and management 
departments of the targeted companies. These persons had direct control over the sampling 
frame and were instructed to distribute the questionnaire according to the sampling strategy 
mentioned above. The language version used was the most appropriate in each case. A date 
of return was stipulated at approximately two months from the date of distribution, with a 
maximum of two polite reminders sent on a monthly basis. This was aimed at increasing 
response rates and at the same time preserving the voluntary nature of the survey (Burns and 
Burns, 2008). In four specific countries, the questionnaire was additionally applied by the 
researcher in individual and confidential face-to-face sessions. Given the simplicity of the 
questionnaire, any potential bias introduced by face-to-face questionnaire application, e.g., 
interviewer-interviewee interaction, interviewee acquiescence and social desirability (see 
Burns and Burns, 2008) was deemed minimal and irrelevant. 
6.5.5 Sample sizes 
Because no sampling frame was available to the researcher (i.e., the cooperating companies 
did not release a list of their pilots), the parameters of the population were actually unknown. 
Therefore, the required sample sizes had to be estimated. This can be done by the formulae of 
Burns and Burns (2008) and the following parameters: σ, which is an estimate of the 
population’s standard deviation (SD); Z, which is the two-tailed value of the standardised 
deviation of the normal distribution associated with the desired level of confidence; e, which 
is the arbitrary error accepted; and π, which is an estimate of the highest proportion of 
sampling units belonging to any of the categories in the population. 
The variables used to estimate the required sample sizes and their rationale were as follows: 
i. The number of nighttime deck landings - chosen because the flight segment is the 
best variable based on which pilot-related events should be normalised (see 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5); 
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ii. Risk ratings - they represent the main output of this investigation and, therefore, it 
is reasonable to choose samples sizes which optimise the quality of this data; and  
iii. Membership to the ‘senior pilot’ group – selected as this is at the centre of the 
research problem. 
With no prior study conducted amongst the target population, σ was estimated by dividing 
the assumed range of the continuous variables by six. This is based on an anticipation of 
normality, which spread of scores is around six SDs. Such an assumption is acceptable in the 
virtual absence of information for sample size estimation (Burns and Burns, 2008). 
The range of the number of night deck landings was estimated from the minimum of three 
required by the OGP for nighttime currency (OGP, 2008) to a maximum of 1080. This 
considers the following: 
• Maximum allowable of 900 flying hours per pilot per year (e.g., JAA, 2007; ANAC, 
2010); 
• 3% of flying hours at night - see Sections 2.1 and 4.3.4.1; 
• One deck landing per hour - average platform distance from shore at 70 nautical 
miles; helicopters’ typical cruising speed of 140 knots (Farrell, 2013); and 
• Pilot service life of 40 years - beginning and end of commercial flying career assumed 
at the minimum and maximum ages typically allowed, i.e., 18 and 60 to 65 years-old, 
respectively, with the initial years of the career in other types of operation (see 
Fitzpatrick, 2013). 
The range of risk ratings was estimated from the 0-10 scales used. 
Z was initially set at 1.96, corresponding to 95% confidence interval. A function of the 
desired precision, e was set at 50 night deck landings, 0.5 risk rating (in order to avoid 
confusion between adjacent ratings) and 10% of the true proportion of senior pilots in the 
population. Finally, π was estimated at 0.9, assuming that typically 10% of the pilots in any 
company are senior pilots. 
Based on these assumptions and the formulae of Burns and Burns (2008), the following per 
group sample sizes were calculated:  
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i. 50 based on number of night deck landings;  
ii. 51 based on risk ratings;  
iii. 35 based on seniority membership.  
Hence, responses were sought from at least 51 senior pilots, with as much representativeness 
of the areas and groups outlined in Section 6.5.4 as possible. 
6.5.6 Statistical analysis 
Given that the risk ratings of each phase were attributed by comparison to one another, the 
ratings were treated as continuous data (Frakes et al., 2009). Using statistical procedures 
which fitted the characteristics and distributions the data, the following hypotheses were 
initially tested (refer to Table 6-2 to the levels of phases of flight): 
• H01: the distributions of risk ratings across phases of flight (level 1) are the same; 
• H02: the distributions of risk ratings across phases of flight (level 2) are the same; 
• H03: the distributions of risk ratings across phases of flight (level 3) are the same; 
• H04: the distributions of risk ratings across combined scan technique – kinetic state 
(St-Ks) categories are the same. 
These procedures aimed to highlight the most critical phases of flight, according to the 
experience of the sample investigated. The tests of H02 and H03 additionally indicated the 
extent to which clustering flight phases could produce misleading results. Building on 
previous findings of Chapter 4, which failed to find associations between regions of 
operations and phases of flight (see Section 4.4.2.1 and Table 4-9), the hypotheses tested 
disregarded regional differences. 
With the results of the previous tests, the following hypotheses were subsequently tested:  
• H05: the distributions of risk ratings across the level 1 phases forming the most 
critical level 3 phase (identified from the test of H03 above) are the same; 
• H06: the distributions of risk ratings across the level 1 phases forming the most 
critical St-Ks category (identified from the test of H04 above) are the same. 
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Such tests confronted the test of H01 and enabled the selection of the riskiest phases for the 
subsequent demographic analysis. This analysis aimed to identify regions or groups of pilots 
particularly vulnerable to the riskiest phases of flight, based upon the differences in the 
distributions of risk ratings per demographic variables collected. 
The hypotheses tested and the statistical tests applied are shown in the next section. The 
hypotheses were two-tailed and significance was established at p≤0.05. 
6.6 Results and discussion 
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
A total of 61 questionnaires were returned, of which 40 were obtained following face-to-face 
sessions. In the following results, the sums that did not reach the total of 61 respondents stem 
from slightly incomplete questionnaires returned online. In all cases, follow-up was 
attempted in vain. Incomplete fields were excluded from the statistical analyses undertaken. 
The respondents were based in the areas described in Table 6-4. There were 3 female and 58 
male pilots, 46 captains and 13 first officers. Fifty of respondents held air transport pilot’s 
licences (ATPL) and nine held commercial pilot’s licences (CPL). 23 respondents were 
‘flight line-only pilots’ and 35 were ‘senior pilots’. The former corresponds to Zs that are 
representative of over 81.3% confidence intervals for both the number of night deck landings 
and risk ratings outlined in Section 6.5.5. Additionally, since the sample of flight line-only 
pilots roughly matched the size of the senior pilot group, it was deemed useful for statistical 
comparisons (Burns and Burns, 2008). The main demographic characteristics of the pilots 
sampled are summarised in Table 6-5. The pilots flew primarily the helicopter models of 
Table 6-6. 
Helicopter types were further categorised according to the following criteria: 
• Transport capacity (see Section 4.3.6.2): heavy twin turbine (HT, i.e., EC332L, 
EC332L2, EC225 and S92. N=20) and mid twin turbine (MT, i.e., all else. N=37) 
helicopters. 
• Cockpit generation: full glass cockpit (i.e., S76C++, EC155, AW139, EC225 and 
S92. N=47) and analogic/mixed cockpit (i.e., all else. N=10). 
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The latter enabled to test whether glass cockpits could be deemed safer than legacy designs 
(see Table 4-2 and Section 6.5.2.1). 
Table 6-4 – Areas and number of respondents 
Areas and countries of operation Narea Ncountry 
Group 1                             
(N=15) 
Americas except the Gulf of Mexico 8 
 
 
Brazil 
 
8 
Middle East 3 
 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
3 
Australasia, Far East 1 
 
 
Thailand 
 
1 
Europe except the North Sea 3 
   Spain 
 
3 
Group 5 
(N=46)  
Norway 
  
20 
 
Holland 
 
22 
 
Denmark 
  
4 
Table 6-5 – Main demographic characteristics of helicopter pilots 
 
Mean SD 
Age, years 42.7 8.9 
Experience flying helicopters, hours total 5904.8 3482.9 
Experience flying helicopters, hours night 3178.6 2916.5 
Experience flying helicopters, hours IFR 886.5 828.9 
Number of night deck landings 1926.4 3868.0 
Length of time working as offshore helicopter pilot, years 10.1 8.5 
Table 6-6 – Aircraft flown by participants (ordered by empty weight) 
A
S
36
5N
3 
S
76
B
 
S
76
C
+
+ 
E
C
15
5 
A
W
13
9 
A
S
33
2L
 
A
S
33
2L
2 
E
C
22
5 
S
92
 
5 1 1 11 19 1 3 3 13 
 
The medians, means and SDs of the risk ratings assigned to the flight phases can be seen in 
Table 6-7. Medians are presented since they are more meaningful when rank-based non-
parametric statistical tests are required. 
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Table 6-7 – Medians, means and SDs of ratings assigned to phases of flight (highest medians in bold font) 
 
 
Level 1 Median Mean SD  Level 2 Median Mean SD  Level 3 Median Mean SD Combined St - Ks
1 Median Mean SD 
Parked, rotors/engines not running 0.0 0.6 0.9  Parked 1.3 1.4 1.2  Ground manoeuvres 3.5 3.4 1.7 Visual scan - low energy 3.0 3.6 2.6 
Parked, rotors/engines running 2.0 2.3 1.8  Taxiing 4.0 4.4 2.2  Departure 4.5 5.0 2.3 Visual scan - high energy 6.0 6.0 2.4 
Hovering before positioning/taxiing for takeoff 4.0 4.0 2.1  Takeoff 4.5 5.0 2.3  Cruise 3.0 2.8 2.0 Instrument scan - high energy 3.0 3.9 2.3 
Positioning/taxiing before takeoff 3.0 3.8 2.3  Cruise 2.0 2.3 2.1  Arrival 4.7 4.8 2.1     
Visual segment of takeoff/initial climb 5.0 5.7 2.5  Approach 4.6 4.9 2.1          
Instrument climb 4.0 4.2 2.4  Landing 5.0 4.8 2.5          
Instrument cruise 3.0 2.8 2.0               
Instrument descent 3.0 3.6 2.3               
Instrument approach 4.0 4.4 2.4               
Visual segment of the approach 6.5 6.0 2.4               
Positioning/taxiing after the approach 5.0 4.8 2.6               
Hovering after positioning/taxiing after approach 4.0 4.6 2.5               
Landing 5.0 4.8 2.5               
Go around in the instrument segment of the approach 5.0 5.1 2.1               
Go around in the visual segment of the approach 6.0 6.3 2.0               
            1 Refer to Table 6-2 for phase coding    
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6.6.2 Hypothesis testing 
During all subsequent tests (i.e., those in Sections 6.6.2.1 to 6.6.2.4 below), the normality of 
the distributions were tested according to the sample sizes involved, i.e., Shapiro-Wilk’s test 
were used when cases were fewer than 50 per category and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were 
used otherwise. Homogeneity of variance was checked by Levene’s test (Field, 2009). 
6.6.2.1 Preliminary statistical tests (i.e., the tests of H01-4) 
Because in all cases at least one assumption of parametric data was violated, non-parametric 
techniques were required to test H01-4. Related Samples Friedman’s Two-Way Analysis of 
Variance by Ranks tests were used to account for the fact that each respondent scored every 
phase of flight proposed (Field, 2009). 
The results of the tests of all 4 null hypotheses (i.e., H01-4) were significant and hence, the 
hypotheses were rejected. This means that there were significant differences between the risk 
ratings attributed by pilots to the phases of flight at all levels of the taxonomy described in 
Table 6-7.  
6.6.2.2 Post hoc analysis of the preliminary statistical tests 
Post hoc analysis was undertaken by application of the Related Samples Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test with Bonferroni correction (see Section 4.3.8.1 for an explanation on the 
Bonferroni correction). 
In each such test, the category with highest median was chosen as the control group. This 
enabled groups to be assessed against the group with potentially the highest risk ratings. 
Therefore, the relevant results are the statistically insignificant results because they indicate 
phases in which risk ratings are comparable to the worst of the phases. 
The tests following the rejection of H01 led to fourteen pairs of level 1 phases of flight being 
formed for comparison. The only ratings that failed to achieve significance (p>0.05/14) and 
hence, were comparable to those attributed to the ‘visual segment of the approach’ (i.e., 
control group), were those of the ‘visual segment of the takeoff’, ‘go around in the instrument 
segment of the approach’ and ‘go around in the visual segment of the approach’. 
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During the post hoc tests of H02, five pairs of level 2 phases were compared. The only ratings 
that failed to achieve significance (p>0.05/5) and, hence, were comparable to those attributed 
to the ‘landing’ level 2 phase (i.e., control group), were those of the ‘taxiing’, ‘takeoff’ and 
‘approach’ phases. This highlights two misleading results stemming from the clustering of 
phases of flight, which have major implications for helicopter safety analysis:  
i. ‘Landing’ appeared as the most critical level 2 phase (i.e., highest median).  
ii. ‘Taxiing’ figured as a level 2 phase of concern even though no level 1 categories 
within ‘taxiing’ achieved significance during the previous tests.  
Given that the level 2 phases proposed are fairly similar to the phases of widely-used 
taxonomies, e.g., CAA (2005), care should be taken when interpreting the results of official 
studies. 
The post hoc tests of H03 were undertaken as three paired-tests of level 3 phases of flight. 
Using the ‘arrival’ level 3 phase as the control group, the ‘departure’ phase failed to show 
significant differences in pilot ratings (p>0.05/3). Therefore, the risk levels assigned were 
comparable between the ‘arrival’ and ‘departure’ level 3 phases. 
The post hoc tests of H04 compared the ratings of the VL and IH phases against those of the 
VH phase (i.e., the control group). Both tests were significant and, therefore, the risk ratings 
were significantly higher for the VH phases. 
The results of the test of H01-4 and associated post-hoc tests indicate that any of the following 
phases may be the riskiest phases of flight: ‘visual segment of the takeoff’, ‘go around in the 
instrument segment of the approach’ and ‘go around in the visual segment of the approach’. 
However, there are confounding information with respect to ‘landing’ and ‘taxiing’. 
Furthermore, multiple statistical testing using the Bonferroni correction could have incurred 
in inaccuracies. Further statistical testing enables to clarify the differences in risk ratings and 
identify the riskiest phases more accurately.  
6.6.2.3  Further statistical testing (i.e., the tests of H05-6) 
Given the results of the test mentioned above, H05 and H06 tested the distributions of risk 
ratings across the level 1 phases within the ‘arrival’ (level 3) and ‘VH’ phases, respectively 
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(see Table 6-7). The statistical tests mentioned above were applied because of similar data 
characteristics and sample sizes. 
The test of H05 produced a significant result. The post hoc tests revealed that the high ratings 
of the ‘visual segment of the approach’ (i.e., control group) were only comparable to those of 
the ‘go around in the visual segment of the approach’ (i.e., p>0.05/5). This challenges the 
post hoc tests of H01, which indicated that the ‘go around in the instrument segment of the 
approach’ also belonged to this population. However, the latter inclusion appears to have 
been a type II error during the post hoc tests of H01, stemming from the excessively stringent 
rejection criterion caused by the application of the Bonferroni correction to all 14 pairs of 
phases (see Section 6.6.2.2). 
Given that the test of H06 failed to produce significant results, and hence the risk ratings 
assigned to all VH phases were similar, the phases rated highest for risk experienced were 
those flown by reference to external visual cues at high kinetic states (i.e., VH phases, formed 
by the visual segments of takeoff, approach and go around). Additionally, considering the 
worldwide concentration of offshore helicopter pilot-related accidents in the arrival segment 
of flight (see Sections 4.4 and 4.5), the numerous international efforts to redress this problem 
outlined in Section 2.1 and given that visual approaches usually cannot be avoided (i.e., once 
in flight, a helicopter necessarily has to land somewhere at some point, see Section 6.5.1), the 
‘visual segment of the approach’ can be confidently considered the single riskiest phase of 
nighttime offshore helicopter flights. 
The demographic analysis that follows focuses, therefore, on both the visual segment of the 
approach and VH category. 
6.6.2.4 Risk ratings per demographic variables (i.e., the tests of H06-19) 
Given that in all cases at least one assumption of parametric data was violated, non-
parametric tests were needed. The Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was used to 
compare the distributions of risk ratings across categories of nominal variables, whereas 
Kendall’s Tau b non-parametric correlations were used against continuous variables. Table 6-
8 presents the hypotheses tested and the results obtained. The significance on the tests of H08 
and H09 occurred as the risk ratings of VH phases were higher for mid twin-turbine and glass 
cockpit helicopters, respectively. Given that these results were insignificant for the ‘visual 
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segment of the approach’, the significance of the VH category stems from the visual 
segments of either the takeoff or go around. 
6.6.2.5 Impacts of the results of the hypotheses tested (i.e., H01-19) 
The tests of H01-19 mentioned in Sections 6.6.2.1 to 6.6.2.4 have a number of direct impacts 
on hazard identification and risk analysis. Firstly, the results highlight that the greatest risks 
of nighttime flying stem from the visual scan technique – high kinetic state (i.e., VH) phases. 
Since Section 6.5.1 showed that these are the characteristic phases of nighttime offshore 
helicopter flights, any hazard identification and risk analysis efforts aimed at improving 
safety in the nighttime could, in principle, concentrate on the VH phases with maximum 
benefit. 
Furthermore, the tests of H01-19 confirmed the visual approach segment as the single riskiest 
phase amongst the VH and all phases of nighttime flights. However, the results add to current 
knowledge as they show, for the first time, that the difficulties of the visual approach phase 
occur pandemically to the pilots of various regions of operations, not just in the North Sea. 
This is virtually the world’s sole region where mitigation efforts are attempted consistently 
(see Section 6.4). 
The tests of H07-19 (i.e., the demographic analysis) have a specific impact on ensuing hazard 
identification and risk analysis efforts, as the results show that there are no particular groups 
of pilots facing greater difficulties during nighttime visual approaches offshore. Therefore, 
follow-up in-depth hazard identification and risk analysis efforts should strive to be as 
generic as possible with respect to regions’ and participants’ sampling strategies. This is 
taken into consideration during the implementation of the processes developed in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
Finally, the tests of H07-19 show that the risks of the remaining VH phases (i.e., visual takeoff 
and visual go around) might be related to specific helicopter categories. Therefore, priority 
should be given to identify the hazards of mid-twin turbine and glass cockpit helicopters 
when assessing these phases. 
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Table 6-8 – Statistical analysis of risk ratings at the most critical phases across demographic variables 
 
  
Visual scan - high kinetic state (VH) Visual segment of instrument approach 
    Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Tests (MW) 
H07 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across regions
* X X 
H08 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across categories of helicopter transport capacity ✓ X 
H09 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across categories of helicopter cockpit generation ✓ X 
H010 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across categories of pilot's licence X X 
H011 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across pilots' genders X X 
H012 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across pilots' ranks X X 
H013 The distribution of risk ratings is the same across categories of pilot seniority X X 
    
  
Kendall's Tau b non-parametric correlations (KTb) 
H014 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of pilot's age X X 
H015 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of time as offshore helicopter pilot X X 
H016 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, total X X 
H017 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, IFR X X 
H018 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, night X X 
H019 The distribution of risk ratings is independent of pilots’ number of night deck landings X X 
 
X: non-significant result, accept H0                ✓: significant result, reject H0                       
* Given the sample sizes of specific regions, the analysis was limited to Group 5 x Group 1. See Section 6.5.4 
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6.7 Limitations and their mitigation 
Surveys are necessarily based on subjective data, such as experience, perceptions and 
information recollected from memory. Hence, a degree of bias can never be discarded. 
Additionally, despite the attempted rigour of the sampling strategy, it can be argued that there 
was no true randomisation of the study sample. This stems from the fact that the respondents 
were volunteers and, therefore, self-selection and non-responder biases might have occurred 
(Dery et al., 2007). While these are fair concerns, the simplicity of the questions, the 
impartiality of the invitation letter (e.g. with no mention of any phase of particular concern) 
and the focus on senior pilots with declarative knowledge and considerable professional 
experience (see Table 6-5) are likely to have minimised any tendentious responses. 
Representativeness can also be questioned, since a sampling frame was unavailable at the 
onset. However, conversations with the collaborating individuals in each company revealed 
that the percentage representativeness was high in at least the North Sea countries, Brazil and 
Spain (i.e., over 30% of the population of ‘senior pilots’ in each region). Hence, the results 
can be expected to be a fair representation of the corresponding macro regions and companies 
covered, which are in any case the main companies in the sector. 
Finally, suboptimal sample sizes limited the analysis that could be undertaken, e.g., analysis 
across all five regions of operations (i.e., Groups 1 to 5, see Section 6.5.4) was not possible. 
However, given the ethical imperative to keep survey participation voluntary, suboptimal 
sample sizes sometimes cannot be avoided. 
6.8 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 (Sections 2.3.2.4, 2.3.3.2.1 and 2.3.3.3) showed that even though surveys are 
recommended as a fundamental process of hazard identification/risk analysis in aviation, no 
guidance is provided on how to conduct surveys. This chapter develops a structured and yet 
simple questionnaire survey methodology for identifying the riskiest phases of nighttime 
offshore helicopter flights. As discussed in Section 6.1, this of prime importance for hazard 
identification and risk analysis and a fundamental pre-requisite for the development and 
implementation of a task-based hazard identification survey process in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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The identification of the riskiest phases of nighttime offshore helicopter flights were 
underpinned by the development of a novel and bespoke taxonomy which overcame the 
weaknesses of current taxonomies discussed in Section 6.2. The taxonomy, developed from 
the application of two simple task analysis techniques, describes the phases of nighttime 
offshore helicopter flights beyond any existing taxonomy and incorporates human factors 
aspects which are essential to understanding the hazards and risks of nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations. 
The questionnaire survey that ensued was specifically designed to generate statistically useful 
data which redressed the limitations of the existing information on the hazards and risks of 
nighttime offshore helicopter operations. As discussed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, these 
limitations included low accident/incident data representativeness, data incompleteness, use 
of clustered phases of flight (see also Sections 4.3.6.3, 4.3.8 and 5.4.5), lack of a focus on 
facts in previous surveys (see Section 2.3.3.2.1) and the absence of a holistic view of the 
impact of respondents’ demographic characteristics on the risk levels experienced. 
Following careful design and piloting of the questionnaire, data was collected from subject 
matter experts based in seven countries. This was followed by the study of the data’s 
properties which defined the multiple statistical tests to be used. The results show that the 
phases flown by reference to external visual cues at high kinetic states (i.e., VH), which are 
the characteristic phases of nighttime flights, cause the greatest difficulties to pilots. Among 
such phases, the visual segment of instrument approaches is particularly risky. 
The demographic analysis of risk levels experienced during this phase failed to show any 
statistical significance. This is important as the sampling strategies of follow-up hazard 
identification studies (e.g., those in Chapters 7 and 8) should be based on criteria other than 
the demographic variables explored in this study. However, for the remaining VH phases 
(i.e., visual takeoff and visual go around), further work should focus on the mid-twin turbine 
and glass cockpit helicopters. 
Limitations were identified in the course of the survey and the results should be interpreted 
with respect to such real-life constraints. Therefore, the results are best dealt with as the first 
step towards evidence-based recommendations. Although external validity seemed assured, 
especially with respect to concurrent validity (i.e., the results converge with ongoing safety 
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interventions in the approach and landing phases of flight, see Section 2.1), further work 
aimed to validate and update this study is advisable. 
As new safety interventions are put in place to redress the per-flight-phase safety risks (e.g., 
the approach procedures flown with the aid of satellite-based vertical guidance in the North 
Sea; see Section 2.1), it will be important to detect phases accurately and reassess the changes 
in associated risk levels. Precise phase discrimination might be attempted through enhancing 
HFDM algorithms and by integrating HFDM data with data from other sources, e.g., from 
cockpit voice and video recorders, for joint analysis. 
Based upon the results of this chapter, Chapters 7 and 8 accept the nighttime visual approach 
phase as the phase which is most representative of the hazards of nighttime offshore 
helicopter flying and use this phase for the development and implementation of a novel Task-
Based Hazard Identification Survey Process. The process aims to achieve a holistic view of 
the hazards and risks faced, as needed to mitigate the problems of unsuccessful human 
performance during motor-controlled nighttime flights (see Section 2.3.2). This novel process 
is of the utmost importance given the current scenario of relatively few nighttime offshore 
helicopter accidents and incidents, as well as reported incidents that cannot be trusted as 
statistical precursors to accidents (see Sections 2.1, 5.9 and 6.3). 
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CHAPTER 7 TASK-BASED HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY PROCESS – 
TEMPLATE DEVELOPMENT 
The previous chapter investigated the levels of risk of well-discriminated phases of nighttime 
offshore helicopter flights and concluded that the visual scan technique – high kinetic state 
(i.e., VH) phases are highly representative of the risks of nighttime flights. Amongst such 
phases, the visual segment of instrument approaches poses the highest level of risk. 
Furthermore, it was determined that the level of risk in this critical phase of flight is 
independent of helicopter category, area of operation and pilot demographic characteristics. 
This chapter builds on these conclusions to develop the Task-Based Hazard Identification 
Survey Process and implements it to identify the hazards associated with the visual segment 
of nighttime instrument approaches. The process enables the assessment of the current level 
of hazard knowledge specific to the task and to realise a factual list of hazards (i.e., a hazard 
template) with two characteristics: (i) it is formed by exhaustive hazard categories and (ii) it 
contains enough hazard data to enable statistical analysis. Whereas exhaustiveness is 
important to ensure the transferability of the template to other similar phases and over time, 
statistical analysis is the cornerstone of predictive safety and essential for assuring that the 
results can be generalised to the wider population of potential survey respondents. This 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.1 discusses the theoretical background linking task 
analysis, survey methods and hazard identification. Section 7.2 reviews how a task analysis 
technique should be selected for survey-based hazard identification and selects one for the 
process. Section 7.3 specifies the architecture of the task-based hazard identification survey 
process, with an explanation for each of its steps. Section 7.4 implements the process in the 
context of nighttime visual approach segments, with the results presented and discussed in 
Section 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 presents the chapter’s conclusions on the ability of the 
process to produce a hazard template with the characteristics specified and, thereby, support 
the exploitation of hazard data in predictive analysis in Chapter 8. 
7.1 Theoretical background 
Although hazard identification through task analysis is recommended in the aviation 
literature presented in Chapter 2, Sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.3.3 showed that this is not typically 
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associated with survey methodologies. Currently, the task analysis methods recommended are 
mostly poor adaptations of analytical system decomposition techniques and associated failure 
mode detection methods, both of which are designed for hardware-centred systems. 
Therefore, the current methods cannot identify fully the contextual hazards embedded in 
intractable human-centred operations (Dougherty, 1990; Hollnagel, 2012, 2009; 2008, 2004, 
1997, 1993; Kim et al., 2006; Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; Snook, 2000; Stolzer et al., 2008; 
Lewis, 2011). 
Surveys are able to offer the human-centred approach missing in the task analysis-based 
hazard identification methods currently recommended in aviation. However, Chapter 2 
showed that most survey methodologies applied to identify hazards in aviation, including in 
nighttime offshore helicopter operations, lack the factual focus which is an integral part of 
task analysis techniques (see Sections 2.3.3.2.1, 2.4 and Shryane et al., 2000; Kirwan and 
Ainsworth, 1992). Hence, a combination of the human-centred focus of surveys with the 
factual, task-based character of task analysis should overcome the current shortcomings of 
hazard identification methods. Therefore, this chapter integrates task analysis and operational 
survey techniques to form the ‘Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process’ and apply 
it in the context of nighttime offshore helicopter visual approach segments. A review of the 
selection of task analysis for addressing the problem of hazard identification is presented in 
section 7.2. 
7.2 Task analysis and hazard identification 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, there are over 100 task analysis techniques in the literature. In 
order to select the appropriate techniques to address a given problem, it is widely accepted 
that case-based reasoning should be used. This means studying similar cases of successful 
and unsuccessful task analyses to inform the selection of an approach for a new task analysis 
problem (Chipman et al., 2000). 
Based on case-based reasoning, the Talk-Through task analysis techniques was chosen to 
form the ‘Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process’. This technique is based on 
retrospective interviews and was successfully applied by Nascimento (2009) to identify the 
hazards of nighttime visual approaches of offshore helicopters in the North Sea (see Section 
2.3.3.2.1). 
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The Talk-Through technique has an intrinsic hazard identification character because it checks 
actual performance against the baseline performance stipulated during the planning of the 
operation. Therefore, the technique allows for the creation of an updated, factual model of 
what actually happens during the task execution (HSE, 2013; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). 
In Talk-Through analysis, workers who know the operation explain verbally how specific 
tasks are undertaken in terms of required actions and work methods. The following three 
steps are necessary for a Talk-Through exercise: (i) develop the scenario of interest, which 
might be a known hazardous scenario; (i) undertake the Talk-Through session, which, 
ideally, includes recording the verbal information; and (iii) debrief, during which time the 
analyst facilitating the exercise pursues any particular aspects of the task of concern (Kirwan 
and Ainsworth, 1992). Incorporating the Talk-Through task analysis technique, the Task-
Based Hazard Identification Survey Process was developed as described in the following 
section. 
7.3 Process development 
The Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process was developed to address the problems 
of previous survey processes discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3.2.1) and enable the 
identification of hazards in human-performed tasks. In this chapter, the implementation of the 
processes covers the nighttime visual approach segment as this is the riskiest task identified 
from the analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
The focus on a specific task minimises biases introduced by personal opinions and unfounded 
perceptions (Sections 2.3.3.2.1 and 2.4). Defining a geographical scope is needed for matters 
of efficiency and to ensure that statistically representative samples of respondents will be 
reached. This in turn ensures the results can be generalised. A preliminary hazard 
identification exercise is then required to cover the state of the art in the topic area, which is 
necessary in any scientific undertaking. The subsequent survey data collection is focused on 
developing an exhaustive and statistically representative list of hazards (i.e., a hazard 
template) because having such a template enables effective management of hazard 
information (explained further in Section 7.3.2). Finally, the process includes the means to 
perform statistical analysis and predictions using the template generated. Figure 7-1 captures 
the architecture of the new process, which is explained further in Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.4. 
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7.3.1 Select task, geographical scope and sample sizes 
In the generic process, any task of safety concern (e.g., identified from the analysis of 
accidents, other surveys or HFDM exceedances) can be selected for the task-based hazard 
identification survey exercise. Well-discriminated phases of flight (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2) 
can be used as task entities amenable to task-based hazard identification. 
The geographical scope depends on the intention of the survey, i.e., the level of generalisation 
intended. It is advisable to define the geographical scope as broadly as possible (e.g., 
worldwide, resources permitting) since virtually all the bounding conditions are artificial (see 
Section 2.2.2). 
The sample sizes required need to be considered at this stage. This is important because 
predictive hazard identification (also known as predictive safety), as stipulated in Section 
2.3.3.3, is built on the assumptions of regression analysis and inferential statistics. The 
method outlined in Section 6.5.5 for the estimation of sample sizes, should be used. Statistical 
sampling methods (e.g., random sampling or stratified sampling) should be given preference 
as far as possible. However, they might prove difficult to implement due to local 
circumstances (e.g., pilot availability for only a short period of time between successive 
flights). Where true randomisation is impossible, representativeness should be attempted by 
increasing sample sizes (e.g., over 10% of the target population) and applying quota 
sampling. Quota sampling enables inferential statistical analysis when representativeness is 
assured and the interviewer consciously controls for selection bias, e.g., by approaching 
potential interviewees who appear both similar and dissimilar to the interviewer (Burns and 
Burns, 2008). 
7.3.2 Preliminary hazard identification 
This stage comprises the review of the literature, applicable taxonomies and available safety 
data (i.e., accident and incident reports). The review of applicable taxonomies is a literature 
review focused on identifying the structure and content of current taxonomies with respect to 
the known hazards of the task under study. This enables the gaps between available and 
required taxonomies to be identified, which indicate the extent to which developing a 
customised template may be necessary. The review of safety data is equally undertaken as a 
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literature review and enables any gaps in the seminal template being developed to be filled. 
The outcome of this step is a seminal hazard template, if the knowledge available supports it. 
Developing a hazard template is an important information management process, as is the 
development of classification schemes in general. Such schemes help to achieve the goals of 
scientific and applied research by simplifying and ordering complex and varied observations. 
They allow for greater sophistication than simply descriptive accounts of hazards and enable 
the development of comparisons and the classification of events according to identified 
general characteristics discovered during the classification process. In order to achieve this, 
the categories of the template should be (Morgan et al., 2000; Fischhoff et al., 1984): 
i. Simple; 
ii. Well defined; 
iii. Mutually exclusive; 
iv. Reflective of risk analysis objectives; 
v. Logically consistent; 
vi. Compatible with administrative systems; 
vii. Equitable; and 
viii. Compatible with human cognitive limitations. 
Classification plays a vital role in the development of practical strategies for controlling the 
environment, guiding policy-making (Cvetkovich and Earle, 1985) and ensuring the 
consistent communication of hazards (Stolzer et al., 2008). However, in order to avoid 
introducing bias in the seminal template (see Section 2.3.3.1.1), it is usually better to remain 
conservative than to add all likely applicable hazards. By remaining conservative, the data 
collected in the subsequent steps of the process (explained in the following section) will lead 
to the development of a customised template. 
The seminal template formed, if any, is then subjected to an initial qualitative assessment. 
This is a value judgement that reflects the trust of the analyst on the template’s believability 
(see Section 4.1.5), completeness and timeliness. The outcome of this assessment is to enter 
either the template development cycle or Content Analysis procedure, as explained in the 
Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4, respectively. 
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7.3.3 Template development cycle  
The template development cycle begins with the collection of hazard data using the Talk-
Through task analysis technique. Subsequently, Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
is applied to categorise the data collected when no template can be drawn in the previous 
step. When a template is drawn, Template Analysis (King, 1998; see Section 4.3.7) is used. 
Data collection, Grounded Theory and Template Analysis are explained in Sections 7.3.3.1 to 
7.3.3.3. 
7.3.3.1 Collect hazard data through task analysis 
As discussed in Section 7.2, the Talk-Through task analysis should be used. Since it is an 
interview-based technique, there are a number of practical issues to consider regarding 
question design, the method of conducting interviews and the need for a pilot study.  
7.3.3.1.1 Question design 
The requirements established in Section 7.2 must be addressed. This includes the design of 
the questions supporting the Talk-Through and the debriefing in which the hazards are 
identified. The hazards are best captured with open-ended questions, i.e., the participant’s 
free expression facilitated by the interviewer, who intervenes to ensure that the participant 
covers the area under study. Such a method of interaction is called a semi-structured 
interview schedule (Denzin, 1988; Robson, 2002). 
Since information from past events (i.e., the overall experience) is required, it is useful to 
define a timeframe of reference. This avoids the effects of memory decay and forgetfulness, 
which lead to both an underreporting of past events and inaccuracies in any reports. A period 
of 12 months prior to the interview is commonly used in qualitative research (Woolsey, 1986; 
Jarvis, 2009; Brenner et al., 1985; Ronan and Latham, 1974). 
The demographics of the respondents are also captured. This factual information is collected 
by means of direct questions, such as ‘how many flying hours do you posses?’ This 
information is used to describe the sample and thereby provide credibility to the research. 
Demographic data also form independent variables during the quantitative analysis of survey 
data, in which the hazards identified are used as dependent variables. This is further explored 
in Chapter 8. 
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7.3.3.1.2 Method of interview application 
Face-to-face individual interviews are preferred since they enable the maximum amount of 
information to be extracted from the participant’s answers. They also allow for participants’ 
privacy and well-being, as well as establishing rapport. However, it is important to control for 
interviewee-interviewer biases, especially leading questions (Burns and Burns, 2008; Robson, 
2002; Brenner et al., 1985). 
To avoid such biases, Brenner (1985) established a set of rules that an interviewer should 
follow, including rules for (i) asking questions, e.g., read the questions as they are worded in 
the interview schedule, (ii) dealing with respondent’s answers, e.g., record exactly what the 
respondent says, (iii) dealing with respondent problems, e.g., when the respondent requests 
the interviewer to repeat an action, he/she must repeat and (iv) interacting with the 
respondent, including to probe only non-directionally, e.g., avoid implying or suggesting to 
the respondent a particular answer or direction of answering.  
The interview recording method is selected on the basis of ethical considerations and the need 
to obtain participants’ trust, keep them satisfied and to be transparent. Ideally, interviews 
should be recorded; however, the analyst may have to reconsider this in the light of 
participants’ unfavourable attitudes. In this case, notes should be taken, if allowed. 
7.3.3.1.3 Conduct a pilot study 
A pilot study was described in Section 6.5.3. Pilot studies are essential in order to remove 
ambiguity, test the adequacy of the range of response categories and to trial instructions and 
administration (Burns and Burns, 2008). They are also useful in correcting linguistic errors 
when the survey is administered in foreign languages. 
7.3.3.1.4 Obtain ethical approval 
Research involving human participation is usually preceded by an analysis of ethical 
considerations, with the view to ensuring the participants’ well-being. When the subject of 
the research can be foreseen as potentially distressful or sensitive, a research proposal should 
be elaborated and submitted to a qualified ethics board for approval (e.g., EASP, 2014). 
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7.3.3.2 Grounded Theory 
Following the collection of the data and with no template for its classification, Grounded 
Theory is applied. This is a structured methodology devised to enable the generation of 
categories and theory from raw data, regardless of any pre-conceived theories. Therefore, the 
methodology enables the creation of an unbiased list of hazards tailored to the needs of the 
industry under investigation, as opposed to the adaptive fitting of identified hazards into pre-
existing taxonomies derived from other domains. Grounded Theory is commonly used in 
sociology (Cooke, 1994) as well as aviation, e.g., developing pilot decision-making models 
(Huddlestone and Harris, 2006) and for the establishment of glider pilot error taxonomies 
(Jarvis, 2010). In nighttime offshore helicopter operations, it was used by Nascimento (2009), 
as described in Section 2.3.3.2.1. 
This methodology may be applied to virtually all forms of data, provided that they are 
transformed into a textual format. Analysis using Grounded Theory follows four steps: data 
coding, open coding, axial coding and selective coding. 
Data Coding is conducted using ‘line-by-line analysis’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 57) of 
the raw textual data (e.g., interview transcripts). In the case of hazard identification, this step 
highlights phrases (or ‘statements’; Berelson, 1952) unambiguously referring to hazards. 
Since these statements form entities of analysis, it is advisable that data coding is preceded by 
interview fidelity and followed by statement extraction checks (Butterfield et al., 2005). The 
former looks for leading questions and consistency in the application of the interview 
schedule. The latter ensures that the hazards are reliably and consistently identified. The 
assistance of independent and knowledgeable raters is advisable for the checks above. 
Open Coding is the ‘analytical process through which concepts are identified” and during 
which ‘data is [...] closely examined, and compared for similarities and differences [...] for 
fine discrimination and differentiation among categories’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 101-
102). This is undertaken using the Constant Comparison Technique described by Partington 
(2002, cited in Huddlestone and Harris, 2006, pp. 360), whereby each statement is compared 
with those preceding it to check whether they describe the same phenomenon and can thus be 
allocated to the same category. Subsequently, categories are assigned names by 
‘conceptualization’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 105), i.e. labelling according to the event 
219 
 
 
 
 
that the statements represent. Intra-rater checks (e.g., test-retest reliability tests) and inter-
rater reliability tests may be undertaken for refinement and consistency of the categorisation.  
Axial Coding is ‘the process of relating categories to their subcategories’ with the purpose of 
‘reassembling data that were fractured during open coding’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 
123-124). As a descriptive template of hazards emerges, triangulation is required. This may 
be done by asking other raters to categorise random statements within and across the axial 
codes. Agreement rates may then be derived using percentage agreement or Cohen’s Kappa. 
The latter factors for the likelihood of random agreement into the calculation of agreement 
rates (Cohen, 1960; Robson, 2002).  
Selective Coding allows for presentation of categories ‘as a set of interrelated concepts, not 
just a listing of themes’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 145). This integration is done by 
‘writing a story’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 148), which should be validated as advised 
by Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 159): ‘tell the story to respondents [...] and then request 
that they comment on how well it seems to fit their case [...] They should be able to perceive 
it as a reasonable explanation’. Another form of validation is ‘high-level comparative 
analysis’ against raw data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 159), leading to the definition of 
areas of concern where appropriate and the establishment of the central theme which 
underpins the relationships between categories. This central theme is called the ‘the core 
category’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp. 159). 
The selective coding step does not aid the development of the template directly and is 
therefore marked by a dashed outline in Figure 7-1. However, doing the selective coding and 
producing a story may be used as an interim validation exercise when developing the 
template. If the story produced on the basis of the categories of the template is meaningful to 
SMEs in the field, confidence in the ability of the template to capture the proposed content is 
increased. 
In order to further enhance validity, some data collected may be analysed only after the 
template is developed. This checks if the story holds true in light of new data. Since a 
template pre-exists the validation check, it is technically already a Template Analysis 
exercise.  
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7.3.3.3 Template Analysis 
Template Analysis (King, 1998) allows for the template’s believability to improve. It also 
expands and updates an existing template as necessary. This technique starts from a list of 
codes defined a priori (i.e., a template), which is then modified, refined and amended as 
prompted by the narratives (see Section 4.3.7). 
The need to improve believability, expand and update the template might be caused by a 
change in theoretical sensitivity. This is commonly associated with the application of 
inductive analysis methods such as Grounded Theory and Template Analysis. Theoretical 
sensitivity (Glaser, 1978; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) refers to an 
awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data and the ability to give meaning to the data. As 
experience is gained in the subject through research, the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity is 
expected to improve. This may lead to changes in the course of the inductive research, 
resulting for example, in a change in the arrangement of categories. 
Changes in the arrangement of the categories may also be deliberate, in light of multiple 
research objectives (Webler et al., 1995). For example, it is common practice in the 
environmental sciences to use a single set of hazards in different classification schemes 
reflecting various analysis purposes, e.g., analysis of population exposed (Morgan et al., 
2000; Cvetkovich and Earle, 1985; Fischhoff et al., 1984). Other deliberate arrangements of 
categories include the alignment of hazard categories with the structures of the system model 
or industry taxonomy adopted (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) and to differentiate between 
sources and manifestations of hazards (e.g., error ‘genotypes’ and ‘phenotypes’, respectively; 
see Hollnagel, 2012; 2009, 2004). 
The process of Template Analysis is similar to that of Grounded Theory. Data coding is also 
conducted using the line-by-line analysis technique. Category fitting resembles the Open 
Coding step with the difference that, since categories already exist, the raw data is primarily 
fit to the categories. The ‘amendment of codes’ step of Template Analysis is equivalent to the 
Axial Coding step of Ground Theory. The integration of categories is also conducted by 
producing a coherent story of the phenomena investigated (King, 1998). This is analogous to 
the Grounded Theory’s selective coding step (and hence, is labelled ‘selective coding’ and 
represented by a dashed line in Figure 7-1). Story writing is a common form of validation in 
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qualitative research in general (Canter et al., 1985) and thus also applies to Template 
Analysis. Interview fidelity, statement extraction, reliability and validity checks are also 
undertaken as in Grounded Theory. Template Analysis is commonly used in aviation to 
create hazard lists or categorise aircrew members’ perception of safety and security issues 
(e.g., Tabary, 2006). 
7.3.3.4 Template reassessment 
The template produced by Grounded Theory or improved by Template Analysis is subject to 
a new assessment of believability (see Section 4.1.5), scope and timeliness. For as long as the 
template needs further improvement, Template Analysis is conducted recursively. When the 
template is deemed exhaustive, more data are collected as in 7.3.3.1 as necessary to complete 
the sample sizes calculated in Section 7.3.1, if not yet completed. When the minimum sample 
sizes are achieved, quantitative hazard analysis through Content Analysis is conducted. An 
exhaustive template is one in which the creation of new categories achieves clear diminishing 
returns in new rounds of safety data analysis. Because an exhaustive template is a 
comprehensive list of hazards, it is usually expected that it is transferable, at least partially, to 
similar areas (e.g., other phases of flight with similar characteristics; see Section 6.6.1 and 
Tables 6-2 and 6-7) not covered by the investigations from which the template emerged. 
7.3.4 Content Analysis 
Content Analysis produces quantitative summaries of responses (e.g., to the hazard 
identification exercise) and enables the identification of specific characteristics of 
communications in a systematic and objective manner (Brenner et al., 1985; Mostyn, 1985). 
Content Analysis has a renowned heritage which includes applications in fields as diverse as 
war propaganda, espionage, psychological analysis of dreams, astronaut-ground control 
interactions (Smith et al., 2008; Mostyn, 1985) and the behaviour of fire fighters when 
dealing with fires (Canter et al., 1980). The strength of Content Analysis lies in the statistical 
analysis of the concepts embedded in the categories of a template. Content Analysis takes 
unities of communication (e.g., words, themes, categories) and subjects them to scrutiny to 
investigate if any regularity occurs. This process frequently leads to hypothesis testing and 
reformulation of hypothesis due to the discovery of relationships among the data (Mostyn, 
1985; Burns and Burns, 2008).  
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Content Analysis has several initial steps that replicate those of Grounded Theory for 
developing categories from the raw data. The disadvantage of Content Analysis is that these 
initial steps are less rigorous and more difficult to apply (Cooke, 1994). Therefore, Content 
Analysis is best used after the successful application of Grounded Theory or Template 
Analysis, thereby benefitting from an existing template. Table 7-1 outlines all the steps of 
Content Analysis described by Mostyn (1985) and shows how the initial steps of the method 
are either already covered or improved by the processes of Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis. 
Content Analysis may be applied both to the frequencies of content (e.g., the hazard 
statements), or to the presence or absence of a particular content in the survey respondents’ 
speeches. Because ‘what is not said may be as, or more, important than what is said’ 
(Berelson, 1971, cited in Mostyn, 1985, pp. 130), Content Analysis allows for the study of 
participant membership in the categories of a hazard template, i.e., the analysis of the 
characteristics of those who commented on particular hazards versus those who failed to 
comment. This approach is called ‘Non-Frequency Content Analysis’ and has been used in 
many domains, such as the production of intelligence material in the political sphere and in 
psychometrical testing (Bainbridge, 1985; Berelson, 1952; Edwards and Hahn, 1980). ‘Non-
Frequency Content Analysis’ is explored in Chapter 8 to analyse survey data quantitatively. 
7.4 Process implementation 
7.4.1 Selection of task, geographical scope and pilot sampling considerations 
7.4.1.1 Selection of task 
Chapter 6 showed that the visual segment of instrument approaches is the phase of flight 
which is most challenging to pilots. Additionally, Chapter 6 also showed that well-
discriminated phases of flight can be viewed as well-defined task entities. Based on these 
results, the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches is the task chosen for the 
implementation of the Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process. This choice 
coincides with the task investigated by Nascimento (2009). This is a key study for the 
development of this chapter, as shown in Section 7.4.2.1.  
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Table 7-1 – Content Analysis steps compared to Grounded Theory and Template Analysis 
Step Description Comparison to Grounded Theory and Template Analysis 
1 Briefing Thorough revision of the research 
problem 
Integral part of the Grounded Theory and Template Analysis 
development process and preceding literature review 
2 Sampling Self-explanatory Precedes data collection by Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis 
3 Associating Compare the problem at hand with 
previous research undertaken 
Part of any literature review (NB: embedded in the 
'preliminary hazard identification' steps of the task-based 
hazard identification survey process) 
4 Hypothesis 
development 
A natural development of the 
previous step 
Occurs through the induction process of both Grounded 
Theory and Template Analysis. NB: this does not refer to 
statistical hypothesis development 
5 Hypothesis 
testing 
Refinement of research questions 
from general to specific 
Occurs through the induction process of both Grounded 
Theory and Template Analysis. NB: this does not refer to 
statistical hypothesis testing 
6 Immersion The researcher gets immersed into 
the task of reading notes and 
interview transcripts and/or 
listening to audio recordings 
Integral to the inductive reiterative data analysis process of 
both Grounded Theory and Template Analysis 
7 Categorising The labelling of categories is 
derived from the impressions of 
the previous step. Categorising 
precedes the comparison of unities 
of raw data.  
Cumbersome and less reliable than Grounded Theory. 
Grounded Theory's line-by-line analysis and constant 
comparison technique generate categories grounded in the 
data. The categories are later labelled by conceptualisation. 
8 Incubation A read through the idea, concepts 
and hypotheses generated for a 
memory refresh, followed by 
setting analytical works aside for 
several days to let ideas incubate 
Typically done also in Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis 
9 Synthesis A revision of coding rationale, 
identification of emerging patterns 
and correlations across categories 
and the identification of central 
themes 
Unique to Content Analysis. This is where Content Analysis 
starts adding to Grounded Theory and Template Analysis. The 
use of statistics begins. 
10 Culling Condensing, excising and 
reinterpreting the data so that it is 
written up meaningfully 
Unique to Content Analysis 
11 Interpretation Exploring the richness of Content 
Analysis, which resides in the 
interpretation made of the 
categories 
Typically done also in Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis 
12 Write This should be done from the key 
concept identified and backed up 
by quotes 
Typically done also in Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis 
13 Rethink Go back to the beginning and 
make sure that the research 
objectives have been met 
Typically done also in Grounded Theory and Template 
Analysis 
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7.4.1.2 Selection of geographical scope 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that the worldwide pandemic nighttime offshore helicopter 
accident problem is particularly acute in the North Sea, Africa and Middle East (Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2.1). Since Chapter 6 did not identify any regional effect on the risk levels 
experienced by pilots in the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches, the results of 
Chapter 4 guided the definition of the scope of the hazard identification exercise as follows: 
• Ideally: worldwide. 
• Minimally: the North Sea (i.e., Group 5) and the area sharing the same characteristics 
as the Middle East and Africa (i.e., Group 1 of ‘other regions’, defined in Section 
6.5.4). 
The ideal scope was initially pursued and attempts were made to contact the key companies 
in each of the five groups of areas of offshore helicopter operations, in accordance with the 
procedure outlined in Section 6.5.4. After difficulties in establishing local collaborations in 
some regions coupled with logistical constraints, the minimal scope was pursued. 
Regarding the North Sea, operators in the British Northern North Sea (NNS, i.e., Aberdeen), 
British Southern North Sea (SNS, i.e., Blackpool) and Norwegian North Sea (i.e., Stavanger) 
were keen on participating in the survey. This was acceptable because, based on the volume 
of operations, the UK and Norway are the main countries for the offshore helicopter activity 
in the North Sea (CAA, 2014). Regarding the areas belonging to Group 1, only in Brazil and 
Europe except the North Sea (i.e., Spain) were offshore helicopter operators keen on 
participating. 
7.4.1.3 Pilot sampling 
In association with the scope decided in Section 7.4.1.2, quota sampling was selected to 
account for an element of convenience in reaching the individual pilots within each region. 
This was necessary due to pilots’ individual circumstances and time availability (see Section 
7.3.1). 
No distinction was made between pilots flying in the right or left hand side seat (usually 
captains and first officers, respectively) because the direction of approach is mostly 
determined by random wind circumstances (Nascimento, 2009). Considering this and the fact 
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that Chapter 6 failed to identify any pilot demographic characteristic associated with higher 
levels of risk experienced in this phase of flight (see Sections 6.6.2.5 and 6.8), all offshore 
helicopter pilots in the pre-selected areas of operation formed the population of interest. 
In order to ensure that sufficient variability of the characteristics of the participants was 
obtained, the sample size estimation method described in Section 6.5.5 was repeated. The 
number of nighttime deck landings was the variable used for the estimation based on the 
explanation provided in Sections 6.5.5. Setting the ideal and tolerable Z at 1.96 and 1.645 
(corresponding to 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively), the sample sizes required 
were, ideally, 50 pilots and tolerably 34 pilots per geographical group. 
7.4.2 Preliminary hazard identification 
7.4.2.1 Literature 
Nascimento (2009, discussed in Section 2.3.3.2.1) was the first to investigate pilot-related 
hazards in the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches of offshore helicopter 
operations. Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) was used to analyse the data 
collected from 22 talk-through semi-structured interviews (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992) 
with individual pilots from the British sector of the North Sea. This investigation extracted 
518 hazard statements from over 10 hours of recorded interviews and produced a template 
formed by 41 open codes gathered in 14 axial codes. Selective coding produced a coherent 
story which represented the overall situation in the North Sea. All the reliability and validity 
checks described in Section 7.3.3.2 and Figure 7-1 were successfully undertaken. However, 
since only the British North Sea was covered, the level of hazard knowledge is assessed to be 
in need of expansion. This is necessary in order to incorporate an updated picture of the 
hazards of the areas away from the British North Sea, into the template provided by 
Nascimento, 2009 (see Figure 7-1). 
7.4.2.2 Taxonomies 
During this step, well-known hazard taxonomies were investigated for their fitness to support 
the identification of hazards related to nighttime visual approaches of offshore helicopters. 
Therefore, this step investigates the structure, i.e., the hazard categories available from 
current taxonomies, not any hazard data per se. Assessing the structure of current hazard 
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taxonomies is an important step since taxonomies which are unfit-for-purpose might bias the 
collection of hazard data (Lundberg et al., 2009). Furthermore, Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 6.2 
identified a considerable disconnect between various taxonomies currently in use and well-
known characteristics of helicopter operations. 
The structures of the following well-known taxonomies were investigated: the taxonomies of 
EASA, usually called ECCAIRS21 taxonomies (see Section 2.3.3.1.1.2); ADREP (see Section 
2.3.3.1.1.1); ATA Spec-100 (see Section 5.4.4); Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS, 
see Section 5.2.2); Aviation Causal Contributors for Event Reporting Systems, ACCERS; 
that from the Safety Management International Collaborating Working Group, SMICG; and 
HFACS (see Section 3.5.2.1). 
With respect to ECCAIRS, at a meeting held at the UK CAA in December, 2013, both the 
British and Norwegian regulators expressed profound dissatisfaction with the hazard 
categories available (ICAO, 2006b). This was caused by the difficulties associated with 
managing over 2500 categories (Section 2.3.3.1.1.2), which confer an excessive level of 
granularity to the hazard data. This has an effect similar to excessively decomposing an 
activity during a task analysis or human reliability analysis (HRA) exercise and analysing the 
activity’s failure modes in the absence of a defined context (see Sections 2.3.2.4 and 7.1). 
Ultimately, each safety event can be described by such a unique set of hazards that 
comparisons between safety events become virtually impossible. 
Furthermore, the hazards of nighttime operations are poorly covered in the ECCAIRS 
taxonomies. Many well-known types of nighttime visual illusions, which are extensively 
covered in the sources cited in Section 2.3.2, are ignored. Moreover, platform and ship 
hazards are absent in the taxonomies of ECCAIRS, which additionally have dubious 
categories (Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, 2010a, 2012). Given all the 
shortcomings in this and previous paragraph, the ECCAIRS taxonomies fail the criteria of a 
good classification scheme established by Fischhoff et al. (1984) and Morgan et al. (2000) 
listed in Section 7.3.2. The ECCAIRS taxonomies fail because of their lack of simplicity, 
21 ECCAIRS stands for European Co-Ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems. 
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poor definitions, non-mutually exclusive categories, incompatibility with administrative 
systems and logical inconsistency.  
Logical inconsistency is a feature of numerous taxonomies that developed in an ad hoc 
fashion from the early taxonomies established to categorise fixed-wing technical accidents. 
This includes ECCAIRS, the ICAO’s ADREP and the ATA Spec-100 (used by the UK CAA, 
see Section 5.4.4), all of which have incorporated human factors categories over time, 
frequently without any theoretical underpinning, reliability and validity testing (ICAO, 1987, 
2007a; CAA, 2005). A lack of theoretical underpinning also characterises the taxonomy of 
the ASRS (NASA, 2014) and the ACCERS (Baker and Krokos, 2007). The former was 
developed from unstructured brainstorming sessions with non-pilot subject matter experts. 
The latter is based on cluster analysis which created categories which do not intuitively match 
the hazards faced by pilots (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
Research on contemporary hazard taxonomies developed by the SMICG has acknowledged 
these problems and recommended simplicity and a more rigorous process of category 
development. This should be based on both data analysis and subject matter expertise in order 
to ensure logical consistency and compatibility with administrative systems (SMICG, 2010b). 
However, because these taxonomies deliberately attempt to be generic and transferable across 
sectors within the aviation domain (SMICG, 2013a, 2010c), they are too simplistic for use in 
task-based exercises in the complex human factors-dominated environment of nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations. 
With respect to human factors-specific taxonomies, the popular Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification system (HFACS; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003) has been criticised for its 
lack of predictive ability (Inglis et al., 2010). Therefore, it is ill-suited to support predictive 
hazard identification on the basis of statistical analysis (see Section 2.3.3.3).  
It is widely acknowledged that all taxonomies represent a compromise between 
standardisation and contextual richness (Stolzer et al., 2008). The level of detail required 
depends on the complexity of the process being considered (SMICG, 2010c) and the 
objectives of hazard identification. Considering the objective of this chapter, i.e., to create an 
unbiased hazard template, current taxonomies of hazards were assessed as unsuitable, given 
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the limitations and weaknesses discussed above. This requires the use of a customised 
template, which is offered by Nascimento (2009), as mentioned in Section 7.4.2.1. 
7.4.2.3 Safety data 
Since the investigation undertaken by Nascimento (2009), only one additional accident report 
has been made available in the public domain (AAIB, 2011) and one serious incident has 
been reported to the UK CAA under the MOR Scheme (see Section 6.3). These do not add 
new information to the template of Nascimento (2009). 
7.4.2.4 Outcome of the preliminary hazard identification 
Given the background in Sections 7.4.2.1 to 7.4.2.3, the template developed by Nascimento 
(2009) was accepted as suitable for the implementation of the Task-Based Hazard 
Identification Survey Process. Since the hazard categories outlined in the template referred 
only to a subset of the regions selected in 7.4.1.2, the template was assessed as necessitating 
both an expansion and an update to improve its believability in a wider range of conditions. 
Therefore, the survey implementation entered the ‘template development cycle’ through a 
series of Template Analysis exercises (see Figure 7-1). 
7.4.3 Template development cycle  
7.4.3.1 Collection of data through task analysis – practical considerations 
7.4.3.1.1 Design of questions and pilot study 
The demographic questions replicated those of the questionnaire survey of Chapter 6 because 
these were important questions according to subject matter experts (SMEs; see Section 
6.5.2.1). The remaining questions were open-ended and replicated the questions in 
Nascimento (2009), which were subjected to extensive piloting and refinement. In order to 
offer further validation and address potential issues associated with changes over time, the 
questions were included in a pilot study involving five senior pilots in Brazil (each with over 
5,000 flying hours offshore). The pilots were the aviation safety officers of the major 
Brazilian offshore helicopter operators and chartered aircraft accident investigators. The 
preamble and questions were sent via e-mail along with the aim of the research (i.e., to elicit 
hazards in the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches offshore). Feedback was 
requested on the ability of the questions to support the aim of the research. All five senior 
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pilots agreed that the questions supported the aim pursued. No changes were needed given 
the simplicity of the interview schedule. 
The preamble and open ended-questions were phrased as follows: 
For this research, I am especially interested in the visual segment of offshore approaches at 
night. You should consider such a segment as starting at a distance from 1.0 to 0.75 nautical 
miles from the helideck and finishing on the helideck landing. Assume that the helicopter is 
operating normally (i.e., there are no malfunctions) and engine performance is not an issue. 
1. Considering this scenario, how would you conduct the visual approach? Describe it 
please. 
2. Considering your description, what difficulties might be experienced while flying 
this segment? 
3. Can you recall cases in which you experienced difficulties or saw difficult scenarios 
happening to other pilots? What happened? 
4. Can you recall any other specific episode, maybe during the past year, if you flew in 
this period? 
5. If you could do anything to make night visual approaches safer, with no budget 
limits or time constraints, would you do anything? What would it be? 
6. Do you have anything that you would like to add, such as comments or suggestions, 
before we finish? 
Question 1 is the Talk-Through question whereas questions 2 to 4 are the debriefing 
questions (Section 7.2). Question 4 used a fixed 12-month time window to improve memory 
recollection accuracy and produce an updated picture of the hazards identified (Section 
7.3.3.1.1). The questions had to balance the need for factual information whilst ensuring that 
participants did not feel threatened. This was extensively discussed in the piloting exercises 
of Nascimento (2009) and led to considerable re-wording of the questions. Questions number 
5 and 6 were introduced for a variety of reasons: to build rapport, to capture suggestions of 
improvement, validate the findings and enable to rectify any unforeseen inaccuracies of the 
research design, should they exist. 
 
230 
 
 
 
 
7.4.3.1.2 Method of interview application and recording  
Given the sensitive nature of the subject, face-to-face individual interviews were chosen as 
the method of survey application. However, in Brazil, because of operational constraints that 
were imposed on the participants (i.e., shortage of time available for the interview), two 
interview sessions were conducted collectively. Participants were individually consulted 
beforehand for their agreement. It should be noted that given the direct relevance of the 
investigation by Nascimento (2009) to this thesis, Imperial College London was satisfied 
with the ethical approval obtained at Cranfield University and described in Nascimento 
(2009).  
All interviews followed the guidelines of Brenner (1985) to avoid biases (Section 7.3.3.1.2). 
The interviews were conducted in a private room in the pilots’ companies, with the consent 
and cooperation of the companies’ senior managers (e.g., by providing the room, sitting 
chairs for both the interviewer and the participants and amenities such as drinking water). 
Within the companies, the pilots were selected by the persons of contact, typically the chief 
pilots. These persons were instructed to select pilots at random from those scheduled to fly on 
the days of the interviewer’s visit. This schedule was adhered to as closely as possible but 
had to balance practical constraints because pilots were only available between successive 
flights. 
Where possible, the interviews were recorded. Standard Microsoft Windows’ Sound 
Recorded software on a portable computer was tested and found appropriate for interview 
recording. However, in Stavanger and Spain recording was not possible due to local 
circumstances (e.g., not to upset the participants). In these scenarios, notes were taken using a 
print version of the template. The hazards mentioned by the interviewees were marked, more 
added where appropriate and general notes taken (Section 7.3.3.1.2). 
The process implemented thus far resulted in a template populated by hazard data. In order to 
ensure it achieved the two main objectives of exhaustiveness and suitability for statistical 
analysis, section 7.5 presents the results with a particular focus on the two main objectives. 
231 
 
 
 
 
7.5 Results and discussion 
7.5.1 Interim results 
The interim results of the template development cycle are described in Table 7-2, in the 
chronological order of data collection and analysis. Table 7-2 also displays the reliability and 
validity checks undertaken, the methods used and information regarding Nascimento (2009), 
which shows the compatibility with the various stages of the process implementation. 
After each round of interviews, the template was reassessed for exhaustiveness (see Section 
7.3.3.4 and Figure 7-1), as described in the next section. The evolution of the template after 
each new round of interview can be seen in Appendix 8 and the final version of the template 
is presented in Chapter 8. 
7.5.2 Template exhaustiveness 
Figure 7-2 shows that the objective of developing an exhaustive template was achieved. This 
is evidenced by the number of categories in the template, which progressed from the 41 
hazard categories of Nascimento (2009) to 33 to 18 to nine to two and finally to no new 
hazard categories being formed at each new round of interviews. The template’s 
exhaustiveness was already noticeable after the round of interviews in Brazil, when only nine 
categories were formed from the 704 hazard statements extracted. However, further 
interviews were necessary in order to achieve statistical representativeness (Section 7.4.1.3) 
and enable quantitative (i.e., predictive) hazard analysis (undertaken in Chapter 8). 
7.5.3 Sample sizes for statistical analysis 
In terms of sample sizes, there were a total of 17 interviews in the North Sea (i.e., Group 5) 
and 34 in the Group 1 of ‘other regions’. Based on the compatibility of methods used 
(explained in Section 7.4.3.1 and 7.5), the hazard statements extracted from the 22 interviews 
conducted by Nascimento (2009) in Aberdeen were borrowed to complete the sample sizes 
required for quantitative hazard analysis. With the 22 interviews borrowed from Nascimento 
(2009), 39 interviews were obtained in the North Sea. The minimum sample sizes required 
for statistical representativeness established in Section 7.4.1.3 were achieved in both regions. 
Hence, the objective of generating a template suitable for statistical analysis was achieved. 
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Table 7-2 (across two pages) – Summary of interim results, controls and methods implemented in the template development cycle 
(NB: the contents of Nascimento (2009) show the compatibility of methods; however, the contents are in grey because they are not part of the novelty of this thesis) 
Countries UK NNS 
(Nascimento, 2009) 
UK NNS UK SNS Brazil Norway Spain 
Cities Aberdeen Blackpool 
Macaé, Rio de Janeiro, 
Cabo Frio Stavanger 
Reus, Amposta, 
Bilbao 
Number of participants 22 11 3 28 3 
(all senior pilots; see 
Section 6.5.4) 
6 
Percentage representation 
(figures from 2010) 
11% 10% 10% 3% 20% 
Interview structure Semi structured Semi structured Semi structured Semi structured Semi structured Semi structured 
Survey application Individual Individual Individual Individual + 2 groups 
(groups: 2 + 4 pilots) 
Individual Individual 
Recorded? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Total interview time 
(hh:mm:ss) 
10:35:12 07:07:29 02:30:51 06:50:07 Not applicable Not applicable 
Fully transcribed? Yes Yes Yes Yes Not applicable 
(notes taken) 
Not applicable 
(notes taken) 
Data extraction method Line-by-line analysis Line-by-line analysis Line-by-line analysis Line-by-line analysis Line-by-line analysis Line-by-line analysis 
Total statements 
extracted 
518 746 367 704 67 82 
Analysis methods Grounded Theory Template Analysis Template Analysis Template Analysis Template Analysis Template Analysis 
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Categories / codes 
created  
41 / 14 33 / -1 
(see table’s footnote 1) 
 
18 / 0 9 / 0 2/0 0/0 
Reliability checks 
(See table’s footnote 2) 
Interview fidelity and 
extraction checks (2 
raters, 1/3 of interviews) 
Interview fidelity and 
extraction checks (2 
raters, all interviews) 
Interview fidelity and 
extraction checks (2 
raters, all interviews) 
Interview fidelity and 
extraction checks (1 
rater, 2/3 of interviews) 
Extraction checks (1 
rater, all notes) 
Extraction checks (1 
rates, all notes) 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Intra-rater categorisation 
checks, Cohen's kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (3 raters, 75% of 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (1 rater, 40% of 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (1 rater, 40% of 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (2 raters, 75% of 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (1 raters, all 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Inter-rater categorisation 
checks (1 raters, all 
statements), Cohen's 
kappa 
Story developed? (not 
essential for template 
development; see Section 
7.3.3.2 and 7.3.3.3) 
Yes (see Appendix 9) No (data was used to 
revalidate previous step) 
No (low absolute sample 
size) 
Yes (see Appendix 10) No (low absolute sample 
size) 
No (low absolute sample 
size) 
Story validation 
 
SME appraisal 
(6 experts) 
Not applicable since it is 
a validation exercise for 
the previous step 
Not applicable since 
there was no story 
outlined 
SME appraisal 
(4 experts) 
Not applicable since 
there was no story 
outlined 
Not applicable since 
there was no story 
outlined 
1. The categories of the code ‘Resource Management’ were absorbed by the codes ‘Training Problems’ and ‘External Pressure’ for efficiency. 
2. Checks involving other raters were mostly completed by e-mail. Raters received an instruction letter with their tasks as follows: 
a. In the interview fidelity checks: to check if all questions of the interview schedule were asked. Check for leading probing. This resulted in two hazard statements from 
Brazil being discarded. 
b. In the extraction checks: to check whether they agreed with the hazards extracted by the researcher, under the criterion that any statement extracted had to directly refer 
to factors that affected safety in nighttime offshore approaches. There is no rule for these checks (Jarvis, 2009). Butterfield et al. (2005) suggest ¼ of the interviews. 
Other authors (e.g., Schluter et al., 2008; Urquharta et al., 2003) were satisfied with less than that. Three hazard statements were added in Brazil. 
c. In the inter-rater categorisation checks: given the definitions of each category and code (see Appendix 11), to categorise hazards into categories and codes 
independently. 25% would normally suffice for this check (Butterfield et al., 2005; Jarvis, 2009). This process led to changes in the labels and definitions of some 
categories and to the assignment of some statements into different categories. The process was stopped when the agreement measured by Cohen’s Kappa was either 
good or excellent, according to the criteria laid out by Fleiss et al. (2003). This corresponds approximately to agreements between 60 and 75% and over 75%, 
respectively, when chance agreement is factored into the calculations (see Section 7.3.3.2). This led to changes of statements in all scenarios. 
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7.5.5 Final template 
The final version of the template is formed of 103 hazard categories, grouped under 13 codes, 
segregated into two sections: ‘Contextual Factors’ and ‘Impacts on Crews’. The former 
corresponds to hazard sources and the latter refers to hazard manifestations (see Section 
7.3.3.3). 
The ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template is formed by 78 hazard categories grouped 
into eight codes. These codes largely reflect the structures of the Offshore Helicopter 
Transportation Industry’s Taxonomy outlined in Section 3.5.3. The ‘Impacts on Crews’ 
section is formed by 25 hazard categories grouped into five codes. 
The sections of the template are optimized to capture meaningful independent and dependent 
variables (see Section 7.3.3.1.1) to be used for predictive hazard/risk analysis. This aspect is 
detailed further in Chapter 8, which presents the final version of the template (Section 8.3.1). 
7.6 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 identified a singular lack, amongst the processes of hazard identification and risk 
analysis in use in nighttime offshore helicopter operations, of a structured and factual hazard 
identification survey process. This needed to be addressed urgently because other sources of 
hazard data (e.g., accident and incident reports, analysed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively) 
have proved to be of limited utility in this industry. 
This chapter has built on the strengths of both task analysis and survey methods to propose 
the structured, joint top-down and bottom-up Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey 
Process. At the top level, the process requires decisions to be taken on the critical task in need 
of hazard identification, the geographical scope of the hazard identification exercise and 
required sample sizes. These are followed by the exploitation of all available sources of task 
hazard information in the literature, taxonomies and safety data. 
Building on the outcome of this preliminary hazard identification effort, the bottom-up 
process integrates rigorous surveys methods with the carefully chosen Talk-Through task 
analysis technique into a recursive and multistage template development cycle. In this cycle, 
data collection and analysis, together with multiple reliability and validity checks are 
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performed through two well-known and appropriate methods of qualitative research, i.e., 
Grounded Theory and Template Analysis. These produce an exhaustive and unbiased hazard 
template (presented in the Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1) and ensure that the sample sizes required 
for statistical analysis are obtained. Finally the third method (i.e., Content Analysis) is 
employed to analyse the hazard accounts statistically and generate ‘predictive safety’. 
The implementation of the qualitative elements of the process (i.e., the steps prior to Content 
Analysis, see Figure 7-1) was undertaken with respect to the visual segment of nighttime 
instrument approaches. As show in Chapter 6 (Sections 6.5.1, 6.6.2.5 and 6.8), this is the 
riskiest phase of nighttime offshore helicopter flights and one of three phases belonging to the 
group of analogous visual scan technique – high kinetic state (i.e., VH) phases which are 
characteristic of nighttime offshore helicopter operations. These features of the visual 
approach phase, coupled with the exhaustive nature of the template developed (see Section 
7.5.2) and the numerous reliability and validity checks successfully undertaken (see Table 7-
2) are expected to ensure the transferability of the template to the other VH phases (see 
Section 7.3.3.4). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the template covers, to a 
considerable extent, the unique hazards of nighttime offshore helicopter operations.  
The template developed from the qualitative implementation described in this chapter is 
shown in the next chapter (Section 8.3.1). This is appropriate because the description of the 
results obtained in this chapter mark the beginning of the implementation of the Content 
Analysis-based quantitative analysis process developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 TASK-BASED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
SURVEY PROCESS – QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter developed the architecture of the Task-Based Hazard Identification 
Survey Process and implemented it to generate an exhaustive template with the hazards of the 
visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches, which is suitable for statistical analysis. 
This chapter completes the implementation of the process by performing statistical analysis 
on the data collected and categorised according to the template of Chapter 7. This is achieved 
in six sections organised as follows. Section 8.1 outlines some preliminary considerations on 
the use of the hazard template for quantitative analysis. Section 8.2 explains the procedure 
developed for quantitative hazard analysis. Section 8.3 presents and discusses the results of 
the analysis. Section 8.4 presents a validation exercise which includes statistical hypothesis 
testing using an alternative dataset. Section 8.5 discusses the limitations of the process. 
Section 8.6 concludes the chapter with comments on how the Task-Based Hazard 
Identification Survey Process should be used to provide optimal results. 
8.1 Preliminary considerations  
Data extracted from surveys are inherently subjective. Therefore, there is always a chance 
that survey data contains general opinions and unfounded perceptions rather than facts (see 
Slovic, 2000; Yantiss, 2011). Since this is undesirable in hazard analysis, measures have been 
taken to concentrate on relevant facts only, including: (i) the generation of the template from 
the application of the Talk-Through task analysis technique, which elicits facts relating to the 
task investigated (see Section 7.2); and (ii) the application of multiple reliability and validity 
checks to the template. Therefore, this chapter assumes that the categories, codes and sections 
of the template reflect factual hazards. 
It is also assumed that the participants communicated hazards which are relevant to current 
operations. A focus on current operations is a feature of the Talk-Through task analysis 
technique. Furthermore, timeliness was emphasised by asking participants to recollect the 
hazards of the last 12 months of operations (Section 7.3.3.1.1). Finally, this assumption is 
justified by the overall assessment of the template’s timeliness in Section 7.5.4. 
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Despite the measures taken above to ensure the objectivity of the hazard data collected, the 
validation of the hazards subjectively identified against some form of objective truth, e.g., 
recorded hazards, is advisable. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis and is 
recommended to be addressed as future work. 
8.2 Content Analysis procedure 
Content Analysis (Section 7.3.4) is used in this chapter to explore the frequencies of pilots 
who identified and who did not identify a hazard belonging to the hazard categories and codes 
developed in Chapter 7. To put it another way, the data analysed in this chapter are the 
presence of at least one hazard statement (and conversely the absence of any statement), by 
each pilot subjected to the Talk-Through interviews, regarding the hazard categories and 
codes developed in Chapter 7. 
Focusing on the presence and absence of a hazard statement per participant rather than on the 
frequency of individual statements expressed by each participant avoids introducing biases 
associated with personal communication styles, e.g., over-representativeness of a hazard 
repeatedly mentioned by a single participant during the course of the interview. Since there is 
no established statistical analysis procedure in Content Analysis (Berelson, 1952; Mostyn, 
1985), a procedure is developed in this thesis and is summarised in Figure 8-1. 
Figure 8-1 replicates the four steps of Content Analysis outlined in Figure 7-1, with additional 
details on each step and two necessary support steps, i.e., the selection of the main categories 
and meta-demographic analysis. All the steps are explained below. 
8.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
This presents and discusses the results of Chapter 7, offering an overview of the 
characteristics of the (i) pilots whose statements were used to develop the template, (ii) 
hazard categories and codes forming the template and (iii) frequencies of pilots who 
identified a hazard belonging to each such code and category. Raw hazard statements are 
presented at the code level in order to familiarise the reader with the phenomena that the 
codes refer to. Additionally, the industry’s safety-critical components (see Section 3.5.3) 
associated with the hazard codes are reviewed. This provides insight, at a general level, on the 
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8.2.3 Bivariate analysis 
In both streams of analysis, the bivariate relationships between hazards and pilots’ 
demographic variables are explored (see Section 7.3.3.1.1). This aims to highlight groups of 
pilots facing greater problems with specific hazard codes or categories. The hazard 
codes/categories are then cross-tabulated, with the aim to identify any associations between 
the hazards (see Section 4.3.8.2.1). 
8.2.4 Meta-demographic analysis 
A meta-demographic analysis is undertaken to ensure that only the essential demographic 
variables are included in the regression analyses of the subsequent step of the procedure. This 
mitigates against the poor fitting of the regression models due to multicollinearity caused by 
highly correlated variables. 
8.2.5 Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate analysis is where ‘predictive safety’ occurs (see Section 2.3.3.3). At this 
stage, regression models are fitted to the data to predict the odds of ‘impacts on crews’ 
occurring based on the occurrence of ‘contextual factors’ and the events of demographic 
variables (see Sections 7.4.3.1.1 and 7.5.5). 
8.2.6 Industry instantiation and update 
Finally, the occurrence of each ‘impact on crews’ represents an instantiation (i.e., a specific 
case) of the operation of the industry, which is shown overlapped on the taxonomy developed 
in Chapter 3. In these instantiations, the explanatory relationships found in the predictive 
analyses are used to update the industry’s taxonomy on a case-by-case basis with the 
probabilistic relationships between the industry’s safety-critical components. This overall 
process is similar to conducting a risk assessment based on selected conflict scenarios, i.e., 
scenarios of high risk (see Section 3.3.3 and Hollnagel, 2012; NASA, 2013; CAA, 2010c; 
Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Aven and Zio, 2011). The next 
section presents and discusses the results of the implementation of the procedure described 
above. 
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8.3 Results and discussion 
8.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
The template contains hazard statements extracted from 73 pilots (70 male, 3 female; 52 
captains, 21 first officers) interviewed in sessions lasting 24 minutes on average. The major 
demographic features of the pilots are recorded in Table 8-1 and the aircraft on which they 
were type-rated are shown in Table 8-2. 
Table 8-1 – Major demographic characteristics of pilots 
Characteristic Mean Standard deviation 
Age, years 43.4 10.1 
Experience flying helicopters, hours 7267.2 5508.6 
Experience flying by Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), hours 1847.3 2827.3 
Experience of night flying, hours 906.5 914.4 
Number of night deck landings 601.4 1238.7 
 
Table 8-2 – Aircraft flown by participants (ordered by empty weight; some participants flew 
more than one type of aircraft) 
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Tables 8-3 and 8-4 present the ‘Contextual Factors’ and ‘Impacts on Crews’ sections of the 
template, respectively (Section 7.5.5). The following font styles indicate the scenario for the 
generation of the codes and categories: 
• Normal font: British Northern North 
Sea (NNS); 
• Bold font: British Southern North Sea 
(SNS); 
• Italic font: Brazil’s Campos basin; 
• Underlined font: Norwegian North Sea. 
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Table 8-3 (across three pages) – ‘Contextual factors’ affecting the crews’ ability to fly visual 
segments of nighttime instrument approaches offshore, with the number and percentage of 
participants who commented on each code and category, and a comment per code 
I - Training                                                                 56 77% 
 
Recency of training 51 70% 
Inadequacy of simulators 15 21% 
Quality of training 14 19% 
Under usage of simulators 7 10% 
Too stringent / bureaucratic legislation for nighttime training/practicing 7 10% 
Make and model transfer training 6 8% 
Diversity of training scenarios not covered by training 4 5% 
Sponsorship cuts/unavailability for training-only sorties 4 5% 
Not practicing nighttime flight profiles in daytime 2 3% 
Wrong use of simulators (surrogate to in-flight training) 2 3% 
Under usage of HFDM1 in training 1 1% 
Lack of experienced pilots/instructors 1 1% 
‘We only fly at nighttime in winter, between 7 and 12 in the evening, if we have any flights to do, which is 
quite rare’ (Spain) 
II - Procedures                                                              55 75% 
 
Lack of communication standards (i.e., call-outs/intervention policies) 30 41% 
Lack of written SOPs2 for visual segments of flight or discouragement to use them 27 37% 
Interpretative descent technique based upon the ovality of the aiming circle 19 26% 
Standards for automation usage (e.g., call-outs, specific de-coupling points) 15 21% 
Appropriateness of instrument flight profile (e.g., ARA3 versus visual gates) 14 19% 
Procedures requiring mental computation 4 5% 
Shuttling and unstable flight paths due to manoeuvring needs 4 5% 
Not using aircraft's external light 3 4% 
‘If you don’t define the procedures for monitoring and you just don’t define the calls you’re expecting, then 
there is more potential there for attrition, let’s say, between the monitoring and flying pilots’ (British NNS) 
III - Offshore installation                                                                                                               54 74% 
 
Lack of depth and texture cues 35 48% 
Destination obstacles (e.g., unlit cranes) 29 40% 
Inaccurate weather reports 13 18% 
Turbulence 11 15% 
Moving references due to vessel movement 10 14% 
Lack of visual references whilst circling to the far side of the platform/ship 9 12% 
Water surface obstacles (e.g., boats) 8 11% 
Variability of the visual picture for the approach (unequal platform shapes) 7 10% 
Bow decks and loss of visual references 4 5% 
Helideck illumination 4 5% 
Clustered / isolated rigs 3 4% 
244 
 
 
 
 
Deck height 3 4% 
Process thermal effects 3 4% 
Aids' conspicuity (e.g., windsocks) 2 3% 
Orientation of the deck out of the prevailing winds 1 1% 
Asymmetric ground effect in small decks 1 1% 
Loss of visual cues in small decks 1 1% 
Substandard helideck net 1 1% 
‘In the final moments of the approach you already have visual contact with the helideck. However, on this 
instrument to visual transition, the next thing is your depth perception of which you do not have any. You only 
have a single light source and all else is dark around it [...] It is not just saying it is bad: it is a real 
deterioration of these [...] feelings’ (Brazil's Campos basin) 
IV – Aircraft/OEM                                                             53 73% 
 
Automation limitations (e.g., upper modes' de-coupling speeds too high) 39 53% 
Airframe limitations (e.g., windscreen wipers maximum usage speed) 23 32% 
Wind-caused handling qualities variability 15 21% 
Cockpit limitations (e.g., awkward arrangement of gauges) 12 16% 
Non-handling pilot vision obstructed on transition to helideck 8 11% 
Engines limitations 7 10% 
Loss of manual flying skills induced by automation 5 7% 
OEM4’s unawareness of offshore needs 3 4% 
‘Why not develop auto-land for helicopters? Why not the same as planes? Because you fly slower? 
[Currently, at] 40 knots one has to decouple and do it manually [...]’ (Norwegian North Sea) 
V - Internal factors (i.e., of the flight crew)                                                                                51 70% 
 
Experience 29 40% 
Dread 21 29% 
Self-induced pressure 17 23% 
Seniority gradient whilst dealing with or being a junior pilot 17 23% 
Pressure by mission unpreparedness 13 18% 
Stress and fatigue 11 15% 
Potential irrelevance of experience 9 12% 
Excessive self-confidence 7 10% 
‘Complacency’ due to exposure (habituation) 5 7% 
Inaptitude to fly at night 3 4% 
Perished skills 3 4% 
Anxiety 2 3% 
Wearing glasses 1 1% 
Irregular meals 1 1% 
‘If you have a young commander or inexperienced co-pilot who is in a very narrow comfort zone [...] you 
know yourself and then you watch your co-pilot and if the pressure builds up, they very quickly get out of that 
zone in which he is happy’ (British NNS) 
VI - Environmental conditions                      37 51% 
 
Illusive weather conditions (e.g., millpond water) 27 37% 
Darkness (e.g., moonless night, no discernible horizon) 21 29% 
Late loss of visual references (e.g., low level patchy clouds) 6 8% 
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Crosswind 5 7% 
Rapid weather changes 3 4% 
‘Especially on nights that there isn’t much wind [...] the pool of lights from the rigs you will get it reflected, 
for example, on a very still sea, which you can get here quite often because we tend not to have very big seas, 
just get it like a pond’ (British SNS) 
VII - Regulator     35 48% 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Low limits (i.e., too low meteorological minima prescribed on approach procedures) 20 27% 
Lacking resources for nighttime flying (e.g., NDBs5 for platform identification) 9 12% 
Legislation vacuum 8 11% 
Congested airspace 4 5% 
‘If you deviate from where you’re intended to be, the leeway for correction is very small’ (British NNS) 
VIII - Organisational issues   27 37% 
 
Corporate mindset (e.g., low understanding of the requirements for nighttime operations) 11 15% 
Commercial pressure 9 12% 
Rosters (e.g., incompatible crew members) 7 10% 
Pressure to avoid go-arounds 7 10% 
Flight programme (e.g., too many flights in a single day) 7 10% 
Reporting culture 2 3% 
Hiring standards 2 3% 
Learning culture 1 1% 
Ineffective pilot unions 1 1% 
‘[...] they had a rule about the number of night takeoffs and landings a passenger could do in the back of an 
aircraft. So they would be at least all around the place, dropping off, picking him up, dropping back off and 
picking up some more, which just added to the number of night deck landings to the pilots, so the passenger 
weren’t doing so many. And I just thought, these people simply don’t understand what we do, or the risk 
they’re putting us under [...]’ (British NNS) 
 
1 HFDM – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (see Section 2.3.3.3) 
2 SOPs – Standard Operating Procedures 
3 ARA – Airborne Radar Approach procedure (see Section 2.1) 
4 OEM – Original Equipment Manufacturer 
5 NDB – Non-Directional Beacon 
 
 
Table 8-4 (across two pages) – ‘Impacts on the crews’ flying visual segments of nighttime 
instrument approaches offshore, with the number and percentage of participants who 
commented on each code and category, and a comment per code 
IX - Handling 50 68% 
 
Speed control 41 56% 
Height control 33 45% 
Maintaining levelled after autopilot is disengaged 9 12% 
Climbing up into bad weather ('ballooning') 8 11% 
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Performing the S turn after an offset instrument descent procedure 7 10% 
Overcontrolling 6 8% 
Overtorquing 1 1% 
Mistimed upset recovery 1 1% 
‘[...] the difference between 5 knots to one side of the transitional lift or to the other side, just because you’re 
approaching to the deck edge it’s critical [...] I think speed control really closing in, people tend to get 
perhaps too slow’ (British SNS) 
X - Attentional resources              49  67% 
 
Switching between visual and instrument scans 45 62% 
Double monitoring breakdown 12 16% 
Cognitive overload 11 15% 
Distractions 4 5% 
Fixation 2 3% 
Low awareness of surrounding environmental conditions 1 1% 
‘In this IFR-VFR transition you're constantly mixing scan techniques. There are hazards associated with it 
and present there at all times’ (Norwegian North Sea) 
XI - Perception     43  59% 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
Visual illusions 29 40% 
Misidentification of the helideck 17 23% 
Impaired vision by excessive lighting 15 21% 
Being able to see small rigs 8 11% 
Noticing own errors 5 7% 
Proprioceptive illusions 1 1% 
Vestibular illusions 1 1% 
‘You feel this so-called 'spoon effect' whereby the pilot thinks he is much higher than he actually is on 
approach at night’ (Spain) 
XII - Decision-making 14 19% 
   
   
   
Deciding to continue the approach at the Missed Approach Point (MAP) 11 15% 
Going back to VMC when thrown into IMC 8 11% 
Accepting to do marginal tasks 1 1% 
‘[...] the only problem that concerns me is somebody calling visual when all they’ve got is a dark patch that 
they know is the rig. They’re just gonna fly towards the rig they’re not really visual with. The problem is 
always people trying to struggle on without sufficient visual cues’ (British NNS) 
XIII - Crew cooperation 11 15% 
 
Communication breakdown 11 15% 
‘During this coordination [between the pilots], let's say, you cannot be shy, can you? Because if you're 
promoting a shy crew they will easily put a helicopter down... If one or the other pilot do not call out for just 
1 or 2 seconds, they might really end up in a crash’ (Brazil's Campos basin) 
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Figure 8-2 illustrates the contextual factor codes from Table 8-4, with respect to the 
industry’s safety-critical components outlined in Chapter 3. These factors are discussed in the 
next section. 
8.3.1.1 Contextual factors (Table 8-3) 
The code cited by the largest number of pilots was ‘training’. This code additionally hosted 
the category identified by the largest number of pilots (‘recency of training’, 70%). This 
highlights the agreement among pilots from all regions that the frequency with which they 
practice offshore nighttime operations is too low to ensure that the skills needed for the task 
are properly developed and maintained. Investment in more advanced simulation technology 
should prove beneficial, given the criticism on the limitations of current simulators 
(‘inadequacy of simulators’, 21%) and their usage (‘under usage of simulators’, 10%). 
Regarding the code ‘procedures’, the distribution of commentators per categories indicated a 
wider spread of exposure to hazards than in the previous code. Participants commented in 
fairly similar numbers on the lack of standardised communication protocols (‘lack of 
communication standards’, 41%) and on the need for more formal procedural guidance on 
how to fly nighttime segments visually (‘lack of written SOPs for visual segments of flight’, 
37%). This was followed by comments on a desire for a descent technique less open to 
individual interpretation than at present (‘interpretative descent technique based upon the 
ovality of the aiming circle’, 26%), a need for greater standardisation in the usage of 
automation (‘standards for automation usage’, 21%) and clearer criteria for the selection 
between different procedures available for the approach task (‘appropriateness of instrument 
flight profile’, 19%). This spread of issues implies the need for helicopter operators to 
standardise the different aspects of operation mentioned above, a need which has already 
been stressed in the industry (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2.1). Alternatively, it is possible 
that this spread of issues was caused by the Template Analysis procedure, which 
discriminated the categories within the procedure code too much in detail. 
This endorses the advice to validate the results of the analysis produced in this chapter against 
some form of objective hazard register (see Section 8.1).
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Next on the template is the code ‘platform and surroundings’, for which ‘lack of depth and 
texture cues’ was identified by the largest number of pilots: 48%. Despite being directly 
related to a poor visual environment upon arrival, it does not relate to the luminescence of the 
helideck but rather to the whole segment between the end of the instrument procedure and the 
landing on the helideck. This endorses the ongoing aspiration in the North Sea to make such a 
segment shorter than current practices by using satellite-based guidance, favouring the 
capture of visual cues closer to the offshore installations (Section 2.1). Alternatively, it 
highlights the scope for improving visual guidance on this particular segment, with for 
example the use of visual glideslope indicators. 
Concerns about the potential for collisions with obstacles at the installations (e.g., misplaced 
or unlit cranes, derricks, aerials and wires) were identified also by a large number of pilots 
(‘destination obstacles’, 40%). This deserves special attention from both those who design 
and those who operate platforms and ships. The remaining categories were identified by 
comparatively few participants (i.e., under 20%), suggesting that, based on the experiences of 
the sample investigated, these were less relevant categories. 
Amidst the ‘aircraft’-related factors, participants mainly highlighted that automation levels 
are still sub-standard for the task at hand (‘automation limitations’ category, 53%). This was 
caused by the minimum speeds required for the use of the upper modes of the auto-pilots 
(Section 3.4.4, Table 3-1, NB 5 and Section 6.5.1). The higher these speeds, the further away 
from the installations the pilots have to switch to manual flight, start flying with reference to 
external visual cues and suffer with the associated poorer visual references. In contrast, the 
longer the aircraft can be flown using automation, the fewer the cognitive resources used by 
the pilots for the stabilising and tracking tasks of flying. This allows for greater appreciation 
of the external environment for the assessment of the sufficiency of the visual cues in support 
of the manual/visually-referenced approach task to come. Therefore, commercially viable 
auto-pilots with lower de-coupling speeds (i.e., as low as auto-hover or auto-land) should 
generate significant benefits. Additionally, there seems to be scope for the development of 
night visual imaging system (NVIS) technologies which can be operated in the lighting 
environment of the offshore oil and gas installations. 
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Other ‘aircraft limitations’ can apparently be addressed at low cost, e.g., the quality of 
windscreen wipers, the installation of a second steering light in some models of aircraft and 
wider incorporation of automatic voice alerting devices (AVAD) and terrain awareness 
warning systems (TAWS). 
In relation to the code ‘internal issues’, conflicting information emerged from the interviews. 
Although 40% of the participants agreed that the lack of pilot ‘experience’ would affect 
safety during night operations, 12% were of the opinion that even the most experienced pilots 
would be vulnerable to accidents in these circumstances (‘potential irrelevance of 
experience’). The reasons behind this apparent contradiction deserve further investigation 
since the literature endorses experience as both an asset and a liability. A potential hypothesis 
is that, whilst experience favours the development of robust internal models for the approach 
task, it could at the same time promote over-confidence, affecting pilot decision-making 
towards more risk-taking attitudes (see Section 2.3.2). The category ‘dread’ (29%) shows that 
discomfort in doing nighttime visual approaches afflicted a considerable part of the pilot 
sample. 
The hazards associated with the environment (‘environmental conditions’ code, 51%) seem to 
be less of a problem when compared to the previous codes and have mainly concentrated on 
‘illusive weather conditions’ (37%). This lower frequency of comments might be caused by 
the infrequent occurrence of combinations of relevant atmospheric and sea states, such as 
steady water (i.e., no waves) and misty air. Alternatively, it might reflect a ‘locus of control’ 
attitude amidst pilots, whereby they consider themselves capable of handling the harshest 
environmental conditions (see Section 5.2.2, especially van der Schaaf and Kanse, 2004a; 
Stewart, 2008). However, testing these hypotheses require further investigation beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The hazards related to the regulatory framework (‘regulator’ code) were mentioned less 
frequently (48%) than in the previous codes. Likewise, ‘organisational issues’ were 
mentioned relatively infrequently by the participants (37%). It could be that the pilots do not 
find them relevant for task execution, for example, or that the stakeholders involved in 
offshore nighttime operations have been doing a fairly good job. The latter assumption seems 
supported by the general safety-proactive attitude of oil and gas contractors in relation to 
helicopter operations (Sections 1.1 and 2.3.3.1.1.3). However, it is possible that the low 
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frequency of comments was caused by a combination of a task-based approach with a semi-
structured interview schedule, one of the limitations of the proposed process. This is 
discussed further in Section 8.5 
8.3.1.2 Impacts on crews (Table 8-4) 
Regarding the impacts on crews associated with the contextual factors, Nascimento (2009, 
mentioned in Section 2.3.3.2.1) pointed out that ‘handling’ the aircraft might be affected by 
the coupled mechanism whereby nose-up decelerating attitudes lead to a reduction in lift and 
flawed height control in helicopters flying in impoverished visual conditions (‘speed control’, 
56% and ‘height control’, 45%). The other hazard categories frequently mentioned by the 
pilots (‘switching between visual and instrument scans’, 62%;  and ‘visual illusions’, 40%) 
are all well-known problems identified in previous nighttime accidents/incidents in the wider 
transport domain (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2.1) and thus many lessons should be 
transferable across transport modes. For example, auto-pilots with auto-land capability have 
been developed to support fixed-wing operations in degraded visual environments (DVE). 
An interesting result, relates to the low incidence of comments in the categories within the 
‘decision-making’ code. Although this contradicts the findings of recent helicopter accident-
based studies (Section 2.3.3.1.1.4), it endorses the discussion over the treacherous nature of 
human decision-making mentioned in section 2.3.2.2. Accident analyses have emphasised 
flawed pilot decision-making as the major cause of accidents in DVE, especially at nighttime. 
However, the literature suggests that unless pilots are trained to understand their decision-
making limitations in DVE, they seldom realise that they are prone to making incorrect 
decisions. This seems to justify why pilots did not confess (or realise) potentially flawed 
decisions as frequently and, therefore, supports the need for ongoing efforts (Section 
2.3.3.1.1.4) to enhance crews’ awareness of the potential for decision-making impairment in 
DVE (Section 2.3.2). 
8.3.2 Analysis of codes 
8.3.2.1 Bivariate analyses 
8.3.2.1.1 Demographic analysis 
The demographic analysis’ results are shown in Table 8-5. The statistical tests used were 
those in Section 4.3.8.1 and 4.3.8.2.1, except for the Independent Samples t-Test. This was 
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used in Table 8-5 to test the significance of the differences in pilot age between who did and 
did not identify a hazard of the ‘environmental conditions’ code. This was needed as the 
distributions of age were normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test and the variance was 
homogenous for each of the groups according to Levene’s test. 
Table 8-5 shows that the hazards related to ‘training’, ‘offshore installations’, ‘environmental 
conditions’ and the ‘regulator’ are not specific to any pilot group neither experience level. 
Hence, these codes encapsulate hazards which are likely to affect all pilots to a similar extent. 
Therefore, addressing these hazards should have an impact in many pilots, with the potential 
to improve safety considerably. 
Regarding the effects of area of operation on the hazard codes, all the significant associations 
stemmed from a concentration of pilots who identified the hazards in the North Sea. 
Although the reasons behind these differences require further investigation, some informed 
speculation is possible. For example, with respect to ‘procedures’, it could be that the pilots 
flying in the North Sea are more skeptical than those in other areas because they are more 
exposed to night flying and, therefore, are more cognizant of the hazards involved and the 
need for standardisation. Alternatively, this might reflect a cultural trait whereby North Sea 
pilots feel a greater need for structured and clear operating procedures and, in the meantime, 
face ‘decision-making’ conflicts more often. With respect to ‘handling’, ‘attentional 
resources’ and ‘perception’, weather conditions are notoriously more severe in the North Sea 
than in the other areas considered (i.e. basically tropical countries; see Section 6.5.4). Hence, 
these may be a consequence of worse weather conditions. The scenario sampling strategy and 
initial set of regional differences (Sections 7.4.1, 6.5.4 and 4.3.6.1) should form the basis for 
further research, as recommended in Chapter 9. 
Regarding the effects of aircraft category on hazard codes, the significant associations 
stemmed from a preponderance of comments by heavy twin-turbine (HT) helicopter pilots. 
This preponderance might stem from genuine controllability issues on these helicopters or 
heightened awareness of such pilots with respect to their own limitations in all codes of 
‘impacts on crews’. Alternatively, it might be that the HT pilots were more open to disclose 
the impacts of contextual factors on their performance than medium twin-turbine (MT) 
helicopter pilots. Further research beyond the scope of this thesis is needed to investigate the 
likely causes of these results. 
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Table 8-5 – Demographic analysis of hazard codes 
 
Null hypothesis: Χ2 or FET: 
identifying the hazard in the column 
is independent of membership to the 
categories of the row variable /  MW: 
the distribution of the quantities of 
the row variable is the same across 
those who identified and who did not 
identify the hazard in the column 
Contextual factors Impacts on crews 
Training Procedures 
Offshore 
installations 
Aircraft / 
OEM 
Internal 
factors 
Environmental 
conditions 
Organisational 
issues 
Regulator Handling 
Attentional 
resources 
Perception 
Decision-
making 
Crew 
cooperation 
 Χ2 or 
FET 
             
Area  X ✓ X X X X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X 
Licence  X X X X X X X X ✓ X ✓ X X 
Rank  X X X ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ X X X X 
Aircraft category  X X X X X X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cockpit generation  X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 MW              
Age  X X X X X X* X X X X X X X 
Flying hours (FH), total   X X X X X X X X ✓ X ✓ X ✓ 
FH IFR  X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FH night  X X X X ✓ X X X X X ✓ X ✓ 
Night deck landing  X X X ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ X X X X 
Time as an offshore 
helicopter pilot in the area 
  X X X X ✓ X ✓ X X X X X X 
Χ2 or FET  Chi-square or Fisher's Exact test, as determined by the expected frequencies at the contingency tables; see Section 4.3.8.2.1   
MW Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test; see Section 4.3.8.1     
 * Parametric data. Independent Samples t-test applied instead of MW. See explanation in Section 8.3.2.1.1.  
 X Non-significant result: retain the null hypothesis      
 ✓ Significant result: reject the null hypothesis      
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All other significant results referred to some measure of pilot experience (e.g., license, rank, 
various types of flying hours, number of night deck landings) with a greater number of 
experienced pilots commenting on the hazard codes. However, no specific pattern was 
identified. This implies that the actual experience might not be a determining factor for the 
identification of the hazards in any of the codes. 
8.3.2.1.2 Cross-tabulation 
Table 8-6 shows the results of the cross-tabulation analysis. In all significant associations 
found, the identification of one column code was associated with a greater number of pilots 
identifying the hazard of the row code than would be expected on the grounds of chance.  
Together with Table 8-3, Table 8-6 highlights the ubiquity of the hazards related to ‘training’. 
In Table 8-3, this was the code identified by the largest number of participants. At the same 
time, in Table 8-6 ‘training’ was not associated with any other hazard code or specific impact 
on crews. Therefore, training is a hazard that stands on its own and can be considered as the 
single biggest threat to the safety of night visual approach segments offshore. 
Regarding the ‘procedures’ code, Table 8-6 shows that there were significant associations 
with all but two contextual factors and three impacts on crews. This highlights that the 
standardisation of operations is potentially beneficial in mitigating a range of hazards. This 
agrees with the observations made from the discussion of Table 8-3 (Section 8.3.1.1). 
With respect to offshore installations, even though this code was only associated with the 
contextual factor ‘procedures’, it was associated with three impacts on crews. This confirms 
that the offshore installation is a hazardous environment and that there is a need to 
standardise operations at these installations (see Section 2.3.3.2.1). 
The codes significantly associated with ‘aircraft/OEM’ show that it is necessary to 
standardise operational ‘procedures’ at an aircraft level, especially with a view to addressing 
pilot ‘internal issues’ (e.g., level of pilot experience), ‘organisational issues’ related to the use 
of the aircraft (e.g., appropriate operational flight envelopes, see Sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2) 
and regulations. ‘Aircraft/OEM’ was also significantly associated with handling problems. 
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Table 8-6 – Cross-tabulation of hazard codes 
 
 
  
Contextual factors 
  
  Training Procedures Offshore 
installation 
Aircraft / 
OEM 
Internal 
factors 
Environmental 
conditions 
Organisational 
issues 
Regulator 
C
on
te
xt
ua
l f
ac
to
rs
 Procedures X 
       Offshore installation X ✓ 
      Aircraft/OEM X ✓ X 
     Internal factors X ✓ X ✓ 
    Environmental conditions X X X X ✓ 
   Organisational issues X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X 
  Regulator X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
 
Im
pa
ct
s 
on
 
cr
ew
s 
Handling X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ 
Attentional resources X ✓ ✓ X X X X X 
Perception X X ✓ X X X X X 
Decision-making X X X X X X X X 
Crew cooperation X X X X ✓ X ✓ X 
  
All tests are either Chi-square or Fisher's Exact test, as determined by the expected frequencies at the contingency tables; see Section 4.3.8.2.1 
  
X     Non-significant result: codes are not associated 
 
  
✓    Significant result: codes are associated 
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Internal factors were significantly associated with a range of other contextual factors, 
revealing that pilot-related issues might be one of the most difficult elements to control in 
order to ensure safe operations. The ‘internal factors’ code was significantly associated with 
the ‘handling’ and ‘crew cooperation’ impacts on the crews.  
The ‘environmental conditions’ code was only associated with ‘internal factors’ reflecting 
that, except for personal susceptibilities, the pilots are likely to generally feel safe regardless 
of the environmental conditions. This is in direct agreement with the discussion in Section 
8.3.1.1. 
The code ‘organisational issues’ was found to be significantly associated with a number of 
other contextual factors, which is expected in any complex activity, such nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations (see Sections 2.3.2.4 and 3.5.2). ‘Organisational issues’ were also 
significantly associated with ‘crew cooperation’. The effects of organisational issues on crew 
cooperation are well-established in the literature (see Section 2.3.2.3). 
The code ‘regulator’ was also significantly associated with a number of other contextual 
factors and the impact on ‘handling’ the aircraft, confirming the view in the literature that any 
hazards (or failures) at this level might have a widespread effect (Section 3.5.2). 
‘Handling’ was associated with all codes except ‘training’, ‘environmental conditions’ and 
‘organisational issues’. This reveals that an array of factors might impact a pilot’s handling 
abilities. On the other hand, ‘attentional resources’ was only associated with ‘procedures’ and 
‘offshore installations’. This limits the candidate contextual factor codes to be addressed for 
the mitigation of attentional problems. Likewise, ‘perception’ was only associated with 
‘offshore installations’ and ‘crew cooperation’ was associated with ‘internal factors’ and 
‘organisational issues’. ‘Decision-making’ was not associated with any contextual factors 
code and, therefore, explanations for decision-making conflicts should be sought across other 
variables, for example pilot demographics. 
8.3.2.2 Meta-demographic analysis 
Table 8-7 shows the results of the meta-demographic analysis. It confirms the expectation 
that all pilot experience variables were highly associated (or correlated in the case of 
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continuous variables) and, therefore, a single experience variable should be used in the 
regression analysis. Since Chapter 4 (Section 4.5) identified the importance of the number of 
night deck landings with respect to pilot performance, it was chosen to represent all other 
pilot experience variables (see also Sections 6.5.5 and 7.4.1.3). 
  
Table 8-7 – Meta-demographic analysis 
 
  
Flying hours 
 
 
Licence Rank Age Total FR Night 
Night 
deck 
landings 
Rank ✓       
Age ✓ ✓      
Flying hours, total ✓ ✓ ✓     
Flying hours, IFR ✓ ✓ X ✓    
Flying hours, night ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X   
Night deck landings ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X  
Time as an offshore 
helicopter pilot in the area ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
 
  Chi-square test; see Section 4.3.8.2.1. 
 
  Mann-Whitney Independent Samples U-Test; see Section 4.3.8.1 
 
  Kendall tau b (KTb) non-parametric correlation coefficient; see Section 6.6.2.4. 
 
        X             Non-significant result: variables are not associated/correlated 
 
        ✓            Significant result: variables are associated/correlated 
 
8.3.2.3 Multivariate analysis and hazard code prediction 
Binomial logistic regression was used to predict membership to each code of ‘impacts on 
crews’ based on membership of the eight ‘contextual factors’ codes and the events of the 
following demographic variables: area of operation, aircraft category, cockpit generation and 
number of night deck landings. This complements the bivariate analyses of the previous 
sections with explanations of the impact of each contextual factor and demographic variable 
(i.e., explanatory, also called predictor variables) on the odds of identifying each impact on 
crew when other contextual factors and demographic variables are kept constant. Interactions 
between predictor variables were not included in the analysis because excessively large 
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numbers of unrepresented events of the predictor variables would compromise model fitting 
accuracy (Sections 4.3.8.3, 4.4.3.2 and 5.4.7). This is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
should be addressed as future work using the template to collect data from a larger sample 
size. 
The forward stepwise model fitting strategy based on the log-likelihood statistic was used. It 
was found that neither multicollinearity nor overdispersion were present in any of the five 
models fitted (Section 4.3.8.3). The omnibus test of model coefficients revealed that, in all 
models fitted, the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between members and non-
members of the ‘impacts on crew’ codes when compared to a constant only model. The 
contribution of individual variables to model prediction was assessed by the Wald criterion. 
The following sections summarise the results, which were found to be in direct agreement 
with the results of the previous sections.  
8.3.2.3.1 Handling 
The prediction of membership to the ‘handling’ code is summarised in Table 8-8.  
Table 8-8 – Prediction of impacts on ‘handling’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)=33.716, p=0.000 Prediction success: 83.6% (members: 100%; non-members: 47.8%) 
 
95% CI for odds ratio 
  b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Helicopter category HT 3.523*** (0.935) 5.424 33.893 211.795 
Offshore installation No comment -2.200** (0.842) 0.021 0.111 0.577 
Constant   0.256 (0.386) 
 
1.286   
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.037; R2Cox & Snell=0 .370; R2Nagelkerke= 0.519              * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
 
The odds ratio indicates that the likelihood of HT helicopter pilots identifying hazards related 
to ‘handling’ was 3389.3% of the likelihood of MT pilots identifying hazards in this code. On 
the other hand, comments on handling issues were only 11.1% as likely to happen when 
pilots did not identify hazards associated with the offshore installation. This indicates that HT 
helicopters might be more prone to handling problems than MT helicopters (e.g., HT 
helicopters might be inherently more difficult to fly manually) or that the pilots of HT 
helicopters were more aware of the potential for handling issues. The change in the odds of 
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handling problems associated with the identification of hazards related to the offshore 
installation indicates that improving the installation environment has the potential to reduce 
handling problems. However, these explanations need to be validated by future research. 
Another reason to validate these results is the goodness-of-fit of the model. Although the Cox 
& Snell and Nagelkerke tests of goodness-of-fit indicate that the model is a good fit of the 
data (i.e., p>0.05), the Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicates a poor fit. Because this test is 
based on the chi-square distribution, it is sensitive to small sample sizes (Field, 2009). 
8.3.2.3.2 Attentional resources 
Table 8-9 summarises the prediction of membership to the ‘attentional resources’ code. 
Table 8-9 – Prediction of impacts on ‘attentional resources’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)=26.361, p=0.000 Prediction success: 79.5% (members: 98.0%; non-members: 41 7%)
95% CI for odds ratio 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Area North Sea 2.593*** (0.675) 3.557 13.366 50.226 
Offshore installation No comment -1.585* (0.689) 0.053 0.205 0.790 
Constant 0.086 (0.399) 1.089 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.365; R2Cox & Snell=0 .303; R2Nagelkerke= 0.422 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
When operating in the North Sea, the odds ratio indicates that the likelihood of commenting 
on issues related to ‘attentional resources’ was 1336.6% of the likelihood in other areas. 
However, comments on attentional resource issues were only 20.5% as likely to happen when 
pilots did not identify hazards associated with the offshore installation. The regional effect 
observed might be caused by the notoriously poor weather conditions in the North Sea, which 
require more concentration from the pilots and consume their attentional resources. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the pilots in the North Sea were simply more cognizant of the 
possibility of attentional problems whilst flying at night (i.e., the North Sea pilots are better 
informed of the hazards of nighttime flying than the pilots of other regions). The change in 
odds associated with the identification of hazards related to the offshore installation highlight 
that improving the installation environment has the potential to improve attentional problems. 
Again, these candidate explanations need to be validated by future research. 
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8.3.2.3.3 Perception 
Table 8-10 summarises the prediction of membership to the ‘perception’ code. 
Table 8-10 – Prediction of impacts on ‘perception’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)=15.029, p=0.001 Prediction success: 68.5% (members: 86.0%; non-members: 43 3%)
95% CI for odds ratio 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Area North Sea 1.382** (0.533) 1.403 3.985 11.316 
Offshore installation No comment -1.506* (0.606) 0.068 0.222 0.728 
Constant 0.068 (0.392) 1.070 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.991; R2Cox & Snell=0 .186; R2Nagelkerke= 0.251 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
When operating in the North Sea, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of commenting 
on issues related to ‘perception’ was 398.5% of the likelihood in other areas. On the other 
hand, comments on perceptual issues were only 22.2% as likely to happen when pilots did 
not identify hazards associated with the offshore installation. The candidate explanations for 
the results of the previous section might also justify these results. Future validation is equally 
required.    
8.3.2.3.4 Decision-making 
Table 8-11 summarises the prediction of membership to the ‘decision-making’ code. 
Table 8-11 – Prediction of impacts on ‘decision-making’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(1)=12.693, p=0.000 Prediction success: 68.5% (members: 100%; non-members: 0%) 
95% CI for odds ratio 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Area North Sea 2.803** (1.070) 2.025 16.500 134.457 
Constant -3.497** (1.015) 0.030 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= -; R2Cox & Snell=0 .160; R2Nagelkerke= 0.256  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
When operating in the North Sea, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of commenting 
on issues related to ‘decision-making’ was 1650.0% of the likelihood in other areas. This 
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might be related, for example, to higher commercial pressure or operational tempo in the 
North Sea. Like with the previous results, further investigation beyond the scope of this thesis 
is required to ascertain the causes of this increase in odds. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit could not be calculated because there was 
only one binary categorical predictor in the model fitted. In this situation, the model’s 
goodness-of-fit should be interpreted using the Cox & Snell or Nagelkerke coefficients 
(Burns and Burns, 2008; Field, 2009), both of which indicated a good model fit (i.e., p>0.05). 
8.3.2.3.5 Crew cooperation 
Table 8-12 summarises the prediction of membership to the ‘crew cooperation’ code.  
Table 8-12 – Prediction of impacts on ‘crew cooperation’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)=17.225, p=0.000 Prediction success: 87.7% (members: 72.7%; non-members: 90.3%) 
 
95% CI for odds ratio 
  b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Helicopter category HT 1.963* (0.883) 1.261 7.119 40.197 
Organisational issues No comment -2.549** (0.869) 0.014 0.078 0.429 
Constant   -1.882* (0.764) 
 
0.152 
 
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.264; R2Cox & Snell=0.210; R2Nagelkerke= 0.368              * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
 
When operating HT helicopters, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of commenting on 
issues related to ‘crew cooperation’ was 711.9% of the likelihood of making such a comment 
when operating MT helicopters. Comments on crew cooperation issues were only 7.8% as 
likely to happen when pilots did not identify hazards related to ‘organisational issues’. This 
emphasises the possibility that flying HT helicopters is indeed more complicated than MT 
helicopters; hence, precise crew cooperation is required. On the other hand, the impacts of 
organisational issues in crew cooperation are well established in the literature (see Sections 
8.3.2.1.2 and 2.3.2.3). However, both findings require future validation. 
Overall, the hazards related to the ‘offshore installations’, ‘area of operations’ and the 
helicopter categories were the main predictors of the impacts on crews at the code level. 
Future research should focus on identifying the reasons for these impacts. For example, 
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HFDM data can be collected from flights to platforms which the pilots consider typically 
good and bad for night operations and compared. Informed criteria for good and bad 
platforms can be elicited beforehand based on the experience of a sample of pilots. Likewise, 
HFDM data from different regions (e.g., UK and Brazil) and helicopters of different 
categories (e.g., S92 and AW139, see Table 4-4) could be compared for flights undertaken in 
similar conditions (e.g., with respect to the prevailing weather). 
8.3.2.4 Industry instantiation and update 
Figure 8-3 provides an example of the industry’s taxonomy instantiated to the problem of 
crew cooperation. The orange box indicates the system instantiation conditions, which are 
connected by orange lines to their reliable predictors (i.e., helicopter category and 
organisational issues). The figure also shows the associated odds ratios. This enables to 
identify at a glance the predictors of particularly hazardous conditions and thereby set the 
priorities for risk mitigation strategies based on unfavourable odds ratios. Each predicted 
impact on crews should be used to form an instantiated industry description as in Figure 8-3. 
A collection of such figures enables the critical aspects of the operation to be covered 
probabilistically and manage safety systemically on the basis of the predictions established. 
This improves on the industry instantiation of Section 4.5, which was based on bivariate 
analysis due to the poor quality of the accident data analysed. This also corrects the lack of 
understanding in the aviation community of what ‘predictive’ hazard identification means 
(see Section 2.3.3.3). 
8.3.3 Analysis of key categories 
In order to benefit from the appraisal of hazards at a more actionable level (see Section 8.2), 
the main hazard categories need to be identified. 
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8.3.3.1 Selection of key categories 
The selection of key hazard categories is necessary to avoid increased complexity and 
inaccuracies when several factors are combined in immature mathematical models 
(Greenberg et al., 2005). Additionally, selection is justified by the consensus that, in Content 
Analysis, it is neither realistic nor necessary to treat all the data collected as relevant evidence 
(Mostyn, 1985).  
However, there is no rule established to select the most relevant hazard categories. For 
example, Fischhoff et al. (1984) only recommend that a modest number of categories (i.e., 
N≤30) should be used. Selection criteria include SME expertise, expected data quality and 
the historical impact of candidate categories into the consequences of accidents (see 
Kyriakidis, 2013; JSSI - Occurrence Data Analysis Working Group, 2006). 
In qualitative research, hazard categories may be selected through participation rates. These 
refer to the rate of participants commenting on a theme, which is accepted as a credible 
indicator of the theme’s validity (Butterfield et al., 2005; Flanagan, 1954; Jarvis, 2009). 
Typically, 25% of participants are considered as the threshold for assured validity. The 
participation rates principle is similar to the ‘law of large numbers’ (Bertolini, 2007, pp. 412) 
used in human reliability analysis (HRA), whereby the greater the number of independent 
experts agreeing on a theme the greater the credibility of the theme. 
Another principle commonly used in category selection, especially in economic analysis and 
quality control applications in aviation, is the Pareto principle. The principle claims that 80% 
of the problems are a result of 20% of the causes, which aids reducing the choice set to those 
alternatives that are efficient to solve problems (Backbaus, 1980, 1981; Stolzer et al., 2008). 
In this section, the key hazard categories were selected based on 25% participation rates. 
Additionally, the compatibility with the Pareto principal was verified to ensure that no 
essential information was missed. This was achieved as follows: the categories selected by 
participation rates (which corresponded to those identified by 75% of the participants) were 
checked to determine whether they corresponded to approximately 20% of the overall hazard 
categories in each section of the template (i.e., ‘contextual factors’ and ‘impacts on crews’).  
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Figures 8-4 to 8-16 are based on Tables 8-3 and 8-4 and show, per hazard code, the 
application of the participation rate criterion. In total, thirteen ‘contextual factors’ and four 
‘impacts on crews’ hazard categories were above the participation rates threshold. This 
corresponds to 17% and 16% of all the categories in each section of the template, 
respectively. In both cases, the proportions involved were similar to those of the Pareto 
principle, confirming as adequate the choice of participation rates as the primary criterion for 
category selection. 
 
 
Figure 8-4 – ‘Training’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template 
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Figure 8-5 – ‘Procedures’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template 
 
 
Figure 8-6 – ‘Offshore installation’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template 
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Figure 8-7 – ‘Aircraft/OEM’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template 
 
 
Figure 8-8 – ‘Internal factors’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of the template 
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Figure 8-9 – ‘Environmental conditions’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of template 
 
 
Figure 8-10 – ‘Regulator’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of template 
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Figure 8-11 – ‘Organisational issues’ code of the ‘Contextual Factors’ section of template 
 
 
Figure 8-12 – ‘Handling’ code of the ‘Impacts on Crews’ section of the template 
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Figure 8-13 – ‘Attentional resources’ code of the ‘Impacts on Crews’ section of the template 
 
Figure 8-14 – ‘Perception’ code of the ‘Impacts on Crews’ section of the template 
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Figure 8-15 – ‘Decision-making’ code of the ‘Impacts on Crews’ section of the template 
 
Figure 8-16 – ‘Communication breakdown’ code of ‘Impacts on Crews’ section of template 
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8.3.3.2 Bivariate analysis 
8.3.3.2.1 Demographic analysis 
The results of the demographic analysis across key hazard categories selected are shown in 
Table 8-13. The table presents the key categories selected in the top row from the greatest to 
the lowest number of participants who commented on them. 
The hazards related to ‘training recency’, ‘lack of depth and texture cues’, ‘destination 
obstacles’ and ‘interpretative descent technique based on the ovality of the aiming circle’ are 
not specific to any area of operation, aircraft category, cockpit generation, or pilot experience 
level (considering the various variables related to pilot experience, see Section 8.3.2.1.1). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that these categories refer to hazards likely to affect all 
pilots in all circumstances, and any safety mitigation is likely to have considerable impact. 
Regarding the effects of area of operation, all significant associations stemmed from a 
concentration in the North Sea of pilots who identified the hazards. The considerations 
outlined in Section 8.3.2.1.1 might equally apply. In addition to those considerations, the 
significant association with ‘low limits’ could be due to the greater focus on Airborne Radar 
Approach (ARA) procedures in the North Sea, as opposed to the looser procedures based 
upon spatial gates more commonly used in other areas (see Sections 2.1 and 6.4). Another 
potential reason is that pilots flying in the North Sea may have a larger tendency to descend 
all the way to the procedural minima than in other areas. Future research should investigate 
the reasons for the concentration of hazards related to low limits in the North Sea. 
With respect to aircraft category, all except two of the significant results referred to a greater 
number of heavy twin-turbine (HT) helicopter pilots identifying the hazard categories. The 
potential explanations outlined in 8.3.2.1.1 also seem applicable. ‘Experience’ and ‘dread’ 
were identified by a greater number of MT helicopter pilots than it could be expected from 
dissociated variables (see Section 4.3.8.2.1). Both seem justified by the typical career 
progression regime whereby pilots of MT helicopters migrate to HT as they accrue 
experience. Hence, MT helicopter pilots are usually less experienced, which might favour 
discomfort in doing the job (i.e., ‘dread’). Confirming this hypothesis requires further 
investigations beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Table 8-13 – Demographic analysis of key hazard categories 
 
 
See Table 8-5 for hypotheses tested 
Contextual factors Impacts on crews (IC) 
Recency of 
Training 
Automation 
limitations 
Lack of 
depth and 
texture cues 
Lack of 
comm. 
Standards 
Destination 
obstacles 
Experience Lack of 
written 
SOP 
Illusive 
weather 
conditions 
Aircraft 
limitations 
Dread Darkness Low 
limits 
Interpret. 
descent 
technique 
Switching 
scan types 
Speed 
control 
Height 
control 
Visual 
illusions 
 
Χ2 or FET 
                 Area 
 
X X X ✓ X X ✓ X X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
Licence 
 
X ✓ X X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X X X X X 
Rank 
 
X ✓ X X X ✓ X ✓ X ✓ X X X X X ✓ X 
Aircraft category 
 
X X X X X ✓ X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
Cockpit generation 
 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
MW 
                 Age 
 
X* X* X X* X X X X* X X X X X X X X* X 
Total (H) 
 
X ✓ X X X X X X ✓ X X X X X X X X 
IFR 
 
X ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X ✓ 
Night 
 
X X X X X ✓ X X X ✓ X X X X X X X 
Night deck landing 
 
X ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X 
Time as an offshore helicopter pilot in the region X ✓ X X X X X X ✓ X X X X X X X X 
Χ2 or FET    Chi-square or Fisher's Exact test, as determined by the expected frequencies at the contingency tables; see Section 4.3.8.2.1 
MW   Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test; see Section 4.3.8.1 
  
X   Non-significant result: retain the null hypothesis 
  
✓   Significant result: reject the null hypothesis 
    
*   Parametric data. Independent Samples t-test applied instead of MW; see Section 8.3.2.1.1 
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Like with the results in Table 8-5, all other significant results referred to more experienced 
pilots commenting on the hazard categories. The only discernible pattern is that the pilots 
who commented on the ‘automation limitation’ and ‘airframe limitations’ categories were 
more experienced in virtually all experience variables investigated. This might reflect a bias 
whereby more experienced pilots are more critical than less experienced pilots with respect to 
the limitations of the aircraft that they fly. This might also be associated with improved 
judgement built over time. Further investigation, beyond the scope of this thesis, is required 
to validate these candidate explanations. 
8.3.3.2.2 Cross-tabulation 
The results of the cross-tabulation analysis are shown in Table 8-14. Like in Section 
8.3.2.1.2, the pilots who identified a hazard in a column were over represented in the 
respective row. The following paragraphs discuss the significant associations according to the 
codes to which the categories belong (see Tables 8-3 and 8-4). 
Table 8-14 enables to identify that the ubiquitous ‘training’ problem identified in Section 
8.3.2.1 actually stems from hazards related to ‘training recency’. These in turn are associated 
with the ‘experience’, in the sense that the lack of training recency is aggravated by a 
perceived low level of pilot experience. This is further explored in the validation exercise of 
Section 8-4. The ‘training recency’ problem is not associated with any specific impact on 
crews, suggesting that it is present in all impacts indistinctively. 
Belonging to the code ‘procedures’, the categories ‘lack of communication standards’ and 
‘lack of written SOPs’ were significantly associated with the impact on crews ‘switching 
between visual and instrument scans’. The need for communication protocols and SOPs 
which ensure safe visual transitions is well-documented in the literature (Sections 8.3.1.1, 
2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2.1). ‘Lack of written SOP’ was additionally associated with ‘airframe 
limitations’. This is related to features of the airframe requiring procedural standardisation, 
e.g., the use of external lights and windscreen wipers (Table 8-3). The hazard category 
‘interpretative descent technique based on the ovality of the aiming circle’ was significantly 
associated with a ‘lack of depth and texture cues’, ‘speed control’ and ‘low limits’. The first 
two associations are intuitive in the sense that a descent technique open to interpretation 
should be more difficult to execute when the visual cues are poor, and such a descent 
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technique may also lead to speed control problems. The association with ‘low limits’ also 
appears intuitive in that the effects of descending to low limits on instruments have the worst 
impact on safety when the subsequent visual descent technique is such that is open to 
interpretation. 
Amidst the categories pertaining to the code ‘offshore installations’, ‘lack of depth and 
texture cues’ was associated with ‘airframe limitations’, ‘interpretative descent technique 
based on the ovality of the aiming circle’ and ‘switching between visual and instrument 
scans’. Whereas the last two are again self-explanatory, the first association is justifiable 
because the airframe limitations frequently referred to low quality windscreen wipers which 
further distort the external visual cues (Table 8-3). For this reason, ‘destination obstacles’ 
was also significantly associated with ‘airframe limitations’. Additionally, ‘destination 
obstacles’ was significantly associated with ‘experience’, attributed to the need to build an 
accurate knowledge of the target installation, which is built primarily from experience. 
Regarding the categories within the code ‘aircraft/OEM’, ‘automation limitations’ was 
significantly associated with ‘experience’, ‘illusive weather conditions’, ‘airframe limitation’ 
and ‘dread’. This indicates that the limitations in automation levels might have a worse 
impact on inexperienced pilots; that low levels of automation leave pilots more exposed to 
illusive weather conditions; and that the helicopters implicated in low levels of automation 
and limitations of the airframe are largely of the same type. The association with ‘dread’ is 
intuitive because lower levels of automation leave pilots unassisted in the critical visual 
approach task. ‘Airframe limitations’ was associated with ‘automation limitations’, ‘lack of 
depth and texture cues’, ‘destination obstacles’, ‘lack of written SOP’ (all already discussed), 
‘experience’ and ‘speed control’. The association with experience reflects an understanding 
that the overall experience enables pilots to devise strategies to overcome the limitations of 
the aircraft (e.g., flying at higher speeds to avoid water accumulation on the windscreen when 
the wipers cannot be used). The association with ‘speed control’ reflects the likely error mode 
resulting from difficulties in dealing with the limitations of the airframe. 
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Table 8-14 – Cross-tabulation of key hazard categories 
 
  
Contextual factors 
 
Recency of 
training 
Automation 
limitations 
Lack of 
depth and 
texture cues 
Lack of 
comm. 
standards 
Destination 
obstacles Experience 
Lack of 
written SOP 
Illusive 
weather 
conditions 
Airframe 
limitations Dread Darkness Low limits 
Interpret. 
descent 
technique 
C
on
te
xt
ua
l f
ac
to
rs
 
Automation limitations X 
            Lack of depth and texture cues X X 
           Lack of comm. standards X X X 
          Destination obstacles X X X X 
         Experience ✓ ✓ X X ✓ 
        Lack of written SOP X X X X X X 
       Illusive weather conditions X ✓ X X X ✓ X 
      Airframe limitations X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ X 
     Dread X ✓ X X X ✓ X ✓ X 
    Darkness X X X X X X X X X X 
   Low limits X X X X X X X X X X X 
  Interpretative descent 
technique 
X X ✓ X X X X X X X X ✓ 
 
Im
pa
ct
s 
on
 c
re
w
s Switching scan types X X ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X X X X X X 
Speed control X X X X X X X X ✓ X X ✓ ✓ 
Height control X X X X X X X ✓ X X X X X 
Visual illusions X X X X X X X X X X X ✓ X 
  
All tests were either Chi-square or Fisher's Exact test, as determined by the expected frequencies at the contingency tables; see Section 4.3.8.2.1 
  
X - Non-significant result: categories are not associated 
  
  
✓- Significant result: categories are associated 
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The ‘internal factors’ code was represented by the ‘experience’ and ‘dread’ hazard categories. 
Whereas the former was significantly associated with a range of other hazard categories, the 
latter was only significantly associated with ‘automation limitations’ (already discussed), 
‘experience’ and ‘illusive weather conditions’. Again, these two appeal to reason since it is 
expected that lack of experience and illusive weather conditions might promote a sense of 
discomfort and unfamiliarity whist flying visual approach segments at nighttime. 
No category within the ‘organisational issues’ code passed the participation rates test (Figure 
8-11). Regarding the code ‘regulator’, the category ‘low limits’ was significantly associated 
with hazards related to the ‘interpretative descent technique based on the ovality of the 
aiming circle’, as discussed in the third paragraph of this section. 
The meta-demographic analysis was covered in Section 8.3.2.2. 
8.3.3.3 Multivariate analysis and key hazard category prediction 
As in Section 8.3.2.3, binomial logistic regression was used to predict membership to each 
category of ‘impacts on crews’ which passed the participation rates criterion, using the 
following predictors: membership to the key ‘contextual factors’ identified in Section 8.3.3.1 
and the demographic variables described in Section 8.3.2.3. Sections 8.3.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.3.4 
summarise the results. 
8.3.3.3.1 Switching between visual and instrument scans 
Table 8-15 summarises the prediction of membership to the hazard category ‘switching 
between visual and instrument scans’.  
Table 8-15 – Prediction of impacts on ‘switching between visual and instrument scans’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)= 21.192, p=0.000 Prediction success: 74% (members: 91.1%; non-members: 46.4%) 
 
95% CI for odds ratio 
 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Area North Sea 2.378*** (0.657) 2.974 10.782 39.088 
Experience No comment -1.910** (0.682) 0.039 0.148 0.564 
Constant 
 
0.512 (0.475) 
 
1.669 
 
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.610; R2Cox & Snell=0 .252; R2Nagelkerke= 0.342              * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
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When operating in the North Sea, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of commenting 
on issues related to ‘switching between visual and instrument scans’ was 1078.2% of the 
likelihood of commenting on this issue in other areas. On the other hand, comments on this 
category were only 14.8% as likely to happen when pilots did not identify a hazard associated 
with experience.  
The potential impact of North Sea weather conditions on pilot’s attentional resources was 
discussed in Section 8.3.2.3.2. This apparently justifies the increase in the odds of problems 
with switching between visual and instrument scan types as well. The impact of experience 
on the ability to switch between scan types effectively is well covered in the literature (see 
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2.1). 
8.3.3.3.2 Speed control 
Table 8-16 summarises the prediction of membership to the hazard category ‘speed control’. 
Table 8-16 – Prediction of impacts on ‘speed control’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(2)=30.668, p=0.000 Prediction success: 83.6% (members: 90.2%; non-members: 75 0%)
95% CI for odds ratio 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Area North Sea 2.562*** (0.608) 3.935 12.960 42.689 
Interpret. descent tech. No comment -1.861* (0.789) 0.033 0.156 0.730 
Constant 0.423 (0.724) 1.527 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= 0.070; R2Cox & Snell=0 .343; R2Nagelkerke= 0.460 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
When operating in the North Sea, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of commenting 
on issues related to ‘speed control’ was 1296.0% of the likelihood of pilots who flew in other 
areas commenting on this issue. Comments on speed control issues, however, were only 
15.6% as likely to happen when pilots did not identify hazards issues associated with the 
‘interpretative descent technique based on the ovality of the aiming circle’. 
The concentration of speed control problems in the North Sea might, again, be justified by 
the inclement weather conditions when compared to the typically benign weather of other 
regions. However, it is also possible that the pilots in the North Sea were simply more 
cognizant of the speed control hazards than the pilots of other regions. The change in the 
279 
 
 
 
odds of speed control problems in association with the identification of hazards relate to the 
‘interpretative descent technique’ is justified by the coupled mechanisms of height and speed 
control in helicopters (see Section 8.3.1.2). Again, these possible explanations require further 
validation. 
8.3.3.3.3 Height control 
Table 8-17 summarises the prediction of membership to the hazard category ‘height control’. 
Table 8-17 – Prediction of impacts on ‘height control’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(1)=14.847, p=0.000 Prediction success: 72.6% (members: 60.2%; non-members: 82.5%) 
 
95% CI for odds ratio 
 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Illusive weather conditions No comment -1.981*** (0.548) 0.047 0.138 0.403 
Constant 
 
1.050* (0.439) 
 
2.857 
 
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= -; R2Cox & Snell=0 .184; R2Nagelkerke= 0.246              * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
 
For pilots who did not identify hazards related to illusive weather conditions, the odds ratio 
indicated that the likelihood of commenting on issues related to ‘height control’ was 13.8% 
of that of pilots who identified hazards related to illusive weather conditions. This indicates 
that height control might be seriously affected by illusive weather conditions, which is well 
documented in the literature (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.2.1). 
The Hosmer & Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit could not be calculated and, therefore, the 
model’s goodness-of-fit should be interpreted in light of the Cox & Snell or Nagelkerke 
coefficients. Both indicated a good model fit to the data (see Section 8.3.2.3.4). 
8.3.3.3.4 Visual illusions 
Table 8-18 summarises the prediction of membership to the hazard category ‘visual 
illusions’. When operating HT helicopters, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of 
commenting on ‘visual illusions’ was 673.5% of the likelihood of MT helicopter pilots 
commenting on this issue. This might reflect the limitations of the HT helicopters, such as 
windscreens which distort the external visual environment and thereby favour visual 
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illusions. It may also reflect a heightened awareness by the HT pilots when compared to the 
MT pilots. These candidate explanations require further investigations to assess their validity. 
This is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Table 8-18 – Prediction of impacts on ‘visual illusions’ 
Omnibus test of model coefficients: χ2(1)=14.088, p=0.001 Prediction success: 71.2% (members: 75.9%; non-members: 68.2%) 
 
95% CI for odds ratio 
 
b (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Helicopter category HT 1.907*** (0.541) 2.331 6.735 19.459 
Constant 
 
-1.455** (0.420) 
 
0.233 
 
 
R2Hosmer & Lemeshow= -; R2Cox & Snell=0 .176; R2Nagelkerke= 0.237              * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.000 
 
 
The Hosmer & Lemeshow coefficient could not be calculated. However, the Cox & Snell and 
Nagelkerke coefficients indicated a good model fit. 
Overall, the key categories of impacts on crews do not share predictors and, therefore, each 
impact on crews requires unique safety mitigation strategies. 
8.3.3.4 Industry instantiation and update 
Figure 8-17 shows the industry’s taxonomy instantiated to the problem of switching between 
visual and instrument scans. The coding of the figure is the same as in Figure 8-3. The 
predictors are ‘experience’ (which is an attribute of the ‘flight crew’ component of the 
taxonomy) and area of operation (which is typically taken as the ‘country of operation’). See 
Section 8.3.2.4 for the utility of instantiating the industry’s taxonomy through figures. 
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8.4 Validation 
The participant sampling strategy described in Section 7.4.1.3 was designed to ensure 
external, population validity. External, ecological validity (Burns and Burns, 2008) is 
expected because the template development process was purposefully inclusive and executed 
to exhaustiveness. Therefore, by covering the widest possible range of hazards, the template 
is expected to be, to a large extent, transferable to other similar contexts not covered by the 
research (e.g., other visual scan technique - high kinetic state (VH) phases of nighttime 
offshore helicopter flights; see Section 6.5.1 and Table 6-2). 
Internal validity is assessed in this section by means of a limited concurrent validity exercise. 
Because of the large number of results of the analyses in the previous sections of this chapter, 
the exercise focuses on the most important hazard identified, i.e., ‘recency of training’. 
Sections 8.3.1.1, 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2, 8.3.3.2.1 and 8.3.3.2.2 identified ‘recency of training’ as 
a stand-alone condition ubiquitously affecting the majority of the pilots. Additionally, 
‘recency of training’ was significantly associated with the hazard category ‘experience’, with 
the lack of recent training having a stronger impact on pilots with lower levels of experience. 
These findings highlight that the standard for pilot nighttime flying recency currently applied 
is unsatisfactory. 
At present, in order to be deemed current, pilots are required to perform three approaches and 
takeoffs within a period of 90 days, irrespectively of their experience (ANAC, 2010; OGP, 
2008; JAA, 2007). This is an arbitrary legacy requirement established in the 1980s for the 
helicopter types of the time. Even though there are ongoing plans to revise this requirement 
(EASA, 2013c), there is still no comparative base to challenge it22. 
The validation exercise created a seminal comparative base and used it to assess the 
relationships between the training recency requirements perceived by pilots as adequate and 
their demographic characteristics, especially experience levels. This was performed by the 
inclusion of a direct question in the questionnaire developed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5.2). 
22 Private communication with experts involved in rule-making at the UK CAA and EASA in December, 2013. 
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Instructed to mentally rehearse the nighttime flying task (Section 6.5.2), the sixty-one 
respondents of the questionnaire survey were asked: ‘Suppose that you have flown a 
nighttime flight today. In how many more days is a second nighttime flight needed so that you 
will still feel current?’ The question wording was peer-reviewed and piloted as described in 
Section 6.5.3. A statistical analysis was undertaken as in Section 6.6.2.4. 
The mean time gap reported for assured recency was 28 days (SD=56.9), which is 
considerably shorter than current requirements. Additionally, the time gaps suggested by 
senior and flight line-only pilots (see Section 6.5.4) were remarkably different, i.e., for senior 
pilots the mean was 52.1 days (SD = 75.9) and for flight line-only pilots the mean was 6.2 
days (SD = 7.2). 
The normality of the distributions and homogeneity of variance were tested as in Section 
4.3.8.2.2. Non-parametric tests were required. Table 8-19 shows the statistical tests 
undertaken and that the difference mentioned in the previous paragraph was statistically 
significant (test of H07).  
Table 8-19 – Statistical analysis of time gap for assured recency per demographic variables 
    MWUb 
H01 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across areas of operation
a X 
H02 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across helicopter categories (i.e., HT and MT) ✓ 
H03 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across cockpit generations (i.e., old and new) ✓ 
H04 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across categories of pilot's licence X 
H05 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across pilots' genders X 
H06 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across pilots' ranks X 
H07 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is the same across categories of pilot seniority ✓ 
     KTbc 
H08 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of pilot's age X 
H09 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of time as offshore helicopter pilot X 
H010 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, total X 
H011 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, IFR X 
H012 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of pilots’ flying hours in helicopters, night X 
H013 The distribution of time gap for assured recency is independent of pilots’ number of night deck landings ✓ 
 
X: non-significant result, accept H0                   ✓: significant result, reject H0 
a North Sea x other regions’ Group 1 b Refer to Table 8-5 for test coding c Refer to Table 8-7 for test coding 
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The differences in time gaps suggested per helicopter category and cockpit generation were 
also significant, with larger gaps suggested by MT and old cockpit helicopter pilots (H02 and 
H03, respectively). Additionally, the time gap for assured recency was positively correlated 
with the number of night deck landings (H013). 
The meta-demographic analysis presented in Table 8-20 clarifies that flight line-only and 
senior pilots differed significantly with respect to the numbers of night deck landings, the 
latter having the greatest numbers of landings (H014). Similarly, the helicopters equipped 
with old cockpits were flown by the most senior pilots (H018). Altogether, the results confirm 
the view of pilots that ‘recency of training’ is associated with pilot experience, with the more 
experienced pilots likely being less affected by longer periods of time between night flights. 
This validated the results of the Content Analysis of interview data, with respect to the 
findings related to ‘recency of training’. 
Table 8-20 – Meta-demographic analysis of participants of the validation exercise 
  MWUa 
H014 The distribution of number of night deck landings is the same across categories of pilot seniority ✓ 
H015 The distribution of number of night deck landings is the same across categories of helicopter  X 
H016 The distribution of number of night deck landings is the same across cockpit generations ✓ 
  Χ2 
H017 Pilot membership to categories of seniority is independent of helicopter categories X 
  FET 
H018 Pilot membership to categories of seniority is independent of cockpit generation ✓ 
H019 Helicopter category is independent of cockpit generation X 
a Refer to Table 8-5 for coding of all tests    X: non-significant result, accept H0             ✓: significant result, reject H0 
 
8.5 Limitations 
As identified in Section 8.3.1.1, the use of the Talk-Through technique in a semi-structured 
interview schedule may induce participants to concentrate on the hazards which are spatially 
and temporally closer to the task, e.g., those immediately experienced in the cockpit 
environment. This may lead to less consideration being paid to the diffuse and less tangible 
organisational and regulatory hazards (Table 8-3). Exploring organisational and regulatory 
hazards can be facilitated by a more focused interview schedule that asks participants directly 
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about their experiences with a range of pre-identified organisational and regulatory hazards 
known or anticipated to have affected task execution in the past. The template developed 
during this investigation should serve as such a guide in future research attempts. 
It is important to note that the use of Content Analysis with interview data enables to 
compare participants’ verbalised perceptions of hazards rather than the hazards themselves. 
The perception of hazards might be influenced by numerous factors (see Section 8.1). 
Moreover, the factors that influence the willingness to report incidents (Section 5.2.2) may 
also have some impact on the openness to disclose hazards during Talk-Through sessions. 
Any results should be interpreted in light of such potential influences. 
It is important to notice that, in all regression analyses the 95% confidence intervals of the 
odds ratios were typically large. This is understood as a product of the pilot sample sizes, 
which were approximately the minimum permissible for statistical analysis (see Sections 
7.4.1.3 and 7.5.3). Future research could collect data from a larger sample in order to achieve 
more accurate analysis’ results. 
More accurate regression analysis (and hence, better ‘predictive safety’) is ideally achieved 
by populating the template on an individual event basis, i.e., with ‘Contextual Factors’ and 
‘Impacts on Crews’ recorded systematically for every flight. This would increase sample 
sizes leading to increased statistical rigour and better prospects of including other explanatory 
variables in the models fitted, especially the interactions between ‘Contextual Factors’. This 
approach is better than building a database from individuals’ overall experiences with a focus 
on the previous 12 months, as done in this chapter. However, where domain knowledge is 
absent or low, as it was the case prior to the investigation reported in this chapter, the process 
described here is essential to provide the foundations for a more systematic data collection 
and analysis in the future. 
Whereas the overall process is useful to build and analyse a hazard repository out of virtually 
absent domain knowledge, the process’ exploratory and inductive character may limit its 
utility due to a lack of focus on specific problems. The results obtained in this chapter should 
be understood as an observed set of informed hypotheses about hazards, which require further 
testing and validation by focused, deductive research. 
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8.6 Conclusions 
Continuing the implementation of the process developed in Chapter 7, this chapter has 
analysed the contents of the template quantitatively through a novel Content Analysis-based 
statistical analysis procedure (see Section 8.2). The results were fed back into the industry’s 
taxonomy developed in Chapter 3 by means of instantiations of critical scenarios. These 
resulted in dynamic updates to the industry’s taxonomy, with the circumstantial changes in 
the odds of a safety breakdown given the occurrence of relevant contextual factors. This fits 
the true spirit of ‘predictive’ hazard identification and corrects the current lack of statistical 
analysis in operational safety management (Sections 2.3.3.3). Additionally, since the analysis 
process combines probabilities and outcomes of safety events, the process can be viewed as 
an alternative risk assessment method in its own right (see Section 2.3.3.4.2). 
Because of initial limited domain knowledge, the process was developed to establish an 
unbiased hazard categorising structure (i.e., the template) and populate it progressively with 
knowledge elicited from experts in the field. Application of the Talk-Through task analysis 
technique in a semi-structured interview schedule was the best option to ensure that expert 
hazard knowledge would be elicited in an unbiased and as comprehensive as possible 
manner. The whole data collection and analysis process represents a transition from the 
bottom-up purely exploratory and inductive research of Grounded Theory towards a quasi-
explanatory and -deductive research with Content Analysis. 
Future application of the process can be optimised by monitoring the task-specific ‘contextual 
factors’ and ‘impacts on crews’ on an individual event basis (i.e., for every flight) and storing 
these data systematically into a single database as much as possible by automated means. For 
example, contextual factors related to weather conditions could be fed into the database 
automatically from existing automated weather stations. Likewise, the impacts on crews 
related to aircraft handling can be downloaded into the database straight from the HFDM 
devices. This would limit the pilot survey effort almost exclusively to the ‘internal factors’ 
hazard categories. This survey could be optimised by presenting tick-off questions on 
briefing and debriefing computerised systems, associated with the flight planning computer 
programmes already in use (see Section 5.6.2). With a complete picture of the events of both 
the ‘contextual factors’ and ‘impacts on crews’ associated with the tasks of each individual 
flight, robust statistical analysis can be undertaken. However, it is important to realise that 
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data should be collected on a task basis, not on an outcome basis. At present, complete data 
collection occurs almost exclusively in response to accidents and incidents, which limits the 
ability to undertake statistical analysis and obtain predictions of hazardous outcomes. The 
paradigm change from Safety-I to Safety-II will likely mitigate this problem (Section 2.2.3). 
Prior to full implementation of systematic and integrated data collection, the hazard template 
developed should be used to inform both data capture and processing, e.g., by using the 
‘contextual factors’ (Table 8-3) during normal operations (i.e., as leading safety performance 
indicators – SPI) and for incident or accident analyses. Additionally, since the codes and 
categories of ‘impacts on crews’ (Table 8-4) indicate overt and covert behaviours related to 
jeopardised safety, the occurrence of any such impact should be used as lagging SPIs (see 
Section 2.2.4.1) which prompt the need for immediate safety interventions and the search for 
the associated ‘contextual factors’. Therefore, the adoption of the template should result in 
improved safety and maximum efficiency during nighttime offshore helicopter operations. 
A number of critical hazards have been exhaustively identified, covering the riskiest scenario 
of nighttime offshore helicopter operations, i.e., the visual approach segment. Since this 
phase shares the characteristics of the other VH phases which are unique to nighttime flying, 
it is expected that the template is highly representative of the hazards of nighttime operations 
in general (see Section 7.6). Therefore, intervention strategies with likely maximum benefit 
can be directly derived from the extensive statistical analyses performed in Section 8.3. For 
example, the pandemic problem of poor pilot recency could be addressed immediately. 
Overall, the Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process enhances hazard identification 
and risk analysis in the nighttime by overcoming the current overreliance on underreported 
incidents (see Sections 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.9 and 6.3.2) and the limited number of accidents (see 
Sections 4.4.3, 4.5 and 6.3.1). Moreover, the process enables the identification of significant 
statistical relationships and differences across the pilots’ hazard accounts. These relationships 
and differences are not evident from simple descriptive analysis. Finally, by identifying the 
probabilistic effects of hazards onto the safety of nighttime offshore helicopter operations, the 
process enables targeted risk mitigation actions to be put in place. This makes the process a 
unique tool of hazard identification and risk analysis.  
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE WORK 
This chapter presents, in Section 9.1, the main findings of the research on hazard 
identification and risk analysis of nighttime offshore helicopter operations. This is done with 
reference to the theoretical background of Chapter 2 to enable a complete understanding of 
the contributions of this thesis. In Section 9.2, avenues for future work are summarised from 
the findings presented in each individual chapter. Finally, in Section 9.3 the dissemination 
and uptake of this thesis are presented in the forms of publications, conference presentations, 
awards and professional contributions. 
9.1 Main findings of the thesis in relation to the theoretical background 
Chapter 2 presented the background of nighttime offshore helicopter operations, highlighting 
that this is an infrequent high-risk activity still in its infancy in terms of hazard identification 
and risk analysis. However, this situation needs to be improved urgently because nighttime 
operations are predicted to experience a sustained and irreversible growth worldwide in the 
near future. Therefore, the aim of this thesis was formulated to develop and implement a 
methodology which integrates processes to enhance hazard identification and risk analysis in 
nighttime offshore helicopter operations. 
The thesis has addressed the aim through six research objectives. The first involved the study 
of the processes of hazard identification and risk analysis used in the offshore helicopter 
industry and related safety-critical industries. Special attention was paid to the specific 
requirements of human-controlled flights in degraded visual environments. At the 
foundational level, it was concluded that a frame of reference, provided by a description of 
the industry’s safety-critical components is a necessary pre-requisite to hazard identification 
and risk analysis. However, such a description, as well as any method to generate it, was not 
available in the offshore helicopter industry. 
These gaps were addressed by the second research objective. This was pursued in Chapter 3, 
which developed and implemented a novel process to generate a taxonomy of the safety-
critical components of the offshore helicopter industry. The process involved the sequential 
application of two task analysis techniques (i.e., high-level mission analysis and hierarchical 
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task analysis), review of aviation system and risk models, as well as the review of key 
accident models and performance shaping factors from the overarching safety literature. 
These reviews were essential to correct any biases associated with the intra-cockpit task 
analysis-based approach initially used to generate the taxonomy. The final taxonomy anchors 
the main concepts of offshore helicopter operations and, therefore, provides the frame of 
reference pursued. The taxonomy was used in other chapters of the thesis (i.e., Chapters 4 
and 8) to support the holistic identification of hazards and analysis of risk. Both the process 
and the final taxonomy produced were validated by carefully selected subject matter experts 
(SMEs) during high-fidelity helicopter flight simulation exercises. 
Another important finding in Chapter 2 was that the reactive, proactive and predictive 
processes of hazard identification and risk analysis currently employed by the offshore 
helicopter industry have serious weaknesses. These make them ineffective in the 
development of effective strategies to prevent nighttime accidents from happening. Amongst 
the reactive processes, previous statistical analyses of accident reports were found to employ 
low quality data and apply over-simplistic statistical techniques. Low data quality was 
associated with inappropriate amounts of data collected on the basis of artificially-bounded 
sampling strategies, data incompleteness due to limited original accident investigations, 
narrow data scope stemming from inconsistent use of terminological definitions and, finally, 
untimely data sampled on the basis of convenience (i.e., data availability) with no scientific 
justification. Over-simplistic statistical techniques were associated with the almost exclusive 
use of descriptive statistics, frequency counts and qualitative interpretations of the data 
captured. This was in addition to a general disregard for the identification of systematic 
hazard trends and patterns and barely any employment of inferential statistics and 
probabilistic hazard predictions. 
Correcting the employment of low quality of data and application of over-simplistic statistics 
mentioned above formed the thesis’ third research objective, pursued in Chapter 4 by 
developing and implementing the novel Accident Analysis Process. The process comprised of 
the selection of a theory-driven analysis timeframe, unequivocal definition of terms and 
identification of countries of relevance where accident and operational data were collected to 
an appropriate amount. Then, a cause classification scheme applicable across the whole 
accident dataset was developed and the variables for the calculation of accident rates were 
290 
 
 
 
 
selected and those of relevance to accident (i.e., hazards) were selected. Following the 
assessment of data completeness, a three-fold statistical analysis procedure took into account 
the characteristics and distributions of the accident and operational data and identified the 
systematic trends and patterns of nighttime hazards amidst the overall hazards associated with 
offshore helicopter accidents. 
From the implementation of the process, it was concluded, inter alia, that the nighttime 
accident rates (i) were significantly greater than those of the daytime, especially the fatal 
accident rates; (ii) largely stemmed from operational issues, especially poor pilot 
performance; and (iii) were highest in areas away from the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico. 
From the analysis of accident by frequencies (i.e., bivariate analysis), it was concluded that 
nighttime accidents were associated with (iv) the North Sea as well as other regions; (v) mid-
twin turbine helicopters; and (vi) fatal controlled flights into terrain or water (CFITWs). 
Finally, the nighttime was a reliable statistical predictor both to operational and fatal 
accidents in the logistic regression models fitted to the data. The results obtained from the 
implementation of the process were validated by experienced SMEs, as well as comparison 
with the pre-existing literature. 
Even though the process of Chapter 4 improved the shortcomings of previous analyses 
considerably, the low quality of the accident data limited the analysis output produced. For 
example, no significant associations could be found between any phase of flight and the 
nighttime. This required further investigations to be undertaken on the hazards and risks 
related to the phases of nighttime flights, which were addressed in Chapter 5 and especially in 
Chapter 6. Moreover, the finest level of detail obtained on the hazards across the whole 
accident dataset was still fairly broad. This prevented multi-layered hazard analysis from 
being undertaken, with further research still required on the multiple hazards associated with 
adverse safety events. Nevertheless, the overlay of the results of the analysis of accidents 
presented in Chapter 4 onto the taxonomy of Chapter 3 offered a unique overview of the 
hazardous interactions across the safety-critical components of the industry during the 
nighttime accident scenarios. This aids hazard identification and risk analysis with by 
providing a holistic overview of the potential cross-industry hazard interactions. Altogether, 
the process developed in Chapter 4 is essential to identify broad areas of intervention and 
highlight the need to improve accident data collection. 
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The statistical analysis of incidents was yet another flawed reactive process of hazard 
identification employed in offshore helicopter operations. As established in Chapter 2, the 
practice of investigating incident reports is built on the belief in the shared aetiology of 
accidents and incidents and the statistical threshold relationship between the latter and the 
former, i.e., the ratios of Heinrich’s pyramid (Heinrich, 1980). Furthermore, Chapter 2 
clarified that, in aviation, a common interpretation of Heinrich’s pyramid is that the incidents 
reported to occur most frequently directly indicate the characteristics of an impending 
accident. This has the potential to bias hazard identification and risk analysis in nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations, especially through the use of reported incidents by their 
frequencies in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and as safety performance indicators 
(SPIs). Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the extent to which this interpretation was 
justifiable on the basis of empirical data analysis. Developing and implementing a novel 
process to investigate the truth of the common interpretation of Heinrich’s pyramid in 
aviation formed the thesis’ fourth objective, pursued in Chapter 5. 
Using elements from the process developed in Chapter 4, the required process to investigate 
the utility of reported incidents as statistical precursors of accidents, as believed to occur in 
the aviation industry, was developed in Chapter 5. The process addressed similar low data 
quality issues which required the definition of the type of incident report which would best 
replicate the original statistical precursor model and the establishment of criteria to select 
trustworthy incident databases. In addition to these, the definition of a theory-driven analysis 
timeframe was required, together with the assessment of data quality by completeness and the 
development of a statistical analysis plan. The latter involved the descriptive analysis of 
frequencies of incident versus accidents by three attributes, including lighting conditions, as 
well as the exploration of the statistical associations between the attributes. Implementation 
used the serious incident data from the UK Civil Aviation Authority’s Mandatory Occurrence 
Reporting (MOR) Scheme’s database and the accident reports available from the UK Aircraft 
Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB). The results obtained directly challenged the long-
lasting belief of the aviation industry whereby the incidents occurring most frequently 
indicate the characteristics of an impending accident. Furthermore, the results led to a 
heightened awareness of the persistent problems of underreporting of incidents in the British 
offshore helicopter industry and beyond and low data quality. Given the results obtained, the 
chapter established that the best use of incident reports for hazard identification and risk 
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analysis is not on the basis of the frequency of reporting but rather on the basis of the 
contents of each report. This is achieved by using incident reports as individual indicators of 
early interventions needed to ensure safety, as raw data to enable the assessment of likely 
consequences of hazards and, finally, to validate any hazards identified through other 
methods. These uses of reported incidents directly impact the identification of hazards in 
nighttime operations since the few reports obtained from aircrew ought to be exploited 
individually. This is taken into account in Chapter 6. Validation of the process and the results 
was undertaken through the careful critique of experienced SMEs. 
The proactive hazard identification processes (i.e., surveys) investigated in Chapter 2 were 
also found to be flawed in the offshore helicopter industry. The shortcomings identified 
included the identification of hazards and analysis of risks, which cannot be generalised, 
neither geographically nor with respect to phases of flight, because of the use of non-
statistical data sampling strategies. Also, circumstantial survey deployments, lack of focus on 
facts and disregard for demographic analysis of respondents were common weaknesses. 
Addressing these weaknesses formed the thesis’ fifth research objective, which was pursued 
in Chapter 6 with regard to risk analysis and Chapter 7, with hazard identification. 
In Chapter 6, a questionnaire survey was created to assess the risk levels experienced by 
highly experienced pilots and identify the riskiest phase of nighttime flights. In addition to 
addressing the weaknesses identified in Chapter 2 mentioned above, this survey improved the 
investigations in Chapters 4 and 5, where the level of detail in the datasets prevented accurate 
risk analysis on a phases-of-flight basis. This was possible through a critical review of the 
taxonomies of phases of flight and, as per the findings of Chapter 5, the re-analysis of 
nighttime incident and accident reports individually at the greatest possible level of detail. 
These led to the development of a novel, bespoke and multilevel taxonomy of phases of flight 
which, for the first time, accounted for the human factors-related characteristics of nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations. Using the novel taxonomy as the basis for the questionnaire 
survey, pilots were sampled on the basis of statistical considerations, the properties of the 
data collected were studies and multiple hypotheses were tested. These highlighted key biases 
of current taxonomies and identified the visual scan technique – high kinetic state (i.e., VH) 
phases, especially the visual segment of nighttime instrument approaches, as the riskiest 
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phases of nighttime offshore helicopter flights. Further testing of the demographic variables 
revealed that this phase was equally problematic to virtually all pilots. 
Based on these results, Chapter 7 continued to address the thesis’ fifth objective by 
developing and implementing the novel Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process. 
The process was designed to address the shortcomings identified in Chapter 2 mentioned 
above and, thereby, produce a factual, exhaustive and statistically representative list of 
hazards (i.e., a hazard template) uniquely related to nighttime offshore helicopter operations. 
The process includes the top-down collection of all task-based hazard information available, 
which is completed by the bottom-up elicitation of factual hazards directly from pilots in the 
field. The requirement to be fact-based set out in Chapter 2 was met by the employment of 
the Talk-Through task analysis technique in confidential interviews. Exhaustiveness, in turn, 
resulted from the recursive application of Grounded Theory and Template Analysis to 
categorise the hazard data collected. Finally, statistical representativeness was assured by the 
collection of data to appropriate amounts of data calculated in advance on the basis of a 
statistical sampling strategy. The implementation of the process was done with respect to the 
riskiest phase of flight identified in Chapter 6 (i.e., nighttime visual segments of instrument 
approaches), which was found to be highly representative of the overall hazards uniquely 
happening in the nighttime. The categories of the template developed added to the current 
and future knowledge of hazards and risks by containing a set of novel leading and lagging 
safety performance indicators (SPI) which redress the pre-existing gap in hazard knowledge. 
Multiple layers of reliability and validity checks were undertaken with various SMEs and 
through the analysis independent raw datasets. 
Finally, Chapter 2 identified that there was a complete lack of a process to generate statistical 
predictions of safety critical outcomes on the basis of the hazards. Therefore, the so-called 
‘predictive’ hazard identification processes were actually non-existent in the offshore 
helicopter industry, even though hazard prediction is accepted as the ultimate goal of safety 
management. Addressing this gap formed the sixth and final research objective of this thesis. 
Exploiting the exhaustiveness and statistical representativeness of the template generated in 
Chapter 7, as well as the industry’s taxonomy developed in Chapter 3, Chapter 8 developed 
and implemented a novel Content Analysis-based statistical analysis procedure which 
predicted the changes in the odds of critical outcomes based on the status of a set of 
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explanatory hazards and demographic variables. The predictions generated were overlaid 
onto the industry’s taxonomy to enable swift appreciation and prioritisation of safety 
interventions on the basis of highest probabilities of success. The statistical analysis process 
developed in this chapter can be adopted as the survey-based standard for ‘predictive’ hazard 
identification in nighttime offshore helicopter operations, which is currently missing. As it 
combines the assessment of probabilities and critical outcomes, the process can also be 
viewed as an alternative risk analysis process on its own right. The process was validated 
through a limited concurrent validity exercise with encouraging results. 
Overall, the development and implementation of the processes aforementioned as an 
integrated methodology have enhanced hazard identification and risk analysis, and 
consequently hazard and risk knowledge in nighttime offshore helicopter operations. This is 
justified by the numerous high-impact achievements listed in Section 9.3. Other important 
areas for further research, which were identified but not addressed in this thesis, are 
suggested as avenues of future work in Section 9.2 below. 
9.2 Future work 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest a number of directions for future research. These 
include: 
• Validation of Chapter 4’s Accident Analysis Process through its implementation for the 
analysis of accidents of other types of helicopter operations. This will ensure the external 
validity of the process in addition to the internal validity assured by the critique of SMEs 
(see Section 4.5). 
• Assessing the seaworthiness and crashworthiness of mid twin-turbine (MT) helicopters, 
especially in the nighttime, across various types of helicopter operations. This will enable 
to determine if the relatively high number of deceased occupants per accident in this 
helicopter category found in Section 4.4.2.2 is associated with the characteristics of 
specific offshore missions (e.g., medical evacuation) or the helicopter category (see 
Section 4.5). 
• Assessing the external validity of reported incidents. Chapter 5 only assessed the validity 
of the reported incidents with respect to the principle of shared aetiology with accidents 
by ratio thresholds as specifically applied in the aviation industry. Because the 
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application of the principle might be inaccurate and invalid, it is useful to investigate the 
extent to which reported incidents are representative of the observed incidents. This 
might be attempted through statistical comparisons between reported incidents and 
incidents recorded automatically, e.g., through Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring 
(HFDM) devices or intra-cockpit video analysis. 
• Assessing the effects of cockpit generation and helicopter transport capacity into the risk 
experienced during the visual takeoff and visual go around phases of nighttime flights. 
Pilots of these helicopters reported higher risk levels on these specific phases of flight 
(see Section 6.8). 
• A longitudinal survey to monitor the evolution of risk levels experienced by pilots per 
phase of flight as new technologies are introduced (e.g., satellite-based approach 
procedures; see Section 2.1) and task and flight profiles are consequently changed. 
• Implementation of the Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process to identify and 
analyse quantitatively the hazards of other tasks (e.g., other phases of flight) and in other 
domains. This will ensure the external validity of the process. 
• Assessing the nighttime flying recency requirements on the basis of empirical evidence. 
This should use the results of the validation exercise described in Section 8.4 as a starting 
point and consider the likely effect of experience on pilot skill decay. 
• Predictive safety analysis based on data routinely collected on a per-flight basis. This 
should build on templates developed through the implementation of process established 
in Chapter 7 to various phases of flight. Subsequently, the templates should be 
systematically populated with hazard data collected by surveys and means of automatic 
data capture. The statistical analysis procedure of Chapter 8 should then be used to 
explore the relationships across the data and analyse/model adverse outcomes 
probabilistically (see Section 8.5). 
• Investigating all the hypotheses generated from the exploration of the statistical 
relationships across the interview dataset in Chapter 8. Since Content Analysis represents 
the transition between inductive and deductive research, its main product are the various 
avenues for future work discussed in Section 8.3. 
9.3 High-impact achievements 
The following high-impact achievements resulted from the research presented in this thesis. 
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9.3.1 Publication format: peer-reviewed journal 
1) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W.Y., Schuster, W. (2014). Nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations: risk levels per phase of flight, recency requirements and 
visual approach technique. Accident Analysis & Prevention, accepted by editor, in 
review. 
2) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2014). Helicopter Accident 
Analysis. The Journal of Navigation, 67, 145-161. 
3) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Investigating the Truth 
of Heinrich's Pyramid in Offshore Helicopter Transportation. Transportation Research 
Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2336, 105-116. 
4) Nascimento, F. A. C., Jarvis, S. and Majumdar, A. (2012). Factors Affecting Safety 
During Night Visual Approach Segments for Offshore Helicopters. The Aeronautical 
Journal, 116, 303-322. 
5) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Jarvis, S. (2012). Nighttime approaches to 
offshore installations in Brazil: Safety shortcomings experienced by helicopter pilots. 
Accident Analysis & Prevention, 47, 64-74. 
6) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. and Jarvis, S. R. (2012). A 
multistage multinational triangulation approach to hazard identification in nighttime 
offshore helicopter operations. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 108, 142-153. 
9.3.2 Publication format: book chapter 
1) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Nighttime Offshore 
Helicopter Operations - Identification of Contextual Factors Relevant to Pilot 
Performance. In: LANDRY, S. J. (ed.) Advances in Human Aspects of Aviation. Boca 
Raton, USA: CRC Press. 
9.3.3 Publication format: conference proceedings 
1) Nascimento, F.A.C., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. and Schuster, W. (2014), Laying out 
the Foundations of Safety Management: the Offshore Helicopter Transportation 
Industry’s Taxonomy. 8th Australian Pacific Vertiflight Conference on Helicopter 
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Technologies/3rd Asian Australian Rotorcraft Forum. Melbourne, Australia (accepted, to 
be presented in December, 2014). 
2) Nascimento, F.A.C., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. and Schuster, W. (2014), Initial 
Evidence-Based Analysis of Risk Levels per Phases of Flight, Recency Requirements 
and Visual Approach Design in Nighttime Offshore Helicopter Operations, 40th 
European Rotorcraft Forum 2014. Southampton, UK: Royal Aeronautical Society 
(accepted, to be presented in September, 2014). 
3) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). A 15-year multivariate 
analysis of worldwide offshore helicopter accidents. AHS 69th Annual Forum and 
Technology Display. Phoenix, USA: American Helicopter Society. 
4) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Investigating the truth 
of Heinrich's pyramid in offshore helicopter transportation. Transportation Research 
Board 92nd Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C.:,USA: TRB. 
5) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). Incident reporting in 
offshore helicopter transportation. 38th European Rotorcraft Forum 2012. Amsterdam, 
Netherlands. 
6) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). Nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations – identification of contextual factors relevant to pilot performance. 
4th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE). San 
Francisco, USA. 
7) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. and Jarvis, S. R. (2012). Assessing 
the hazards of nighttime offshore helicopter operations. Transportation Research Board 
91st Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C., USA: TRB. 
8) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A., Jarvis, S. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2011). Safety 
Hazards in Nighttime Offshore Helicopter Operations. 37th European Rotorcraft Forum 
2011. Gallarate, Italy. 
9.3.4 Key conference presentations 
1) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2014). Predictive Safety: 
Filling in the Gaps of Ad Hoc Incident Reports. CHC Safety and Quality Summit 2014. 
Vancouver, Canada: CHC. 
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2) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Analysis of Accidents 
in Helicopter Operations: a New Framework. Seventh EASA Rotorcraft Symposium. 
Cologne, Germany: EASA. 
3) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2013). Predicting Risks in 
View of Rare Occurrences. CHC Safety and Quality Summit 2013. Vancouver, Canada: 
CHC. 
4) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). Offshore helicopter 
transportation: the utility of incident reporting. Sixth EASA Rotorcraft Symposium. 
Cologne, Germany: EASA. 
5) Nascimento, F. A. C., Majumdar, A., Jarvis, S. (2009). Factors Affecting Safety During 
Night Visual Approaches for Offshore Helicopters. National Committee for Air Accident 
Prevention Annual Meeting. Brasilia, Brazil: CNPAA/CENIPA 
9.3.5 Awards 
1) Santander International Mobility Award (2011). Santander Universities. UK – 
sponsorship for research in Spain, awarded on the basis of academic merit and relevance 
of research. 
2) Santander International Mobility Award (2010). Santander Universities. UK – 
sponsorship for research in Latin America, awarded on the basis of academic merit and 
relevance of research. 
9.3.6 Membership to public review 
1) CAP 1145 - Safety Review of Offshore Public Transport Helicopter Operations in 
Support of the Exploitation of Oil and Gas. 2014, UK Civil Aviation Authority: London 
– member of the expert challenge team, independent advisor and peer-reviewer. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Summary of the safety aspects of the Annexes of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO, 2006a) 
and their limitations in offshore helicopter transportation 
 
Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing (ICAO, 2011a) 
This annex provides the international standards and recommended practices for the licensing 
of flight crew members, aircraft maintenance engineers, air traffic controllers, flight 
dispatchers, aeronautical station operators and aeronautical meteorological personnel. With a 
view to ensuring confidence in safe air travel, the annex establishes the age, knowledge, skill, 
medical fitness and experience requirements for each such profession. For example, 
exercising the privileges of professional helicopter pilot requires considerable flight 
experience (i.e., minimum of 150 and 1000 hours of flight time for commercial and air 
transport pilots, respectively) and demonstrated knowledge and skills in relation to air law, 
aircraft characteristics, flight performance, planning and loading, human performance, 
meteorology, navigation, operational procedures, principles of flight and radiotelephony. 
However, there are no provisions in the annex for the closed-loop control (Hollnagel, 2009) 
of the effectiveness of the proposed requirements and their update where needed. Likewise, 
there are no provisions which focus on pilot currency and recency in the mission that they 
intend to perform. Existing currency and recency provisions are only established for the 
aircraft type used. 
Annex 2 – Rules of the Air (ICAO, 2005a) 
This annex establishes a set of internationally agreed rules devised to ensure safe and 
efficient air travel. The rules consist of general rules (which apply to all aircraft at all times 
and mostly concern right-of-way provisions), instrument and visual flight rules (IFR and 
VFR, respectively). 
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Prevailing visibility, distance from clouds and ceiling at the time of the flight primarily 
dictate which one of the latter two rules (i.e., IFR or VFR) shall be applied by pilots, in 
addition to the general rules. However, this IFR/VFR dichotomous classification has been 
disputed, given that a range of perceptual states exists which cannot be expressed exclusively 
by these two rules. For example, there are cases in which, while the prescribed VFR limits 
might have been met, there are nonetheless insufficient visual cues in the external 
environment to allow for human spatial orientation. Hence, adopting a visually-guided 
aircraft control strategy (i.e., VFR) would be inappropriate. Such conditions are collectively 
labelled degraded visual environments (DVE) and include nighttime flights over water 
(‘black-out’ condition); daytime flights over water in horizon-less conditions, still water 
surface and no atmospheric formation (i.e., when the sea and sky blend to form a ‘grey-out’ 
condition); flights over icy surfaces (i.e., ‘white-out’ condition); and flights over desert 
regions (brown-out conditions). DVE render helicopter pilots to be especially susceptible to 
spatial disorientation (CAA, 2007). Yet, DVE cannot be identified based on Annex 2’s 
provisions. 
Annex 3 – Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation (ICAO, 2010a) 
This annex aims to ensure that pilots, operators, air traffic service units, search and rescue 
units, airport management and others concerned with aviation will be informed about the 
meteorological conditions along the routes to be flown and at the destination aerodromes. 
This annex addresses offshore helicopter operations specifically when it recommends the 
establishment of aeronautical meteorological stations on offshore structures or at points 
where support to offshore helicopter operations can be provided. Additionally, the annex 
recommends that sea surface temperature, sea state, visibility, cloud cover, barometric 
pressure, icing and turbulence information be incorporated into the messages communicated 
to the crews engaged in helicopters missions to offshore structures. This is an important 
acknowledgement that the standard meteorological services, which are designed to support 
aviation in general, are suboptimal in the offshore helicopter context. 
Annex 4 – Aeronautical Charts (ICAO, 2009a) 
This annex defines the obligations of States to make available aeronautical charts and specify 
chart coverage, format, identification and content. The goal is to satisfy the need for 
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uniformity and consistency in the provision of aeronautical charts that contain appropriate 
information of a defined quality (ICAO, 2012b). 
Under the provisions of Chapter 13 - Aerodrome/Helicopter Chart – ICAO, the charts used in 
helideck23 operations shall show, with metre-level accuracy, the final approach and take-off 
(FATO) and touchdown and lift-off (TLOF) areas, as well as declared take-off, rejected take-
off and landing distances and types and elevations of obstacles. Safety areas and helicopter 
clearways must also be shown, along with visual aids for approach, touchdown, lift-off and 
take-off. Additionally, the annex establishes the data integrity requirements needed for the 
proposed operation, based upon the potential risk resulting from the corruption of the data. 
Whereas the helideck reference point must comply with a ‘routine’ 1 x 10-3 integrity 
criterion, a tighter ‘essential’ 1 x 10-5 level of integrity is required from data on helideck 
elevation and magnetic variation. However, the most stringent level of integrity (i.e., ‘critical’ 
1 x 10-8) only applies to the geometric centre of the FATO and TLOF areas (ICAO, 2009a). 
This is very important in the context of offshore helicopter operations to variable height and 
moving installations. 
Annex 5 – Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground Operations (ICAO, 
2010b) 
This annex relates to safety only to the extent that it standardises the units to be used in 
aviation. However, no provisions address safety in offshore helicopter operations especially. 
Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft (ICAO, 2010c) 
This annex contributes to efficiency and regularity of international air travel by encouraging 
contracting States to facilitate the passage over their territories of commercial aircraft 
belonging to other signatory States. Regarding safety, this annex provides specific criteria for 
safe operating practices in air navigation (ICAO, 2012b). For example, the annex’s definition 
of operation establishes the need to understand aircraft use from a hazard perspective (see 
Section 2.2.2). 
23 Helideck is a heliport located on a floating or fixed offshore structure ICAO (2010c). The Convention on 
International Civil Aviation - Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft. 7th ed. Montréal: ICAO. 
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With particular relevance to safety of offshore helicopter operations, this annex regulates the 
use of helidecks as alternative heliports, especially in relation to the need for assured deck 
availability, reliable and accurate weather information, one engine inoperative performance 
capability prior to arrival and a preference for onshore landing options, especially when 
operating in hostile environments24. The annex also requires offshore helicopters to be 
certificated for ditching25 (i.e., that the helicopter be suitable for landing on water, 
considering the anticipated sea states), fitted with permanent or rapidly deployable means of 
flotation and their occupants to constantly wear life jackets and survival suits when the water 
temperature is below 10o C. 
Annex 7 – Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks (ICAO, 2012a) 
This annex aims to turn the registration of various types of aircraft possible and simple. This 
annex does not address any issue particularly relevant to safety in offshore helicopter 
operations. 
Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft (ICAO, 2010d) 
This annex establishes the high level requirements that underpin the creation of detailed, 
quantitative airworthiness specifications at a national level and facilitate mutual recognition 
by States of Certificates of Airworthiness for the purpose of flight of aircraft of other State 
into and over their territories. 
With respect to the provisions of interest to offshore helicopter safety, this annex establishes 
that maximum practical assurance shall be built into the design of helicopters certificated for 
ditching conditions, so that safe evacuation of the passengers and crew is achievable. 
Additionally, the annex states that the design of a helicopter shall not have any features or 
characteristics that render it unsafe given the anticipated operating conditions. These are 
conditions known from experience or which can be envisaged to occur during the operational 
24 Hostile environments are such on which a) a forced landing cannot be accomplished because the surface and 
surrounding environment are inadequate, or b) the helicopter occupants cannot be adequately protected from the 
elements, or c) search and rescue response/capability is not provided consistent with anticipated exposure, or d) 
there is an unacceptable risk of endangering persons or properties on the ground. Ibid. 
25 The forced landing of an aircraft on water ICAO (2004). The Convention on International Civil Aviation - 
Annex 12 - Search and Rescue. Montréal: ICAO. 
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life of the helicopter, taking into account the operation for which the aircraft is made eligible 
with respect to, at least, atmospheric meteorological conditions, configuration of terrain, 
functioning of the aircraft and efficiency of personnel. This is very important in the context of 
offshore helicopter operations in novel scenarios, which might not have been anticipated 
when the aircraft certification occurred. 
Annex 9 – Facilitation (ICAO, 2011b) 
This annex contains international standards and recommended practices which pertain 
specifically to facilitation of landside formalities for clearance of aircraft and commercial 
traffic through the requirements of customs, immigration, public health and agriculture 
authorities (ICAO, 2012b). Therefore, this annex is not relevant to safety in offshore 
helicopter operations. 
Annex 10 – Aeronautical Telecommunications (ICAO, 2007b) 
This annex contains the technical specifications for use of telecommunication equipments in 
aeronautics. With respect to subjects of relevance to offshore helicopter transportation, the 
annex emphasizes the potentially ineffective coverage of non-directional beacon (NDB) in 
presence of night effects, stemming from the interaction between the components of the NDB 
signal which are propagated in the horizontal plane and by reflection at the ionosphere. When 
there is interaction between these components, which arrive at the automatic direction finder 
(ADF) receiver with a different phase, bearing errors are introduced. Due to such errors, 
NDBs are unreliable over the sea at distances greater than 320 kilometres (i.e., 172 nautical 
miles), regardless of the transmission power. This is very important in regions where oil and 
gas operations are executed at long distances from shore, mainly if local aeronautical 
infrastructure is limited and other navigational aids are unavailable (e.g., Brazil, see 
Appendix 11). 
The annex additionally outlines ICAO’s strategy for the introduction and application of radio 
navigation aids to support safe, efficient and flexible all-weather approach and landing 
operations with vertical and both vertical and lateral guidance (i.e., APV and precision 
approach and landing operations, respectively). The strategy must be applicable until, at 
maximum, the year 2020 and shall be based on improvements on the following technologies: 
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instrument landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), global navigation 
satellite system (GNSS) with augmentation (i.e., recipient of correcting signals from aircraft-, 
ground- or satellite-based differentiating stations), head-up displays and enhanced synthetic 
vision systems. This strategy has had a direct impact in ongoing offshore helicopter 
operations (see Section 2.1). 
Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services (ICAO, 2001) 
This annex sets out standards and recommended practices which prevent collisions of aircraft 
and expedite and maintain and orderly flow of air traffic. There is none but one provision in 
the annex which is specific to offshore helicopter operations. This is a recommendation 
whereby, when warranted by density, complexity or nature of traffic, special routes should be 
established for low-level helicopter flights to and from helidecks on the high seas. The 
establishment of such routes should take due account of the navigational means and 
equipment available onboard when determining the lateral spacing between such routes. 
Since offshore helicopter traffic can be significantly dense, in the interests of safety this 
recommendation has been applied in a number of regions (e.g., Brazil, see Appendix 11). 
The annex additionally establishes the accuracy and integrity requirements for determination 
and reporting of air traffic-related aeronautical data, with direct applicability to helicopter 
operations offshore. Obstacles, in particular, have to stem from surveyed data, comply with 
an ‘essential’ 1 x 10-5 integrity level, as well as with 3 and 5 metres accuracy in terms of 
geographical coordinates and height, respectively. As with the requirements outlined in annex 
4, such provision of annex 11 are very important in the context of offshore helicopter 
operations to variable height and moving installations. 
Annex 12 – Search and Rescue (ICAO, 2004) 
This annex sets forth the provisions for the establishment, maintenance and operation of 
search and rescue (SAR) services by Contracting States, within their territories and over those 
portions of the high seas as determined in regional air navigation agreements (ICAO, 2012b). 
This is directly relevant to offshore helicopter operations as the minimum units and facilities 
necessary for the provision of SAR services should, ideally, consider the anticipated exposure 
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of helicopter occupants in case of ditching and helicopter traffic density over sea areas. 
However, this might not always be the case (see Appendix 11). 
Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (ICAO, 2010e) 
This annex provides the international requirements for the investigation of accidents and 
incidents, with the objective of prevention. The investigation process includes the gathering, 
recording and analysis of all relevant information; the determination of the causes; 
formulating appropriate safety recommendations and the completion of the final report. 
The applicability of one fundamental provision of this annex has been particularly disputed in 
the offshore helicopter industry, i.e., the definition of accident26. According to annex 13, an 
accident is: 
‘an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which [...] takes place between 
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time when all 
such persons have disembarked, [...] in which: 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: 
- being in the aircraft, or 
- direct contact with any parts of the aircraft, including parts which have become 
detached from the aircraft, or 
- direct exposure to jet blast, 
[...]; or 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the 
aircraft, and 
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, 
26 This argument apparently started in April, 2011 at the Professional Pilots Rumours Network (PPRUNE) at 
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/176803-gom-yet-another-ditching-10.html. 
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[...]; or 
c) the aircraft is missing, or is completely inaccessible’ (pp. 1-1). 
Note 1. – Regarding aircraft damage which adversely affects structural strength, 
performance or flight characteristics, the aircraft may have landed safely, but cannot be 
safely dispatched on a further sector without repair. 
Note 2.- If the aircraft can be safely dispatched after minor repairs and subsequently 
undergoes more extensive work to effect a permanent repair, then the occurrence would 
not be classified as an accident. Likewise, if the aircraft can be dispatched under the CDL 
[i.e., configuration deviation list] with the affected component removed, missing or 
inoperative, the repair would not be considered a major repair and consequently the 
occurrence would not be considered an accident’ (pp., ATT G-1). 
Given the requirement for one of three conditions (i.e., a, b, or c above) and the presence of at 
least one person onboard when the safety occurrence happens, the definition of accident 
devised for aviation in general fails to properly cover the particular (and yet frequent) case of 
catastrophic helicopter ditching. Ditchings in which uninjured occupants manage to evade the 
helicopter before the environment destroys it (e.g., by wave impact, followed by inversion, 
submersion and sinking) violate the definition of accident proposed by ICAO. Having no 
persons onboard when the helicopter is destroyed, such occurrences can still be classified as 
incidents, oblivious to the fact that the damage sustained prevents the aircraft from being 
dispatched on a further sector. 
Given the permissiveness of the definition mentioned above, problems of understated 
accident statistics have been reported in the Gulf of Mexico (HSAC, 2012). In this area, many 
catastrophic helicopter ditchings were officially classified as incidents (as opposed to 
accidents), arguably to satisfy commercial or public conveniences27. 
The intrinsic value of accident causes and the assumptions underpinning the accident 
investigation process advocated in annex 13 have also been disputed. According to the annex, 
27 http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/176803-gom-yet-another-ditching-11.html  
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accident causes are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or combinations thereof, which led 
to the accident and hence, can be determined through properly conducted accident 
investigations. However, other authors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2009; Dekker, 2002; Saleh et al., 
2010) advocate that accident causes are constructed, rather than determined, according to 
tacit or explicit accident investigation stop rules which satisfy social and psychological needs. 
For example, during the course of an accident investigation, the investigators might be 
convinced that they found the causes of the accident (and hence, that the investigation should 
stop) when they reach the bottom of a taxonomy, highlight generally accepted causes (e.g., 
pilot error), comply with political, institutional or moral convenience, provide psychological 
relief or exhaust the resources available for the investigation. In this case, accident 
investigation is not a strictly objective and technical process. It actually is a (technically-
driven) social and psychological process which enables ‘the identification, after the fact, of a 
limited set of factors or conditions that provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
effects to have occurred’ (Hollnagel, 2009, pp.9) when attending the prevailing stop rules. In 
summary, accident causes are relative, rather than absolute, and accident investigation is a 
constructive, rather than a deterministic process. 
Other provisions of annex 13 are both important to and well accepted across the offshore 
helicopter industry. For example, contracting States are required to establish mandatory and 
voluntary occurrence reporting systems that facilitate collection of information on actual and 
potential safety deficiencies. Additionally, the annex recommends that contracting States 
facilitate the establishment of information sharing networks which enable the free exchange 
of standardised safety-relevant content (from accident/incident investigations or otherwise) 
across the industry. However, with barely any guidance provided as to how all such data 
should be analysed, the implementation of these provisions vary considerably between 
countries (see Section 2.3.3.1). 
Finally, annex 13 recommends on the format of accident reports, the fields of which indicate 
drivers to safety (and, conversely, threats to safety, i.e., hazards) in aviation to be studied 
during the investigation of accidents in aviation, including nighttime offshore helicopter 
operations (see Section 4.3.6). 
Annex 14 - Aerodromes (ICAO, 2009b) 
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This annex establishes the international standards and recommended practices applicable to 
planning, designing, constructing, operating, maintaining and managing aerodromes. Volume 
II of this annex is dedicated to heliports and includes provisions specifically applicable to the 
helidecks used by the offshore oil and gas industry. 
Regarding offshore helidecks, the standard and recommended practices cover the physical 
characteristics of touchdown and lift-off (TLOF) and final approach and take-off (FATO) 
areas; geometry and markings of obstacle free, obstacle limitation and prohibited landing 
sectors and surfaces; helideck dimensions needed to ensure the operability of the intended 
helicopter models; maximum obstacle height permitted within the FATO area (e.g., light 
fittings); structural strength and aerodynamic characteristics of the FATO area; need for and 
location of safety nets and shelves at the helideck’s outer perimeter; specifications for water 
repellent, skid-resistant (to both persons and helicopters) helideck surfaces; specifications for 
wind direction indicators; stabilisation requirements for helicopter approach path indicators 
(HAPI); and texture-rich, glare-avoiding helideck lighting specifications. 
The annex additionally lists safety critical aspects of operations at offshore structures, namely 
potential turbulence due to airflow direction, prevailing wind velocity and high temperatures 
from gas turbine exhausts or flare radiated heat on the location of the FATO. Overall, annex 
14 highlights that the offshore installations are very important drivers to the safety of 
helicopter operations. 
Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services (ICAO, 2010f) 
This annex establishes the international standards and recommended practices for essential 
aeronautical information. The annex reflects the increased need for timely provision of 
quality aeronautical and terrain information/data as they have become critical components of 
data-dependent on board navigation systems. Therefore, the annex contains many provisions 
aimed at preventing erroneous or corrupt information/data which can potentially affect safety. 
For example, the quality requirements for aeronautical and terrain information/data 
mentioned in previous annexes (i.e., accuracy and integrity) are replicated in this annex 
(ICAO, 2012b). 
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Additionally, annex 15 requires States to establish a data quality system with which all stages 
of the aeronautical information/data process shall be managed. 
Annex 16 – Environmental Protection (ICAO, 2011c) 
This annex deals with the protection of the environment from the effects of aircraft noise and 
aircraft engine emissions (ICAO, 2012b). Although the annex has specific provisions for 
helicopters, safety is not dealt with in this annex. Therefore, it is not relevant for this thesis. 
Annex 17 – Security (ICAO, 2011d) 
This annex is mainly concerned with administrative and co-ordination aspects, as well as with 
technical measures for the protection of the security of international air transport (ICAO, 
2012b). This annex has no provisions specifically related to helicopters, neither to safety. 
Therefore, it is not relevant for this thesis. 
Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO, 2011e) 
This annex specifies standard and recommended practices to be followed to enable dangerous 
good to be carried safely. This annex also has no provisions specifically related to 
helicopters, neither to operational safety. Therefore, it is not so relevant for this thesis. 
Annex 19 – Integrated Safety Management 
This is a new annex (released in November, 2013) which is not discussed in this Appendix. 
However, the annex provisions are embedded into the provisions of the annexes discussed 
above. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Hazard identification and risk analysis processes in use across various safety-critical industries 
Hazard identification/risk analysis process’ name  
(techniques applied in offshore helicopter transportation shaded in grey) Examples of areas of application, with references from the literature 
1 Accident and incident investigation Civil aviation, offshore helicopter operations, offshore installations, complex socio-technical systems (CASA, 2009; 
Saleh et al., 2010; Vinnem, 1998; ICAO, 2012c) 
2 Accident and incident statistics Offshore installations, maritime transportation, civil aviation, offshore helicopter operations, technical systems, 
military aviation, helicopter operations in general (CASA, 2009; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Ventikos and 
Psaraftis, 2004; Vinnem, 1998; Aven, 1992; OGP, 2012b; Mapes, 2010; Couch and Lindell, 2010; Harris, 2006b; 
Harris et al., 2000) 
3 Accident tree analysis Maritime transportation (Huang, 2012) 
4 Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for 
Industries (ARAMIS) 
Offshore installations, complex socio-technical systems (Kazaras et al., 2014; Deacon et al., 2013) 
5 Acci-map Complex socio-technical systems (Sklet, 2004; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) 
6 Action Error Analysis (AEA) Chemical and process industries, computer-controlled systems, tasks performed by operators (Goud et al., 2000; 
Kjellén, 2000; Leveson, 1995) 
7 Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
8 Barrier analysis Offshore installations (Deacon et al., 2013) 
9 Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA)  Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
10 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) Complex socio-technical systems, engineering applications, maritime transportation, offshore installations; nuclear 
and chemical installations, civil aviation (Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Paté-Cornell, 2002; Merrick and Van Dorp, 
2006; Aven, 2007, 2008; Ren et al., 2008; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011; Greenberg et al., 2005) 
11 Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
12 Boolean representation method Offshore installations and maritime transportation (Wang, 2002) 
13 Bow tie analysis Offshore installations, maritime transportation, civil aviation (Deacon et al., 2010, 2013; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; 
ICAO, 2012c) 
14 Brainstorming using experienced operational 
personnel 
Civil aviation (CASA, 2009) 
15 Causal modelling of air safety Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
16 Cause-consequence analysis (CCA) Offshore installations and maritime transportation, computer-controlled systems, chemical and process industries, 
technical systems (Goud et al., 2000; Leveson, 1995; Brandsæter, 2002; Wang, 2002; Aven, 1992) 
337 
 
 
 
 
17 Charting and network techniques Human-centred systems, civil aviation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Jarvis and Harris, 2008) 
18 Checklists Offshore installations and maritime transportation, computer-controlled systems, chemical and process industries, 
technical systems (Goud et al., 2000; Leveson, 1995; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Kontovas, 2005; Vinnem, 1998) 
19 Coarse risk analysis (also known as energy 
analysis or Preliminary Hazard Analysis - PHA) 
Chemical and process industries, geographical area enterprise, maritime transportation, offshore installations, 
technical systems (Wang, 2002; Goud et al., 2000; Kjellén, 2000; Huang, 2012; Vinnem, 1998; Aven, 1992, 2008) 
20 Cognitive Reliability Analysis Method 
(CREAM) 
Offshore installations (Vinnem et al., 2009) 
21 Comparison analysis Technical systems (Kjellén, 2000) 
22 Computer Hazard and Operability (CHAZOP) 
studies 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
23 Computer modelling and simulation Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
24 Computerised Operator Reliability and Error 
Database (CORE-DATA) 
Offshore installations (Vinnem et al., 2009) 
25 Concept Hazard Analysis (CHA) (also known 
as concept safety review) 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
26 Content analysis Maritime transportation (Ikeagwuani and John, 2013) 
27 Crisis Intervention and Operability Analysis 
(CRIOP) 
Technical systems (Kjellén, 2000) 
28 Critical Examination of System Safety (CEx) Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
29 Critical Incident Technique (CIT) Human-centred systems, maritime transportation, civil aviation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and 
Lamoureux, 2003; Jarvis, 2010) 
30 Data mining Maritime transportation (Ikeagwuani and John, 2013) 
31 Decision trees Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
32 Decision-action diagrams Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
33 DEFI method Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
34 Development of risk scenarios Civil aviation, offshore helicopter transportation (CASA, 2009; CAA, 2010c) 
35 Documentation review Human-centred systems, maritime transportation, civil aviation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and 
Lamoureux, 2003; ICAO, 2012c) 
36 Emergency systems survivability analysis Offshore industry (Brandsæter, 2002) 
37 Ergonomic checklists Human-centred systems (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992) 
38 Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
39 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Chemical and process industries, complex socio-technical systems, computer-controlled systems, human-centred-
338 
 
 
 
 
systems, maritime transportation, offshore installations, technical systems (Trucco and Leva, 2007; Sklet, 2004; 
Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Leveson, 1995; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Webb and 
Lamoureux, 2003; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; Aven, 1992, 2008; Vinnem et al., 2009; Ren et al., 2008; Wang, 2002; 
Kjellén, 2000) 
40 Event-driven process chain Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
41 Experience from previous studies Offshore installations, offshore helicopter transportation (Vinnem, 1998; Herrera et al., 2010a; Hokstad et al., 1999; 
Hokstad et al., 2001) 
42 Expert judgement Maritime transportation, offshore helicopter transportation (Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 
2004; Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006; CAA, 2010c; Herrera et al., 2010a; Hokstad et al., 2001; Hokstad et al., 1999) 
43 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Chemical and process industries, complex socio-technical systems, computer-controlled systems, engineering 
applications, human-centred-systems, maritime transportation, offshore installations, system of systems, technical 
systems (Goud et al., 2000; Kazaras et al., 2014; Leveson, 1995; Paté-Cornell, 2002; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; 
Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Cicek and Celik, 2013; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; 
Aven, 1992, 2008; Ren et al., 2008; Alexander and Kelly, 2013; Kjellén, 2000) 
44 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) 
Chemical and process industries, computer-controlled systems, offshore installations, maritime transportation 
(Goud et al., 2000; Leveson, 1995; Huang, 2012; Brandsæter, 2002; Wang, 2002) 
45 Fault hazard analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
46 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Aerospace exploration, air traffic management, chemical and process industries, civil aviation, complex socio-
technical systems, computer-controlled systems, human-centred systems, maritime transportation, offshore 
installations, technical systems (NASA, 2002; Brooker, 2004; Goud et al., 2000; Lu et al., 2005; Fernández-Muñiz 
et al., 2007; Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Kazaras et al., 2014; Leveson, 1995; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; 
Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Labib and Read, 2013; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; 
Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; Aven, 1992, 2008; Vinnem et al., 2009; Ren et al., 2008; Wang, 2002; Kjellén, 2000) 
47 Feedback from training Civil aviation (CASA, 2009; ICAO, 2012c) 
48 Flight data analysis programs Civil aviation, offshore helicopter transportation (CASA, 2009; ICAO, 2012c; OGP, 2013a) 
49 Flow charts Complex-socio-technical systems, human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Webb 
and Lamoureux, 2003; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992) 
50 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Maritime transportation, offshore installations (Hu et al., 2007; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Rosqvist and 
Tuominen, 2004; Soares and Teixeira, 2001; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Kontovas, 2005; Wang, 2002) 
51 Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) System of systems (Alexander and Kelly, 2013) 
52 Functional failure modes and effects analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
53 Functional Integrated Hazard Identification 
(FIHI) 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
54 Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) 
Complex socio-technical systems, air traffic control, offshore helicopter transportation (Nouvel et al., 2007; 
Hollnagel, 2012; Herrera et al., 2010a) 
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55 Fuzzy Extended Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA)  Maritime transportation (Celik et al., 2010) 
56 Fuzzy-logic-based approach to qualitative safety 
modelling 
Maritime transportation (Huang, 2012) 
57 GEMS (General Error Modelling System) Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
58 Goal-Oriented Failure Analysis (GOFA) Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
59 Graphe de Commande Etat-Transition 
(GRAFCET) 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
60 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies Air traffic control, chemical and process industries, computer-controlled systems, offshore installations, maritime 
transportation, system of systems, technical systems (Vinnem, 1998; Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002; Goud et al., 2000; 
Trucco and Leva, 2007; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; Leveson, 1995; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Huang, 2012; 
Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Kontovas, 2005; Aven, 1992, 2008; Brandsæter, 2002; 
Deacon et al., 2010, 2013; Ren et al., 2008; Wang, 2002; OGP, 2011; Alexander and Kelly, 2013; Kjellén, 2000) 
61 Hazard checklist Offshore installations (Brandsæter, 2002) 
62 Hazard indices Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
63 Hazard review Offshore installations (Brandsæter, 2002) 
64 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) Chemical and process industries, offshore installations, human-centred systems, maritime transportation, civil 
aviation, offshore helicopter transportation (Goud et al., 2000; Deacon et al., 2013; Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; 
Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Harris et al., 2005; Nascimento, 2009; Wilke et al., 2014) 
65 Human factors studies Maritime transportation, civil aviation (Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Lenné et al., 2008) 
66 Human Hazard and Operability studies (Human 
HAZOP) 
Complex socio-technical systems (Kazaras et al., 2014) 
67 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Technical systems, offshore installations, chemical and process industries, maritime transportation (Goud et al., 
2000; Trucco and Leva, 2007; Deacon et al., 2013; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; 
Soares and Teixeira, 2001; Aven, 1992) 
68 Human Reliability Management System 
(HRMS) 
Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
69 Influence Diagram (ID) Complex socio-technical systems, offshore installations; nuclear and chemical installations, civil aviation 
(Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Vinnem et al., 2009; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
70 Information exchange systems (similar 
operators, regulators, etc.) 
Civil aviation (CASA, 2009; ICAO, 2012c) 
71 Inherent hazard analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
72 Integrated Computer-Aided Manufacturing 
Definition for Function Modelling (IDEFØ) 
Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
73 Integrated definition methodology Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
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74 Integrated Safety Model (ISM)  Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
75 Interface analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
76 Interface hazard analysis technique System of systems (Alexander and Kelly, 2013) 
77 Interface surveys Human-centred systems (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992) 
78 Interviews Human-centred systems, maritime transportation, civil aviation, offshore helicopter transportation (Kirwan and 
Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; ICAO, 2012c; Nascimento, 2009) 
79 I-Risk model Complex socio-technical systems, offshore installations; nuclear and chemical installations, civil aviation (Kazaras 
et al., 2014; Vinnem et al., 2009; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
80 Job safety analysis Individual jobs and equipments, technical systems (Kjellén, 2000; Aven, 1992, 2008) 
81 Link analysis Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
82 Maintenance analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
83 Maintenance and Operability Study (MOp) Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
84 Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) 
Analysis 
Complex socio-technical systems, computer-controlled systems, technical systems (Sklet, 2004; Leveson, 1995; 
Aven, 1992) 
85 Man-Technology-Organisation (MTO) Analysis Complex socio-technical systems (Sklet, 2004) 
86 Method Organised Systematic Analysis of Risk 
(MOSAR) 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
87 Model Based on Relative Risk Assessment 
(MRRA) 
Maritime transportation (Hu et al., 2007) 
88 Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical 
Influence Network (MACHINE) 
Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
89 Monitoring of normal operations Civil aviation (CASA, 2009; ICAO, 2012c) 
90 Monte Carlo simulation System of systems, civil aviation (Alexander and Kelly, 2013; Aven, 2008; Stolzer et al., 2008) 
91 Network modelling Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
92 Observation Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
93 Omega factor model  Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
94 Operational Conditional Safety (OTS) Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
95 Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSD) Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
96 Operator task analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
97 Optimum risk analysis Complex process industries (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007) 
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98 Organizational Risk Influence Model (ORIM) Nuclear, chemical and offshore installations, civil aviation (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
99 Path Analysis  Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
100 Pattern Search Method Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
101 Petri-nets Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
102 Potential Human Error and Cause Analysis 
(PHECA) 
Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
103 Predictive Bayesian approach Maritime transportation (Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2004) 
104 Predictive human error analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
105 Procedural HAZOP Chemical and process industries, offshore installations (Goud et al., 2000; Brandsæter, 2002) 
106 Procedure analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
107 Questionnaires Human-centred systems, offshore helicopter transportation, civil aviation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; CAA, 
1997; NASA, 2004, 2009) 
108 Regulatory Impact Diagrams (RID) Maritime transportation (Soares and Teixeira, 2001; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004) 
109 Reliability block diagram Chemical and process industries, maritime transportation (Goud et al., 2000; Labib and Read, 2013) 
110 Reliability data statistics Technical systems (Aven, 1992) 
111 Review of standards, codes of practice, 
literature 
Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
112 Risk influencing factors (RIF) Offshore installations, offshore helicopter operations (Vinnem et al., 2009; Herrera et al., 2010a; Hokstad et al., 
1999, 2001)  
113 Risk matrix Chemical and process industries, engineering applications, offshore installations, maritime transportation, offshore 
helicopter operations (Goud et al., 2000; Paté-Cornell, 2002; Deacon et al., 2013; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; 
Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; Deacon et al., 2010; Wang, 2002; CAA, 2010c) 
114 Root-cause analysis Complex socio technical systems, offshore helicopter transportation (Saleh et al., 2010; Ross and Gibb, 2008; OGP, 
2012b) 
115 Safety audits and inspections Chemical and process industries, offshore installations, civil aviation, offshore helicopter transportation (Goud et 
al., 2000; Brandsæter, 2002; CASA, 2009; OGP, 2013a) 
116 Safety Culture Hazard and Operability 
(SCHAZOP) studies 
Complex socio-technical systems (Kazaras et al., 2014) 
117 Safety Management and Organisation Review 
Technique (SMORT) 
Technical systems (Aven, 1992) 
118 Safety surveys Civil aviation, offshore helicopter transportation, maritime transportation (CASA, 2009; Webb and Lamoureux, 
2003; CAA, 1997; Herrera et al., 2010a) 
119 Simulation analysis  Maritime transportation, offshore installations (Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006; Almaz et al., 2012; Wang, 2002) 
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120 Simulator-based Hazard Analysis (SimHAZAN) System of systems (Alexander and Kelly, 2013) 
121 Skill-, Rule-, Knowledge- (SRK) Analysis Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
122 Sneak analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
123 Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA)  Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
124 State Chart Diagram Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
125 State machine hazard analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
126 State-transition diagrams Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
127 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
128 Structural reliability analysis Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
129 Structured methods (e.g., Structured Analysis 
and Design Technique - SADT) 
Complex socio-technical systems, chemical and process industries (Mohaghegh et al., 2009; Goud et al., 2000) 
130 Structured What-If Analysis Technique 
(SWIFT) 
Maritime transportation, offshore installations (Kontovas, 2005; Aven, 2008; Brandsæter, 2002) 
131 Success Likelihood Index Method - Multi-
Attribute Utility Decomposition (SLIM-
MAUD) 
Offshore installations (Vinnem et al., 2009) 
132 System Dynamics (SD) Complex socio-technical systems (Mohaghegh et al., 2009) 
133 System-Action-Management (SAM) Approach Complex socio-technical systems; nuclear, chemical, offshore industries, civil aviation (Kazaras et al., 2014; 
Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
134 Systematic Human Error Reduction and 
Prediction Approach (SHERPA) 
Maritime transportation, civil aviation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Harris et al., 2005) 
135 Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and 
Processes (STAMP) 
Complex socio-technical systems, civil aviation (Leveson, 2004; Kazaras et al., 2014; Kontogiannis, 2012; 
Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2011) 
136 Tabular task analysis Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
137 Task analysis Chemical and process industries, offshore helicopter transportation (Goud et al., 2000; Nascimento, 2009) 
138 Task and human error analysis techniques Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
139 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) 
Computer-controlled systems, maritime transportation, offshore installations (Leveson, 1995; Webb and 
Lamoureux, 2003; Vinnem et al., 2009) 
140 Technique for Retrospective Analysis of 
Cognitive Errors / Human Error Retrospective 
Analysis (TRACER/HERA) 
Maritime transportation (Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
141 Timeline analysis Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
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142 Verbal protocol Human-centred systems, maritime transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; Webb and Lamoureux, 2003) 
143 Vulnerability assessment Chemical and process industries (Goud et al., 2000) 
144 Walk-/talk-through Human-centred systems, maritime transportation, offshore helicopter transportation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; 
Webb and Lamoureux, 2003; Nascimento, 2009) 
145 What-if analysis Chemical and process industries, maritime transportation, offshore installations (Goud et al., 2000; Fernández-
Muñiz et al., 2007; Ikeagwuani and John, 2013; Kontovas, 2005; Brandsæter, 2002) 
146 Work Process Analysis Model (WPAM) Complex socio-technical systems, offshore installations; nuclear and chemical installations, civil aviation (Kazaras 
et al., 2014; Vinnem et al., 2009; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) 
147 Work safety analysis Computer-controlled systems (Leveson, 1995) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Datasets recommended for use in hazard identification in 
aviation, organised by the attributes of the datasets 
 
Yantiss (2011) 
Safety Management Manual 
(ICAO, 2012c) 
Corporate organisational sources, i.e., work of the safety department Internal data sources 
 
Audit results 
 
Voluntary reporting systems 
 
Flight data 
 
Mandatory reporting systems 
 
Operational procedures 
 
Safety surveys 
Individual source 
 
Safety audits 
 
Employee reports of threats and errors 
 
Feedback from training 
External sources 
 
Investigation and follow-up on accident reports 
 
The view of the CAA inspectors over the hazards in the company 
 
Investigation and follow-up on incidents reports 
Reactive safety data External data sources 
 
Incident investigation 
 
Industry accident reports 
 
Accident investigation 
 
State mandatory incident reporting system 
 
Employee safety reports 
 
State voluntary incident reporting system 
 
Flight data analysis (FDA) 
 
State oversight audits 
 
Regulatory violations 
 
Information exchange systems 
 
Debriefing with crews involved in accidents/incidents Reactive 
Proactive/predictive safety data 
 
Mandatory occurrence reports (MOR) 
 
Safety risk management panel (SRMP) 
 
Incident reports 
 
On-site safety/quality audits 
 
Accident reports 
 
Flight data analysis Proactive 
 
Line operations safety audit (LOSA) 
 
Surveys 
 
Safety studies 
 
Audits 
Existing hazards 
 
Voluntary hazard reporting 
 
People's reports Predictive 
 
On-site audits 
 
Flight data analysis (FDA) 
 
Flight data analysis (FDA) 
 
Direct observation systems 
 
Regular feedback 
  Predicted hazards 
  
 
Safety risk management panel (SRMP) 
  
 
Business Process Engineering Team (BPET) 
  
 
Joint Quality Review Team (operators & regulator) 
  
 
Continuous Improvement Team (e.g., using Six Sigma toolkit) 
  
 
FAA (2006) Arendt and Adamski (2011) Stolzer et al. (2008) 
System and task analysis System and task analysis Task analysis 
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Aviation Risk Management 
Solutions (ARMS Working 
Group, 2010) Transport Canada  (2008) 
Safety reporting Internal reporting systems: employee, service provider, customer, industry 
partner input 
 Air safety reports Corporate experience, workplace opinions 
 Cabin safety reports Line management judgement on the operating environment 
 Maintenance safety reports Safety audits of all aspects of operation, including third-parties, non-regulated 
entities and contractors 
 Ground safety reports Safety assessment of company processes 
 Confidential reports Trend and pattern analysis 
 Human factors reports Site inspections: hangar, airport, flight line 
 Mandatory occurrence reports 
(MOR) 
Quality assurance reviews 
Surveys Accident data review 
Questionnaires Incident data review 
Flight data monitoring 
(FDM/FDA/FOQA) 
Industry generic hazard register: ASRS, association lists, ICAO information 
Observing the operation Safety data recording systems, e.g., CADORS and GAIN 
 Line operations safety audit (LOSA) Data monitoring: FDM, maintenance monitoring, reliability data, airport 
incident statistics 
 Line operations assessment system 
(LOAS) 
Active behavioural monitoring: LOSA, MOSA (maintenance operations safety 
audit), DOSA (dispatch operations safety audit), observe people as they perform 
their work Learning from own people 
 Moderated sessions with groups of 
internal experts 
 
 Brainstorm new hazards  
 Elaborate on known hazards  
 Other operators  
 Conferences  
 Publications  
 
CASA (2009) EU Commission (2011) 
Safety surveys Information exchange 
Brain-storming using experienced operational 
personnel 
Ramp inspection forms from the Safety of Foreign Aircraft Programme 
(SAFA) 
Development of risk scenarios Occurrence reports integrated into the ECR 
Trend analysis Oversight audits, including EASA Standardisation Inspections 
Feedback from training Investigation and follow-up of incidents 
Operational oversight safety audits Accident reports 
Information exchange systems (e.g., similar operators, regulators) 
State investigations of serious incidents 
  State investigations of accidents 
  Flight data analysis programmes 
  Monitoring of normal operations 
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APPENDIX 4 
Brief explanation of the phases of helicopter flight 
(adapted from Teixeira, 2006) 
 
 
 
Flight phases Definitions 
Pre-flight Crew boards the aircraft with the intention to fly, after having signed off the maintenance 
records accepting the aircraft as airworthy. Pre-flight inspection occurs. 
Engine start At least one engine has experienced rotation 
Taxi out Helicopter has moved on the ground before flight (only for helicopters equipped with 
wheels)  
Hover out Helicopter has become airborne with no speed, before flight 
Air taxi out Helicopter has become airborne (close to the ground), moving at a slow speed before flight 
Takeoff The helicopter has departed its origin to accomplish its mission 
Climb Helicopter has ascended en-route from point A to point B 
Cruise Helicopter has achieved level flight en-route from point A to point B 
Descent Helicopter has left level flight for arrival at point B 
Final approach Helicopter has commenced preparation for landing 
Go around Helicopter commenced the final approach. However, for any unexpected reason, it was 
obligated to abort the landing 
Air taxi in Helicopter has completed the arrival, but is in the air (close to the ground) moving at slow 
speed 
Hover in Helicopter has remained airborne after arrival, with no speed 
Landing Helicopter touches down after arrival 
Touch and go After landing, due to any unexpected reason, helicopter was obligated to takeoff 
Taxi in Helicopter has moved on the ground (on its wheels) after flight 
Engine stop Engines have been shut down. Post-flight inspection occurs 
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APPENDIX 5 
Countries where offshore helicopter operations were 
identified to occur 
 
Country, accident investigation authority and last date of search for accident reports 
1 Angola 
 
Instituto Nacional de Aviação Civil 
 
http://www.inavic.gv.ao/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
2 Argentina 
 
Junta de Inverstigación de Accidentes de Aviación Civil 
 
http://www.jiaac.gov.ar/ 
 
14-Jun-13 
3 Australia 
 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/index.aspx?mode=avi  
 
06-Apr-12 
4 Azerbaijan 
 
Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) 
 
http://www.mak.ru/english/english.html 
 
05-Apr-12 
5 Belgium 
 
Air Accident Investigation Unit (Belgium) 
 
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/fr/index.htm 
 
07-Apr-12 
6 Brazil 
 
Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (CENIPA) 
 
http://www.cenipa.aer.mil.br/cenipa/paginas/index_dipaa.php 
 
09-Apr-12 
7 Cameroon 
 
Cameroon Civil Aviation Authority 
 
http://www.ccaa.aero/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
8 Canada 
 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
 
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/index.asp 
 
07-Apr-12 
9 Chile 
 
Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil 
 
http://www.dgac.gob.cl/portal/page?_pageid=315,151771&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
 
14-Jun-13 
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10 China 
 
Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aviation Administration of China 
 
http://www.caac.gov.cn/  
 
09-Apr-12 
11 Congo 
 
Direction Générale de l’Agence Nationale de l’Aviation Civile 
 
Not available online 
 
09-Apr-12 
12 Denmark 
 
Accident Investigation Board Denmark 
 
http://www.hcl.dk/sw1072.asp 
 
07-Apr-12 
13 Estonia 
 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 
 
http://www.mkm.ee/index.php?id=366854 
 
07-Apr-12 
14 Finland 
 
Accident Investigation Board 
 
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/2605.htm 
 
07-Apr-12 
15 Germany 
 
Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU) 
 
http://www.bfu-
web.de/cln_016/nn_226462/EN/Publications/Investigation_20Report/reports__node,param2=hu
bschrauber.html 
 
07-Apr-12 
16 Greece 
 
Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board 
 
http://www.aaiasb.gr/en.html 
 
07-Apr-12 
17 India 
 
Directorate General of Civil Aviation 
 
http://www.dgca.gov.in/accident/reports/contents_acc_rep.htm 
 
09-Apr-12 
18 Indonesia 
 
Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Udara 
 
http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/aaic.htm 
 
07-Apr-12 
19 Iran 
 
Civil Aviation Organization 
 
http://www.cao.ir/portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=2887debf-4ed9-423e-847a-
7cd864b93709 
 
09-Apr-12 
20 Ireland 
 
Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) 
 
http://www.aaiu.ie/aviation/aaiu/reportsevent/index.asp?lang=ENG&loc=1280 
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08-Apr-12 
21 Italy 
 
Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo 
 
http://www.ansv.it/It/Main.asp?Area=yyy  
 
07-Apr-12 
22 Japan 
 
Japan Transport Safety Board 
 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/airrep.html 
 
11-Mar-12 
23 Malaysia 
 
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia 
 
http://www.dca.gov.my/mainpage.html# 
 
09-Apr-12 
24 Maldives 
 
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority 
 
http://www.aviainfo.gov.mv/publications/accidents/history.php  
 
09-Apr-12 
25 Mexico 
 
Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes 
 
Not available online 
 
06-Apr-12 
26 Mozambique 
 
Instituto Nacional de Aviação Civil de Moçambique 
 
http://www.mtc.gov.mz/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=50&Itemid=164 
 
09-Apr-12 
27 Myanmar 
 
Department of Civil Aviation 
 
Not available online 
 
06-Apr-12 
28 Namibia 
 
Directorate of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 
 
http://www.mwtc.gov.na/download.php 
 
09-Apr-12 
29 Netherlands 
 
Dutch Safety Board 
 
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.php/onderzoeken/afgerond/sector/luchtvaart/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
30 New Zealand 
 
Transport Accident Investigation Commission 
 
http://www.taic.org.nz/ReportsandSafetyRecs/AviationReports/tabid/78/language/en-
US/Default.aspx 
 
26-Mar-12 
31 Nigeria 
 
Accident Investigation Bureau 
 
http://aib.gov.ng/reports.aspx 
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08-Apr-12 
32 Norway 
 
Accident Investigation Board Norway 
 
http://www.aibn.no/default.asp?ACTION=ITEM_SEARCH&SEARCH_ID=88&V_ITEM_ID=
747&EQ_F_F266=&EQ_F_name=&EQ_F_TEXTINDEX= 
 
08-Apr-12 
33 Panama 
 
Unidad de Prevención e Investigación de Accidentes 
 
http://www.aeronautica.gob.pa/accind/index.html 
 
09-Apr-12 
34 Portugal 
 
Gabinete de Prevenção e Investigação de Acidentes com Aeronaves 
 
http://www.gpiaa.gov.pt/cs2.asp?idcat=1026 
 
09-Apr-12 
35 Qatar 
 
Department of Civil Aviation and Meteorology 
 
Not available online 
 
06-Apr-12 
36 Russia 
 
Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) 
 
http://www.mak.ru/english/english.html 
 
05-Apr-12 
37 Saudi Arabia 
 
Aviation Investigation Bureau 
 
http://www.gaca.gov.sa/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
38 Singapore 
 
Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) 
 
http://app.mot.gov.sg/Air_Transport/Air_Accident_Investigation_Bureau_(AAIB)/Reports_Ava
ilable_from_AAIB.aspx 
 
09-Apr-12 
39 South Africa 
 
South African Civil Aviation Authority 
 
http://www.caa.co.za/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
40 South Korea 
 
Aviation & Railway Accident Investigation Board 
 
http://www.araib.go.kr/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
41 Spain 
 
Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC) 
 
http://www.fomento.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/ORG
ANOS_COLEGIADOS/CIAIAC/INVESTIGACION/ 
 
09-Apr-12 
43 Sweden 
 
Board of Accident Investigation 
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http://www.havkom.se/index-eng.html 
 
09-Apr-12 
44 Switzerland 
 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau 
 
http://www.bfu.admin.ch/en/dokumentation_berichte_suchen.htm 
 
09-Apr-12 
45 Taiwan 
 
Aviation Safety Council 
 
http://www.asc.gov.tw/asc_en/accident_list_1.asp 
 
09-Apr-12 
46 Thailand 
 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of Thailand (AAIC) 
 
http://www.aviation.go.th/index_en.htm 
 
09-Apr-12 
47 UAE 
 
General Civil Aviation Authority 
 
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/epublication/pages/investigationreport.aspx 
 
09-Apr-12 
48 UK 
 
Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
 
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/index.cfm 
 
07-Apr-12 
49 Ukraine 
 
Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) 
 
http://www.mak.ru/english/english.html 
 
05-Apr-12 
50 USA 
 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
 
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp#query_start 
  28-Mar-12 
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APPENDIX 6 
Questionnaire survey 
 
 
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine 
London-UK, October the 18th, 2011 
 
Nighttime Offshore Helicopter Operations Questionnaire 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thank you for participating on this survey.  
Nighttime offshore helicopter operations are predicted to increase worldwide in the near 
future. However, little scientific knowledge exists on the risks associated with such an 
activity. This questionnaire was created to obtain information on nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations from key people actively involved in it. 
Answering this questionnaire is expected to take approximately 30 minutes of your time. You 
should address the questions based on your operational experience, however large or little it 
might appear to you. The information you provide us will be used solely to enhance 
understanding of the issues associated with nighttime offshore helicopter operations needed 
for the PhD dissertation developing in this area. 
All your answers will be treated confidentially. As it is our intention that you return this 
questionnaire to us by e-mail (f.a.c.nascimento@imperial.ac.uk), the e-mail box you use to 
return it to us and your affiliations (e.g., the company you work for) will also be treated as 
confidential information. 
If you wish to make any comments, complaints or suggestions, please use the relevant spaces 
on the questionnaire, or feel free to contact us directly. We will be delighted to receive your 
communication and will answer you promptly. 
Finally, should you accepted being contacted in case further clarifications are desired, or if 
you wish to know of the outcome of this survey, please leave your contact details at the end 
of the questionnaire. 
Once more, thank you very much for your time and effort. 
Best regards, 
Felipe A. C. Nascimento, CPL(H) CPL(A) MSc 
PhD Candidate in Transport Risk Management 
The Lloyd's Register Educational Trust Transport Risk Management Centre 
Centre for Transport Studies 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Imperial College London 
South Kensington campus 
London SW7 2AZ  
U.K. 
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PART 1: PARTICIPANT'S CREDENTIALS 
            Age   
        
            Gender Male   
 
Female   
      
            
License ATPL(H)   
 
CPL(H)   
 
Other (please specify): 
 
            Rank Captain   
 
First officer   
 
Other (please specify):   
            Instructors TRI   
 
TRE   
 
Other (please specify):   
(please consider 
offshore training only) 
           Time as an offshore instructor: 
   
Flying hours Total (H): 
   
  
  
 
IFR (H):  
   
  
  
 
Night (H): 
   
  
  
 
Other (please specify): 
 
  
  
            Number of night deck landings: 
   
  
  
            Time since last nighttime flight offshore: 
  
          
  
            Time working as an offshore helicopter pilot (continuously or not):    
  
            Are you currently employed to any of the following positions? 
 
Safety 
    
            
       
Operations 
   
        
  
  
       
Management 
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Not risky at all Somewhat risky Very risky
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.    Parked, rotors/engine(s) not running
2.    Parked, rotors/engine(s) running
3.    Hovering before positioning/taxiing for takeoff
4.    Positioning/taxiing before takeoff
5.    Visual segment of takeoff/ initial climb segment
6.    Instrument climb
7.    Instrument cruise
8.    Instrument descent
9.    Instrument approach
10. Visual segment of the approach
11. Positioning/taxiing after the approach
12. Hovering after approach/before landing
13. Landing
14. Go around manoeuvre in the instrument segments of the approach
15. Go around manoeuvre in the visual segment of the approach
PART 2: RISK[1] PER FLIGHT PHASE
Please consider flights to and from offshore installations (platforms/ships) only in perfectly serviceable helicopters (i.e., with 
no malfunctions). Based on your operational experience, how risky are the following phases of nighttime flight? Please rate 
them on the scales provided, where zero means ‘not risky at all’, five means ‘somewhat risky’ and 10 means ‘very risky’.
If there is any other phase of flight that we should consider, please specify and rate it here:
If you want to make any comment, please do so here:
[1] Risk is defined as the likelihood that an adverse event of damaging consequences might happen.
PART 3: FURTHER PARTICIPATION AND FEEDBACK 
                          
If you would be OK with being contacted for further clarifications on your answers, please leave your 
contacts here: 
If you would like to receive feedback about the outcome of this survey, please leave your contact here: 
 
Thank you for you time and effort. Your participation is greatly appreciated. 
 
 
357 
 
 
 
 
  
358 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 7 
List of companies and institutions contacted for the 
questionnaire survey 
 
 Gulf of Mexico 
 
Far East 
 
PHI Helicopters 
  
CHC Thailand 
 
Era Helicopters 
 
Australia 
 
International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) 
  
Australian HST 
 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical university 
  
Flight Safety Foundation 
 
University of Southern Florida 
  
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
North Sea 
 
CIS 
 
CHC (UK, Norway and Netherlands) 
  
Interstate Aviation Committee 
 
Bristow (UK and Norway) 
  
UTAir 
 
Bond (UK) 
 
Africa 
 
DanCopter (Denmark) 
  
DanCopter 
 
NHV (Belgium) 
  
NHV 
California 
  
HeliUnión 
 
Arctic Air Service 
 
Europe except the North Sea 
Alaska 
  
INAER Spain 
 
Era Helicopters 
  
INAER Italy 
Canada 
   
 
Canadian Helicopter Safety Team (HST) 
   
 
Heliflight Phoenix 
   
 
Cougar Air Services 
   Mexico 
   
 
PEMEX 
   Brazil 
   
 
Aeróleo Taxi Aéreo 
   
 
BHS 
   
 
Líder Aviação 
   
 
Omni Brasil 
   
 
Senior Taxi Aéreo 
   Middle East 
   
 
Gulf HST 
   
 
Saudi Aramco 
   India 
   
 
Indian HST 
     PAHN       
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APPENDIX 8 
Template evolution 
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APPENDIX 9 
Story integrating the hazards of helicopter night visual 
approach segments in the North Sea (Nascimento, 2009) 
 
The problems that offshore helicopter pilots face while flying visual night approaches over 
the sea relate to perceptual constraints caused by illusive, insufficient or absent visual cues 
to support flight conducted with external references. These conditions can be worsened by 
some particular environmental states. 
Perceptual constraints can result in handling difficulties, mainly in the form of flawed speed 
control, or height mishandling, most often causing the aircraft to descend excessively. 
However, there are strategies to overcome perceptual sets. These are adequate attention 
allocation and/or automation usage, though they can also be flawed. 
Attention allocation takes the form of switching between instrument and visual scans. This 
practice is regarded as a non-intuitive skill and has to be learned. However, due to the 
seasonal characteristics of night flying over the North Sea, coupled with the low frequency of 
night flights even in winter, those skills perish and have to be re-learned every winter season. 
Other training resources, in particular simulators, might be either inadequate or not 
explored in a consistent manner. 
The strategy concerning automation usage is to keep the autopilot upper modes engaged 
beyond the DR [i.e., decision range]. This requires only de-coupling the autopilot and 
assuming manual control of the aircraft in such a position whereby visual cues are deemed 
enough for an approach with reference to the external features of the installation. 
Attention allocation strategy is to be assisted by the NHP [i.e., non-handling pilot, also 
known as the monitoring pilot] giving a talk-down of the aircraft’s flying state (height, speed, 
rate of climb or descent, and distance to destination), in order to enhance the HP‘s 
awareness of the ongoing situation. This talk-down, in turn, is grounded in one of two 
factors: 
• Experience, i.e. through repetition and observation over time pilots get to know 
what is appropriate to be talked-down and in what frequency; and/or 
• Standard calls coupled with standard flight profiles, in the form of “gates” to be 
met in space, which are specified heights and speeds as a function of distance to 
the destination. The latter though, is not always present across the operators or 
consistently followed by the pilots.  
Crew cooperation issues might therefore contribute to attentional problems by insufficient, 
excessive or unfamiliar talking-down. Furthermore, should intervention on flight controls be 
needed by the NHP in order to keep a safe flight profile, transfer of control might suffer. 
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The automation use strategy is constrained by autopilot limitations due to the minimum 
coupling speeds required for use of its upper modes. For example often the helicopters used 
in the NNS [i.e., Northern North Sea] cannot maintain coupled modes at the slow speeds 
required for visually referenced manoeuvring in proximity to the installation.  This means 
that the transfer to manual flight has by necessity to take place at a higher speed, and hence, 
at a greater distance from the offshore installation, with the associated reduction in visual 
reference. In this case, the available option for approach reverts to the attention switching 
strategy aided by NHP talk-down.  
Occasionally, pilots seem to face problems with decision-making in being tempted to reduce 
altitude when inadvertently thrown into IMC (either by mishandled height or lowering 
ceiling), and trying to regain VMC. Another issue might be delaying the decision at the MAP 
[i.e., the missed approach point, which coincides with the DR], when reaching such position 
under IMC, in the hope of getting visual contact later, so as to proceed visually to land. The 
consequence might be the onset of perceptual problems which may cause handling 
difficulties. Reasons for such decisions seem to lie beyond the cockpit, on operators’ adverse 
state or some external pressure. 
Some problems are due to the rig and its surroundings, mainly in the form of inaccurate 
weather reports which lead to wrongly prepared visual segments (e.g., approaching out of 
the wind, or not getting visual when expected due to lower cloud base and/or worse visibility 
than reported). In addition, unlit or wrongly positioned obstacles can interfere with the 
helicopter’s path, as can boats in the safe sector beneath the aircraft’s trajectory. 
Finally, pilots also have concerns about the limits which they must abide by while 
approaching offshore installations, i.e. 0.75 nautical miles and 300 feet (or helideck height 
plus 50 feet, whichever is greater) for the nighttime ARA, which some deem excessively low 
for non-precision approaches. 
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APPENDIX 10 
Development of the story integrating the hazards of helicopter 
night visual approach segments in Brazil 
 
The links between the codes of the template (Appendix 9), which are identified through the 
iterative categorisation process of Template Analysis are shown in the Table A10 below. 
Such links led to the conceptual integration of categories in the story presented next. The 
numbers in the table correspond to specific phrases highlighted in superscript brackets [] in 
the story, which typify the links that are identified. 
Table A10 - Links between higher order codes that formed the story 
Rows contributing to columns 
A
 -
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B
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I 
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J 
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g 
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s 
L
 –
 E
xt
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na
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e 
M
 –
 O
ve
rs
ig
ht
 to
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e 
A - Perceptual problems 
   
7 
         
B - Attentional problems 2 
            
C – Decision Problems 
             
D – Handling problems  
             
E – Adverse operator state 
 
4 
   
5 
       
F – CRM issues 
 
3 
           
G – Human-aircraft interface problems 6 
            
H – Procedures 
 
14 
           
I – Interface with the destination 8 9/11 
 
10 
         
J – Environmental aggravators 1 
            
K – Training problems 
 
18 
   
19 
  
20 
    
L – External pressure 
             
M – Oversight tolerance 12 13/17 
     
15 16 
 
21/2
2 
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Story 
Pilots perceive that the problems that they face while flying offshore nighttime approaches 
in south-eastern Brazil result from three main issues: visual spatial disorientation, 
destination issues and flawed safety oversights. 
Visual Spatial Disorientation 
Because of illusory, absent or insufficient visual cues at the Missed Approach Point 
(MAP) of their instrument descent procedures, pilots could find that flying strictly using 
external visual references is not truly feasible after that point. These perceptual 
constraints can be aggravated by specific environmental conditions, such as rain, drizzle, 
patchy low level clouds or a lack of celestial illumination[1]. 
Against such perceptual limitations, pilots often employ two strategies: ‘adequate 
attention allocation’ and/or an ‘extended usage of aircraft capabilities’. The latter refers 
to the continued use of IFR instrumentation and automation (i.e., the auto-pilot’s ‘upper 
modes’) beyond the missed approach point. 
‘Adequate attention allocation’ means that if external visual cues are still deemed 
insufficient for a visually referenced flight after the aircraft reaches the MAP, pilots may 
engage in a process of switching between visual and instrument scan techniques while 
assessing how supportive the external environment is for visual flying. This practice, 
however, is perceived by pilots as requiring a wealth of mental resources[2], and, as such, 
there are concerns over its potential to contribute to flaws in the task execution.  
An effective attention allocation strategy requires, in turn, adequate CRM [i.e., crew 
resource management] practices. Ideally, the non-handling pilot monitors the aircraft 
flight instruments and calls out the parameters that deserve immediate 
attention/intervention. When this task is completed, the handling pilot can then, 
presumably, focus his/her visual scan at the external environment for a longer period than 
at the cockpit instrumentation. This practice, however, requires a set of finely tuned crew 
interaction procedures, the absence of which could result in an increased attentional 
burden to the handling pilot[3], as he/she must continue with internal and external cockpit 
scan techniques at higher rates. 
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Some adverse operator states have been assessed as negatively affecting attentional 
capabilities[4] and CRM practices[5]. Stress, fatigue and dread could decrease pilots’ 
concentration for adequate attention allocation, whereas any excessive self-confidence on 
the part of the pilots could impede proper CRM practices onboard. 
The exploration of aircraft capabilities mainly concerns the use of automation for as long 
as possible on the approach, such that the stabilization and tracking tasks do not add to 
the pilot workload. By keeping the autopilot’s upper modes engaged for a longer time 
period, pilots can put more resources into monitoring visual cues rather than actively 
flying the aircraft. Once closer to their destinations, visual cues should be sufficient for 
pilots to revert to manual flying. This strategy, however, is constrained by the autopilots’ 
capabilities[6], given the speed that is required to disengage its upper modes. A manually 
controlled flight phase is a necessity because current technologies do not provide auto-
land or auto-hover for either passenger ferrying or for medical evacuation (i.e., ‘medvac’) 
offshore helicopters. Other perceptual problems could also occur from high nose-up 
rotorcraft attitudes at low approach speeds, obscuring the view ahead[6], and from 
ineffective windscreen wipers[6], which cause external visual cues to degrade further.  
In any case, unconstrained perceptual sets could translate into handling difficulties[7], 
often in the form of flawed height and/or speed control, which pilots perceive as capable 
of leading to an accident. 
Destination Issues 
The destinations themselves pose additional problems to pilots, primarily because of 
misplaced unlit obstacles that they may not be aware of, improper helideck illumination 
that blends with other lights on the structure, and/or by excessively lit platforms, 
potentially causing visual impairment[8]. 
Unknown obstacles and unclear helidecks consume additional attentional resources[9], 
because pilots must maintain extra vigilance while flying their aircraft. There are 
concerns about near misses with obstacles that could have led to accidents. 
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In addition, some platforms offer few approach path options that are free from turbulent 
airflow or obstacles, potentially leading to aircraft controllability issues[10] and an extra 
attentional burden[11] in terms of the search for obstacles. 
Flawed safety oversight 
The operational problems that are mentioned above are perceived by pilots to stem from 
flawed safety provisions and enforcement, emanating from a combination of insufficient 
infrastructure for properly supporting night flights together with shortcomings in training. 
Lack of infrastructure for night flying 
Only two certified non-directional beacon (NDB) instrument approach procedures 
exist to serve more than 80 platforms within the Campos basin. Therefore, whenever 
pilots need to reach one of the remaining 78 or so platforms that are not fitted with an 
NDB, they are supposed to execute an instrument descent procedure at either of these 
two NDB-equipped platforms, reach their MAP under VMC and then proceed under 
visual flight rules (VFR) to their final destination. However, the distances involved 
often preclude such a procedure at night, because, in effect, the pilots are faced with 
external black-out conditions[12][see Appendix 1]. Hence, pilots must blend 
instrument and visual scan techniques during the navigation task toward their 
intended destination [13] or revert to instrument flying with no formal procedures 
outlined by the regulator[14]. Procedures for this scenario are often developed at a 
company level or on the basis of experience, with practical techniques passed on by 
senior colleagues[15]. 
Because there are no formal platform charts, pilots rely on company-provided 
photographs or past experience to know their destinations’ layouts, their helideck 
location and obstacles to the approach[16]. This procedure is believed to contribute to 
‘close calls’ as well as to add to the attentional burden of having to maintain an 
active external search for obstacles [17]. 
Training shortcomings 
Training is deemed to be fundamental to both the attentional allocation strategy and 
the crew interaction procedures that are mentioned in section above. However, 
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training was assessed by the pilots as being too infrequent for developing the 
attentional[18] and crew interaction[19] skills that are required by the task. This result 
arises from on-demand medvac sorties as well as from service contractual clauses, 
both of which imply that there are few opportunities for training and practicing the 
approach task at offshore installations. 
Training is also deemed to be an important element in developing the awareness of 
the various platform layouts, helideck and obstacle locations. Again, it is assessed as 
too infrequent for such purposes[20]. 
Although deemed to be of paramount importance for both avoiding spatial 
disorientation and for recognizing platform layout, in-flight training is perceived as 
having declined in recent years in favour of simulator-based training. This result 
however, relies on allocating financial resources for hiring simulators abroad and 
requires appropriate simulators to be available. As a consequence, scenario-based 
training for offshore installations appears to be kept to a minimum (annual line 
checks)[21], and even then, it is often unreflective of the environment found in the 
Campos basin, because few foreign platforms are replicated by existing simulator 
databases. Additionally, unrealistic handling qualities appear in some aircraft 
simulation models in low altitude–low airspeed flying regimes. 
Finally, from a managerial viewpoint, planning for training-only sorties over the 
Campos Basin is a bureaucratic ordeal, because the different stakeholders (e.g., the 
air traffic control services, the oil companies that run the destinations, and the 
airports from which the aircraft will operate) must be engaged and coordinated 
before any such sorties can occur[22]. 
All 4 SMES asked to validate the story (see Section 7.5.1 and Table 7-2) were satisfied that 
the story developed was a credible representation of reality in the Brazilian offshore scenario. 
These SMEs were very experienced pilots, each with over 5000 flying hour accrued in the 
Campos basin and over 5 years of experience as the aviation safety officer of their respective 
companies. 
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Discussion 
In common with Nascimento’s (2009) findings for the UK Northern North Sea scenario, 
pilots flying offshore nighttime missions in Brazil also felt prone to spatial disorientation in 
the visual portion of the task, because of a similar interplay of hazards. This observation is 
also in accord with the wider helicopter accident-based research (CAA, 2007; Masson et al., 
2009; Smith and Foster, 1995; Talbot and Webber, 1988; U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety 
Analysis Team, 2011b, a), which emphasizes the hazards of the IFR-VFR transition in 
degraded visual environments. Additionally, there has been prior mention of the problems at 
the interface with the destination (Morrison, 2001; Hart, 2006). 
While decision making was mentioned as one of the emerging codes (Table 8-4), it was 
populated solely by a comment from a single participant and hence, it was not mentioned in 
the story. Further discussions with the collaborating SMEs indicated the possibility that few 
pilots would experience decision-making conflicts under such circumstances, because they 
would tend to opt for safer behaviour by quitting approach attempts in such cases. This result 
also led to filtering out the ‘external pressure’ code of the template because pilots seemed to 
ignore it, as shown by the low frequency of comments and SME input. Alternatively, it was 
speculated that pilots may not have felt keen on disclosing the existence of decision-making 
conflicts during the course of the research. This is commonly associated with the 
underreporting of incidents and serious incidents (see Section 5.2.2). 
The issues encompassed by the ‘flawed safety oversight’ heading (‘training shortcomings’ 
and ‘lack of infrastructure for night flying’) were the focus of the participants’ concerns. 
Indeed, inadequacies of the Brazilian helideck design standards (Marinha do Brasil, 2009) 
that were in force during the course of this investigation have previously been highlighted 
(Quintão, 2010) and identified during the preliminary hazard identification implemented in 
Section 7.4.2. Such inadequacies established a link between participants’ comments on 
‘destination issues’ and ‘lack of infrastructure for night flying’. More recently, however, 
updated helideck design standards were published by the Brazilian regulator (Marinha do 
Brasil, 2011). Whereas such standards are expected to improve safety in nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations, it is important to realize that they can only address a small subset of the 
areas that are in need of intervention. This is confirmed by the plethora of hazards in the 
template developed (Tables 8-3 and 8-4) and investigations in other areas (see Section 2.3.2). 
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With regard to training, although the Brazilian regulation has recently been changed to 
account for the rehearsal of offshore nighttime medvac missions (ICA, 2008), in practice, this 
scenario does not seem to be encouraged, given the interplay of two conditions. First, pilots’ 
nighttime flying currency can be achieved by performing three approaches and take-offs 
within a 90-day period to onshore installations (ANAC, 2010; OGP, 2008). Second, operators 
are required to request the regulator’s permission 15 days in advance if they want to train 
offshore at night (ICA, 2008). As a consequence, planning for offshore nighttime training 
could prove to be an ordeal, as commented upon by the participants: 
‘You have to ‘leave no stone unturned’ to do some training. They [the regulator and oil 
companies] won’t admit it, but this is the truth. You need authorization from the 
regulator. You need authorization from the airport authority. You have to arrange it 
with the person on duty at the airdrome flight information service, because this person 
will have to stay for longer than normal working hours and might have already gone 
home. There is the team on the platform for helicopter operations, which also has other 
assignments and might not be on their rest times. [...] In summary, you have to arrange 
so many things that it becomes a really difficult thing. It should be easier.’ 
Ultimately, scenario-based training may be relegated to annual simulator flights, with the 
drawbacks mentioned in the story, together with the additional load of check rides where 
pilot performance is under evaluation, as opposed to skills-development training-only sorties. 
Participants perceive training and infrastructure as latent conditions that set the stage for both 
visual spatial disorientation and issues with the destination, as follows: existing flaws in 
terms of the infrastructure for nighttime flights have the potential to lead both to spatial 
disorientation on the approach and undesirable near misses when closer to the destination. 
Both of these scenarios increase the need for training. Therefore, it is of concern that training 
was perceived by crews to be in decline. Flawed infrastructure and training shortcomings 
apparently stem from inadequate safety oversight mechanisms. These relationships are 
summarised in the Figure A10 below. 
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Figure A10 – Relationships between pilots’ major areas of concern 
 
These shortcomings could be overcome, for example, by improving the safety regulations 
that govern offshore flight activity, with a view toward smoothing the bureaucracy that is 
needed when arranging for training flights. Additionally, regulations should also ensure that 
the minimum infrastructure for night flying is put into place both en-route (e.g., by the 
installation of differentiating stations for DGPS-based approaches with vertical guidance) and 
at the destinations (e.g., by extrapolation of the ICAO guidance and industry best practices 
for helideck design). Such an enhanced role again requires considerable commitment and 
resources from the relevant authorities and stakeholders. However, given the expected 
increase in offshore helicopter operations, this set of actions is an imperative for Brazil. 
These conclusions have also been further validated by the pilots’ suggestions on how to 
improve safety, as queried during the interview’s question number 5 (see Section 7.4.3.1.1). 
Suggestions concentrated on providing more training and fitting platforms with glide path 
indicators. The former would address ‘training shortcomings’, whereas the latter, when 
proved feasible, could improve the ‘lack of infrastructure for night flights’ to some extent. 
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Although similar shortcomings were previously individually mapped by other authors 
(Gomes et al., 2009; Hart, 2006; Mata et al., 2006; Morrison, 2001), studies uncovering the 
interplay between these factors are absent, despite its importance for effective safety 
promotion. Unveiling the interplay of hazards, as opposed to the hazards in isolation, is a 
unique product of the Task-Based Hazard Identification Survey Process (see Section 7.3). 
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APPENDIX 11 
Definitions of the categories 
1 Visual illusions Refers to participants’ concerns over flying in a potentially illusive environment. It also encompasses illusions caused by the dynamics 
of the nose-up deceleration mechanism of helicopters 
2 Depth and texture perception  Entails concerns expressed by pilots over difficulties in making fair judgments of distance in low visual cueing environment 
3 Seeing small rigs Concerns instances of difficulties in positively identifying the destination before attempting to land on it 
4 Identifying the helideck Encompasses problems in positively finding the helideck amidst the whole offshore installation superstructure 
5 Interpretative ovality technique Refers to problems in executing the descent technique to the helideck 
6 Circling to the far side Identifies concerns while having to circle to reach far side helidecks, with regard to the perceptual demands that such operation imposes 
7 Impaired vision Examples in which excessive illumination in the rig posed problems for participants 
8 Proprioceptive illusion Identifies instances in which illusions caused by the proprioceptive system were identified 
9 Wearing glasses Identifies instances in which wearing glasses was identified as a factor affecting safety duringtask execution 
10 NHP blocked vision Encompasses comments about safety at jeopardy as the NHP cannot attain visual contact with the destination when the HP is flying 
11 Late loss of visual references Gathers comments about instances in which visual references were lost in the latest stages of the approach, yet close to the destination 
structure 
12 Noticing errors Refers to difficulties in picking up own errors while executing the task 
13 Lacking visual cues (i.e., darkness) Refers to a general sense of lacking visual cues for self motion awareness in time and space 
14 Bow decks Refers to perceptual difficulties when operating to bow deck ships 
15 Destination lighting levels 
variability 
Refers to difficulties imposed by the variability of the visual picture required for the approach and landing manoeuvres, as a function of 
different lighting standards of the destinations 
16 Moving vessels Refers to perceptual difficulties in approaching to moving installations 
17 Perceiving surrounding 
environmental conditions 
Refers to difficulties in perceiving degrading weather conditions during night flights 
18 Vestibular illusions Refer to perceptual difficulties as related to the vestibular system 
19 Switching between visual and 
instrument scans 
Refers to difficulties posed by the need to switch attention from instrument to visual scan and vice-versa, even though the whole 
segment is regarded as a visual night approach 
20 Double monitoring breakdown Concerns examples when ultimately no one was scanning the aircraft’s instruments or external visual cues properly 
21 ‘Complacency’ due to exposure 
(habituation) 
Comments on becoming ‘complacent’ over time due to exposure to repetitive stimuli 
22 Cognitive overload Refers to instances in which the workload eventually seemed difficult to cope with while flying night visual approaches 
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23 Mental computation required Refers to attentional demands imposed by the need to mentally collate spread-out information during task execution 
24 Distractions Refers to problems brought by having one’s attention diverted elsewhere whilst executing the task 
25 Fixation Concerns occasions in which one's attention was captured by a single task at the expense of others equally important 
26 Perishable skills Concerns explicit comments about quick decaying on night flying ability when not practiced frequently enough 
27 Going back to VMC when thrown 
into IMC 
Refers to comments on difficulties in resisting the temptation to command the aircraft down to regain Visual Meteorological Conditions 
(VMC) when inadvertently caught up by Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) 
28 Deciding at MAP Comments on the difficulties of taking a clear-cut decision as to whether to approach the installation or not, once at the Missed 
Approach Point 
29 Accepting to do marginal tasks Comments on flawed decisions in terms of accepting risks where the situation seemed to require otherwise 
30 Speed control Refers to comments on difficulties in controlling the aircraft’s speed 
31 Performing the S turn Comments referring to difficulties in handling the S turn of the an offset approach (e.g., in the ARA procedure) 
32 ‘Ballooning’ Refers to pilots’ difficulties in keeping level flight while decelerating the aircraft, occasionally climbing back up into bad weather 
33 Height control Refers to instances in which pilots referred to difficulties in avoiding the onset of higher-than-desired rates of descent/ascent 
34 Overtorquing Refers to instances in which an overtorquing event approached or happen, due to mishandling the aircraft 
35 Overcontrolling Refers to instances in which major attitude changes were commanded where the situation would have required otherwise 
36 Upset recovery Refers to instances in which recovering the aircraft from an upset attitude was found difficult to execute 
37 Stress and fatigue Refers to manifested preoccupation of fatigue and stress interfering with in-flight performance 
38 Self-induced pressure Refers to instances in which the pilot put himself under pressure or avoided being under pressure in order to get the job done 
39 Pressure by unpreparedness Relates to instances in which inadequate planning was said to potentially generate problems later in the visual segment 
40 Anxiety Refers to acknowledgement that the task increases anxiety levels on pilots, which in turn might affect pilot performance 
41 Dread Refers to comments about the perceived dangers and discomfort the task entails, which in turn might affect pilot performance 
42 Self-confidence Refers to comments about having excessive self-confidence as a factor to jeopardise safety 
43 Irregular meals Refer to performance decrements due to irregular meal times 
44 Inaptitude to fly at night Refers to comments in which difficulties to execute the task were found related to personal inaptitude for it 
45 Communication standards Refers to the difficulties associated with the lack of standard calls between the pilots in the cockpit when executing visual night 
approaches  
46 Dealing with/being a junior pilot Refers to difficulties in executing the visual night flying task caused by the presence of pilots with different experience levels in the 
cockpit 
47 Communication breakdown Expresses concerns over complete communication disruption in the cockpit 
48 Hiring standards Refers to the absence or inadequacy of hiring criteria covering pthe ilots' ability to work on a multi-crew environment 
49 Maintaining levelled after autopilot Refers to comments on difficulties in immediately assuming control of the aircraft after the autopilot had been disengaged 
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disengaged 
50 Automation limitations Refers to comments about the limitations of auto-pilots, which make them unable to provide as much aid during the flying task as 
desired by the pilots 
51 Airframe limitations Refers to comments on limitations imposed by the aircraft, not related to the autopilot 
52 Wind-caused handling 
characteristics variability 
Refers to comments on the variability of the aircraft behaviour as a function of wind component 
53 Standards for automation usage Refers to concerns over not having set standards for when to use the automation and what upper modes should be used 
54 Cockpit limitations Refers to difficulties imposed on pilots by cockpit instrumentation layout or the way in which the instruments convey information 
55 Loss of manual flying skills induced 
by automation 
Refers to concerns on potentially losing hands-on flying ability as a function of automation usage 
56 Engines limitations Refers to occasions in which more power was desired to increase safety margins during the approach and reduce the need to monitor 
the engine gauges so frequently 
57 Not using the ACFT's external light Refers to instances in which using the aircraft external light would have been recommended but did not happen 
58 Writing and following operating 
procedures 
Refers to the difficulties in setting standards for visual flights offshore and, considering the currently set standards, how it can 
sometimes be difficult to follow them 
59 Appropriateness of instrument 
flight profile 
Refers to comments about the potential inappropriateness of the flight profile as it is established 
60 Inaccurate weather reports Refers to the quality of the weather reports received from the oil rigs/boats and how they might add to the difficulties in reaching such 
destinations safely 
61 Water surface obstacles Refers to comments regarding safety breaches due to unclear water surface beneath the expected flight path 
62 Destination obstacles Refers to the difficulties imposed by the features from the destination (e.g., aerials and flare booms) 
63 Turbulence Refers to difficulties caused by turbulence when approaching and/or landing on the destination 
64 Helideck illumination Refers to difficulties imposed by the helideck lighting itself 
65 Clustered / isolated rigs Refers to problems brought about by the disposition of rigs in clusters, or for their isolation, in terms of visual cues provided (too much 
or too little lighting) 
66 Shuttling and manoeuvring needs Refers to the need to manoeuvre the aircraft manually too frequently in a shuttling environment 
67 Orientation of the deck Refers to few into wind approach options as a function of the helideck position within the platform metalwork 
68 Aids conspicuity Refers to difficulties imposed by not being able to see the landing aids, e.g., windsocks, clearly 
69 Deck height Refers to problems imposed by the helideck height, too close or too far off the water 
70 Ground effect in small decks Refers to helidecks which are so small that, on the final moments before landing, there is still part of the downwash on ground effect 
and part out of ground effect, causing aircraft handling instability 
71 Process thermal effects Refers to problems brought about by hot gases at or on the way to the landing zone 
72 Small decks Refers to perceptual difficulties due to reduced size of some helidecks 
379 
 
 
 
 
73 Helideck net Refers to problems posed by the anti-resonance net placed on the helideck’s floor, e.g., getting entangled 
74 Illusive weather conditions Comments on particular weather conditions and sea states which aggravate perceptual difficulties at night (e.g., fog, haze, patchy low 
level clouds, millpond water, light rain) 
75 Rapid weather changes Refer to instances in which weather conditions were perceived to have changed too fast, influencing the visual approach phase in 
unanticipated manners 
76 Crosswind Refers to instances whereby having crosswind components was identified to have caused difficulties during the approach 
77 Under usage of simulators Refers to insufficient use of simulators which prevented the amelioration of in-flight problems 
78 Inadequacy of simulators Refers to comments over simulator’s inadequacy for training night visual flights 
79 Currency of Training Refers to in flight difficulties caused by lack of recent practice 
80 Diversity of training scenarios Refers to existing difficulties in training for the whole breadth of conditions that might occur offshore 
81 Under usage of HFDM Refers to lost opportunities to learn from HFDM use  
82 Make and model transfer training Refers to instances where inadequate make and/or model transfer training was identified 
83 Quality of training Refers to instances in which the quality of the training for the nighttime flying was deemed sub-standard 
84 Experience required Refers to the acknowledgement that the task under study requires pilots to be experienced in order to perform the task adequately 
85 Experience not a guarantee for 
success 
Refers to the consent that experience on its own cannot provide an adequate barrier against nighttime flying problems 
86 Not practicing in daytime Refers to lost daytime training opportunities in preparation for the nighttime approaching task 
87 Lack of experienced people Refers to the loss of experienced pilots (i.e. through retirement) and them not been replaced by others with adequate experience  
88 Wrong use of simulators (surrogate 
to in-flight training) 
Refers to wrongly employing simulators as a surrogate for in-flight experience, instead of a training aid 
89 Sponsorship cuts/unavailability for 
training-only sorties 
Refers to sponsorship reductions for training-only sorties 
90 Rosters Refers to difficulties due to inadequate rostering of crew members (e.g., incompatible personalities) 
91 Pressure for not going around Entails perceived external pressure for not going around 
92 Commercial pressure Refers to perceived commercial pressures to complete the sortie 
93 Flight programme Refers to difficulties imposed by the intensity of the daily flying schedule 
94 Corporate mindset Refers to perceived corporate mindset which do not favour flight safety 
95 Low limits Refers to comments on the safety issues associated with the low flying limits that pilots are supposed to abide by while approaching 
offshore oil and gas installations at night (too low meteorological minima) 
96 Congested airspace Refers to instances in which more than one aircraft were operating close to each other in the same oil field under low visibility, which 
added to the difficulties in executing an instrument approach procedure, including its visual sector 
97 OEM's unawareness of offshore 
needs 
Refers to the perceived lack of awareness of aircraft manufacturers requiring the needs of the offshore activity 
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98 Reporting culture Refers to the perception that safety is affected by the aircrews’ lack of commitment to report hazardous situations 
99 Legislation vacuum Refers to the perceived lack of assertive and comprehensive legislation governing nighttime operations 
100 Learning culture Refers to the lack of a feedback culture within the organisation whereby pilots can learn from the experience of others 
101 Ineffective unions Refers to low participation of unions on labour demands which could turn nighttime flying safer 
102 Lacking resources for night flying Refers to sub-standard aeronautical infra-structure and poor resources to support nighttime flying offshore 
103 Too stringent / bureaucratic 
legislation 
Refers to lethargic rules which fail to facilitate and promote offshore nighttime practice, perpetuating unsafe conditions 
 Written in black 
 
Nascimento (2009) template categories 
 
 Written in blue 
 
Categories added during Aberdeen 2009 validation of Nascimento (2009) 
  Written in green 
 
Categories added during SNS 2009 work 
  Written in orange 
 
Categories added during Brazil Offshore 2010 work 
  Written in purple 
 
Categories added during Norwegian Offshore 2010 work 
  NB: there were no new categories added during the work in Spain in 2011. 
 
 
 
381 
 
